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MAHĀVĪRA AND HIS PREDECESSORS

H. Jacobi

In the *Indian Antiquary*, vol. VIII, p. 311, a paper on the Six Tīrthakas by James d'Alwis was reproduced with notes by the editor. One of these heretical teachers, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, has lately become of great interest, and he has been identified with Mahāvīra, the supposed founder of the Jaina sect. The proof of this identity is conclusive. For the Bauddhas and Jainas agree not only in the name of the sect, viz., Pali,—Nigaṇṭha, Niggaṇṭha, Nigandha; Sanskrit,—Nirgrantha, and Prakrit,—Nīyaṃṭha Niggaṁtha; Sanskrit,—Nirgrantha,—respectively; and in the name of the founder Pali,—Nātaputta, Nāṭaputta, Sanskrit,—Jñātiputra, and Prakrit,—Nātaputta, Nāyaputta; Sanskrit,—Jñātaputra, Jñātiputra respectively; but also on the place of Jñātaputra's death, the town Pāvā; see my edition of the *Kalpasūtra*, pp. 4 sqq. Yet there remain some anomalies in the forms of these names and some obscure points in the doctrines of the Nigaṇṭhas as defined by the Bauddhas. To account for, and clear up these, is my purpose in the first part of this paper.

The word Nigaṇttha in Pali books, and Nīyaṃṭha in Jaina *Sūtras* (e.g. the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Bhāgavatī*) are neither Pali nor Jaina Prakrit. For its Sanskrit prototype, Nirgrantha, current with the Jainas and Northern Buddhists, would in both dialects have regularly become Niggaṃṭha, which form, indeed, is the common one in Jaina Prakrit, but not so in Pali. The form Nigaṇṭha was almost certainly adopted by both sects from the Magadhi dialect; for it occurs in the Aśoka inscription at Delhi, separate edict I. 5 (*Ind. Ant.* vol. VI, p. 150 note). This hypothesis becomes a certainty for the word Nātaputta. As translated in Sanskrit it is Jñāta or Jñātiputra, the regular Pali derivative would

be Ñātaputta with a palatal *ñ*. The dental in its stead is a Magadhism. For, in the Magadhi inscriptions of Aśoka, we read *nāti, aṃna*, etc.—Sanskrit *jñāti, anya* etc, which words become *ñāti, añña*, etc. in Pali and in the dialects of the Aśoka inscriptions at Girnar and Kapurdigiri. The palatal *ñ* appears in Pali in the first part of the name when used as the name of the Kṣattriya clan to which Mshāvīra belonged. For I identify the *ñātika* living near Koṭigāma mentioned in the *Mahāvagga sutta* (Oldenberg's edition p. 232), with the Jñātaka Kṣattriyas in Kuṇḍagrāma of the Jaina books. As regards the vowel of the second syllable, the different sources are at variance with each other. The Northern Buddhists spell the word with an *i*,—Jñātiputra in Sanskrit, and *Jo-thi tseu* in Chinese (*tseu* means 'son'), the Southern ones with an a—Nātaputta, as do the Jainas, though Jñātiputra is not unfrequent in MSS. The form Nayaputta proves nothing, for the syllables *ya* and *i* are interchangeable in Jaina Prakirit. M. Eug. Burnouf, commenting on the name in question, says: "J'ignore pourquoi le Pali supprime l'i de Djñāti ;[1] serait ce que le primitif veritable serait Djñāti et que le Djñāti en serait un prakritism correspondant a celui du Sud *nāta*, comme *djeta* correspond a *djetri*?" That M. Burnouf was perfectly right in his conjecture, can now be proved beyond a doubt. For the occasional spelling of the word with a lingual *ṭ* Nāṭaputta shows an unmistakable trace of the original *ṛ*. The Sanskrit for Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta was therefore in all probability Nirgrantha Jñātṛputra, that of the Kṣattriya clan Jñātṛka (Pali—*Nātika*, Prakrit—*Nāyaga*). It is perhaps not unworthy of remark that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta must have made part of the most ancient tradition of the Bauddhas, and cannot have been added to it in later times as both words conform, not to the phonetic laws of the Pali language, but to those of the early Magadhi.

We shall now treat of the opinions which the Buddhists

1. Preserved however in *naṭikā*, if my conjecture about the identity of that word with the first part of Nātaputta be right.

ascribe to Nātaputta and to the Niganṭhas in general, in order to show that they are in accordance with Jainism. One of its most characteristic features is the unduly extended idea of the animate world ; not only are plants and trees endowed with life, and accordingly are not to be wantonly destroyed, but also particles of earth, water, fire and wind. The same doctrine was according to James d'Alwis, held by Niganṭha Nātaputta : "He held that it was sinful to drink cold water : 'cold water', he said, was imbued with a soul. Little drops of water were small souls, and large drops were large souls." In Buddhaghoṣa's commentary on the *Dhamapadam* (Fausboll's edition p. 398), the 'better Niganṭhas' who go about naked, say that they cover their almsbowls least particles of dust and spray, imbued with life, should fall into them. Compare *Kalpasūtra,* Samācārī 29, where a similar rule is given. These naked Niganṭhas need not have been of the Digambara sect, for according to the *Acārāṅga Sūtra* it was considered a meritorious, not a necessary, penance for an ascetic to wear no clothes.

In the *Mahāvagga Sutta*, vi, 31, 1, Niganṭha Nātaputta is said to hold the *kiriyāvāda* opposed to the *akiriyāvāda* of Gotama Buddha. The *kiriyāvāda,* or the belief in the activity of the soul, is one of the cardinal dogmas of the Jainas, and is found in their creed in the first chapter of the *Acārāṅga.*

James d'Alwis proceeds after the above quoted passage : "He [Nātaputta] also declared that there were three *daṇḍas* or agents for the commission of sin, and that the acts of the body (*kāya*), of the speech (*vāc*), and of the mind (*mana*) were three separate causes, each acting independently of the other," Compare the subjoined passage from the third *uddeśaka* of the *Sthānāṅga*, in which the term *daṇḍa* in its relation to mind, speech and body occurs : *tao daṇḍā pannatta, taṃ jahā : manadaṃḍe, vaidaṃḍe. kaya-daṃde.* "There are declared three *daṃḍas* namely, the *daṇḍa* of the mind, the *daṇḍa* of the speech, the *daṇḍa* of the body." Thus for all agrees with Jainism. James

d'Alwis's account of Nātaputta's doctrines concludes: "This heretic asserted that crimes and virtues, happiness and misery, were fixed by fate, that as subject to these we cannot avoid them, and that the practice of the doctrine can in no ways assist us. In this notion his heresay consisted." As the Jaina opinions on these points do not materially differ from those of the Hindus in general, and as the doctrine defined above are inconsistent with the *kiriyāvāda* and with ascetic practices I do not doubt that the Bauddhas committed an error, perhaps in order to stigmatise the Nigaṇṭhas as heretics, who in their turn have mis-stated the Bauddha doctrine of the *nirvaṇa*, saying that according to the Saugata's opinion the liberated souls return to the *Saṃsāra* (*punarbhave 'vataranti'*). This mis-statement occurs in Śīlāṅka's commentary on the *Acārāṅga Sūtra* (867 A.D.), and can have no reference therefore to the Lamas and Chutuktus of the Northern Buddhist church, as I formerly opined, for they were not yet in existence in Śīlāṅka's time.

We pass now to the outline of Nātaputta's system in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, (Grimblot *Sept Suttas Palis*. p. 126). It may be remarked that, according to Mr. Rhys Davids (*Academy*, September 13th, 1879, p. 197) the passage in question is not commented upon in the commentary *Sumangala Vilāsinī*. Mr. Gogerly translated it thus: "In this world, great king, the Nigaṇṭhas are well defended in four directions, that is, great king, the Nigaṇṭhas in the present world by general abstinence (*from evil*) restrain sinful propensities, weaken evil by controlling it, and are ever under self-government. They are thus well defended on all sides, and this is called—being arrived at perfection, being with subjected passions, being established in virtue" (*ibidem*, p. 173). All this might as easily have been translated from a Jaina *Sūtra*, and it would be difficult to tell the difference, but unfortunately this translation cannot be reconciled with our text. M. Burnouf's translation is more literal, but less intelligible; it runs thus: "En ce monde, grand roi, le mendiant Nigaṇṭha est retunu par le frein de quatre

abstentions reunies. Et comment, grand roi, le mendiant Nigaṇṭha est-il retenu par le frein de quatre abstentions reunies ? En ce monde, grand roi, le mendiant Nigaṇṭha est entierement retenu par le lien qui enchaine ; il est enveloppe par tous les liens, enlace par tous les liens, resserre par tous les liens ; voila de quelle maniere, grand roi, le mendiant Nigaṇṭha est retenu par le frein de quatre abstentions reunies. Et parce qu'il est, ainsi retenu, grand roi, il est nomme Nigaṇṭha, c'est-a-dire libre de toute chaine, pour qui toute chaine est detruite, qui a secoue toutes les chaines", (*ibidem*, p. 204). And in a note he adds : "Mais quand la definition dit qu'il est enlace dans tous les liens, cela signifie qu'il obeit si completement aux regles d'une rigoureuse abstention, qu'il semble que tous ses mouvements soient enchaines dans les liens qui le retiennent captif, &c." The general drift of this definition, especially the stress laid on control, savours of Jainism ; but luckily we are not confined to such generalities for our deduction. For the phrase *cātuyāma saṃvara-saṃvuto*, translated by Gogerly "well defended in our directions", and by Burnouf "retenu par le frein de quatre abstentions reunies" contains the distinct Jaina term *cāturyāma*. It is applied to the doctrine of Mahāvira's predecessor Pārśva, to distinguish it from the reformed creed of Mahāvira, which is called *pāñcyāma* dharma. The five *yāmas* are the five great vows, *mahāvratāni*, as they are usually named, viz. *ahiṃsā* not killing, *sunṛta* truthful speech, *asteya* not stealing, *brahmacarya* chastity, *aparigraha* renouncing of all illusory objects. In the *cāturyāma* dharma of Mahāvīra *brahmcarya* was included in *aparigraha*. The most important passage is one of the *Bhagavatī* (Weber, *Fragment der Bhagavatī*, p. 185) where a dispute between Kālāsa Vesiyaputta a follower of Pārśva (Pāsāvachchejja, i.e. Pārśvapatyeya) and some disciples of Mahāvīra is described. It ends with Kālāsa's begging permission : "to stay with you after having changed the law of the four vows for the law of the five vows enjoining compulsory confession". In Śīlaṅka's Commentary on the *Acārāṅga* the same distinction is made

between the *cāturyāmadharma* of Pārśva's followers and the *pāñcayāma dharma* of Vardhamāna's *tīrtha* (Ed. Cal. p. 331). These particulars about the religion of the Jainas previous to the reforms of Mahāvīra are so matter-of-fact like, that it is impossible to deny that they may have been handed down by trustworthy tradition. Hence we must infer that Nirgranthas already existed previous to Mahāvīra,—a result which we shall render more evident in the sequel by collateral proofs. On this supposition we can understand how the Buddhists ascribed to Nātaputta the *cāturyāma dharma.* though he altered just this tenet; for it is probable that the Buddhists ascribed the old Nirgrantha creed to Nātaputta, who then took the lead of the community, and of whose reforms, being indeed only trifling, his opponents were not aware. And though it looks like a logical trick, the testimony of the Buddhists on this point might be brought forward as an argument for the existence of Nirgranthas previous to, and differing in details from, the *tīrtha* of Mahāvīra. But we have not to rely on so dubious arguments as this for our proposition. The arguments that may be adduced from the Jaina *Sūtras* in favour of the theory that Mahāvīra reformed an already existing religion, and did not found a new one, are briefly these. Mahāvīra plays a part wholly different from that of Buddha in the histories of their churches. His attainment to the highest knowledge cannot be compared to that of Buddha. The latter had to reject wrong beliefs and wrong practices before he found out the right belief and the right conduct. He seems to have carved out his own way,—a fact which required much strength of character, and which is easily recognised in all Buddhist writings. But Mahāvīra went through the usual career of an ascetic ; he seems never to have changed his opinions nor to have rejected religious practices, formerly adhered to. Only his knowledge increased, as in the progress of his penance the hindrances to the higher degrees of knowledge were destroyed until it became absolute (*kevala*). His doctrines are not spoken of in the *Sūtras* as his discoveries, but as decreta or old establiseed truths,

paṅnattas. All this would be next to impossible if he had been like Buddha, the original founder of his religion; but it is just what one would expect to be the record of a reformer's life and preaching. The record of the fourteen *pūrvas* points the same way; for these books which were lost some generations after Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa*, are said to have existed since the time of the first Tīrthakara Ṛṣabha or Ādinātha; they must therefore be considered as the sacred books of the original Nirgranthas previous to Mahāvīra's reforms. But all these arguments are open to one fatal objection, viz. that they are taken from the Jaina literature which was reduced to writing so late as the fifth century A.D. During the preceding ten centuries, an opponent will say, the Jainas modelled everything in their sacred books on the preconceived theory of the uninterrupted existence of their faith since the beginning of the world. On this supposition the whole of the *sūtras* would be a most wonderful fabric of fraud; for everything is in keeping with the theory in question, and no trace of the contrary left. I place much confidence therefore in the Jaina *Sūtras*, being of opinion that they are materially the same as they were in the early centuries after Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa*, as may be proved to be the case with the *Acārāṅga*, the present disposition of which is already followed in Bhardrabāhu's *Niryukti*. Yet we must confirm the above suggested opinions by evidence from another quarter, open to no objection. If the sects of the Bauddhas and Jainas were of equal antiquity, as must be assumed on the supposition that Buddha and Mahāvīra were contemporaries and the founder of their sects, we should expect either sect mentioned in the books of their opponents. But this is not the case. The Nirgranthas are frequently mentioned by the Buddhists, even in the oldest parts of the *Piṭakas*. But I have not yet met with a distinct mention of the Bauddhas in any of the old Jaina *Sūtras*, though they contain lengthy legends about Jamāli, Gosāla and other heterodox teachers. It follows that the Nirgranthas were considered by the Bauddhas an important sect, whilst the

Nirgranthas could ignore their adversaries. As this is just the reverse position to that which both sects mutually occupy in all after-times, and as it is inconsistent with our assumption of a contemporaneous origin of both creeds, we are driven to the conclusion that the Nirgranthas were not a newly-founded sect in Buddha's time. This seems to have been the opinion of the authors of the *Piṭakas* too; for we find no indication of the contrary in them. In James d'Alwis' paper on *Six Tīrthakas*, the "Digambaras" appear to have been regarded as an old order of ascetics, and all of those heretical teachers betray the influence of Jainism in their doctrines or religious practices, as we shall now point out.

Gosāla Makkhaliputta was the slave of a nobleman. His master from whom he ran away, "pursued him and seized him by his garments; but they losening Gosāla effected his escape naked. In this state he entered a city, and passed for Digambara Jaina or Bauddha, and founded the sect which was named after him." According to the Jainas he was originailly a disciple of Mahāvīra, but afterwards set himself up for a Tīrthakara. In the *Mahāvīra-caritra* of Hemacandra, he defends the precept of nakedness against the pupils of Pārśava, and "gets beaten, and almost killed bv the women of a village in Magadha, because he is a naked Śramaṇa, or mendicant".—Wilson, *Works*, vol. I, p. 294, note 2.

Purāna Kāśyapa declined accepting clothes "thinking that as a Digambara he would be better respected."

Ajita Keśakambala believed trees and shrubs to have a *jiva*, and that "one who cuts down a tree, or destroyed a creeper, was guilty as a murderer".

Kakudha Kātyāyana also "declared that cold water was imbued with a soul".

The preceding four Tīrthakas appear all to have adopted some or other doctrines or practices which make part of the Jaina system, probably from the Jainas themselves. More difficult is the case with Sañjaya Belāṭṭhaputta. For the

account of his doctrines in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* has been so differently translated by M. Burnouf and by M. Gogerly as to suspend decision. According to the former Sañjaya's doctrine, which is called *anattamanavācā*, would coincide with the *svādvada* of the Jainas; but according to the latter it denotes no more than perfect indifference to all transcendental problems, not the compatibility of one solution with its contrary. All depends on the interpretation of the two words *me no* in the text, about which it is impossible to form a correct opinion without the help of the commentary.

It appears from the preceding remarks that Jaina ideas and practices must have been current at the time of Mahāvīra and independently of him. This, combined with the other arguments which we have adduced, leads us to the opinion that the Nirgranthas were really in existence long before Mahāvīra, who was the reformer of the already existing sect. This granted, it is not difficult to form a tolerably correct idea of the relation between Buddhism and Jainism. The former is not an offshoot of the latter; for Buddha rejected the principal dogmas and practices of the Nirgranthas; it is rather a protest against it. All that has been said to maintain that Buddhism stands in a closer connection with Jainism, is to no effect for lack of proof. The proposed identification of Mahāvīra's disciple, the Gautama Indrabhūti with the Gautama Śākyamuni, because both belonged to the *gotra* of Gotama, has been refuted by Profs. Wilson, Weber and others. It can only be maintained on the principles of Fluellen's logic: "There is a river in Macedon; and there is also, moreover, a river in Monmouth. It is called Wye at Monmouth, but it is out of my brains what is the name of the other river. But 'tis all one: it is so like as my fingers; and there is salmons in both."

Little better is the second argument, that there were twenty-four Buddhas who immediately preceded Gautama Buddha. These twenty-four Buddhas have been compared with the twenty-four Tīrthakaras of the Jainas, though their

names have little in common. As Buddha rejected the last Tīrthakara at least as an heretic, he could only have recognised twenty-three. The only inference which can be made from the twenty-four Tīrthakaras and twenty-five Buddhas in texts of recognised authority is that the fiction in question is an old one. Whether there be any foundation for this Buddhistical theory, it is not for me to decide ; all authorities on Buddhism have given their verdict to the contrary. But it is different with the Jainas. For, since we know that Jainism was not founded by Mahāvīra it follows that somebody else was the real founder of the seet, and it is possible that many reformers preceded Mahāvīra.

It is the opinion of nearly all scholars who have written on this question that Pārśva was the real founder of Jainism. The Rev. Dr. Stevenson says in his Preface to the *Translation of the Kalpasūtra*, p. xii : "From Mahāvīra upwards, to the preceding Tīrthaṅkara Pārśvanātha, we have no list of head teacher, but we have only an interval of 250 years, while the term of Pārśva's sublunary existence is still bounded by the possible number of a hundred years...........The moderation of the Jains, up to the time of Pārśvanātha, is the more remarkable as after that they far outstrip all their compeers in the race of absurdity, making the lives of their Tirthaṅkars extend to thousands of years, and interposing between them countless ages, thus enabling us to trace with some confidence the boundary between the historical and fabulous". Whatever may be thought of this argument, it is at least favourable to the opinion that Pārśva is a historical person. This is rendered still more credible by the distinct mention of his followers and his doctrines in the Jaina *Sūtras*. That selfsame doctrine, the *cāturvāma dharma*, is mentioned by the Buddhist, though ascribed to Nātaputta. But there is nothing to prove that Pārśva was the founder of Jainism. Jaina tradition is unanimous in making Ṛṣabha the *first* Tīrthakara. Though he is stated to have lived 840,000 great years, and have died something less than 100,000,000 oceans of years

before Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa*, yet there may be something historical in the tradition which makes him the first Tīrthakara. For the Brahmins too have myths in their *Purāṇas* about a Ṛṣabha, son of king Nābhi and Meru, who had a hundred sons, Bharata and the rest, and entrusting Bharata with the government of his kingdom, adopted the life of an anchorite—Wilson, *Viṣṇu Puraṇa*, vol. II., p, 103 sqq. All these particulars are also related by the Jainas of their Ṛṣabha; and from the more detailed account in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* it is evident that the fabulous founder of the Jaina sect must indeed be meant (*ibid*, p. 104, note I). But what value belongs to these myths of the *Purāṇas* about Ṛṣabha, whether they are founded on facts, or were merely suggested by the legendary history of the Jainas, it is wholly impossible to decide.

Of the remaining Tīrthakaras I have little to add. Sumati, the fifth Tīrthakara, is apparently identical with Bharata's son Sumati, of whom it is said in the *Bhāgavata* that he "will be irreligiously worshipped, by some infidels, as a divinity" (Wilson, *ibid*).

Ariṣṭanemi, the 22nd Tīrthakara, is connected with the Kṛṣṇa-myths through his wife Rāgīmatī, daughter of Ugrasena.

But we must close our researches here, content to have obtained a few glimpses into the prehistorical development of Jainism. The last point which we can perceive is Pārśva; beyond him all is lost in the mist of fable and fiction.

(IA, Vol. ix, 1880)

ANEKĀNTAVĀDA : THE PRINCIPAL JAINA CONTRIBUTION TO LOGIC

Sukhlalji Sanghvi

The first and the foremost of the contributions—one that is the key to the rest—made by the Jaina savants to Indian Logic (*pramāṇa-śāstra*) is the systematic exposition (*śāstrīya-nirūpaṇa*) of *Anekāntavāda* or the Doctrine of Non-Absolutism and (its corollary) *Nayavāda* or the Doctrine of Partial Truths.

There are two mutually distinct, fundamental standpoints (*dṛṣṭi*) for looking at the universe—one is that which tends towards generalization (*sāmānya-gāminī*), the other that which tends towards particularization (*viśeṣa-gāminī*). The former starts with the observation of the similarities (*samānatā*), but it is gradually inclined to emphasize non-distinction (*abheda*) and finally views the universe as rooted in something one and single ; hence it arrives at the conclusion that whatever is an object of awareness (*pratīti*) is, really speaking, some one single element (*tattva*). Thus passing beyond the initial stage (*prathamika bhūmikā*) of viewing similarities the standpoint in question culminates in viewing essential identity (*tāttvikaekatā*) whatever element is here asserted to be the sole object of awareness is also declared to be the sole reality (*sat*). Owing to its excessive preoccupation with the one ultimate real, this standpoint either fails to take note of diversities or it takes note of them but dismisses them as empirical (*vyavahārika*) or non-ultimate (*apāramārthika*) because according to it unreal (*avāstavika*). This applies to all diversity we are aware of, be it diversity in respect of time (*kālakṛta* ; as, for example, that between the antecedent seed and the subsequent sprout), or diversity in respect of space (*deśakṛta* : as, for example, that between the simultaneously existing *prakṛtika*, i.e. physical, modifications like

jars, cloths, etc.), or innate diversity irrespective of space and time *deśa-kāla-nirapekṣa sāhajika* : as, for example, that between *prakṛti*, i.e. physical, modifications like jars, cloths, etc.), or innate diversity irrespective of space and time (*deśa-kāla-nirapekṣa sāhajika* : as, for example, that between *prakṛti*, i.e the root physical element, and *puruṣa*, i.e. the root conscious element, or that between one *puruṣa* and another).

As against this, the second standpoint sees dissimilarity (*asamānatā*) everywhere, and gradually searching for the root of this dissimilarity it finally reaches that stage of analysis (*viśleṣaṇa-bhūmikā*) where even similarity, (*samānatā*), nothing to say to identity (*ekatā*), appears to be something artificial (*kṛtrima*, unreal) ; hence it arrives at the conclusion that the universe is but a conglommeration (*puñja*) of several discrete existents (*bheda*) utterly dissimilar from one another. According to it, there really exists no single element (at the root of diversities), nor does there obtain any real similarity (between one existent and another). This applies to single elements like *prakṛti* which (allegedlv) pervade all space and persist for all time, as also to single elements like atoms which (allegedly) are mutually different substances (occupying different points in space) but ones that persist for all time.

The above-stated two standpoints are fundamentally different from one another, for one of them is based exclusively on synthesis, the other exclusively on analysis. These two fundamental lines of thought (*vicāra-saraṇi*) and the derivative lines of thought developing out of the two give rise to a number of mutually conflicting views on a number of topics. We thus see that the first standpoint with its tendency to generalization led to the formulation of the doctrine of 'one, non-dual Brahman (Brahmādvaita)—the sole real element—occupying all space and time (*samagra-deśa-kāla-vyāpin*) and free from the limitations of space and time (*deśa-kāla-vinirmukta*)'. This doctrine, on the one hand, dubbed as unreal (*mithyā*) all diversity and all organs of knowledge taking note of this diversity, while, on the other hand, it asserted that the

real-element (*sat-tattva*) lies beyond the reach (*pravṛtti*) of speech (*vāṇī*) and logic (*tarka*) and is amenable to bare experience (i.e. experience untrammelled by speech and logic) (*mātra anubhava-gamya*). Likewise, the second standpoint with its tendency to particularization led to the formulation of the doctrine of 'an infinite number of discrete existents, each different from the rest not only as to its spatio-temporal location but as to its very nature'. This doctrine too, on the one hand, dubbed all non-distinction (*abheda*) as unreal while, on the other hand, asserted that the ultimate discrete existents lie beyond the reach of speech and logic and are amenable to bare experience. Thus both the doctrines in question did ultimately arrive at one common conclusion, viz. that whatever is revealed by speech and logic is a nullity (*śūnya*) while the ultimate reality is amenable to bare experience; but their ultimate objectives (*lakṣya*) being utterly different the two came in headlong clash and emerged as rivals to each other.

There also came into existence a number of lines of thought that either sprang from or were related to these two fundamental lines. Some of them accepted non-distinction (*abheda*) but only in respect of space and time or in respect of mere time, that is, not in respect of essential or substantial nature. Thus one line of thought did posit multiplicity of substances but regarded them all as eternal from the point of view of time and ubiquitous from that of space; the Sāṅkya doctrine of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (*prakṛtipuruṣavāda*) is an instance in point. Another line of thought came to attribute a comparatively greater extension to the sphere of diversity. Thus even while positing entities that are eternal and ubiquitous this line also posited a multiplicity of entities that are eternal and ubiquitous this line also posited a multiplicity of entities that are physical by nature (and hence occupying different points in space); the (Nyāya-Vaiśesika) doctrine of atomic-as-well-as-ubiquitous-substances (*paramāṇu-vibhu-dravya-vāda*) is an instance in point,

It was but natural that the standpoint of exclusive

non-dualism (*advaita-mātra*) and exclusive monism (*san-mātra*) —a standpoint tolerant of no diversity in any respect—should lead to the formulation of numerous doctrines based onthe acceptance of non-distinction (*abheda-mūlaka-vāda*). And this is what actually happened. Thus the standpoint gave rise to the doctrine of *satkāryavāda*, according to which there is a non-distinction between a cause and its effect ; similarly, it gave rise to the doctrine of non-distinction between an attribute (*dharma*) and that which possesses this attribute (dharmin), a quality (*guṇa*), and that which possesses this quality (*guṇin*), a substratum (*ādhāra*) and that which is supported by this substratum (*ādheya*), and so on and so forth. On the other hand, the standpoint of exclusive pluralism (*dvāita-mātra*)[1] and exclusive distinction (*bheda-mātra*) led to the formulation of numerous doctrines based on the acceptance of distinction (*bheda-mūlaka-vāda*). Thus it gave rise to the doctrine of *asatkāryavāda*, according to which there is absolute distinction between a cause and its effect ; similarly, it gave rise to the doctrine of absolute distinction betweent an attribute and that which possesses this attribute, a quality and that which possesses this quality, a substratum and that which is supported by this substratum, and so on and so forth. Thus we find that in the field of Indian philosophical speculation a number of mutually antagonistic views (*mata*) and systems (*darśana*) arose out of the fundamental standpoints of generality (along with its derivative standpoints) and the fundamental standpoint of particularity (along with its derivative standpoints). These views and systems, without caring for the element of truth that might underlie a rival view or system, made in their prime concern to attack one another.

The doctrine of pre-existence (*sad-vāda*)—be it non-dualistic (as in Vedānta) or dualistic as in Sāṅkhya—cannot achieve its basic aim without accepting *satkāryavāda*, according to which there is a non-distinction between a cause

1. Here '*dvi*' stands not for 'two' but for 'more than one'. Tr.

and its effect; on the other hand, the doctrine of pre-nonexistence (*asad-vāda*)—be it applied to momentary entities as in Buddhism or to static and eternal entities as in Vaiśeṣika etc.—cannot achieve its basic aim without accepting *asatkāryavāda* (according to which there is absolute distinction between a cause and its effect).[2] Hence *satkāryavāda* came in clash with *asatkāryavāda*. Similarly, the theory of permanence-without-change (i.e. eternity: *kūṭasthatā, kālika nityatā*) and all-pervadedness (i.e. ubiquity: *vibhutā, daiśika vyāpakatā*)—a theory resulting from the doctrine of pre-existence, dualistic or non-dualistic—eame in clash with the theory of spatially as well temporally impartite, ultimate elements (*deśa-kāla-kṛta-niraṃśa-aṃśa-vāda*), that is, with the theory of impartite moments (*niraṃśa-kṣaṇa-vāda*)—a theory resulting from the doctrine rival to the doctrine of pre-existence. Now those who regard the entire universe as some single (*eka*), continuous (*akhaṇḍa*) element (*tattva*) also those who regard it as a mere conglommeration (*puñja*) of impartite (*niraṃśa*), ultimate elements (*aṃśa*) could achieve their respective aims only by maintaining that the ultimate real posited in their respective systems is incapable of definition and description through words (*anirvacanīya, anabhilapya, śabdāgocara*); for if the real is capable of definition through words it can be neither some single, continuous element nor a multiplicity of impartite, ultimate elements, and this, in turn, is because definition puts an end as it were to continuity (in one single form) as well as impartibility. Thus the theory of indefinability (*anirvacanīyatvavāda*) arose as a natural corollary to the doctrine of one continuous real as also to the doctrine of impartite distinct reals. But this theory was taken exception to by the Vaiśeṣika logicians and others who averred that to describe every real entity (*vastumātra*) is not only a possibility but

2. By *sadvāda* or the doctrine of pre-existence we mean the doctrine that an entity exists always (or it is not a real entity): by *asadvāda* or the doctrine of pre-nonexistence we mean the doctrine that a real entity—at least in case it happens to be a produced entity—exists only for an interval of time (possible for one moment). Tr.

an accomplished fact. Thus arose the theory of defina bility (*nirvacanīyatvavāda*) that came in clash with the rival theory of indefinability (*anirvacanīyatvavāda*).

In a like manner, some people upheld the view that it is dangerous to arrive at a final conclusion by means of an organ of knowledge—of whatever sort—unaided by reason (*hetu*) or logic (*tarka*) ; others, on the contrary, maintained that logic possesses no independent force, and that the Scripture, inasmuch as it does possess an independent force, is the senior most (*mūrdhanya*) of all organs of knowledge. Hence the clash between these two viewpoints. Again, the fatalist (*daiva-vādin*) would say that everything depends on fate (*daiva*) and the human endeavour (*puruṣartha*) is independently of no avail, the protagonist of human endeavour would maintain just the opposite view that man's endeavour is independently capable of delivering the goods (*kāryakara*). Thus each thought that the other was in the wrong. Likewise, one-sided view (*naya*) emphasized the importances of the denoted entity (*artha*) at the cost of denoting word (*śabda*), the other that of the denoting word at the cost of the denoted entity ; and the two argued against each other. Similarly, some thought that absence (*abhāva*) is an independent entity alongside of the positive one (*bhāva*) while others that it is but of the nature of the positive entity, and thus developed the attitude of hostility between them. Furthermore, some thought that an organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the resulting piece of knowledge (*pramiti*) are utterly distinct (*atyanta bhinna*) from the knower (*pran ātā*) concerned, while others that they are non-distinct (*abhinna*) from the later. Lastly, some emphasized that the sole means for attaining the desired (ultimate) result is action performed in conformity with the Varṇa-Āśrama rules, others insisted that knowledge alone will lead to (absolute) bliss, while still others maintained that devotion (*bhakti*) is the only instrument for realizing the *summum bonum*. Thus on a number of major or minor problems pertaining to metaphysics and ethics several such views had been in vogue as were extremist (*ekānta*) and wholly antagonistic to one

another.

On noticing this debating sport (*vāda-līlā*) indulged in by the advocates of the extremist doctrines (*ekānta*), the following question occurred to the teachers who were inheritors of the non-absolutist (*anekānta* ; non-extremist) standpoint : Why are these doctrines—each claiming to be true —so much in conflict with one another ? Is it that *none* of them contains any element of truth, or that *each* of them contains *some* element of truth, or that *some* of them contains *some* element of truth, or that *each* of them contains the *whole* truth ? The cognition over this question urnished these teachers with a clue that would put an end to all conflict and reveal the whole truth ; the clue was the non-absolutist standpoint that forms the ground (*bhūmikā*) of the doctrine called *Anekāntavāda.* This standpoint enabled our teachers to see that all particular theory based on logic (*sayuktika*) is true to a certain extent and from a certain point of view. However, when a particular theory, refusing to take into account the line of thought and the sphere of application (*sīmā*) of the rival theory, imagines that everything lies within the sphere covered by its own standpoint it turns blind to the truth contained in this rival theory. And the same thing happens with this rival theory (that is to say, it too imagines that everything lies within the sphere covered by its own standpoint). Under these circumstances, justice demands that a theory be tested keeping in view its specific line of thought and its specific sphere of application, and in case it passes the test it should be treated as an aspect (*bhāga*) of truth ; subsequently, a sort of necklace ought to be prepared with the various aspects of truth—uncontradictory of one another—acting as diamonds (*satyāṃśarūpa-maṇi*) and the idea of whole truth acting as the running thread (*pūrṇa-satya-rūpa-vicāra-sūtra*). These considerations impelled the Jaina teachers to synthesize (*samanvaya* ; harmonize), on the basis of their non-absolutist standpoint, all the theories that were then prevalent. And this is how their thought ran. When certain pure (*śuddha*) and selfless (*niḥsvārtha*) minds are cognizant of similarity

culminating in identity and when certain other minds (no less pure and selfless) are cognizant of (diversity culminating in) impartite ultimate elements, how can we say that one of these cognitions (*pratīti*) is valid and the other not ? If one of these cognitions is somehow treated as invalid the same logic will compel you to treat the other as equally so. Moreover, granting that one of these cognitions is valid and the other not, you will have to offer a logical explanation (*upapatti*) of what in our everyday dealings (*sarvajanika vyavahāra*) is taken as forming the object of the cognition—of identity or of diversity as the case may be—dismissed as invalid. Certainly, a mere assertion to the effect that one of these cognitions is valid and the other will not mean a logical explanation of our everyday dealings, empirical (*laukika*) or sastric (*śāstrīya*). Nor can you leave these dealings unexplained. So the monistic Brahmavādin's explanation of the phenomena in question will lie in treating as a product of ignorance (*avidyā-mūlaka*) all diversity and our cognition thereof, while the momentarist's explanation will lie in treating as a product of ignorance all similarity or identity and our cognition thereof.

These thoughts led advocates of *Anekāntavāda* to realize, in the light of their non-absolutist standpoint, that all cognition—be it cognition of identity or that of diversity—is after all valid (*vāstavika*). A cognition is valid in relation to its own object, but when it arrogates to itself the right to demonstrate the unreality of the object another cognition seemingly contradictory of itself it turns invalid. The cognition of identity and the cognition of diversity seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth (*pūrṇa-pramāṇa*). As a matter of fact, both these cognitions are valid so far as they go, but neither is the whole truth though each is a part (*aṃśa*) thereof. The total nature of reality ought to be such that these seemingly contradictory cognitions might reveal it in their respective ways but without contradicting one another and might both be treated as valid

insofar as both go to reveal the total nature of reality. This synthesis, that is, the idea that the two cognitions in question have two different spheres to operate in *(vyavasthā-garbhita vicāra)*, enabled the advocates of *Anekāntavāda* as to see that there is no real conflict between monism *(sad-advaita)* and pluralism *(sad-dvaita)*, for the total nature of reality comprises identity as well as diversity, generality as well as particularity. For example, when we think of that huge mass of water and disregard its place, time, colour, taste, dimension, etc. it appears before us in the form of one single entity called ocean. On the other hand, when we take into account the place, time, etc. of this very mass of water we begin to see a number of oceans—small and big—instead of one gradually, we do not even perceive even a single drop of water but certain impartite elements like colour, taste, etc., and, eventually, they too appear as nought (śūnya). Cognition of the mass of water as one single ocean is valid, and so also is its cognition as (a conglommeration of) ultimate elements. The cognition of one (single ocean) is valid because it views diversities *(bheda)* not as standing out separately from one another but as together exhibiting one common form ; likewise, the cognition of diversities-as-to-spatio-temporal-location-etc.—diversities which totally demarcate (*vyāvṛtta*) the elements concerned from one another—is valid because these diversities are actually there. Inasmuch as the mass of water is in fact one as well as a multiplicity, our cognition of it as one single ocean is as much valid as our cognition of it as a multiplicity of ultimate elements ; but since neither of these cognitions grasps the total nature of reality, neither of them is the whole truth, though the two together do constitute the whole truth. Analogously, when we view the entire universe as one single real, in other words, when we take note of "existence" (*sattā*) which is common (*anugamaka*) to all diverse existents, we say that all-reality is one and single ; for while taking note of the all-comprehensive (*sarvyāpaka*) "existence" we are aware of no diversities demarcated from one another, and that, in

turn, is because all diversities are here revealed as exhibiting one collective and common form. viz. "existence". Hence the epithet "Monism" or "Doctrine of Non-dual Reality" (*sad-advaita*) attributed to this viewpoint. When we confine our attention to what is common to all existents and call the universe '(one single) real' (*sat*) the denotation of the word "real" becomes so wide as to exclude nothing (i.e. no existing entity) whatsoever. However, when we view the universe as possessed of the mutually demarcated diversities of qualities and attributes, it no more appears in the form of one real (*sat*) but becomes a multiplicity of reals. In that case, the denotation of the word "real" undergoes corresponding limitation (for now we do not at all speak of real in general but only of this or that type of real). Thus we say that some reals are physical while some conscious ; going further in the direction of noticing diversities we say that there are a number of physical reals and a number of conscious reals. Thus when we view the one all-comprehensive real as divided into mutually demarcated diversities, it appears before us as a multiplicity of reals. This is the viewpoint of "Pluralism" or the "Doctrine of Diverse Reals" (*sad-dvaita*). Thus the monistic and pluralistic viewpoints are valid in their respective spheres, but they will go to constitute the whole truth when they are combined together as complementary to each other (*sāpekṣa-bhāvena*). This then is the synthesis, arrived at from the non-absolutist standpoint, of monism and pluralism which are generally supposed to be mutually antagonistic.

The same idea can be elucidated with the help of the illustration of trees and the forest. When the several, mutually different, particular trees are viewed not in the form of this or that particular tree but in a collective, general form designated "forest" the particular features of these different trees do not cease to exist but they are so much absorbed (*līna*) in the general feature—observed for the time being—of these trees as to appear to be non-existent. In this case we see the forest and it alone and our outlook may be characterised as monistic. Again,

sometimes we take note of these trees one by one, that is, in the form of particular entities. Here we see the particular entities and them alone, and the general feature of these entities is so much absorbed in their particular features—observed for the time being—as to appear to be non-existent. Now an analysis of these two cognitions (*anubhava*) will suggest that neither can be regarded as solely true, i.e. true at the cost of the other. Both are true within their respective spheres but neither represents the whole truth ; for the whole truth lies in a proper synthesis of these two cognitions. Only such a synthesis can do justice to the two cognitions, viz. cognition of the forest in general and cognition of each, single, particular tree, both of which are uncontradicted (*abādhita*). The same holds good of the monistic and pluralistic world-views (that is to say, they to, represent the whole truth only when properly synthesized).

The above was an account of the monism *versus* pluralism controversy in regard to features that might be spatial (*daiśika*), temporal (*kālika*), or non-spatiotemporal (*deśa-kālātīta*) : there is a special controversy between the doctrine of temporal generality (*kālika sāmānya*) or eternalism (*nityatvavāda*) and the doctrine of temporal particularity (*kālika viśeṣa*) or momentarism (*kṣaṇikatvavāda*). These two doctrines too seem to be mutually antagonistic, but the non-absolutist standpoint suggests that there is no real conflict between the two. Thus when an element (*tattva*) is viewed as being continuous (*akhaṇḍa*) throughout the three periods of time, that is, as beginningless and endless, it is certainly eternal (*nitya*), for in that case it is of the form of a continuous flow (*akhaṇḍa pravāha*) that has no beginning and no end. But when the same element—undergoing that continuous flow—is viewed as divided in terms of relatively large or small temporal units (*kāla-bheda*) it appears as having assumed a limited (*sīmita*) form which lasts for this or that interval and which therefore has a beginning as well as an end. And in case the interval in question is too brief to admit of further dissection by means of

intellectual weapons *(buddhi-śāstra)*, that portion of the element-in-continuous-flow which occupies this interval is called momentary *(kṣaṇika)* because smallest possible. The words eternal and momentary are considered to be each other's antonyms *(viruddhārthaka)*; for the connotation of one includes lack of a beginning and of an end *(anādi-anantatā)*. However, viewing from the non-absolutist stand-point, we can see that the same element which is called 'eternal' insofar as it is of the form of a continuous flow may also be called 'momentary' insofar as it undergoes a change *(parivartana)* or a new modification *(paryāya)* every moment. The basis of one viewpoint is the observation of beginninglessness and endlessness, that of the other the observation of beginnings and ends. But the total nature of a real entity comprises the lack of a beginning and of an end as also the possession of a beginning and of an end. Hence the viewpoints in question, though true within their respective spheres, will yield the whole truth only when properly synthesized.

This synthesis, too, can be elucidated with the help of an illustration. The total life-activity of a tree—right from the beginning uptil the time of fructification—completes its course only by flowing through the successive stages represented by the seed, the root, the sprout, the trunk, the branches and twigs, the leaves, the flowers, the fruits, etc. So when we view an entity as a 'true' we have in mind the total life-activity continuously flowing through these various stages. On the other hand, when we grasp, one by one, the successively emerging elements—like root, sprout, trunk, etc.—of this life-activity we have in mind but these various elements, each possessing a limited duration. Thus our mind takes note of the life-activity in question sometimes in one continuous form and sometimes in a discontinuous form, that is, element by element. On closer investigation it becomes evident that neither is the continuous life-activity either the whole truth or but a product of imagination, nor are the discontinuous elements either

the whole truth or but a product of imagination.[3] Even granting that the continuous life-activity absorbs within itself the totality of discontinuous elements or that the discontinuous elements absorb within themselves the total continuous life-activity, the fact remains that a real entity, viewed in its total nature, is continuous as well as discotinuous, and that therefore it is grasped only when both these aspects of its nature are (separately) taken note of. These two aspects are both real so far as each of them goes, but they become totally real only when synthesized. To view the tree as a beginningless and endless flow in time is to indicate it as an eternal entity, to view the tree as made up of (the successively emerging) elements is to indicate it as a transient or momentary entity. The transient constituent elements (*ghaṭaka*) are inconceivable without a substratum in the form of an eternal flow, and this eternal flow is inconceivable without those transient constituent elementary. Thus the view that eternity is real while transience unreal and the view that transience is real while eternity unreal give rise to the eternalism *versus* momentarism controversy which, however, is eliminable from the non-absolutist standpoint.

The non-absolutist standpoint also eliminates the controversy between the doctrine of definability and the doctrine of indefinability. For according to it, only that aspect of an entity's nature is amenable to description (*pratipādya*) which can be made an object of convention (i.e. conventional attribution of words : *saṅketa*). Now even though a convention is established by *buddhi* (i.e. intellect) which is snbtle in the extreme (*sūkṣmatama*), aspect of the nature of an entity ; for there are innumerable (subtle) aspects of an entity's nature which are inherently

3. That the continuous life-activity is the whole truth and discontinuous elements but a product of imagination is the eternalist's position, that the discontinuous elements are the whole truth and the continuous life-activity but a product of imagination is the momentarist's position. Tr.

incapable of description through words. It is in this sense that the one continuous real (*akhaṇḍa sat*) as well as the impartite moment (i.e. ultimate element) (*niraṃśa kṣaṇa*) are indefinable, while the gross entities of medium duration (and extension) are capable of definition. Thus the doctrine of definability and the doctrine of indefinability—applied to the entire universe or to an element thereof—are true within their respective spheres and wholly true when taken together.

Nor is it self-contradictory to view a thing as a positive entity and also as an 'absence'. For a thing is never cognized either solely through its positive traits (*mātra-vidhimukhena*) or solely through its negative traits (*mātra niṣedha-mukhena*). E.g. the milk is cognized as milk and also as not-curd, i.e. something different from curd. This means that the milk is of a positive-cum-negative nature (*bhāva-abhāva-ubhaya-rūpa*). Thus it is not self-contradictory to maintain that a thing is a positive entity and also an 'absence', for two different cognitions take note of these two aspects of the thing's nature. Similarly, the non-absolutist standpoint resolves the controversy as to whether the members of other similar pairs (*dvandva*)—e.g. 'attribute and the possessor of the attribute' (*dharma-dharmin*), 'quality and the possessor of the quality' (*guṇa-guṇin*), 'cause and effect' (*kārya-kāraṇa*), 'substratum and superstratum' (*ādhāra-ādheya*)—are identical with one another or different from one another.

When the authoritativeness (*āptatva*) and the validity-source (*mula-prāmāṇya*) (of a verbal testimony) are in doubt, it is always well to decide an issue after examining (*parīkṣā*) the matter ratiocinatively *(hetuvāda-dvāra)*; dut in case the authoritativeness (of the testimony in question) is beyond doubt, resort to ratiocination only leads to an infinite regress and is to be discarded. In this latter case reliance on the Scripture *(āgamavāda)* has to be our sole guide. Thus both ratiocination and reliance-on-the-Scripture have a scope, but they apply to different subject-matters (*viṣaya*) or to different sorts of exposition (*pratipādana*) of the same subject-matter. In one word, there is no conflict between the two.

The same is the case with the doctrine of Fate *(daivavāda)* and the doctrine of Human Endeavour (*pauruṣavāda*), for there is no conflict between them either. In those cases where endeavour based on rational calculation *(buddhi-pūrvaka pauruṣa)* is an impossibility, problems can be solved only by the doctrine of Fate, where endeavour of this type is possible the doctrine of Human Endeavour is in place. Thus the doctrine of Fate and the doctrine of Endeavour can be reconciled harmoniously, provided one keeps in view that the two cover different aspects of life.

The non-absolutist standpoint easily succeeds also in eliminating the opposition between the 'doctrine of absolute presence of the effect in the cause' and the 'doctrine of absolute absence of the effect in the cause. For according to it, the effect (*kārya*) is present as well as absent in the material cause *(upādāna)*. E.g. even before it is actually turned into a bangle, a piece of gold has the capacity (*śakti*), to turn into a bangle; thus viewed in the form of a 'capacity' *(śakti)*, that is, in the form of something non-distinct from the cause, the effect can be said to be present even before it is actually produced. However, even though present in the form of a capacity, this effect is not there to be seen *(upalabdha)*, because the absence of necessary accessories (*utpādana-sāmagrī*) has prevented it from emerging into being, i.e. from being produced; in this sense the effect is absent (before it is actually produced). Again, after the bangle has disappeared and the material concerned turned into an earring, the bangle is doubtless not there to be seen, but since even the gold turned-into-an-earring possesses the capacity to turn into a bangle, the actually absent bangle can be said to be potentially present in this gold.

The Buddhist's 'doctrine of mere conglomeration of atoms' *(kevala-paramāṇupuñja-vāda)* and the Naiyāyika's 'doctrine of an altogether novel composition' *(apūrva-avayavi-vāda)* come in conflict with one another. But the non-absolutist standpoint with its acceptance of *skandha*, which is neither

a more conglomeration of atoms nor something so contradictory of experience *(bādhita)* as a composite standing over and above its component-parts, properly resolves the conflict and works out a flawless synthesis of the two doctrines. Thus the non-absolutist standpoint has impartially synthesized, on so many questions, the current doctrines that were clashing with each other. And in the course of its doing so, the doctrine of Nayas *(nayavāda)* and the doctrine af *Bhaṅgas* *(bhaṅgavāda)* follow as a natural corollary ; for a proper formulation of non-absolutism requires as its preliminary an analysis of the different stands and view-points, a demarcation of their respective subject-matters, and a determination of their roles concerning one and the same subject-matter.

No one corner of a house makes the whole house, nor do the different corners of this house lie in one particular direction. The view *(avalokana)* had of the house from one of the two opposite directions—like south and north, or east and west—is certainly not full but nor is it false. It is the totality *(samuccaya)* of the views had of the house from different possible angles which may be called a full view of the house. Thus the view had of the house from one particular angle is a necessary part of the total view of the house. Analogously, the formulation of thoughts and views *(cintana-darśana)* concerning the nature of an entity or of the entire universe is accomplished from various stands *(apekṣā)*. And a stand is determined by a multiplicity of factors like the innate constitution *(sahaja racanā)* of the mind, the impressions *(saṃskāra)* received from outside, the nature of the object thought about, etc. Such stands—for thinking about the nature of things—are many in number. And since these stands from the basis or the starting point of the viewing process *(vicāra* ; lit. thought-process) they are also called 'angles of vision' *(dṛṣṭikoṇa)* or 'points of view' *(dṛṣṭibindu)*. The harmonious totality *(sāra-samuccaya)* of the thoughts and views concerning a thing formed from different stands—however contradictory of each other in appearance—is called the

total view or the non-absolutist view of this thing. The view formed from a particular stand is a part of this total view, and though the different such views (i.e. the views formed from different particular stands) are (seemingly) contradictory of one another, they are really uncontradictory of one another inasmuch as they all find synthesis in the total view.

When a mind ignores and takes no account of diversities —qualitative (*guṇa-dharmakṛta*) or essential (*svarūpa-kṛta*) as well as numerical (*vyaktitva-kṛta*)—while confining its attention to mere continuity (*akhaṇḍatā*) the universe appears to it as one and continuous. Understood from this standpoint of non-distinction (*abheda*), the word 'real' means something one and continuous (and nothing more), and this type of partially true understanding of things is technically called *saṅgraha-naya* (where '*naya*' stands for a partially true understanding of things). The view taken of the universe from the standpoint of diversities—qualitative as well as numerical—is technically called *vyavahāra-naya*, for here special importance is assigned to the diversities on which is grounded our everyday experience (*loka-siddha vyavahāra*). On this view, the word 'real' denotes not something one and continuous but things different and dis-continuous. When this tendency to take note of diversities confines its attention to mere temporal diversities, and concludes that the present alone is real because it alone is capable of performing a function (*kāryakara*), that is to say, when the past and the future are excluded from the denotation of the word 'real', there results a partially true understanding of things which is technically called *ṛjusūtra-naya*. It is so called because it seeks to avoid the labyrinth (*cakravyūha*) of the past and the future while sliding along the straight line (*ṛju-rekha*) representing the present.

The above-stated three attitudes consider the nature of things without basing themselves on (the consideration of) words and their qualities and attributes. Hence the three resulting understandings are designated *artha-naya*. But there

are also possible attitudes which consider the nature of things basing themselves on (the consideration of) words and their qualities and attributes. The understandings resulting from these attitudes are designated *śabda-naya.* Grammarians are the chief advocates of the various *śabda-nayas,* for it is on account of the divergent standpoints upheld by the grammarians that one *śabda-naya* differs from others.

Those grammarians who regard all words as impartite (*akhaṇḍa*) or etymologically underived (*avyutpanna*), certainly, do not base on etymology their distinction of the meaning of one word from that of another, but they too hold that words mean different things according as they possess different attributes (*dharma*) in the form of gender, person, tense, etc. This type of distinguishing the meaning of one word from that of another is called *śabda-naya* or *sāmprata-naya.* On the other hand, those grammarians who regard all words as etymologically derived (*vyutpanna*) posit distinction between the meanings of even such words as are generally admitted to be synonymous ; this view, according to which (for example) the synonyms like '*śakra*', '*indra*', etc. have different meanings, is called *samabhirūḍha-naya.* Lastly, there is a view according to which a word applies to a thing not in case this thing *sometimes* satisfies the etymology of the word in question, but only in case this thing is for the time being satisfying this etymology.[4] This view is called *evambhūta-naya.* Apart from these six logical *nayas* there is a seventh called *naigama-naya.* '*Nigama*' literally means local convention (*deśa-rūḍhi*), and this seventh *naya* stands for the view which includes—in accordance with local conventions—all kinds of doctrines of distinction and the doctrines of non-distinction.[5] These are the seven

4. E.g. '*go*'—the Sanskrit word for cow—means 'that which moves'. Hence on this view, a cow cannot be called 'go' when it is not actually in motion.—Tr.
5. More literally, '*naigama-naya*' may mean understanding based on the convention of the market-place. Really speaking, it is not a considered conviction concerning the nature of things but just an uncritical acceptance of whatever views are offered as and when

chief, (not all) *nayas*, and, really and generally speaking, whatever understanding of things results from the adoption of one particular standpoint rather than any other is the *naya* corresponding to that standpoint.

The Jaina texts also speak of the two *nayas* called *dravyārthika-naya* and *paryāyārthika-naya*; however, these are not something over and above the abovementioned seven *nayas* but a mere broad classification (*saṃkṣipta vargīkaraṇa*) of and an introductory ground (*bhūmikā*) to these very seven *nayas*. *Dravyārthīka-naya* is that line of thought which takes 'substance' (*dravya*) into account, that is, which takes into account what is general (*sāmānya*), common (*anvaya*), non-distinctive (*abheda*) or unitary (*ekatva*) about things. The *nayas* called *naigama*, *saṃgraha* and *vyavahāra* are comprised with *dravyārthika-naya*. Of these, *saṃgraha-naya*, inasmuch as it takes note of pure non-distinction, is the pure (*śuddha*) or basic (*mula*) *dravyārthika-naya*: but even *vyavahāra-naya* and *naigama-naya*, which no doubt take note of certain distinctions, are invariably cognizant also of non-distinction of some type or other. Hence it is that these latter two *nayas* are also classed under *dravyārthika-naya*, but they are *dravyārthika-nayas* of an impure (*aśuadha*) or mixed (*miśrita*) type (and not of the pure and basic type as in *saṃgraha-naya*).

Paryāyārthika-naya is the name for that line of thought which takes 'modes' (*paryāya*) into account, that is, which takes into account what is particular (*viśeṣa*) exclusive (*vyāvṛtti*) or distinctive (*bheda*) about things. The remaining four *nayas*—i.e. *ṛjusūtra* etc.—are comprised within *paryāyārthika-naya*. Consideration of distinctions by a neglect of non-distinctions starts with *ṛjusūtra-naya*, and hence the Texts call this *naya* the *prakṛti* or root-basis (*mūla*) of *paryāyārthika-naya*. The remaining three *nayas*—i.e. *śabda-naya* (*sāmprata-na*,*a*) etc.—are in a way the amplifications of this basic sort of *paryāyārthika-naya*.

occasion arises. There is also another interpretation of the word "*naigama-naya*", but that is not relevant in the present context.—Tr.

Similarly, the line of thought which attaches sole utility to knowledge will be called *jñāna-naya* while that which attaches sole utility to action will be called *kriyā-naya.* In short, the total—i.e. non-absolutistic—view of the universe is unlimited (*niḥsīma*) because the *nayas* that form the basis of this view are unlimited (in number).

The multifarious views concerning one and the same entity that result from the adoption of the various stands (*apekṣā*); angles of vision (*dṛṣṭikoṇa*), and approaches (*manovṛtti*) constitute the foundation of *Bhaṅgavāda* or the Doctrine of Manifold Judgment. When two views whose subject-matters are diametrically opposite of each other are sought to be synthesized, and with this end in view such (simple) judgements are formed as given expression to the positive as well as negative aspects of the (two) subject-matters in question, the result is a (complex) sevenfold judgement (*saptabhaṅgī*). The Doctrine of Partial Truths (*nyavāda*) is the basis of the Doctrine of Sevenfold Judgement (*saptabhaṅgī*) and the latter doctrine aims at an all-comprehensive (*vyāpaka*) harmoniously synthesized—i.e. non-absolutistic-understanding of things. Just as inference-for-the-sake-of-others (*parārthānumāna*)—i.e. inference expressed in the form of verbal/propositions—is resorted to when one seeks to convey to others a piece of knowlege that he has come to acquire through some particular organ of knowledge, similarly, resort is taken to the simple judgements that go to constitute a complex sevenfold judgement when one seeks to convey to others how certain mutually contradictory traits are harmoniously synthesized in one single whole. Thus the Doctrine of Partial truths (*nayavāda*) and the Doctrine of Manifold Judgement (*bhaṅgavāda*) are natural corollaries to the non-absolutistic standpoint.

True, in the Vedicist philosophical systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, etc. and so also in the philosophy of Buddhism, we often come accross a tendency (*dṛṣṭi*) to view the same thing from different standpoints and thus

synthesize its various aspects ;[6] but the utmost insistence (*ātyantika āgraha*) that every aspect of *everything* must be viewed from every possible standpoint, and the unfinching faith that the consumation of all thought-process lies only in a synthesis of all possible standpoints, are to be found nowhere except in the Jaina system of philosophy. It was as a result of this insistence (and this faith) that the Jainas gave birth to those independent (*svatantra*), systematic disciplines (*vyavasthita śāstra*) called 'Doctrine of Non-Absolutism' (*anekāntavāda*), 'Doctrine of Partial Truths' (*nayavāda*), and 'Doctrine of Sevenfold Judgement' (*saptabhaṅgī*), disciplines which became a part and parcel of their treatment of Logic (*pramāṇa-śastra*) and on which no other school produced even a single or even a minor text. Though an advocate of Vibhajyavāda (Doctrine of the Avoidance of Extremes) and *Madhyamamārga* (Middle Path), the Buddhist system, remained blind to the element of permanence exhibited by a real entity, and hence declared everything to be but momentary. Similarly, though actually employing the word "*anekānta*" to characterize their own standpoint,[7] the Naiyāyikas could not help harping on the thesis that atoms, souls, etc. are absolutely unchanging (*sarvathā apariṇāmin*). Again, the Vedāntists, even while taking recourse to the various standpoints called 'empirical' (*vyavahārika*) 'ultimate' (*pāramarthika*), etc., could not help insisting that all standpoints except the standpoint of *Brahman* (*Brahma-dṛṣti*) are of an inferior—or even utterly false—sort. The only reason for this anomaly seems to be that these systems did not imbibe the spirit of non-absolutism to the same extent as did the Jaina. Thus the Jaina synthesizes all the standpoints and, at the same time, grants that all these standpoints are equally competent and true so far as their respective spheres are concerned. Since the Jaina's non-absolutistic standpoint and the systematic treatises composed

6. See *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, p. 2 ; *Siddhānta-bindu*, p, 119 *seq.* ; *Vedāntasūtra*, p. 25 ; *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā*, p. 175 ; *Mahāvagga*, 6. 31.
7. *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 2. 1. 18.

by him on the subject, concern themselves exclusively with the time-honoured philosophical controversies like identity versus difference, generality versus particularity, eternity versus transience, etc., it might appear, at first sight, that all this is repetitive, hackneyed, and something lacking in originality ; but the spirit of accepting (nothing save) the total (*akhaṇḍa*), living (*sajīva*), and all-sided (*sarvāṃśa*) truth—a spirit reflected in the standpoint and the treatises in question—which is so characteristic of the Jaina and which found entrance in Logic through him, is capable of successful employment in all the fields of life, and may on that account be regarded, not unduly, as a contribution made to (Indian) Logic by the Jaina savants.

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THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS

(A Study in Jaina Logic)

P. C. Mahalanobis

Introduction

0.1 I am particularly grateful to Professor F. Gonseth and Professor A. Linder, the organizers of the Zurich Symposium which was held in the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich in April 1953, for having invited me to open the discussion on the foundations of statistics. In my opening observations I had referred to certain ideas in the Indian-Jaina theory of *syādvāda*[1] which aroused much interest ; and I was requested to give a fuller account of Jaina views at the time of preparing the text of my communication. I am doing this in Part I of the present paper.

0.2 There was also a brisk discussion on some of the views which I had placed before the symposium. It was suggested that I should take into consideration these comments and amplify to some extent my own arguments in writing out my communication. I intend to give my own views in Part 2 of the present paper broadly on the basis of the observations made by me at the Zurich symposium with, however, certain additions and amplifications to deal with some comments made by the other speakers.

0.3 I wish to offer my sincere thanks to Professor Linder for looking through the manuscript of the paper and for making valuable comments and suggestions.

Part I. The Indian-Jaina dialectic of *syādvāda* in relation to probability

1. Usually described as [The dialectic of the sevenfold categories of knowledge]. In the present paper I have given references to books in the English language and not to original Sanskrit texts because these are not likely to be readily available in Europe. The English books (to which I referred) give very full bibliographical references to original texts.

1. Brief history of *syādvāda*

1.1. There are certain ideas in Indian-Jaina logic called *syādvāda* which seem to have close relevance to the concepts of probability, and which can, therefore, supply a convenient background to my own observations on the foundations of statistics. It is always difficult to be sure about the exact meaning of logical and philosophical phrases which were current 1500 or 2500 years ago: and it is not claimed (and I also agree that it would not be corret to claim) that the concept of probability in its present form was recognized in *syādvāda* but the phrases used in *syādvāda* seem to have a special significance in connexion with the logic of statistical inference.

1.2. I shall first give a brief historical account of *syādvāda*. Jaina religion and philosophy came into prominence from the time of its great leader Mahāvīra (599-527 B,C.) who was a contemporary of Buddha, the founder of the Buddhist religion. The earliest reference to *syādvāda* occurs in the writings of Bhadrabāhu who is believed to have given the following explanation of *syādvāda*: *syāt* = [may be], and *vāda* = [assertion], or the assertion of possibilities.[2]

[The *syādvāda* is set forth as follws: (1) May be, it is, (2) may be, it is not; (3) may be, it is and it is not; (4) may be, it is indescribable; (5) may be, it is and yet it is indescribable; (6) may be, it is not and it is also indescribable; (7) may be, it is and it is not and it is also indescribable.][3]

1.3. There were two authors of the name Bhadrabāhu the senior belonging to the period 433-357 B.C., and the junior to about 375 A.D., and it is not definitely known whether the above explanation was given by the senior or the junior Bhadrabāhu; but the above exposition is usually ascribed

2. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic* (Calcutta University 1921), pp. 167. (This book will be referred to as *HIL*.)
3. *HIL*, pp. 167-168.

to the senior Bhadrabāhu of the 4th century B.C.[4] There is indisputable mention of *syādvāda* in the *Nyāyavatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara[5] (about 480-550 A.D.). A little later Samantabhadra (about 600 A.D.) gives a full exposition of the seven parts of *Syād-vāda* or *Sapta-bhaṅginaya* in his *Āptamīmāṃsā*.[6] It is clear that *syādvāda* was well developed by the sixth century A.D., and received a great deal of attention in the mediaeval period of Indian logic; the *Syādvādamañjari* of Mallisena (1292 A.D.), for example, is a separate treatise on the same theory.[7] There are, of course, still later works such as Vimala Dāsa's *Saptabhaṅgi-taraṅgiṇī* and a large number of mediaeval and modern commentaries. I am, therefore, dealing with a well-known theme which is considered to be the most original contribution of Jaina logic to Indian thought.[8]

2. Dialectic of seven-fold predication

2.1. I shall next refer to the actual text in Sanskrit of the dialectic of seven-fold predication (*saptabhaṅginaya*):

1) *syādasti*[9]	=may be, it is.
2) *syātnāsti*	=may be, it is not.
3) *syādasti*[10] *nāsti*[11] ca	=may be, it is, it is not.

4. *HIL*, p. 167.
5. *HIL*, p. 181 : [It is the perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc. according as we take it from one or the other standpoint.]
6. *HIL*. pp. 182-184.
7. Jadunath SINHA, *History of Indian Philosophy* (Central Book Agency, Calcutta, 1952), Vol. II, p. 179. (This book will be referred to as J. SINHA, *HIP*).
8. Satkari MOOKERJEE : *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism* (Bharati Jaina Parisat, Calcutta, 1944), p. 191 (This book will be referred to as *JPN*).
9. The two words *syāt* (may be) and *asti* (it is) are compounded (by rules of pronunciation) in one compound phrase *syādasti*.
10. *nāsti*=not-is or it is not.
11. The compound-phrase consists of two words *syāt* (may be) and *avaktavyaḥ* (or inexpressible, or indeterminate).

4) *syādavaktavyaḥ*[12] =may be, it is indeterminate.

5) *syādasti ca*[13] *avaktavyaśca*[14] =may be, it is and also indeterminate.

6) *syātnāsti ca avaktavyaśca* = may be, it is not and also indeterminate.

7) syādasti nāsti ca avaktavyaśca=may be, it is ānd it is not and also indeterminate.

2.2. The word *syāt* has been translated as [may be] but this does not bring out the full implications. The Sanskrit word in mentioning one possibility has also some indirect allusion to other possibilities. The Sanskrit word *asti* may be rendered as [it is], [it exists], or [it is existent] ; and *nāsti* is the negation, i.e. [it is not], [it does not exist], or [it is non-existent]. The third category predicates the possibility of both *asti* and *nāsti* ; of both [it is] and [it is not]. The first three categories conform thus to the categories of classical logic and do not present any difficulty.

2.3. The fourth category is *avaktavya* which I have translated as [indeterminate]. Other authors have used the words [indescribable],[15] or [inexpressible] or [indefinite]. For example, Satkari Mookerjee explains [The inexpressible may be called indefinite]...(JPN, p. 115). I prefer [indeterminate] because this is nearer the interpretation which I have in mind.

2.4. It will be useful if at this stage I give an illustration. Consider the tossing of a coin ; and suppose it turns up [head]. We may then say (1) [it is head] (now). This also implies, (2) [it is not-head] (on some other occasion). The third category follows without difficulty, (3) [it is, and it is not] which is a synthetic predication based on both

12. *ca*=and or also.

13. By rules of pronunciation the two words *avaktavyaḥ* and *ca* are compound into *avaktavyaśca*.

14. For example, Satis Chandra VIDYABHUSANA in *HIL* and other works.

15. *Nyāyāvatāra* edited by Satish Chandra VIDYABHUSANA (Indian Research Society, Calcutta, 1909), pp. 29-30.

(1) and (2). The fourth category predicates that the position is still (4) indeterminate.

2.5. This, however, does not exhaust lhe possibilities of predication or modes of knowledge. For example, if we know that it is a coin which has [head] on one side and [not-head] or [tail] on the other side, and we also know that it must turn up either [head] or [tail], we may then predicate that (5) there exists one type of indeterminateness which is capable of being resolved in terms of the first four categories. On the other hand, we may know that the subject of discourse is not a coin but something else to which the category of indetermination in the above sense cannot apply, we may then use the sixth mode of predication and assert that (6) there does not exist that type of indeterminateness which is capable of being resolved in terms of the first four categories. Finally, there is the seventh mode of knowledge where we may be able to predicate that sometimes the possibility of resolution of indetermination exists (as in the fifth mode) and sometimes this possibility does not exist (as in the sixth mode).

2.6. According to *syādvāda*, the above seven categories are necessary and are also sufficient so that they exhaust the possibilites of knowledge. There is minority view which holds that there are further possibilities of (8) *vaktavyaśca avaktavyaśca*, a kind of duplicated indeterminateness together with successive categories of the fifth, sixth and seventh types in an infinite regression but the accepted opinion is that the hypothetical eighth category is identical with the fourth so that there is no need of more than seven categories.

2.7. I should like to emphasize that the fourth category is a synthesis of three basic modes of [it is] (assertion), [it is not] (negation), and inexpressible, or indefinite, or [indeterminate] (which itself is resolvable into either [it is] or [it is not], and supplies the logical foundations of the modern concept of probability. Consider the throw of a coin. It has the possibility of head (it is) or not-head (it is not) ; sometimes head and sometimes not-head ; and

the combination of both possibilities of [it is] and [it is not] in an yet indefinite or indeterminate form. The fifth category of knowledge in Jaina logic predicates the existence of indetermination (which we may perhaps interpret, in modern language, as the assertion of the existence of a probability field). The sixth category denies the existence of a probability field ; while the seventh category covers the whole range of possibilities mentioned in the other six categories.

3. Relativism

3.1. It would be of interest to consider some further aspects of Jaina logic. The points to be stressed are that Jaina thought is non-absolutist (that is, it is relativist) and realist. Siddhasena Divākara (480-550 A.D.) in *Nyāyavatāra* (which is accepted as the earliest Jaina work on pure logic at present available) gave an exposition of *syādvāda* (knowledge of the all-sided method) of which the authentic text is as described below :

[*Syādvāda,* which literally signifies assertion of possibilities, seeks to ascertain the meaning of things from all possible standpoints. Things are neither existent nor non-existent absolutely...*Syād* which signifies (may be) denotes all these seven possibilities, that is, thing may be looked at from one of the above seven points of view, there being no eighth alternative].[16]

3.2. It has been pointed out that :

[All objects are muiltform (*anekānta*) according to him (i.e. the Jaina). From their many-sided nature it follows that all judgments are relative. They are true under certain conditions. They are conditional or hypothetical. No judgments are absolutely true. The word [perhaps] must be added to all judgments to indicate their conditional character. This is *Syādavāda* or the doctrine of relativity of judgments].[17]

16, J. SINHA, *HIP*, vol. II, 19:2, pp. 205-206.

17 It is worth noting that the Jaina view in this respect has much

[The Jainas emphasize manifold nature of real things which are endowed with infinite qualities, modes, and relations to the other things.[18] They have identity-in-difference. The Vedāntists emphasize pure identity and deny plurality. The Jainas emphasize manifoldness of inter-related reals and deny pure identity. They are anti-Absolutists. They are advocates of relative pluralism].[19]

3.3. It has been also pointed out that :

[Thus the Jainas hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of them any of the above seven alternatives (teachnically called *saptabhaṅgī*) holds good. (See *Syādvādamañjarī* with Hemacandra's commentary, p. 166 etc.). The Jainas say that other Indian systems each from its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional, and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or senses (*upādhi*). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly permanent and partly exposed to change in the form of losing and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite, the three categories of logic are all equally available in some sense or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally].[20]

similarity to A. N. WHITEHEAD'S [inexhaustibility of nature]. Also cf. V.I. LENIN : [*Materialism and Empiriocriticism.*]

18. J. SINHA, *HIP*, vol. II, 1952. p. 208.
19. S. DASGUPTA, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I. pp. 180-181 (Cambridge University Press, 1922).
20. *dravya*=substance ; *kṣetra*=space ; *kāla*=time ; *bhāva*=attribute.

4. *Realism*

4.1. Jaina logic is essentially realistic: [The Jaina philosopher maintains that existents are possessed of an infinite number of attributes and characteristics which can be discovered by experience alone...He refuses to put a premium on internal intuition. The mind, even with its active contributions, which the Jaina does not seek to deny, is believed by him to be an instrument of discovery and not a creator of facts.] (JPN, p. 1)

[Logic has to work upon the data of experience and is as much an instrument as experience is.] (JPN, p, 5.). [Pure logic, prior to and independent of experience, is a blind guide to the determination of truth. Logic is to rationalize and systematize what experience offers.] (JPN, p. 78).

[A thing is existent, is non-existent and is both existent and non-existent, but always subject to limitations imposed by objective differences of substance, time, space and attributes (*dravyakṣetra-kāla-bhāvāpekṣayā*).[21] The differences in predication are not due to our subjective contemplation from different angles of vision, but are founded upon objectively real attributes. They are facts irrespective of the consideration whether we contemplate them or not.] (JPN, p. 107).

4.2. [The Jaina does not see any reason why things should be particulars alone. Things are, according to the Jaina, both universals and particulars together...A real is a particular which possesses a generic attribute.] (JPN, p. 2)... [in conformity with the plain verdict of experience, the nature of reals is admitted to be made up of both the elements—universal and the particular and to be cognised as such by perceptual knowledge.]...(JPN, p. 3).

[Things are neither exclusively particulars, not are they

21. I may draw attention to the similarity of these ideas to the concept of an [individual element] in relation to the [population] in modern statistical theory.

exclusively universals, but they are a concrete realization of both. The two elements can be distinguished by reflective thought, but cannot be rent asunder. So our experience of one particular individual is not confined to that individual alone, but extends to unperceived individuals also in so far as the latter typify the universal as a part of their constitution. Individuals, even when they belong to a class, will vary from one another...Repetition of experience only helps us to take stock of the universal in its true character, but once the latter is known, it does not stand in need of verification or confirmation by further observation.[22]] (JPN, p. 6.).

4.3. The Jaina emphasizes the multiple nature of reality and aecepts the standpoint of non-absolutism: [He asserts that neither unity nor diversity sums up the nature of a real, but both taken together do it. Unity is not exclusive of diversity or *vice versa.* The difficulty that is confronted is not grounded upon objective reality, but arises from a subjective aberration, which consists in the imagination of inconsistency between unity and diversity. But unity is associated with diversity and diversity is never found apart from unity, which is its very foundation.] (JPN, p. 58).

[The central thesis of the Jaina is that there is not only diversity of reals, but each real is equally diversified. Diversification as induced by relations has been explained. The conclusion is legitimate that each real is possessed of an infinite number of modes at every moment. The number of reals is infinite and consequently their relations with one another are infinite...all things are related in one way or the other and...relations induce relational qualities in the relate, which accordingly become infinitely diversified at each moment and throughout their careeer......Things

22. There is one well-known school of Buddhist philosophy which holds that reality consists of an infinite sequence of [atomistic] or completely independent [moments] which have no connexion with one another.

are neither momentary[23] nor uniform[24]]...(JPN, p. 70). According to the Jaina [a real changes every moment and at the same time continues. The continuity never breaks down] (JPN, p. 70).

[A real is that which not only originates, but is also liable to cease and at the same time capable of persisting. Existence, cessation, and persistence are the fundamental characteristics of all that is real...This concept of reality is the only one which can avoid the conclusion that the world of plurality, which is the world of experience, is an illusion.] (JPN, p, 72).

4.4. The relativism of the Jaina philosopher is to be sharply contrasted with some of the other Indian systems of philosophy.

[The Vedāntist starts with the premise that reality is one universal existence; the Buddhist fluxist[25] believes in atomic particulars, each absolutely different from the rest and having nothing underlying them to bind them together. The Naiyāyika[26] believes both to be combined in an individual, though he maintains that the two characters are different and distinct...The Jaina differs from them all and maintains that the universal and the particular are only distinguishable traits in a real, which is at once identical with and different from both.] (JPN, p. 13).

It is, however, necessary to notice that:

[There is a difference—and intrinsic difference at that—between a manifested and an unmanifested real...They are

23. On the other hand, the monistic philosophy of the Vedāntist holds that the Absolute transcends all change.
24. The phrase [fluxist] requires a little explanation. The Buddhist school of philosophy (to which reference has been made in footnote 1) is known as *kṣaṇa-vāda* which means literally the theory or philosophy of [moments]. It has been translated by S. Mookerjee as [fluxist] which, however, does not seem to be entirely happy.
25. Another well-known school of Indian philosophy.
26. It may be noted that a single or unique individual as such (that is without any relation to a [population] or [universe] has no meaning in modern statistical or probability theory.

identical and different both—idential in so far as it is the same substance and different in so far as it undergoes a change of characteristic. This is the Jaina position of non-absolutism.] (JPN, p. 39).

[A real is not entirely expressible in all its aspects and modes. But it is not inexpressible altogether. A real being a multiple entity is expressible and inexpressible both in reference to different aspects ; it is expressible in so far as it partakes of a universal and is inexpressible so far as it is a unique individual.][27]...(JPN, p. 113).

[The unique individuality of a real is not accessible to conceptual thought and, hence, to language, but it is reached by an analysis of the nature of reality as it is apprehended in perception....we have tried to prove, following the guidance of the Jaina philosophers, that the nature of reals, on analysis, has been found to exhibit the following traits, viz., existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. (JPN, p. 127).

5.1. Relational aspects have received special notice in Jaina logic.

[Everything is related with every other thing, and this relation involves the emergence of a relational quality. The qualities cannot be known *a priori*, though a good number of them can be deduced from certain fundamental characteristics.] (JPN, p. 3)....[A real is only a part of a system knitted together by a network of relations, from which it cannot be divorced.] (JPN, p. 109). (Every real is thus hedged round by a network of relations and attributes, which we propose to call its system or context or universe of discourse, which demarcates it from others] (JPN, p. 114).

[It is idle to raise questions of chronological status as

27. The Jaina view insists on the inadequacy of formal log'c, by introducing the concept of indefiniteness or indetermination or uncertainty as an inalienable character of reals ; but also emphasizes the possibility of defining reals in terms of existent or non-existent taken together.

to whether the unity is prior to the elements or the elements are prior to the unity. In the concrete real at any rate they are coordinate. This unity of being and non-being or rather of self-being and negation of other-being, is beyond the reach of logical concepts, and, hence, of linguistic symbols, which are but the vehicles of such concepts. The Jaina in recognition of this inalienable character of reals declares them to be inexpressible. The inexpressible may be called indefinite from the standpoint of formal logic. But this is not the whole character of a real. It is also expressible and logically definable as existent, as non-existent.][28] (JPN, p. 115).

[The Jaina conception of relation may be summed up as follows. Relations are objective verities which are as much given to intuition and to thought as the terms are. A relation has no objective status outside the terms. It is the result of an internal change in the nature of the terms. It is *sui generis* in that it cannot be placed under the head of identity or of difference, both of which are contained as traits in its being.] (JPN, p. 211).

5.2. The Jaina view of relatedness of the things is very naturally extended to the discussion of causality.

[...neither synchonism nor succession is believed by the Jaina to be the essential characteristic of causal relation. Causality is a relation of determination. The effect is that whose coming into being is necessarily determined by the being of another. The determinant is called the cause and the determinatum is called effect. The determinant may be synchronous with the determined or may be separated by an interval , ...] (JPN, p. 212).

[What is the organ of the knowledge of causality ? The Jaina answers that it is perception of the concomitance in agreement and difference...The Jaina takes the observation of concomitance in agreement and in difference to be one observation....The Jaina posits a twofold cause for the

28. Pure logic in the sense of formal logic.

perception of universal relation—an internal and an external condition. The internal condition is found in the developed state of our mind and the external condition is the repeated observation of the sequence of the two events.] (JPN, p. 217).

...[Such concepts as causality, substance, attribute and the like, and no doubt the ways in which the mind works up the data of experience, but this does not mean with the Jaina that they are true of the mind only and not of the extra-mental reality which they purport to understand. The Jaina would take them to be the instruments of discovery of the nature of reality, internal and external, which render the same kind of service as the sense-organs do.] (JPN, p. 217).

...[The different categories, viz., the selves, matter, time, space and so on, are deductions from experimental data. They have been posited since general concepts presuppose their existence and since without these principles the data of experience cannot be organized into a system. These categories in spite of their general and comprehensive character are not only not inconsistent with the existence of individual entities, but on the contrary they are entirely based on the objective data. Without the individual existents these categories would be reduced to unmeaning class concepts. The affirmation of categories as objective principles is thus proof of the existence of individual reals, which are included within the ambit of these categories. Without the individuals forming their contents the categories would be empty and barren, and the individuals without the categories would be reduced to a welter of chaos. The Jaina is a believer in plurality no doubt, but that plurality is not an unrelated chaos. The plurality is a system inasmuch as each individual is cemented with the rest by definite bonds of relationship.] (JPN, pp. 299-300).

[From the analytic point of view (*paryāyārtkikaṇaya*) the world is an infinite plurality with their infinite variations and modes. But the analytic view does not give us the whole nature of reality as it is. It is partial picture that

we derive of the world by means of such approach. The whole gamut of reality, however, reveals its universal unitive nature *as one existence* when it is envisaged from the synthetic angle of vision *(dravyārthikanaya)*.] (JPN, p. 301).

[It seems legitimate to conclude that the universe is one existence which manifests itself, as substance *(dravya)* as it unifies the modes and attributes. The selfsame existence again reveals itself as Space in so far as it provides accomodation for the infinite plurality of existence within itself (*kṣetra*). It is the same existence which manifests itself as Time (w.f. *kāla*) in so far as it changes into aspects, as precedent and consequent, as earlier and latter, as present, past and future modes. It is the same existence that evolves as phases and modes, attributes and states. The substance, time, space, attribute and relation are thus evolved from the same existence. The different categories, thus viewed as functional variations on one principle, are no longer in a position of antagonism of indifferent isolation. *(Aṣṭasāhasrī*, p. 113).

The world of reals is thus not only plurality but a unity also. It is one universe that the Jaina metaphysics gives us. But the oneness is not secured at the sacrifice of the many, nor are the many left in unsocial indifference.] (JPN, pp. 301-302).

5.3. It has been observed that [Jaina philosophy is... entitled to be called the paragon of realism. If experience be the ultimate source of knowledge of reality and its behaviour, we cannot repudiate the plurality of things. The admission of plurality necessitates the recognition of the dual nature of real as constituted of 'being' and 'non-being' as fundamental elements. One real will be distinguished from another real and this distinction, unless it is dismissed as error of judgment, presupposes that each possesses a different identity, in other words that being of one is not the being of the other. This truth is propounded by the Jaina in that things are real, so far as they have a self-identity of their own unshared by others (*svarūpasattā*),

and they are unreal in respect of a different self-identity (*pararūpasattā*). .. The logic of Jaina is empirical logic, which stands in irreconcilable opposition to pure logic.][29] (JPN, p. 181)

5.4. J. Sinha (HIP., vol. II, p. 180) gives the following summary of Jaina philosophy: [The world is self-existent and eternal. All objects of the world are multiform (*anekānta*) and endued with infinite qualities and relations (*anantadharmaka*). This is relative pluralism. The reality can be considered from different points of views or *nayas*. The *nayas* are the standpoints. ...All judgments are relative and probable. No judgments are absolute. This is *syādvāda*. There are seven ways of predication. This is called *saptabhaṅgīnaya*.][30]

It is not strange that Jainas believe that [the different systems of philosophy are only partial views of reality. Jainism is the complete view of reality.] (J. SINHA, HIP, vol, II. p. 180.).

29. J. SINHA, *HIP*, vol. II, p. 180.
30. I think it is also proper to note the occasional occurrence of certain intriguing phrases in the mediaeval period of Indian logic, As an example, I am giving below what I myself heard about 20 years ago from the late Dr. Sir Brajendra Nath SEAL (the great Indian savant and the author of the *History of Positive Sciences of the Hindus* and other works who died in 1938. Dr. Seal told me that in a mediaeval Indian treatise there is a discussion about the practice of giving alms to Brahmins; and the question is raised whether the recipients of the gifts are always deserving persons. It is stated in reply that the practice of giving alms can be supported because [only ten out of hundred recipients are undeserving]. I do not know whether the above phrase is to be interpreted as a simple statement about the number of proportion of recipients who were found to be undeserving or whether the phrase has any implications of a statistical or probabilistic nature. Dr. Seal's view was that the above phrase had some probabilistic significance but only in a latent or implied (but not explicit or developed) form. As the subject of mediaeval Indian logic is not my special field of study I have not had the opportunity of making more detailed enquiries. I am, however, mentioning this point because it may be worth while making some further researches in this matter.

6. Some general observations

6.1. I have given actual quotations from books on Jaina philosophy to convey the thoughts in their original form (of course, in English translation) without the bias of any subjective interpretations. I should now like to make some brief observations of my own on the connexion between Indian-Jaina views and the foundations of statistical theory. I have already pointed out that the fourth category of *syādvāda*, namely, *avaktavya* or the [indeterminate] is a synthesis of three earlier categories of (1) assertion ([it is]). (2) negation ([it is not]), and (3) assertion and negation in succession. The fourth category of *syādvāda*, therefore, seems to me to be in essence the qualitative (but *not* quantitative) aspect of the modern concept of probability. Used in a purely qualitative sense, the fourth category of predication in Jaina logic corresponds precisely to the meaning of probability which covers the possibility of (a) something existing, (b) something not-existing, and (c) sometimes existing and sometimes not-existing. The difference between Jaina [*avaktavya*] and [probability] lies in the fact that the latter (that is the concept of probability has definite quantitative implications, namely, the recognition of numerical frequencies of occurrence of (1) [it is], or of (2) [it is not]; and hence in the recognition of *relative* numerical frequencies of the first two categories (of [it is] and [it is not]) in a synthetic form. It is the explicit recognition of (and emphasis on) the concept of numerical frequency ratios which distinguishes modern statistical theory from the Jaina theory of *syādvāda*. At the same time it is of interest to note that 1500 or 2500 years ago *syādvāda* seems to have given the logical background of statistical theory in a qualitative form.

6.2. Secondly, I should like to draw attention to the Jaina view that [a real is a particular which possesses a generic attribute]. This is very close to the concept of an individual in relation to the population to which it belongs. The Jaina view in fact denies the possibility of making

any predication about a single and unique individual which would be also true in modern statistical theory.

6.3. The third point [to be noted is the emphasis given in Jaina philosophy on the relatedness of things and on the multiform aspects of reals which appear to be similar (again in a purely qualitative sense) to the basic ideas underlying the concepts of association, correlation, and concomitant variation in modern statistics.

6.4. The Jaina views of [existence, persistence, and cessation] as the fundamental characteristics of all that is real necessarily leads to a view of reality as something relatively permanent and yet relatively changing which has a flavour of statistical reasoning. [A real changes every moment and at the same time continues] is a view which is somewhat sympathetic to the underlying idea of stochastic processes.

6.5. Fifthly, a most important feature of Jaina logic is its insistence on the impossibility of absolutely certain predication and its emphasis on non-absolutist and relativist predication. In *syādvāda*, the qualification [*syāt*], that is, [may be] or [perhaps] must be attached to every predication without any exception. All predication, according to *syādvāda*, thus has a margin of uncertainty which is somewhat similar to the concept of [uncertain inference] in modern statistical theory. The Jaina view, however, is essentially qualitative in this matter (while the great characteristic of modern statistical theory is its insistence on the possibility and significance of determining the margin of uncertainty in a meaningful way). The rejection of absolutely certain predication naturally leads Jaina philosophy continually to emphasize the inadequacy [pure] or [formal] logic, and hence to stress the need of making inferences on the basis of data supplied by experience.

6.6. I should also like to point out that the Jaina view of causality as [a relation of determination] based on the observation of [concomitance in agreement and in difference] has dual reference to an internal condition [in the developed state of our mind] (which would seem to

correspond to the state of organized knowledge in any given context) and also to an external condition based on [the repeated observation of the sequence of the two events] which is suggestive of a statistical approach.

6.7. Finally, I should draw attention to the realist and pluralist views of Jaina philosophy and the continuing emphasis on the multiform and infinitely diversified aspects of reality which amounts to the acceptance of an [open] view of the universe with scope for unending change and discovery. For reason explained above, it seems to me that the ancient Indian-Jaina philosophy has certain interesting resemblances to the probabilistic and statistical view of reality in modern times.

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PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE OF BUDDHISM

Th. Stcherbatsky

INTRODUCTION

The existence of God immortality of the soul, and freedom of will,— these three main ideas are the postulates of every religion; no doctrine of morals can be built without these. This is the view of Kant and of the European philosophy in general, as also the conviction of wide sections of educated people. But there also exists a religion which glows in the hearts of millions of its followers with a bright flame of living faith—a religion that embodies in itself the highest ideals of the good, of love for one's fellow beings, of spiritual freedom and moral perfection, a religion that has ennobled the peoples of Asia and introduced civilization into their lives—and which nevertheless admits neither God nor immortality of the soul, nor even freedom of will. And this religion, viz. Buddhism, not only does not know God; the very idea of one supreme being—who, for some totally unknown reason which is neither his own pleasure nor any showing off of his power, creates the whole restless and suffering world from out of nothing—appears strange and absurd to a Buddhist. In his polemical zeal he is prepared to scoff at it, ready to ridicule it for all those logical inconsistencies which automatically appear before our mind at the thought of the creation of everything from nothing—at the idea of that being whom, in his turn, none has created.

Though Buddhism acknowledges the existence of personalities more perfect than an ordinary person and calls them saints and gods, these personalities are not, in any way, above or outside the world and the limits of worldly life. They are as much subject to the laws of world process and to the effect of the impersonal world-moving force as ordinary people. Such

a negative attitude to monotheism is already clear in the earliest form of Buddhism but it does not then play a very vital role, for the very concept of monotheism was at that time rather poorly developed. Indian monotheism developed first as a religion and then, partly based on it, as a philosophical doctrine. In mediaeval India, the great Buddhist philosopher, Nāgārjuna, wrote a small tract[1] where he refuted monotheism and showed all its logical inconsistencies. It has served as an example for a number of later works directed against monotheism right up to our days. One of our countrymen, the Kalmuck Lama Bovaev who recently met with a tragic end in Petrograd, wrote a treatise in Tibetan, which repeats the arguments generally put forward by Nāgārjuna and also develops and supplements them.

As regards the second idea—the immortality of the soul—Buddhism not only does not accept it, it negates the very existence of the soul. This point—the denial of the soul—is far more prominent in the original or basic form of Buddhism than even the rejection of monotheism. This is because, in ancient India at the time when Buddhism appeared, the doctrine of the soul was far better developed and it became, therefore, the object of more powerful attacks. The denial of the soul is the main starting point of the Buddhist doctrine. The idea of the existence of a soul in us, i.e. of a special, integral, spiritual personality, is regarded as the most evil heresy and root of all evil. Of course, there exists consciousness as a special apparatus which comprehends the phenomena of the external world; there exists will as a spiritual process which precedes every action; there exist feelings, pleasant and unpleasant,—but all these have momentary existence, i.e. change, appear and

1. This small tract, entitled *Īśvara-kartṛtva-nirākaraṇa-viṣṇoḥeka-kartṛtva-nirākaraṇa*, was edited by Stcherbatsky and published, along with an Introduction and a Russian translation, in the *Zapiski*, 1904, pp. 58-74. For an English translation of Stcherbatsky's Introduction and of Nāgārjuna's work see *Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky*. Calcutta 1969, pp. 1-16 (also in: "Indian Studies: Past & Present" X, 1. 55-66)—Tr.

disappear, and there is no single, lasting and especially immortal soul from which all these mental phenomena originate. Thc existence of such a soul cannot, in any way, be proved; it does not reveal itself in anything and is a prejudice, a native belief, which Buddhism primarily wants to demolish.

It follows from this that a free will, too, does not exist in the sense of a will attributed to some personality and originating from some soul. There exists, on the other hand, a beginningless impersonal world process of life that is constantly changing and developing in inevitable facets provided by the law of cause and effect. Nothing appears without a corresponding adequate cause. The process of such a life is burdensome; it is a process of suffering but one that contains in it a grain of perfection and freedom. This conviction—namely, that the world process of life leads to perfection and ultimate deliverence from the fetters of sorrow imposed by the law of cause and effect—is the only faith, the only domestic premise of Buddhism. Everything else is based on observation of facts and free logical proofs allowing and even inviting free criticism. According to this conviction the process of life has a specific aim; it leads to a clear end, to a tendency to gradual perfection inherent in its very self, to deliverence from sufferings of the world and to the attainment of the ultimate aim in quietude. According to the conviction of Buddhism, the more perfect the life, the less the agitation and the more the tranquility in it. The annihilation of excitement, the annihilation of this existence or suffering—"Eternal Calm", "Absolute Existence", "Nothing" in relation to worldly restlessness, the "Extinction" forever of the agitation of life—this is the ultimate, distant ideal which Buddhism was not afraid to face. In this, there is no place either for God or for the soul or for free will. This is the impersonal Absolute, which contradicts an equally impersonal agitation of the world process of life occurring in the limits of what we call personalities with all their experiences.

THERE IS NO SOUL

We now come to the doctrine of the soul, for it is, let us repeat, the main starting point of the whole Buddhist doctrine. There is no soul! But what does the concept "soul" properly mean? At the time of the appearance of Buddhism, several doctrines were current in India about the essence and attributes of the soul. Accordingly, the very concept of "soul" received various connotations. One of the views fairly prevalent among the orthodox Brāhmaṇa teachers was that the soul was a special, integral spiritual substance (located inside a person), which could think, feel and will. It is supposed to reside inside us, guide us, and through the apertures of the eyes, look on what happens around and on what other people like us do. At the time of death, it quits the body and flies away through a special unnoticed hole in darkness. According to this view, the soul is distinguished from the body and constitutes the main part of our being to which the body is subjected. But a somewhat different use of the term "soul" (Sanskrit, *ātman*) was also in vogue; this corresponds more to our word "personality". This is a literal meaning of the term *ātman,* which primarily is a reflexive pronoun and means "I myself", i.e. "my personality". In this sense of the word the Buddhists and other schools preferred the word *pudgala*—"personality"—but considered it synonymous with the term *ātman*—"soul". In such a case, the concept "soul" means personality in its total composition, viz. it covers both body and soul. This apart in the Brahmanical circles of India, there was also current, at this time, another doctrine, according to which the soul or spiritual source inside us was identified with the spiritual source outside us—with the world-soul. The notion of this world spiritual essence sometimes tended towards the side of pantheism, in which case the whole world possessed it in its internal omnipresent soul. It also sometimes tended towards the side of theism—faith in God—when the world-soul received the significance of one God, the creater

and builder of the whole world. In all these cases the word "soul" meant something "integral", a single, special, spiritual substance or a special integral personality. It is this concept of the soul as something integral, representing in itself a specific real identity, which Buddhism fought against. According to the Buddhist doctrine, there is as little identity in the spiritual world as in the material one. Matter consists of atoms—particles ; and the soul consists of individval mental phenomena or spiritual elements. Concerning the question of the relation between the whole and its parts, Buddhism, generally speaking, held the view that we could attribute real, true existence only to the parts and, properly speaking, only to such parts as, in their turn did not consist of parts, i.e. to atoms, indivisible particles. Matter is composed of physical, material atoms, and soul of spiritual atoms. Just as in a heap of grain there is nothing more than those grains of which it is made up, in a spiritual personality, too, there is nothing over and above those individual mental elements or phenomena of which it is composed. Only our habit or the limitedness of our knowledge attributes some special existence to the whole, though, in reality, reasoning convinces us that it does not have any special existence like that of its parts. Thus the existence of the soul or the totality of personality is not fully negated by the Buddhists. They consider it possible to speak of these and accept their existence but only conventionally, always remembering that this is only a transient, habitual use of the word by people who are not initiated in the subtleties of philosophy. If we pass over from plain language to the language of philosophy, it ought to be firmly known that there is no single soul which would have existed separately and independently along with those elements—the component parts—of which it is composed.

So there is no unity in the mental world and no unity, no compact or permanent matter in the physical world. Everything exists separately, all by itself. The apparent unity of the personality is, on a close study, dissolved into

individual elements exactly as the apparent compact existence of some matter is, in a scientific experiment, dissolved into individual atoms. The Buddha called these elements *dharma*-s. This word was current even earlier in various senses; the Buddha used it for elements of existence, wishing obviously to differentiate his doctrine of elements by introducing a new terminology. He wanted a new term; for the concept of the elements of existence, of their importance and attributes, was according to him, distinctly different from all that was taught by the systems preceding him and contemporary to him. A special catalogue, compiled of these *dharma*-s or elements of existence, comprised, so to say, a table of 75 elements. These elements were variously grouped, and were classified from various points of view. Here, we shall not discuss the whole table and all the classifications in detail—which would mean a long digression—and shall limit ourselves only to the group that is most prevalent. From the point of view of part included in the composition of a personality, the elements of existence are united into five groups (the so-called *skanda*-s): the physical group or body, and the four groups of mental elements—(1) feelings, pleasant or unpleasant, (2) ideas, (3) will, and (4) consciousness.

In this classification our attention is drawn by the division of consciousness into two independent categories, To one belongs general consciousness—the bare fact, so to say, of being conscious, the capacity to perceive the external world. To the other belongs developed consciousness, i.e. presentations and concepts. It is true that both these elements are invariably linked, and that they coexist. But in this relation of invariable coexistence we also find among many other elements, which however does not prevent them from being individual elements. Thus, in place of one soul which is not at all there, we have feelings, ideas, will and consciousness. We cannot help noticing the similarity of this view of the soul to the view at which, after a long history, our contemporary European philosophy has arrived. The British philosopher, Hume, was the first

to build his psychology without soul from detached mental phenomena alone, and his point of view is accepted in modern psychology. Our contemporary, the great French philosopher, Bergson, begin his last major work with a confirmation of the same fact ; viz. that by self-observation we establish in ourselves a constant process of change in which we can distinguish sensations, feelings, wishes and presentations, i.e. like the four groups of psychic elements of the Buddhists just enumerated in a somewhat different order, and no single integral soul. The fact that these four categories of psychic phenomena are included in the composition of one personality actually exist as something independent, irrespective of its parts. exactly in the same way as a heap of grains is nothing more than these grains themselves.

With the passage of time, in the Buddhist community itself, there arose discussions on how the doctrine of the convensional existence of personality was to be understood. One of the schools into which original Buddhism disintegrated—the school of the Vātsīputrīyas—maintained that the unity underlying the elements of a personality could not, however, be totally denied. Fully following the general and fundamental Buddhist doctrine of the non-existence of the soul this school nevertheless claimed that some—howsomuch relative—reality of a personality (*pudgala*) as the combination of elements of a certain person at a certain moment was to be admitted. According to this school, a personality is not distinguished from the elements of which it is composed, but it is also not to be fully identified with the latter. It is some being conditioned by the simultaneous existence of elements of which it is composed.

Arguing against this humble, bold attempt to admit some individuality of personality, the well-known Buddhist philosopher, Vasubandhu, says : "First, one must solve the question as to what sort of existence is attributed to a personality or soul as mentioned by the Vātsīputrīya school : is it actual: real existence or only a relative existence ?

But what is this actual existence, and what is this relative existence? If something exists by itself as an individual it has a real existence as, for instance, colour and other basic elements of matter and spirit. If, on the other hand, something is a combination of such elements, this existence is conventional or relative as, for example, milk consisting of various elements and not existing separately from them. It follows from this that a personality or soul—if true existence is attributed to it—must have its essence separate from other elements, and it must be distinguished from them in the same way as they are distinguished from one another. Secondly, if the soul exists, it must also have its cause, its special source of existence, as distinct from the source from which the elements originate. If this is not so, i.e. if, in the process of life, the soul does not originate from some previous existence, it will be an eternal and unchangeable existence. This contradicts the fundamental principles accepted by all Buddhists including the Vātsīputrīyas. The acceptance of the eternal existence of the soul is a heretic view, which Buddhism does not allow. Besides, an eternal and unchangeable soul could not be actual or real, for only that which changes is actual i.e. real. On the other hand, if the said school of the Vātsīputrīyas attributes to the soul only a conventional existence as the habitual symbol of elements included in the composition of a personality, I fully agree with it and say: Yes! This is so!"

Now, when we know how the Buddhist doctrine that "there is no soul" is to be understood, we are in a position to explain one apparent contradiction which has always been a stumbling block for the European scholars and which they were always prepared to attribute to the lack of logic on the part of the Indian mind, in general. This contradiction lies in the fact that whereas the existence of the soul is negated, the transmigration of the souls appears to be accepted. Nevertheless, a proper understanding of both the doctrines shows no contradiction; it reveals not the inadequacy of the logic of Indian

intellect but rather its undoubted superiority. An Indian did not imagine that, with the death of a person, his spiritual world could simply disappear without a trace or could straightaway pass into eternity. Just as our body, after death, disappears, i.e. is converted to dust in which science finds the same elements—the same atoms—of which the living body consisted, similarly our spiritual world—and primarily the element of consciousness—will not, on our death, totally disappear from the cycle of life; it will appear again in another form and at another place. In the whole universe, a causal law rules everywhere. Every moment in the existence of an element or of a group of elements will be necessarily followed by a new moment, etc. This process has neither a beginning nor an end. The moment of death or of the beginning of a new life is a prominent, important event in the unique change of moments, but it is, nevertheless, only an individual moment in the whole chain of such separate moments, which follow each other of necessity. It was preceded by a moment, and it will be invariably followed by a moment of the same stream of changing elements. A child is born, and in the very first moment of his life—or rebirth as the Buddhists put it—stretches his lips to his mother's breast and makes a number of expedient movements. It is obvious that the psychic world did not appear from out of nothing. It, at the time of his birth, is only the next moment for a number of mental antecedents exactly in the same way as his body is only a particular moment in the development of the body from the foetus which, in its turn, was preceded by individual particles of matter. And, in this sense, this is not birth but rebirth. In its scientific, philosophical form, the law of rebirth of the souls is nothing but a fact of mental succession; it can be simply called the law of heredity without, of course, ignoring all that difference which is introduced into this concept by the progress of our knowledge. Just as a Buddhist allows the use of the words "soul" and "personality" in a conventional sense usual for the people, similarly he convention-

ally speaks of the rebirth of the same person, though. in reality, any rebirth is already a new person or, expressing still more correctly, an absolutely new collection of elements connected with its past by the inevitable law of causes and effects. In his sermons, the Buddha himself liked to use the language of the ordinary people ; he liked to speak of his own previous existences, of the past and future rebirths of his pupils and of other people. If it is remembered here that this is only a descriptive expression under which is hidden a deep and fine theory of the progress of life and and its elements towards the ultimate ideal, there will be no contradiction between the doctrine of the non-existence of the soul and the so-called transmigration of souls.

This doctrine, as we shall see later, also does not stand in the way of the establishment of the moral ideal of Buddhism.

EVERYTHING REAL CHANGES EVERY MOMENT

So, we have elucidated the fact that, according to the Buddhist doctrine, everything real consists of individual elements—physical and psychic. Now the question arises as to what exactly these psycho-physical elements—the *dharma*-s —are. And here, primarily, there is the doctrine of the momentariness of everything real, i e. of the momentariness of the *dharma*-s.

There is not only nothing compact and whole, and everything exists in pieces, there is nothing lasting too ; everything exists only for a moment. Just as there is no unity, so to say, in breadth, just so is there no unity in depth or in duration. The existence itself is a change that occurs every moment like a cinematographic picture where there are no individual pictures at all but only one, the so-called picture-stream. Where there is no change, there is no existence.

Here, too, one cannot help noticing the striking similarity of this doctrine with the aforementioned doctrine of

Bergson. In the work already referred to by us, he shows that not only does everything real ceaselessly change, the very term *existence* is equivalent to the term *change*. For instance, it appears to us that one mental state in us gives place to another but, actually, every mental state is already a transition. A state that would actually be a *state*, i.e. something lasting, is not there. Had a mental state ceased to change, its existence would have ceased to last. A mental *state*, i.e. a stoppage, is the creation of our imagination. Our imagination also creates some static substratum, a lining in the form of a soul, in the background of which individual thoughts wishes and feelings appear like states succeeding one another. In fact, this substratum,—this soul, this "I",—says Bergson, is not a reality ; it is a simple conventional sign which reminds our consciousness of the artificial nature of that mental process which makes us see different *states* succeeding one another, "when, actually there is only one abiding constant change". The same applies also to the material world. Before we discern a body in the world, we discern a quality : colour replaces colour, sound follows sound, sensation follows sensation. Each such quality appears to us as existing, i,e. lasting ; whereas it decomposes into numerous elementary movements. It is therefore clear that every quality, i.e. every matter, is nothing but a ceaseless change. Thus, to exist means to change every moment.

We see how deeply the notion of existence—change—is, in its essence, related to the negation of substance—the soul. This is the same doctrine clearly revealed to us in the system of the Buddha as well as in modern philosophy.

It should be further noted that Buddhism, in its doctrine of universal change occurring every moment, sticks to the preceding Indian thinking—to the philosophical system of Sāṃkhya, which also preached that everything changed eternally. The relation between both the systems is already being long felt, and has been discussed by European scholars. The Indians themselves have acknowledged it, though they have at the same time affirmed that this is

more a relation of contrast than of similarity. They called both the systems radical, but juxtaposed one against the other, inasmuch as one affirmed that all was eternal and the other that all was momentary. According to the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya system, there actually exist, in all, only two ultimate sources: spirit and matter. The spirit is static, eternally calm. Matter, which also includes the whole of our cognitive apparatus, moves and changes eternally. The mutual relation of these two sources, as imagined by Kapila, the builder of the system, stands out most clearly in a picture to which the protagonists of the system like to refer. We shall mention below what significance this picture—which emerges before his mental gaze, embodies his principal thought and elucidates his system—generally has for the philosopher. The builder of the Sāṃkhya system imagined the relation between matter and spirit as a fidgety game of an actor before a silent spectator. Just as the spectator does not at all participate in the action, stands aside, calm and impassioned—merely contemplates and does not act—similarly, the spiritual source does not move or change, is eternally the same, and stands either aside or above the world process. For this the whole of our cognitive apparatus had to be dissociated from the spiritual source and assigned to the eternally moving matter. The spirit only contemplates and does not act. Just as the actor all along changes his position, jests, speaks and generally works exclusively for the spectator, so also the matter—though one abiding source in itself—constantly changes, indulges in the eternal game of light and shadow when this game is performed entirely for the silently contemplating consciousness. Such were the conceptions dominant in India before the appearance of Buddhism. The Buddha Śākyamuni himself studied philosophy from the teachers of the followers of this system. His own system, as I have already mentioned, sticks to the preceding system more as a protest than as an imitation.

We have already seen what the Buddha did with the soul, i.e. with the inactive, spiritual, eternal source standing

aloof from the agitation of life. He simply rejected it as something of absolutely no use. Once the entire cognitive apparatus is assigned to another domain, any other con sciousness is not even required. It was discarded by the Buddha most resolutely with a clearly marked polemical hostility towards such an absolutely unnecessary, static and inactive master of the world. As regards the other source, Kapila conceived it as indivisible, compact and abiding material existence though in a state of perpetual unrest. The Buddha replaced it by atoms and individual elements.

All that exists, exists eternally, for the matter of which everything consists is eternal, does not vanish in any way and does not disintegrate into particles, as there are no particles. According to the doctrine of the Buddhists, on the other hand, individual elements appear every moment and disappear without leaving any trace. The *dharma*-s therefore constantly emerge from somewhere, and vanish somewhere. After the death of the Teacher, there was at first a difference of opinion among the learned Buddhists on the conception of this doctrine of the continual appearance and disappearance of the elements of existence. Some,-the so-called Sarvāstivādins, i.e. those who accept the usual existence, differentiate between the existence of *dharma*-s and their appearance. They assume that *dharma*-s exist for ever—in the past after they had appeared, in the present at the moment of appearance, and in the future when they have not yet appeared. Others, the so-called Vibhajyavādins —or Distinguishing School—however, assert that the past and present elements may be said to exist but the future ones exist only conventionally as causes from which they are to emerge. To this, the former [viz. the Sarvāstivādins] objected that such an admission was a digression from the radical viewpoint of Buddhism and was a compromise with the views of the Sāṃkhya system.

Whatever these controversies, we have before us a picture of the world as a restless ocean in which, like the waves rolling from within the deep, the individual elements

of life roll out from somewhere. This agitated surface, however, does not represent chaos; it obeys the strict laws of causality. Some elements constantly appear as accompanied by others, while some invariably follow others. This doctrine of the "dependent origination of elements" is the most central point of the whole Buddhist outlook. It is inseparably connected with the negation of the soul and with the dissolving of everything real into individual elements and with the perpetual succession of some combinations of elements by the others. We shall not dwell on this doctrine here, for it is so difficult to comprehend that the Buddha himself did not develop it before everybody, always fearing that he would be misunderstood. Another aspect of this doctrine of the "dependent origination of elements" concerns the relation of the elements of the present life of man with the combinations of elements which constitute his past life and with those which comprise his future existence. You will hear more of this aspect of "dependent origination", or "twelve-term formula of the cycle of existence" as it is otherwise called, in the lecture of my friend, Professor Rozenberg.

The question before us is: Will this continuous birth or rebirth—or, to put it more precisely, this appearance of new combinations of elements which follow one another—ever end? Did this process have a beginning? To the second question the reply given is simply that there was no beginning. To the first, Buddhism gives a specific reply. There will be an end. It is possible to come out of the restless ocean of existence. The way has been shown by the Buddha in his doctrine of morals, to which we now pass over.

THE MORAL LAW

What is the philosophical basis of the moral law in Buddhism? This, we know, is the most difficult question for any philosophical system. In a religion which accepts

the existence of God, divine revelation and free will, this problem is most easily solved. Here, the moral law proceeds from the divine will ; man freely obeys the latter and receives his reward as salvation. But it is far more difficult to substantiate a moral law outside the will of a personal God. For this, the German philosopher, Kant, developed his doctrine of the *categorical imperative*, that is, of the will which is deep-seated in the inmost recesses of human soul and which is a hidden spring, as it were, of all the moral attainment of man.

The orthodox *Brāhmaṇa*-s also had their doctrine of this categorical imperative,—of the will which made it obligatory for the people to carry out religious injunctions and accomplish good deeds irrespective of any divine will. But they saw its source in their holy writ—in the "words"—to which they attributed a supernatural, beginningless existence.

All these doctrines presuppose the existence of the soul or personality and free will. In Buddhism, on the other hand, there is neither freedom nor personality itself which would have been responsible for its actions. On this question, we find an interesting dialogue between a Buddhist and a representative of an Indian philosophical school, the Vaiśeṣika, which defends the existence of soul and free will. The latter asks : If there is no soul at all, who, then, performs actions, who bears the responsibility for these, and who receives the result ? The Buddhist rejoins : And who, according to you, is this person responsible for the acts—this agent ? "The agent", says the [Vaiśeṣika] philosopher, "is the one who is endowed with free will. For instance, we observe in everyday life that some person, say Devadatta, by his free will, washes, eats, or goes for a walk whenever he pleases".

"But who, then, is this Devadatta himself, to whom you attribute the capacity of free actions ? If you assume that his soul is free, its existence does, in no way, stand proved. If, however, by the conventional name, Devadatta, is meant the totality of mental phenomena or elements, such an

agent is far from free! Actions, generally speaking, are of three types; physical actions, speeches and thoughts. As regards the physical and verbal action, they are not free, for they are dependent on thought. But the thought, too, is not free in its control of words and actions, as it, in its turn, depends on its own causes—its past. And if even the thought itself is not free, there is no freedom anywhere. All that lives and moves is under the inexorable power of causes and their effects. Among these causes we do not find any acting soul; therefore it does not have a free will. If we ascertain that, among the causes which result in a certain phenomenon, one is the uppermost, we can conventionally call it an 'acting personality.' But we cannot even conventionally thus speak of the soul, for we do not find any action of even the slightest consequence proceeding from it."

To build a moral law by negating the soul and free personality would have appeared still more difficult than to build it without God. Nevertheless, the Buddha regarded the establishment of a moral law as his main task—the whole of his theoretical philosophy is only a preamble to the moral philosophy which leads to salvation. "Just as the waters of the ocean", he said, "have only one taste, viz. the salty taste, similarly my doctrine has only one taste—the taste of salvation". The acknowldgement of the existence of the soul, and the existence of personality have, in his opinion, not only not helped the establishment of the moral law, these have constituted the main obstacle to it. In the negation of the soul he saw the main trait of his doctrine and of its superiority over all others. Where there is personality, there is property belonging to it; where there is "I", there also is "my"; and where there is personal property, there necessarily emerges a love for it in one form or the other. This attachment to personal property is the root of all evil, the root of every personal action as well as of all social injustice. Thus, by negating the existence of the soul, Buddhism gives us a very profound philosophical basis for the negation of the right of personal

property. What personal property can be possible where even the personality itself is not there? Therefore, a real Buddhist is only he who has renounced personal property —and not merely property but also family, home, etc.— once for all. In the history of world religions, of Christianity and of Islam, we frequently find doctrines which negate personal property and advise that this be renounced. But Buddhism gives the most radical treatment of this question.

The negation of the soul can easily lead a philosophically uninitiated mind to moral indifference. The existence of the soul, as is known, is also denied by materialism, In India, there existed the doctrine of the materialists, which preached an unrestricted enjoyment of life and accepted no moral obligations or retribution for one's actions. Along with materialism there also existed the doctrine of one Gosala Maggaliputta, a contemporary of the Buddha, who taught that "all that is—is, and all that is not—is not". From this he concluded that "there is nothing invisible, that there is no world after death, no responsibility for any actions except that before the earthly power, and that, consequently, there is no other will for the establishment of the basis of moral law." Thus, whatever a person might do, it has no consequence for the soul either in this life or in future, which, generally speaking, does not exist. The Buddha declared that of all the numerous doctrines, this one was the most foolish. He was obviously afraid lest his audience should draw such conclusions from the negation of the soul, as done by those who followed the doctrine of Gosala. "I am teaching", said the Buddha, "that there are actions and their consequences, that there is creative work, and that there is the energy of exerting for the good". However, the conception of impersonal work of the world process and of impersonal good as an element attributed to no personality was so new, so unusual and so difficult to understad that the Buddha was always apprehensive of being misunderstood. So, in his sermons, to avoid misunderstandings, he took recourse to all methods—

right to direct implorings. A later Buddhist philosopher, the famous Kumāralābha, says in this connection: "The Buddha observed the greatest care in formulating his doctrine of the elements of existence, like a tigress holding her cub in her teeth—she does not press her teeth too tightly lest she should harm the cub, and she does not also open her mouth lest the cub should fall down. The Buddha saw all the wounds that the sharp teeth of the dogmatic faith in personality and property could inflict. At the same time, he also saw the danger of falling in the domain of non-responsibility for actions. If humanity sticks to the idea of the existence of eternal soul, it will writhe with wounds inflicted by the sharp weapon of dogmatism. If, however, it stops accepting even the conventional existence of personality, the tender child of its 'moral actions' will perish. To avoid misunderstanding, the Buddha often preferred to evade a direct answer when he saw that his interlocuter was not adequately prepared for a proper comprehension of the doctrine of elements of existence and of their impersonal development. Thus when a Brāhmaṇa, Vatsa, asked whether the conception of a living being would agree with that of a living body or whether there was some difference between them, the Buddha gave no answer and, later explained his silence like this: Had I said that there was a soul, this would have been an untruth, for, in all elements of existence, there is none which would correspond to the idea of eternal soul. Had I said directly that there was no soul, the unfortunate Vatsa might still have fallen in a false position. He might have thought: Earlier, I had a soul, now it is no more! When you say that there is a soul, you are always subject to the danger of being misunderstood that there is a real eternal soul. If you straightaway say that there is no soul, this entails another risk: the people may think that there is no moral responsibility for one's actions."

This very mode of speaking with reservations was also employed by the Buddhists of the later period. The famous dialogue between the mighty Greek king, Menander, and

the Buddhist elder, Nāgasena, on this subject—whether there is a difference between the conceptions of a living body and a living being—is well known.

The king came to the old man and said: "I would like to put a question to you, but I am afraid that you may not give a frank answer. Old men, you know, are awefully talkative. If you promise to reply to my question correctly, I am prepared to ask." "Please ask", said the old man. Then the king put the aforesaid question as to whether there was any difference between the conceptions of a living body and a living being. The Elder replied, "The Buddha has not given any answer to this question". The king objected: 'Most revered Sire! Did you not promise to give me a frank answer and not to evade the point? Why, then, do you now say that the Buddha did not solve this puzzle? This, you see, is not the answer to my question". Then the Elder said: "O Great King! Excuse me, but the kings are also terribly talkative. If you promise to answer me simply and frankly, I would also like to put a question to you". "Please do", said the king. Then the Elder asked: "Are the fruits of the mango tree in your courtyard sweet or sour?" "In my courtyard, there is no mango tree as such", replied the king. "O Great King", the old man objected, "Did you not promise first that you would not evade the question and would give a direct answer to the question asked?" Why, then, do you now tell me that there is no mango tree in your courtyard? Is this the reply to my question?" The king replied, "But how can I say something about the taste of the fruit of a tree which does not exist?" Then the Elder said: "Same is the case with the so-called living being, or soul. It does not at all exist. How can I, then, reply to the question whether it differs from the body or not?" "But, in that case, why did the Buddha not reply directly to Vatsa that the 'soul' was only a conventional symbol of some congeries of individual elements of the life process?" "Because he saw clearly that his interlocutor was not in a position to understand the doctrine

of elements and their perennial appearance in groups in which they were interconnected". So, when the Buddha addressed the laymen, he preached them in a most simple fashion to strive after moral perfection. It is, therefore, difficult even to notice anything specially Buddhistic in his sermon. Life is only suffering, he taught. It does not contain anything truly joyous. Every joy, too, is suffering because it is attained with effort, labour and hence suffering. This is the first noble truth—the so-called truth of the suffering. The second truth indicates that suffering results from passions, greed, grabbing, and from the wish to live and use life. The third truth is that one can be liberated from suffering—viz. the path to salvation. The fourth or the last noble truth is that there is a right path which leads to salvation—the so-called eightfold path of right understanding, right aims, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. These four truths, in their popular form, I repeat, have nothing specially Buddhistic. They are clearly borrowed from medical science with its doctrine of the suffering of a sick man, of the cause of his suffering viz. disease, of the liberation from suffering and of the means leading to it. Other Indian philosophical systems also repeat the doctrine of the same four truths, but what the real philosophical Buddhism understands by the four noble truths is something totally different. By true suffering is understood all the sources whose actions constitute the content of the life-process. By the second truth—the cause of suffering—are meant the same very sources, but from the point of view of their sourceless excitement which occurs under the influence of the forces moved by them and constantly makes them appear and vanish; the beginningless excitement of life-process is the source of suffering or phenomenal existence. Absolute suppression of this excitement, Eternal peace, the Extinction of the life-process for ever—in a word, Salvation or *nirvāṇa*—this is the third noble truth, the truth of the annihilation of suffering. Finally, the fourth truth is the truth of the path to Per-

fection. This is the most important and characteristic truth of Buddhism. The fact is that there are some elements of existence, which have neutralizing effect on the agitation of life-process. Such, primarily, are the elements of true knowledge and self-absorption or of the concentration of thought. By developing themselves gradually, these elements lead all other elements, so to say, to silence: the life is gradually calmed down. The man who, on this path, attains absolute peace and clear knowledge is called a saint. The philosophical doctrine set forth here serves as an answer to the question as to what constitutes the elements of true knowledge. To cognize and to be deeply penetrated by the idea that no "I" exists, there is nothing "mine", there is no soul, and that there exists only changeable work of the individual elements eternally at play,—this is the "true knowledge". This element in embryo is inherent in every act of cognition; this is simply the fact of "understanding"—a clear evaluation by the intellect of what occurs. Independently of general consciousness, i.e. of the very fact of consciousness, there also exists, as we have seen, in every act of cognition an element of "conception" or of the presentation connected with the word. This apart, the Buddhist psychology also distinguishes, in every act of cognition, a special element of understanding or evaluation. This very element of understanding developed by corresponding work leads to the end—to "pure knowledge", i.e. to a philosophical understanding of the world-process, and, in the ultimate end, to the absolute knowledge of the Buddha.

As regards the second element, the so-called "concentration" or absorption of thought, this, too, in its embryo, is outwardly present in every act of knowledge, howsoever simple. This is simply the fact of directing one's attention to something. Attention is the simplest form of self-absorption as a special psychic element. By special exercises this usual method of understanding can be developed. Thus is attained a unique state: the object contemplated, or the thought to which attention is strongly directed,

begins fully to occupy the entire consciousness, ousting everything else from it. The stability of one picture—the state of trance, sometimes accomplished by catalepsy—is attained. The methods and objects of such exercises of concentration of attention are discussed in detail in Buddhist literatures.

Practically all Buddhists do a great deal of these exercises. The Buddha Śākyamuni himself devoted a part of his normal day to these. In Japan, there exists a "Zen" sect which, even to this day, sees in such exercises the very essence of the Buddhist religion. However, this phenomenon is not at all specially Buddhistic but, generally, Indian. This is the so-called "restraint of thought" or "*yoga*" about which we have perhaps heard much, for a talk of *yoga* has lately become, amongst us, a sort of a fashion. But in the Buddhist system, this concentration or *yoga* has a special significance. This is the means or one of those means through which the world-process of life is ultimately calmed down. The individual elements stop functioning, stop manifesting themselves into life, and, primarily, stop appearing. Finally, the passions, attachments and sinful elements die out. Many elements of existence are neutralised; these stop appearing because of mere insight into truth by right knowledge. But there are others which can be destroyed only by self-absorption and by ecstasy of thought. One who has attained the complete permanent annihilation of all agitation is called the Buddha.

CONCLUSION

In one of his remarkable papers, the same Bergson, to whom we have repeatedly referred in the course of this lecture, tries to find out what constituted the essence of philosophical doctrine and the most characteristic trait of any philosopher. He arrives at the conclusion that every philosopher first proceeds from some vision—from a picture in which the very core of his doctrine is embodied. The

entire work of the philosopher is, then, only an attempt to interpret, somehow or other, and understand the importance of this picture which is the intermediate link between the world as observed and the theory formulated. These words can more possibly be applied to the great Indian philosopher and to the system built by him.

This picture is that of the light of a lamp. It burns; the fire appears as existing and lasting whereas, in reality, we have a new light every moment. There is no lasting fire and, therefore generally speaking, even the fire is not there. There is only a stream of some elements which we are accustomed to call fire. When the oil in the lamp runs out, the fire will be extinguished and the stream of moments of fire will stop. So also will this worldly life become extinct when the elements of existence stop appearing. The path to this extinction of the variable flash of our life has been determined by the Buddha in his moral doctrine.

In this short survey we could touch only upon the main aspects of the Buddhist philosophical doctrine. We cannot but conclude that these, when properly understood and put in our philosophical language, reveal a remarkable proximity to the latest, most modern attainments in the domain of our scientific outlook. The "Universe without God", "psychology without soul", the "eternity of elements of matter and spirit" being only a special expression of the law of causality, continuity, life-process in place of existence of things; and in the practical aspect, the negation of the right to private property, the negation of national narrow outlook, universal fraternity of all peoples without the right to private property, and finally the essential and unavoidable faith that we shall move and must move towards perfection irrespective of God, soul and free will,—these are the main features of the Buddhist as well as of our modern latest outlook.

(Speech at the Inauguration of the First Buddhist Exhibition in St. Petersburg on August 24, 1919. Tr. H. C. Gupta)

EIGHTEEN SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM

S. Beal

One of the most interesting but intricate questions that can occupy the attention of the Buddhist student is the history of the eighteen sects into which the Buddhist Church was at an early date separated. A clear account of the causes that led to the schisms and the several tenets held by the separatists was, in the opinion of the late Mr. Spence Hardy, one of the great *desiderata* in the history of this religion. The Chinese and Tibetan books contain much valuable information on these points. Among other works in the northern copy of the *Tripiṭaka*, common in the monasteries of China and Japan, is one which contains three translations from Sanskrit of the treatise, written by Vasumitra, on the eighteen schools. This Vasumitra[1] was one of the Buddhist patriarchs who lived probably about the time of Kaniṣka, that is, as far as we know at present with any certainty, about 42 B.C.[2] His aim was evidently to reconcile the differences that existed in traditions, customs, and acknowledged scriptures; and it was probably under his auspices, or by his influence, that the Great Council was held that rearranged and revised the Buddhist Canon as it is known in the North. There are three translations of this treatise into Chinese; the first is anonymous, and is most obscure The second is by Chin-ti, of the Tsin dynasty. The third is by Hiwen Thsang, of the Tang dynasty. It would be rash to attempt a translation of these tracts into English without aid or direction—nor would the present writer have undertaken such a task—but, unfortunately, there is a parallel translation

1. Ind. Ant. vol. IV, p. 363.
2. By some he is placed rather later.—ED. I.A.

from the Tibetan in Vassilief's *History of Buddhism* (Second Supplement, p. 222). This translation by the learned writer named above was prepared after careful comparison of the Tibetan text with the three Chinese versions. The result is no doubt an accurate, though most obscure, reproduction of the work by Vasumitra. It may perhaps be useful to attempt an independent version of the three Chinese translations. Not that we can hope to render all plain, but with the purpose of inducing scholars in China to look into this matter, and endeavour to throw some light on the subject by comparing these translations and working independently in the production of others. The matter may appear to little consequence to some, and needless labour to others, but in the presence of facts, which are daily coming to our knowledge, it becomes almost the duty of those who are interested in the religious development of the Eastern mind, not only in India, but in other countries more or less affected by Indian speculations, to search out the causes and the character of that development, and so connect it with the religious movements which occurred elsewhere about the same time. We proceed to give part of the translation by the anonymous Chinese writer, and which stands first in the Buddhist Cannon.[3] *An Account of the Eighteen Principal Schools of Buddhism, from the original Treatise of Vasumitra, translated into Chinese by thrree separate authors.*

1. A treatise on the eighteen schools (translator's name unknown).

In the 15th section of the latter volume of the work known as the Queries of Mañjuśrī (*Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā*), the subject being "The division into schools." [It is thus written :]

At this time Mañjuśrī questioned Buddha thus : "World-honoured ! Explain, I pray you, what will the different schools into which your followers will be separated in the future after your *Nirvāṇa*, and from what original division these schools will be formed ?"

3. This translation is denoted as C by Vassilief.

Buddha answered Mañjuśrī thus : "There will be twelve schools among my followers hereafter, in which (the separate interpretation of) my law will be preserved in the world. These schools will be the repositories of the diversified fruits of my Scriptures (*piṭakas*) without priority or inferiority—just as the taste of sea-water is everywhere the same—or as the twelve sons of one man all honest and true, so will be the exposition of my doctrine advocated by these schools. Mañjuśrī ! the two original germs of these separate schools will be found in the rendering of my dotrine by the Mahāyāna and the Prajñāpāramitā systems. The Śrāvakas, Pratyeka Buddhas, and different Buddhas (i.e. the doctrine which teaches these three degrees of religious advancement) will come from the Prajñāpāramitā. Mañjuśrī ! as earth, water, fire, wind and space compose the material and visible universe, so the Mahāyāna and the Prajñāpāramitā compose the material of the system in which these different degrees of Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-Buddhas, and Buddhas are entertained."

Mañjuśrī asked Buddha this question : "World-honoured ! and by what names will these schools be known ?"

Buddha replied : "The two schools first formed will be 'the Mahāsāṃghikas[4] and the Pi-li'[5] (Sthaviras). Within a hundred years after my *Nirvāṇa* a school will be formed called 'Yeb-wu-in'[6] [Ekabhyohārikhās (Burnouf, tom. I. p. 357), or Ekavyavahārikas (according to Vassilief's *Buddhism*, p. 227, n.)]. Again, within a hundred years from the formation of this school, another will be formed called 'Ko-kin-li'[7] [Kukkulikās]. Within a hundred years from this another school will arise called To-man[8] (Bahuśrutīyas).

4. This word means the great congregation, composed of young and old alike, the same as the school of "various and miscellaneous Moral Rules."—[Ch. Ed.]
5. This word means the congregation of old men only, it is the same as that which acknowledges the authority of the (original) Vinaya only.
6. So called because they agreed in the main with the Mahāsāṅghikas. [Ch. Ed.]
7. From the name of the master who formed it,—[Ch. Ed,]
8. So called from the "famous wisdom" of its founder.—[Ch. Ed.]

Within a hundred years from this there will be another school formed, called 'Che-tai-ho'[9] [Caitiyavādās]. Within another hundred years a school will arise called 'Eastern Mountain'[10] [Purvaśailās]. Within a hundred years another school will arise from this called 'Northern Mountain'[11] [Uttaraśailās]. These seven school come from the Mahāsāṃghikas and including the original Saṃgha, or congregation, they are classified as eight schools.

"From the Sthaviras were formed eleven schools. Within a hundred years from the origin of the above school, there arose another, called 'Yeh-tsai-wu-in'[12] (Sarvāstivādas). Within a hundred years from this school proceeded another, called 'Yun-Shan[13] (Haimavatas). Within a hundred years from this school another will arise, called 'Vātsiputriyas'[14] (sons of the calf). Within a hundred years after this another school called 'Dharmottarīyas.'[15] Within a hundred years from this another called 'Bhadrāyanīyas.[16] Within a hundred years from this school will come another called 'Yih-tsai-sho-kwei'[17] (Sammatīyas). Within a hundred years another school will arise from this, called 'Jing-shan'[18] (Jungle-hill, i.e., Ṣāṇṇagarika). Within a hundred years after this arose another school called 'Tai-puh-ho-ki'[19] (Mahīśāsakas). Within a hundred years from

9. So called from the locality in which the founder lived.
10. So called from the locality in which the founder lived.
11. Likewise from the abode of the founder.
12. So called because the founder of the school held the positive existence of all things in the three worlds.—[Ch. Ed]
13. So called from the abode of the founder.
14. From the name of the founder.
15. From the name of the founder.
16. From the name of the founder.
17. So called from the great esteem in which the master was held among men.
18. So called from the character of the place where the founder lived. The name is Sanskrit however means "of six towns," and so is Tibetan ; see Vassilief, p. 231—J.B.
19. So called because the founder of this school was, when a child, east into a well by his mother, and when his father sent to recover his body he was found uninjured.

this arose the school called 'Fau'[20] (Dharmaguptas). Within a hundred years another school arose called 'Ka-hi-pi'[21] (Kāśyapīyas). Within a hundred years from this another school arose named 'Sieon-to-lo-ku'[22] (Samka- ntikās or Sautrāntikas). The above are the eleven schools derived from the Sthaviras, and including their mother-school, comprise twelve distinct branches."

Buddha spoke the following *gāthās* :—

"The school of the Mahāsāṃghikas
Will divide into seven parts,
The Sthaviras into eleven,
This is what we term the twelve schools,[23]
The eighteen including the two original,
All these will arise from the Mahāyāna,
Which admits of neither affirmation nor contradiction.
Now I say that in future time will appear,
The miscellaneous writings of the Master Kumārajīya
After the cessation (*nirvāṇa*) of the true Law,
Just one hundred years ;
And by these various productions
The true Law will be gradually destroyed,
Everyone forming his own views,
Founding their opinions on heterodox sects,
Despising that which ought to be honoured.
A rebellious and discontented tone will arise
But now the *Sūtras* alone are the ground
On which to build the doctrine of Buddha,
Relying on the former truths.
Seeking a foundation on this solid basis,
Is like in the multitude of sand particles
Seeking for the true gold.
Thus have I heard former sages.
Who appear like suns among men."

"One hundred and sixteen years after the *Nirvāṇa* of

20. The founder's name.
21. The founder's name.
22. The founder rested his deductions on the Sūtra.
23. That is the twelve schools that sprang from the Mahāsthaviras,

Buddha (in a) city called 'I-ta-fuh,' (I for Pa, therefore equivalent to Pa-ta-fuh, i.e., Pāṭaliputra) there shall be a king called 'A-yu' (Aśoka) who shall gather (as in a square) the whole of Jambudwipa as his empire. In his time the division of the great congregation into schools shall begin. There shall arise a Bhikṣu called 'Neng' (able), and another called 'Yin-un' (Nidāna), and and another called 'To-man' (Bahuśrutīya ?)—these shall assert the necessity of teaching five propositions as a basis for religious instruction. The five points are these :-

Profit and increase from others.

Ignorance.

Doubt.

Words according to the religious formula.

To obtain reason.

"It was from a consideration of these questions that the first two schools arose, to wit, the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviras.[24]

"In the middle of the century (*following*) the Mahāsāṃghikas other schools arose as follows :- (1) 'Yih-shwo' [Ekavyavahārikas], (2) 'Chu-shai-kan-shwo' [Lokottaravādins], (3) 'Kin-ku' [Gokulikas or Kukkuṭikas]. Again, in the middle of a century or so after the Mahāsāṃghikas will originate other schools, called 'Shi-chi-lun.'[25]

"Again, in the middle of the two hundred years, the heretical followers of the Mahādeva, taking on themselves the vows of religious ascetics, fixed their abode in Mount Chaitiya. Again, from the Mahāsāṃghikas arose three other schools, viz. Che-tika, 'Huh-pi-lo' (Apara), and Uttaraśaila. Thus from the Mahāsāṃghika arose nine schools, viz. (1) Mahāsāṃghikas, (2) Ekavyavahārika, (3) Lokottaravādin, (4) Gokulika, (5) Bahuśrutīya, (6) Shi-chi, (7) Yan-ka, (8) Ho-lo, (9) Uttaraśaila.

"In the middle of the three hundred years from the Sthavira school, arose from controversies connected with

24. In Chinese, "high-seat".
25. I cannot explain this title at present.—S. B.

the Canon of the *Abhidharma*, different schools, as follows: (1) Sarvāstivādin, also called Hetuvāda, (2) Haimavatas. In the middle of the three hundred years again there arose another school called Vātsīputrīyas, from this school sprang another, called Dharmagupta (or Dharmottarīyas), another called Bhadrayānīyas, and again, another called Mi-li (where *li* is evidently a mistake for *ti*) otherwise named San-mi-ti (Sammatīyas) another school called the school of the six cities (Ṣāṇṇagarikas). Again, in the three hundreed years, the Sarvāstivādins produced another school, viz., Mahīśāsakas, from which sprang the Dharmaguptas (so called from the Master of the school, whose name was In-chi-lin).[26] Again, in this three hundredth year, another school sprang from the Sarvāstivādins, called Yan-li-sha (Varṣa), likewise named Kāśyapīyas. In the four hundredth year from the Sarvāstivādins sprang another school called Seng-kai-lin-to (Saṃkrānti), so called from the name of its founder Yeon-to-lo (Uttara), this school was also known as Sautrāntika.

"Thus, from the school of the Mahāsthaviras branched off twelve schools, viz. (1) Mahāsthaviras, (2) Haimavatas, (3) Sarvāstivādins, (4) Vātsiputrīyas, (5) Dharmottarīyas, (6) Bhadrayānīyas, (7) Sammatīyas, (8) The school of six Cities, (9) Mahīśāsikas, (10) Dharmaguptas, (11) Kāśyapīyas, (12) Sautrāntikas."

We will now proceed to speak of the distinguishing tenets of these various schools, both to their radical differences and also those held[27] in common.

The following schools, Mahāsāṃghikas, Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaras, Kukkuṭikas, hold the views we are about to mention. They all say that the traditions respecting the Buddhas having been born into the world (*as men*) are incorrect—that the law is Tathāgata, and the only one in the world. They all say that the (*system of religion known as*) 'turning the Wheel of the Law' is at an end.

26. Vide Vassilief, p. 232 n. 5.
27. So I would translate "Chung-kan."

They say that "things exist," "relationships exist," "truth exists". They say that Tathāgata is infinitely extended, immeasurably glorious, eternal in duration, that to his power of recollection (*nim*, *smṛti*), his power of faith (*śraddhābala*), his experience of joy, and his life, there is no end ; he sleeps not, he speaks, asks, reflects not ; they say that his existence is ever one and uniform (*one heart*), that all things born may obtain deliverance by having his instruction, that in his essential existence (one heart, *ekacitta*) Tathāgata comprehends all subjects (*laws*) in a moment by his own wisdom.

(IA, Vol. ix, 1880)

THE SECTS OF THE BUDDHISTS

T. W. Rhys Davids

We find in the *Dipavaṃsa* (Chapter V. 39-48) a list of the eighteen sects (or schools rather) into which the Buddhists in India had, in the course of the second century of the Buddhist era, been divided. In the *Mahāvaṃsa* (Chapter V) there is a similar list, evidently drawn from the same sources, but omitting (in Turnour's texts) numbers 1-7 of the older list. It is curious that precisely where these names ought to come in (at line, 5), the text given by Turnour is evidently corrupt, a half-*śloka* at least being missing, and probably more.[1]

So far as is yet known these eighteen sects are not elsewhere mentioned in Pali literature, excepting only in the commentary on the *Kathā Vatthu*, edited by the late Professor Minayeff, for the Pali Text Society, in 1889. The book itself, composed by Moggali-putta Tissa, about 240 B.C., deals with a number of ethical points which were then matters of controversy; and it is the greatest pity that, owing to want of funds, the Pali Text Society has not yet been able to publish it. But the commentary, short as it is (only 200 pages in the journal of the Pali Text Society), gives the name of the particular sect against which certain of the arguments are directed.

These data are very important. Following the list of eighteen sects in the *Dīpavaṃsa* and *Mahāvaṃsa* above referred to is another list of six later sects, the names of which, with one exception, are derived from places, presumably the places where the sects in question took their

1. Since the above was written I find that the missing passage has actually been found by Batuwan Tudawa. It contains exactly what we find in the *Dīpavaṃsa*.

origin. Now we find that in a large majority (about ninety as against about forty-five) of the cases in which the commentary gives the name of the sect referred to the names are those of these six later sects. And of the forty-five directed against the eighteen older schools, sixteen are directed against one, nineteen against another, and seven against a third (only four others of the eighteen being mentioned at all, and three of these four being referred to only once.)

There is every reason to believe that the commentator's statements as to the sects against whom his author's arguments were directed are, so far as they go, correct. When we have the text before us we may be able to specify others. But we may fairly draw the conclusion that *already in the time of Aśoka only seven of the eighteen sects had retained any practical importance at all, and that of these seven only three, or perhaps four, were still vigorous and flourishing.*

This will be made plainer by the following table, in which I have first arranged the list given in both the Ceylon chronicles (and derived by both from the history handed down in the Mahā Vihāra at Anurādhāpura) in such a way as to show the relationship of these eighteen Hīnayāna sects one to another. To each sect I have then added the pages of the commentary on the *Kathā Vatthu*, in which it is specifically referred to by name.[2]

2. The *Maha-bodhivaṃsa,* being edited this year for the Pali Text Society, also gives the eighteen schools of Buddhists in India. But its data are merely derived from the older Ceylon sources, and it adds nothing new.

All our Ceylon information is really derived from the Mahāvihāra at Anurādhāpura.

Three of the eighteen sects have been found in inscriptions of the second and third century A. D.—The Bhadrayānīyā in the "Archaeological Survey of Western India", 11, 85; IV. 109 111—the Cetika. *ibid* IV. 115, and "Arch, Survey of Southern India," I. 100—and the Mahāsāṃghika in the "Arch. Survey of Western India," IV. 113.

TABLE I. SECTS OF THE HĪNAYĀNA

(A. The eighteen sects.)

1. Thera-vādino.
    2. Vajjiputtakā.
        4. Dhammuttarikā.
        5. Bhaddayānikā, 58.
        6. Channagarikā (Dip. Chanda°, and Cy on *Kathā Vatthu* Channā°) 3.
        7. Sammitiyā, 42, 58, 67, 68, 97, 106, 110, 111, 112, 114, 123, 127, 129, 150, 156, 160, 161, 162, 174 (Total 19).
    3. Mahiṇsāsakā, 60, 90, 92, 111, 123, 160, 173, 181.
        8. Sabbatthivādā (Dip. Sabbattha-), 43, 58, 132.
            10. Kassapikā, 50.
                11. Saṇkantikā
                12. Suttavādā.
        9. Dhammaguttikā.

13. Mahāsaṅgītikārakā = Mahāsāṃghikā, 123-129, 131, 135, 136, 147, 152, 154, 158, 176, 189, 190 (Total 16).
14. Gokulikā, 58.
    16. Bahussutakā = Bāhulikā.
    17. Paññatti-vādā.
    18. Cetiya-vādā.[3]
15. Ekabyoharikā.

All these 18 arose in 100-200 A.B. (Dīp. 5.53 = Mah. 5.8).

TABLE I. HĪNAYANA (continued)

(B. Later sects in India)

1. Hemavatikā.

2-5. Andhakā, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 71, 78, 79, 80,

3. This school was very probably the source of the schools of the Eastern and Western Caves at Dhanakaṭaka (the Pubba—and Apara-selika of Table I. (B) as its name occurs once on the Amarāvatī Tope in the description of one of the donors, a member of the order resident in one or other of these mountain Vihāras.

81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 101, 102, 103, 105, 109, 110, 111, 115, 117, 118, 121, 122, 130, 133, 144, 149, 150, 151, 156, 161, 162, 163, 172, 173, 174, 177, 180, 184, 185, 189, 190, 193, 197, 198 (Total 55)

2. Rājagirikā, 1, 94-99, 140, 154, 163, 164.
3. Siddhatthikā, 94-99, 163, 164.
4. Pubbaselikā, 54, 56, 90, 106, 108, 109, 112, 114.
5. Aparaselikā, 54, 55, 56, 143, 148, 159, 187.

Andhakā

6. Vādariyā (so in Mah. The Dīp. 5. 54, has Aparo Rājagiriko, and the Cy on the Kathā Vatthu, p. 5, calls them Vājariya and Vājiriyā).

(C. Later sects in Ceylon.)

1. Dhammaruciyā (B.C. 90)
2. Sāgaliyā (A.D. 251).
3. Dāṭhāvedhakā (A.D. 601).

But the commentator mentions all five sects with names not occuring in Table I. I give these sects, therefore, in a separate table, again adding all the pages in which they are referred to.

TABLE II.

1. Uttarāpathakā, 73, 81, 82, 92, 105, 117, 118, 119, 132, 137, 139, 141, 144, 145, 148, 149, 151, 160, 170, 172, 177, 179, 180, 183, 188, 191, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198 (Total 34).
2. Vibhajjavādino, 6 (=Thera-vādino).
3. Vetulyakā, 167, 171, 197.
4. Suññatavādā, 167.
5. Hetuvādā, 153, 154, 156, 158, 166, 181, 184, 198.

We can now, therefore, in a third table, give the names of the sects which are, so far, known to have been considered as of real practical importance in the time of Aśoka, or rather when the *Kathā Vatthu* was composed.

TABLE III. SECTS IN ASOKA'S TIME.

1. Thera-vādino (=Vibhajja-vādino), the old school, to which Moggaliputta Tissa himself and the authors of the Ceylon commentaries, etc., belonged.

2. Sammitiyā (derived from the above, but existing only on the Continent).
3. Mahiṃsāsakā, with their subdivision, the
   4. Sabbatthi-vādino.

5-8. The Andhra sects, with four subdivisions (see Table I. B.).
9. The Mahāsāṃghikā.
10. Uttarāpathakā.

It will not be possible till we get the text of *Kathā Vatthu* to show the exact nature of the differences by which these sects were distinguished. But is is already clear from the commentary, which shows the nature of the questions at issue, that they one and all looked upon Arahatship (not Bodhisatship) as the ideal of a good Buddhist, and were really much alike in essentials, not differing more than the various sects of Protestants do today.

The above results are entirely confirmed by such other evidence of value as is accessible to us. We have two important Hīnayāna books in Sanskrit, the *Divyāvadāna* and the *Mahāvastu*, accessible to scholars in critical editions. The former mentions no sects, and though its ethical teaching, as is natural in a story-book, is put in the background, it contains very little that is contradictory to the older teaching. The latter purports to belong (see vol. i. p. 2, line 13) to the Lokottaravādins, a sect of the Mahāsāṃghika (who are supposed to have been the furthest removed from the school of the Theras). But there is very little in its teaching which could not have been developed from the Thera-vāda ; and it also differs from the Pali texts in the lower general tone—in the prominence given to legendary matter, and in the consequest inattention to ethical points, and the details of Arahatship—rather than by the enunciation of new and divergent doctrines.

We find a similar confirmation of our *Kathā Vatthu* commentator if we look at the names of the sects referred to by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims. These are shown in the following table.

TABLE IV. SECTS MENTIONED BY FA HIAN AND YUAN THSANG.

A. By Fa Hian.

In Lob and Karaschar	the Hīnayāna, Ch. 2.
,, Khoten	,, Mahāyāna, Ch. 3.
,, the Dard Country	,, Hīnayāna, Ch. 6.
,, Udyana	,, Hīnayāna, Ch. 8.
,, Panjab	,, both Ch. 14, 15.
,, Kanauj	,, Hīnayāna, Ch. 18.
,, the Middle Country	,, 96 sects, Ch. 20 (apparently not Buddhists).
,, Kosambi	,, Hīnayāna, Ch. 34.
,, Patna	,, Mahāsaṃghika, Ch.
,, India	,, 18 sects, Ch. 36.
,, Patna (and China)	,, Sabbatthi-vādā, Ch. 36.
,, Ceylon	,, Mahiṃsasākā, Ch. 40.

B. By Yuan Thsang.

In Gaz	the Sabbatthivādā, 1. 49 (trans. Beal).
,, Bamiyan	,, Lokottaravādino, 1. 50.
,, Kapisa	,, mostly Mahāyāna, 1. 55.
,, India	,, 18 schools (apparently both Hīna—and Māha-yāna !) 1.80
,, Gandhara	,, Hīna-yāna, 1. 104.
,, Po-lu-sha	,, Hina-yāna, 1. 112.
,, Udyana	,, Mahā-yāna, 1. 120, and also Nos. 3, 8, 9, 10, 13, of Table I. (A), 1. 121.
,, Takshasila	,, Mahāyāna, 1. 137.
,, Kashmir	,, Mahāsāṃghikā, 1. 162.
,, Sagala	,, Hīnayāna, 1. 172.
,, Kuluta	,, Mahāyāna, 1. 177.
,, ?	,, Hīnayāna, 1. 179.
,, Mathura	,, both, 1. 180.
,, Sthanesvara	,, Hīnayāna, 1. 184.

In Srughna	the Hīnayāna, 1. 187.
,, Rohilkund	,, Hīnayāna (Sabbatthivadino) 1. 190, 192, 196.
,, Govisana	,, Hīnayāna, 1. 200.
,, Pi-lo-shan-na	,, Mahāyāna, 1. 201.
,, Ahikshetra	,, Sammitiyā, 1. 200.
,, Kapitha	,, Sammitiyā, 1. 102.
,, Kanauj	,, both H. and M., I. 207.
,, Navadevakula	,, Sabbatthivādino, 1. 224.
,, Audh	,, both, I. 225.
,, Hayamukha	,, Sammitiyā, I. 230.
,, Prayaga	,, Hīnayāna, I. 231.
,, Kosambi	,, Hīnayāna, 1. 235.
,, Visakha	,, Sammitīyā, 1. 239-40.
,, Sravasti	,, Sammitīyā. 2. 2.
,, Kapilavastu	,, Sammitiyā, 2. 14.
,, Benares	,, Sammitiyā, 2. 44, 45.
,, Ghazipur	,, Hīnayāna, 2. 61.
,, Mahasala	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 65.
,, Svetapura (?)	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 75.
,, Vajjians	,, both, 2, 78.
,, Nepal	,, both 2, 81.
,, Magadha	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 82.
,, ,,	,, both; 2. 103, 104.
,, Gaya	,, Mahāyāna of the Sthavira School, 2. 133
,, Pigeon Vihara	,, Sabbatthivādā, 2. 182.
,, Mongir	,, Sammitiyā, 2. 186.
,, Campa	,, Hīnayāna, 2. 192.
,, Po-chi-po Vihara	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 195.
,, Pundra	,, both 2. 195.
,, Bengal	,, Sthavira, 2. 199.
,, Bhagalpur	,, Sammitīyā, 2. 201.
,, Orissa	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 204.
,, Kalinga	,, Sthavira school, 2. 208.
,, Kosala	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 210.
,, Dhanakataka	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 221. (Here are

	the Pubbasela and Aparasela Vihāras)
In Kanchipura	the Sthavira, 2. 229.
,, Ceylon	,, Sthavira, 2. 247.
,, Konkana	,, both 2. 254.
,, Mahrattas	,, both, 2. 257.
,, Baroach	,, Sthavira, 2. 260.
,, Malva	,, Sammitīyā, 2. 261.
,, Kachch	,, Hīnayāna & Mahāyāna, 2. 266.
,, Valabhi	,, Sammitīyā, 2. 266.
,, Surat	,, Sthavira, 2. 269.
,, Gurjara	,, Sabbatthivādā, 2. 270.
,, Ujjen	,, both, 2, 270.
,, N. Sindh	,, Sammitīyā, 2. 272.
,, Parvata (Po-fa-to)	,, both, 2. 275.
,, Kurachi (?)	,, Sammitīyā, 2. 276.
,, Lang-kia-lo	,, both, 2. 277.
,, Persia	,, Sabbatthivādā, 2. 278.
,, Pi-to-shi-lo	,, Sammitīyā, 2. 279.
,, O-fan-cha	,, Sammitiyā, 2. 280.
,, Fa-la-na	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 281.
,, Ghazni	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 184.
,, Hwoh	,, both, 2. 288.
,, Och	,, Sabbatthivādā, 2. 304.
,, Kashgar	,, Sabbatthivādā, 2. 307.
,, Cho-kiu-kia	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 308.
,, Khoten	,, Mahāyāna, 2. 309.

On these lists it may be noted that Fa Hian knows of the list of eighteen Hīnayāna sects (see Ch. XXXVI.) ; but he mentions by name only three ; and those three are precisely those three of the eighteen which, in our Table No. I, are shown to have been, together with the Sammitīya, the most important in Aśoka's time. Further, Fah Hian only knows of one other sect, the Mahāyānists, and of them only in Khoten and the Panjab. Similarly the *Kathā Vatthu* mentions only one other sect as at all of equal importance with those just referred to ; and that sect is that of the "Northerners", the Uttarapāṭhaka. The

undesigned coincidence between the two authors is as complete as it is striking.

Yuan Thsang goes into much greater detail, but his statements are quite consistent with those of the earlier authors. He finds the Mahāsāṃghika only in Kashmir, and there only in small numbers (100), and a subdivision of that school, that is the Lokottara-vādins, only in Bamiyan. Further down on the continent that school seems, in his time, to have passed over bodily to the Mahāyānists. But the Hīnayānists are still much more widely distributed, and also more numerous; and of their subdivisions it is precisely those mentioned as important by the earlier writers who recur in Yuan Thsang. He also in most cases gives an estimate of the actual number of Bhikṣus in each country. But before discussing these numbers it is necessary to notice the statement, astounding at first sight, that the 20,000 Bhikṣus in Ceylon were then principally Mahāyānists.

Yuan Thsang admits that the Ceylonese were originally Hīnayānists, but he explains the change by a division of opinion which took place between the Bhikṣus resident at the capital, in the Mahā Vihāra, and in the Abhayagiri Vihāra (the latter drifting towards the Mahāyana). This division he dates about 200 years after Mahinda's time, that is to say, shortly before the Christian era. He is referring evidently to the same schism as that described in the commentary on the *Mahāvaṃsa* (Turnour, p. 53), which is there dated about 90 B.C., and is said to have arisen between the residents at these two great Vihāras. As the whole of the voluminous Pali literature of Ceylon in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and later centuries, is written entirely from the Theravāda standpoint, it is clear that Yuan Thsang, who did not himself visit Ceylon, either misunderstood or was misinformed as to the side on which the preponderance, in his time, lay. And when he adds that the particular school of the Mahāyānists to which the Ceylonese Buddhists belonged was the Sthavira or Thera school, it can scarcely be doubted that he (or his infor-

mant) had in view the Theravāda school to which we know the Ceylonese almost exclusively adhered. A Thera school of the Mahāyānists has not been found mentioned in any other author, and the Sthavira school is elsewhere referred to as identical with the Thera-vādā, the most fundamentally Hīnayānist of all the sects.

Taking this to be so, it will be of value to arrange in another table, according to sects, the data given by Yuan Thsang, adding the numbers of the Bhikṣus where he gives numbers.

TABLE V. NUMBERS GIVEN BY YUAN THSANG.

1. Sthavira sect (Thera-vādino).

In Gayā	1000 (in a Vihāra founded by a Ceylon king).
,, East Bengal	2000
,, Kaliṅga	500
,, Kāñcipura	10,000
,, Ceylon	20,000
,, Bharukaccha	300
,, Suraṭṭha	3000
	36.800

2. Sammitīya (No. 7 of Table I.).

In Anikṣetra	1000
,, Sankassa	100
,, Hayamukha	1000
,, Visākhā	3000
,, Sāvatthi	few
,, Kapila-vatthu	30 (text has 3000)
,, Benares	3000
,, Migadāya	1500
,, Mungiri	4000
,, Bhagalpur	2000
,, Mālva	2000
,, Valabhī	6000
,, N. Sindh	10,000
,, Kurāchi	5000

In Pi-to-shi-lo	3000
,, Avanti (?)	2000
	43,630

3. Sabbatthivādino (No. 8 in Table I.)

In Balk	200
,, Ma-ti-pu-lo (Rohilkund)	800
,, Pigeon Vihara	200
,, Kanauj	500
,, Gurjara	100
,, Persia	Several hundred
,, Och	Several hundred
,, Kashgar	10,000
More then	12,000

4. Lokottaravādino (probably—No. 14 of Table I. A.)

In Bāmiyan	1000

5. Hīnayāna, without mention of any one of the eighteen sects.

In Sāgala	100
,, Sthāneṣvara	700
,, Srughna	1000
,, Govisāna	100
,, Kosambī	300
,, Ghazipur (near Benares)	1000
,, Campā	200
	3400

6. Mahāyāna.

In Kapisa (Hindukush)	6000
,, Uyyāna (so at I. 120. But the schools are given, p. 121, and they all belong to the Hīnayāna!)	
,, Kulūta (on the Upper Biyās)	1000
,, Pi lo-shan-na	500
In Ti-lo-shia-kia (20 m. W. of Nālanda)	1000

In Po-chi-po Khara	700
,, Orissa	10,000
,, South Kosala	10,000
,, Dhanakaṭaka	1000
,, Fa-la-na	300
,, Ghazni	1000
,, Cho-kiu-kia	500
,, Khoten	1000
	32,000

7. Bhikṣus who study Hina—and Mahā-yāna

In Mathurā (on the Jumna)	2000
,, Kanauj	10,000
,, Audh	3000
,, Vajjians	1000
,, Nepal	2000
,, Magadha	10,000
,, Pundra	3000
,, Koṅkana	10,000
,, Mahrattas	5000
,, Ujjen	300
,, Po-fa-to	1000
,, Lang-kia-lo	6000
,, Hwoh	200
,, Och	1000
	54,500

Totals of above.

Hīnayāna		
Sthavira	36,800	
Sammitīyā	43,630	
Sabbatthivādino	12,000	96,430
Lokottaravādino	1000	
(No name)	3400	
Mahāyāna		32,000
Both Hīna-and Mahāyāna		54,500
(Total members of the Order)		182,930

These numbers are exclusive of those, not many cases, where it is said there were 'few' at any place. They show that Yuan Thsang estimated the Buddhist Bhikṣus in India and the adjacent countries to the N. W. towards the close of the seventh century of our era at less than two hundred thousand. And further that, in his opinion, about three-fourth of them studied at that time what he called the 'Little Vehicle', and about one-fourth of them what he called the 'Great Vehicle'.

Besides the above statements, we have others from Tibetan books of the tenth and following centuries, which will be of value, inasmuch as they attempt to give not only the geneology of the sects (their relation to one another), but also a summary of their special doctrines. Mr. Rockhill, to whom we owe the best existing summary of these statements[4], says of these as to doctrine that "the theories of the different schools are unfortunately given...so concisely that it is a difficult, if not an impossible task, to give a satisfactory translation of them." And the statements as to the origin of the sects are so confused, and even contradictory, that very little can be made out of them. Tāranātha (of the seventeenth century) gives another account of the origin of these sects drawn principally from the same Tibetan sources as Mr. Rockhill summarises at greater length (Tāraṇātha, pp. 270-273). It is plain that all these Tibetan data rest upon earlier Sanskrit summaries, and go back eventually to a tradition which, when it is fully known, will probably confirm, and even perhaps add to, the data derived from the other sources[5].

I would add that in an essay in the Asiatic Researches (Vol. XVI. pp. 424 fol., written in 1828), Mr. Hodgson has given us a somewhat extended summary of four later

4. In his "*Life of the Buddha,*" Chapter VI.
5. Mr. Beal, in the *Indian Antiquary*, ix, 300, gives us the same details as we find in Mr. Rockhill, but through a Chinese instead of a Tibetan translation.

schools in Nepaul, none of which are even mentioned in the foregoing works. These are :

TABLE VI. NEPAUL SECTS

1. The Svābhāvikā.
2. The Aiṣvarikā.
3. The Karmikā.
4. The Yātnikā

They are all probably Mahāyānist, and if so are the only subdivisions of that school known to us by name. Mr. Hodgson does not refer to any Sanskrit authority, and is apparently quoting the verbal statements of a Nepal pandit. And, notwithstanding the lapse of time, the sects thus named had not yet been found in any Buddhist author.

Finally we have the following list of Buddhist schools known to Sāyana-Mādhava in the fourteenth century A. D. in South India.[6]

1. The Vaibhāṣikā.
2. The Yogācārā.
3. The Sautrāntikā.
4. The Mādhyamikā.

The conclusion I would venture to draw is that our best authorities are really at harmony ; and that the history of the Buddhist sects is not the confused and hopeless muddle it has been often supposed to be, but only awaits the publication of the texts, and especially of the *Kathā Vatthu*, to be capable of reconstruction in an intelligible and fairly satisfactory way.

(JRAS, 1891)

6. *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha*, Chapter III.

SCHOOLS OF BUDDHIST BELIEF

T. W. Rhys Davids

I have received several interesting communications on my article, published in our Journal for last July, on the Sects of the Buddhists. The Rev. J. E. Carpenter has given me additional figures in Yuan Thsang which had escaped my notice. These numbers bring up the totals given by the Chinese author of the adherents of the different schools to 200,000 instead of 182,000. But they leave the conclusion, which was drawn from those numbers, as it stood.

Professor Bühler writes, that besides the references to inscriptions mentioning one or other of the schools, there are a few other references known to him in inscriptions as yet unpublished. On a consequent application from me he has been kind enough to send a second letter in which the details are given, and it is here printed in full.

Mr. Bouverie-Pusey, who takes much interest in the question, has pointed out to me a possible explanation of Yuan Thsang's mistake in assigning the Sthavira school to the Mahāyānists. When his informants, as stated in the 'Vie de Hiouen Thsang', p, 192, were questioned by him, they may have been willing to leave on his mind the impression that they belonged to the same school as he himself did.

Mr. Bouverie-Pusey also suggests that use might be made of Wassilief's translation of the Tibetan version of the tract assigned to Vasumitra—more especially as he has translated it in full with copious notes. I have accordingly read it through again to see what could be made out of it, and am obliged to say that I still think Rockhill's summary of the Tibetan notices of the Buddhist schools is the more intelligible of the two. But the fact is that short tracts like those attributed to Vasumitra and Bhavya

and Vinīta Deva are really of very little use without a larger knowledge which would supersede them except as guides to the memory. Even the Kathā-vatthu, which is some centuries older, and nearer, therefore, to the time when these discussions reged : which is also most probably written either in the very language, or at least in a dialect closely allied to the dialects, in which they were conducted ; and which besides, being more than twenty times as long, is able to devote more space to making the questions at issue clear,—is hard enough to understand. It is easy therefore to realize why it is that these translations of translations of earlier and shorter treatises should be so much more difficult to use to any profit. What we want is not short summaries of the opinions of all the various schools, but substantial works expounding the views of individual schools at length, and in their own words. When the magnificent edition of the standard book of the Lokuttara-vādins, which we owe to the self-denying scholarship and industry of M. Senart, shall be completed, all these works, *Kathā-vatthu* itself not excepted, will be superseded on that point. We shall go to the *Mahāvastu* to find out what the Lokuttara-vādins thought.

And so let us hope that before the Pali Text Society shall have been able to complete its important task of placing in the hands of scholars a complete edition of the Buddhist piṭakas, together with the interpretation put upon them by the oldest and sole surviving school (which has also kept most closely to them)—by that time let us hope we shall be able to compare with that interpretation the divergent ones of other now extinct Hīnāyāna schools in equally complete editions of their works too.

As I mentioned in the former article, the *Mahāvastu* is the only work we have available in a critical edition that purports to belong to any special school. It is true that a much discussed passage[1] of a Chinese author

1. See Foucaux, "Lalita Vistara" (the Guimet edition), pp. vii, viii, Wassilief, "Buddhismus." p. 123. Beal, "Legend of Śākya

(whose name is restored by Bunyin Nanjio[2] to Jñāna-gupta, and by Beal[3] to Jñāna-kūṭa sic), the *Lalita Vistara* is apparently stated to be a book of the Sabbātthivādins. But that book calls itself (see the last page of the Calcutta edition) a Mahāyāna work ! How is this to be reconciled ? The passage referred to occurs in the colophon to the *Fo-pan-kin-tsi-chin*, of which work Beal's book, strangely entitled "The Romantic Legend of Śākya Buddha," is a kind of abstract. The Chinese title is restored by Mr. Bunyin Nanjio *(loc. cit.)* to *Buddha-pūrvacaryā-saṅgraha-sūtra*, and he adds below *Abhiniṣkramaṇa,-sūtra*, which is the only restoration used by Beal. The colophon says in Beal's version, "It may be asked : 'By what title is this book to be called ?' to which we reply the Mahāsāṅghikas call it *Ta-sse* (*Mahāvasu).* The Sarvāstavādas (sic) call it Ta-chong-yeh *(Lalita Vistara).* The Kasyāpiyas (sic) call it *Fo-wong-yin-un* (former history of Buddhism). The Dharmaguptas call it, etc., etc." And Wassilief's translation (*loc.* cit.) is practically the same.

From this Wassilief draws the conclusion that "under different names they understood the same book." If that be so, it is certainly not the *Lalita Vistara*, for the analysis given by Beal is quite different from that work. But Foucaux draws the conclusion that the passage refers to different books, and regards it as a proof that they all existed towards the second century after the death of the Buddha (!).

Now the Chinese title which Wassilief (and following him also Beal) restores here to *Lalita Vistara* is entirely different from the Chinese titles so restored by Bunyin Nanjio in his Catalogues Nos. 159 and 160. It is therefore, to say the least, most doubtful whether it is the *Lalita Vistara* at all which is here referred to. Even if it

Buddha," p. v ; and Senart, "Mahāvastu," vol. i. p. iii. M. Senart refers to "des autorites chinoises," but the two passages he gives in the note refer to the same authority.

2. Catalogue of Chinese Books, No. 680.
3. *loc. cit.* p. 1.

were, it would be entirely unwarranted to conclude that because a Chinese writer of 587 A. D. thought it belonged to the Sabbatthivādins that it did certainly so belong; much less than because it did, it must have been written, as M. Foucaux thinks this passage proves, at the time when that school first, arose (that is to say, in the second century after the Buddha's death). Surely it is better to leave so uncertain, and so late, a statement in its own obscurity, and to trust rather to the published text of the *Lalita Vistara* itself, and regard it therefore as a Mahāyāna book.

We cannot, therefore, refer to any work emanating from any school differing from the Sthaviras, save only to the one book of the Lokuttara-vādins. Meanwhile—until we have such works—the three Tibetan tracts and the Pali treatise are of use for showing us the kind of thing we ought to look for. I have spent some days in trying to piece together the various statements the Tibetans make as to the Sabbatthivādins, hoping that this would serve as a specimen of what might be reaped from them in the way of positive information. But the results are too unsatisfactory—contradictory, as it seems to me, on some points and simply unintelligible, even with the help of the *Kathā Vatthu*, on others to be fit for publication.

But I have put together a table of their statements as to the names and interdependence of the Hīnayāna schools, without attempting to harmonize their divergent and contradictory data. I have simply added in brackets the number of each corresponding name in the Theravāda list given in my last article.

As the matter seems to be of interest, I have added also a complete synopsis of the questions discussed in the *Kathā Vatthu.* This I had prepared for my own use only, as an assistance in writing the introduction to the second volume of my Milinda (in which some of the questions are discussed), and had not intended it for publication, except eventually as part of an edition of the whole text. It is drawn up from a MS. in my own

collection, a very faulty one, I am sorry to say. One or two points may already be noticed. Those questions dealt with in chapters one and two are discussed at so much length that the two chapters make up about one-third of the book. Incidentally to the principal theses a number of other questions, subsidiary to the main issue, are put and settled. Including these, the number of questions put in the *Kathā Vatthu* is about a thousand. In one or two cases (II. 2 and XXII. 5) these questions are mentioned in the title of the main thesis, and are included therefore in my synopsis. For the interpretation of the real meaning of the question put, which is often by no means certain from the words employed, much help has been derived from the commentary, as published by the late Prof. Minayeff for the Pali Text Society.

TABLE I.

THE HĪNA-YĀNA SECTS ACCORDING TO TIBETAN TRANSLATIONS.

Vasumitra.

1. Thera-vādino (Hemavattikā) (1 and 19)
    2. Hetu-vādino (32)
    3. Sabbatthi-vādino (8).
    4. Vajjiputtakā (2)
        5. Dhammuttarikā (4)
        6. Bhaddayānikā (5)
        7. Sammittiyā (7)
    8. Channāgarikā (6)
    9. Mahīṅsāsakā (3).
    10. Dhammaguttikā (9).
    11. Kassapikā (Sovassikā) (10).
    12. Saṅkantikā (Suttantavādino) (11 and 12).
    13. Mahāsaṅghikā (13).
    14. Ekavyohārikā (15).
        15. Lokottaravādino.

16. Kukkutikā (14).
17. Bahussutikā (16).
18. Paññatti-vādino (17).
19. Cetiya-vādino (18).
20. Pubbaselikā (Uttaraselikā) (22).
21. Aparaselikā (23).

Bhavya.

1. Hemavatikā = Thera (1 and 19).
2. Sabbatthivādino (8).
3. Vibhajja-vādino (29).
4. Hetu-vādino (27)
5. Muruntakā.
6. Vajjiputtakā (2).
7. Dhammuttarikā (4).
8. Bhaddayānikā (5).
9. Sammittiyā (7).
10. Avantikā.
11. Kurukulakā (Gokulikā) (14).
12. Mahiṅsāsakā (3).
13. Dhammaguttikā (9).
14. Suvassikā.
15. Kassapikā (10).
16. Uttariyā.
17. Saṅkāntikā (11).
18. Mahāsaṅghikā (13).
19. Ekavohārika (15).
20. Lokuttara-vādino.
21. Bahussutikā (16).
22. Paññatti-vādino (17).
23. Cetiya-vādino (18).
24. Pubbaselikā (22).
25. Aparaselikā (23).

Bhavya's 'other say'.

1. Therā (1)
2. Sabbatthi-vādino (8).
4. Mūla-sabb°.
5. Suttantikā (11).

3. Vajjiputtakā (2).
    6. Dhammottariyā (4).
    7. Bhaddāyaniyā (5).
    8. Sammittiyā (7).
    9. Chan-nāgarikā (6).
10. Vibhajja-vādino (29).
    11. Mahiṅsāsakā (3).
    12. Kassapiyā (10).
    13. Dhammaguttikā (9).
    14. Tāmrasātiyā.
15. Mahāsaṅghikā (13).
    16. Pubba-selikā (22).
    17. Uttara-selikā (23).
    18. Rājagiriyā (20 and 24).
    19. Hemavatā (19).
    20. Cetiya-vādino (18).
    21. Saṅkānti-vādino (?).
    22. Gokulikā (14).

Bhavya's 'again others say'.

1. Therā = Hemavatā (1).
    2. Sabbatthi-vādino.
    3. Vajjiputtakā (2).
        4. Sammitiyā (7).
        5. Dhammuttariyā (4) } = Mahagiriyā.
        6. Bhaddayāniyā (5) }
        7. Channāgarikā (6).
8. Vibhajja vādino.
    9. Mahiṅsāsaka (3).
    10. Dhammaguttikā (9).
    11. Tāmrasātiyā.
    12. Kassapiyā (10).
13. Mahāsaṅghikā (13).
    14. Ekavyoharikā (15).
    15. Gokulikā (14).
        17. Bahussutikā (17).
        16. Paññatti-vadino (16).
        18. Cetiya-vādino (18).

QUESTION DISCUSSED IN THE

Kathā Vatthu

I. 1. Is there is the truest and highest sense a soul ? No.
Opponents Sammitiyā, Vajjiputtakā (Mil. I. 40-45, 48, 86, II. 85).

2. Can an Arahat fall from Arahatship ? No.
Contra Sammitiyā, Vajjiputtakā, Sabbatthivādino and some of the Mahāsaṅghikā.

3. Can a god enter the Path or the Order ? No.
Contra Sammitiyā.

4. Can a converted man get rid of evil without going through the four stages of the Path ? (Relying on Dhp. 239).
Contra Sammitiyā and others.

5. Can an unconverted man get rid of all lust and ill will ? No.
Contra Sammitiyā.

6. Does everything exist ? No. (There is nothihg that is not transient. Everything becomes.)
Contra Sabbatthi-vādino (hence their name).

7. Did the Skandhas exist in the past ? No.

8. Did anything (as it now is) exist in the past ? No.
Contra 'some did and some did not' say the Kassapikā.

9. Do all qualities rest on memory ? No
Contra the four subdivisions of the Andhakā (Compare Mil. I. 122).

10. Have all things now existing existed the same in the past ? No.
Contra the Andhaka.

II. 1. Can an Arahat be guilty (unwittingly and through the action of the Māras) of indecency ? No.
Contra the Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā (Comp. XXIII. 2)

2. Can the Arahats have ignorance, doubt and error ?

No (relying on M. V. I. 1, etc.).

Contra the Pubbaseliyā (Mil, II. 98).

3. Does a converted man on attaining the first Jhāna burst out into the exclamation "All is sorrow" ? No (replying on S. VI. 2-4=Th. I. 256-7=Divy. 300, 569=Mil. II. 60).

Contra the Pubbaseliyā (See XI. 4)

4. Is the perception of sorrow that follows on such an exclamation part and parcel of the Excellent Way ? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā.

5. Can one thought last a day (That is, is thought exempt from the law of impermanence) ? No.

Contra Andhakā.

6. Are the Confections all as ashes ? No (relying on Mahāvagga I. 21).

Contra Gokulikā.

7. Is insight attained to in a certain specified order ? No (relying on Cullav. IX. 1-4).

8. Was the Buddha extra-ordinary as regards the ordinary affairs of Life ? No.

Contra Andhakā.

9. Are there two sorts of Nirvāṇa ? No.

Contra Mahiṅsāsakā and Andhakā.

III. 1. Are the ten powers of the Tathāgata common also to his hearers ? No.

Contra Andhakā.

2. Are the nine last of them (as well as the first) part of the Excellent Way ? No.

Contra Andhakā

3. Can one whose heart is lustful be set free ? No.

Contra Andhakā.

4. Can a man set free by Jhāna be afterwards set free by the Path ? No (relying on D. 2. 97).

5. Does a man get rid, by the mere entry on the Path, of doubt and wrong views ? No.

Contra Andhakā and Sammitiyā.

6. Is a converted man at once in possession of the

fiive moral organs *(indriyāṇi)* ? No.
Contra Andhakā.

7. Can the eye of flesh, through strength of Dhamma, become the Heavenly Eye (which perceives the rebirths of others) ? No.
Contra Andhakā and Sammitiyā (Mill. I. 179-185).
8. The same of the ear of flesh.
9. Is the Divine Eye nothing more than the knowledge of other people's rebirth ? No. (It sees the moral cause) (relying on Th. I. 996, 7).
10. Is there moral restraint among the gods (in the heavens above that of the thirty-three) ? No.
11. Have the so-called Unconscious Gods consciousness ? No.
Contra Andhakā.
12. The same of the gods in the Nevasaññā-nāsaññā world.

IV. 1. Can a layman be an Arahat ? No. (He can become, but cannot remain, one).
Contra Uttarāpathakā (see Mil. 2, 57-59, 96-98).
2. Is there any one who is born as an Aarhat (in the Heavens of Pure Abode) ? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
3. Are all the qualities of an Arahat free from the Āsavas ? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
4. Is the Arahat gifted with the fruits of all four stages of the Path at once ? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā (see IV. 9).
5. Has the Arahat six forms of equanimity (one for each of the five senses and one for the mind) ? No, it is the same for all.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.[4]
6. Does Bodhi (wisdom, insight) lead to Buddhahood ? Not necessarily. There is a kind of Bodhi which leads to Arahatship.

4. That this is their view follows from the opening words of the Commentary on IV. 7.

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

7. Is every one endowed with the 32 marks a Bodisat? No (quoting D. 30).

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

8. Did the Bodisat (that is, Jotipāla, M. 81) adopt the method and conduct necessary for Buddhahood at the command of Kassapa the Buddha? No (quoting Mahāvagga, I. 6. 7, 8, and I. 6, 23-26).

Contra Andhakā.

9. Does the realization of Arahatship include the fruits of the three lower stages of the Path? No.

Contra Andhakā (compare IV, 4).

10. Is the breaking of all the Fetters at once the same thing as Arahatship? No (they must be broken gradually).

Contra Andhakā.

V. 1. Is a man who has the knowledge of emancipation an Arahat? No (there are emancipations the knowledge of which has not that result).

Contra Andhakā.

2. Can an Asekha (one who is not yet an Arahat) have the knowledge of an Arahat? No.

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

3. Can he who has successfully accomplished the Meditation on the Earth be said to have a false view? No.

Contra Andhakā.

4. Is an unconverted man, when good, capable of entering the career of a Bodisat? No.

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

5. Is every kind of knowledge (*ñāṇa*) the same as analysis (*Patisambhidā*)? No.

Contra Andhakā.

6. Are there two kinds of truth (*sacca*) or only one? Two.

Contra Andhakā.

7. Is the knowledge of other people's thoughts to be attained by meditation? No.

Contra Andhakā.

8. Is there such a thing as knowledge of the future ?
Of the immediate future yes, but not otherwise (quoting (M. P. S. I. 28 = Mahav. V. 28).
Contra Andhakā.
9. Is there such a thing as knowledge of the present ?
No (the moment anything is known it is already past).
Contra Andhakā.
10. Have disciples as well as Buddha the power of knowing who will be converted ? No.
Contra Andhakā.

VI. 1. Is the Noble Path self-existent ? No.
Contra Andhakā (relying on A. 3. 22)
2. Is the Chain of Causation self-existent ? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā and Mahiṅsāsakā (relying on S. XII. 20).
3. Are the Four Truths self-existent ? No.
4. Is the Realm of the Infinity of space self-existent ? No.
5. Is the Attainment of Cessation self-existent ? No.
Contra Andhakā and Uttarāpathakā.
6. Is space self-existent ? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā and Mahiṅsāsakā (compare Mil. 2. 103, foll.).
7. Is space visible ? No.
Contra Andhakā.
8. Is the Earth-element visible ? No.
Contra Andhakā.

VII. 1. Are there not same qualities included in other qualities ? Yes.
Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthikā.
2. Are there not some qualities united with other qualities ? Yes.
Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthikā.
3. Are there not mental qualities ? Yes (quoting D. X.).
Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthikā.
4. Is it only mental giving (charity) that is a real gift ? No.

Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthikā.

5. Does the merit which arises out of the enjoyment of a gift by the donors tend to increase? Yes (relying on S. I. 7, 5 and A. IV. 51).

Contra Rājagirikā, Siddhatthikā and Sammitiyā.

6. Do the dead benefit by gifts given in the world? No.

Contra Rajagirikā and Siddhatthikā.

7. Is the Earth a result of Karma? No.

Contra Andhakā.

8. Are old age and death results of Karma? No.

Contra Andhakā.

9. Is there no result of the Excellent Way save the putting away of evil? Yes (there is the acquisition of moral qualities, positive good as well as negative

Contra Andhakā.

10. Does one result of Karma produce another? No.

Contra Andhakā.

VIII. 1. Are there six future states? No, only five.

Contra Andhakā and Uttarāpathakā.

2. Is there an Intermediate Realm (where beings await rebirth)? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā and Sammitiyā.

3. Are the five constituents of lust also elements of lust? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā.

4. Have lusts five realms? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā.

5. Are those qualities which have form also elements of form? No.

Contra Andhakā.

6. The same of qualities which have no form.

7. Is every being with the six senses dependent on the element of form? No.

Contra Andhakā.

8. Have the beings in the Formless Worlds a form? No.

Contra Andhakā.

9. Is a bodily set due to a virtuous thought neces-

sarily beautiful in form? No.

Contra Mahiṅsāsakā and Sammitiyā.

10. Is there vitality in form? Yes.

Contra Pubbaseliyā and Sammitiyā (see Mil. I. 89).

11. Will an Arahat fall from Arahatship through the result of an evil deed, such as abuse of an Arahat, committed in a previous birth? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā and Sammitiyā (compare I. 2 and Mil. 2. 20-22).

IX. 1. Can a man, by insight into the advantages of Arahatship. but without insight into the dangers attendant on the Saṅkhāras, put away the Fetters? No.

Contra Andhakā.

2. Is the meditation on the ambrosia (of Arahatship) a Fetter? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā.

3. Has form a basis? No.

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

4. Are the seven evil inclinations (*anisayā*) without basis? No.

Contra Andhakā and some Uttarāpathakā (see XI. 1)

5. Has knowledge no basis? It has.

Contra Andhakā.

6. Is a thought which has its basis in past events therefore without a basis? No.

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

7. Is every thought followed by reasoning? No.

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

8. Does every reasoning and argument diffuse itself in speech? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā.

9. Does every speech correspond to a previous thought (train of reasoning)? Yes.

Contra Pubbaseliyā.

10. The same of every act.

11. Is a man now in possession of what he once had, or eventually will have? No.
Contra Andhakā.

X. 1. Can five Skandhas arise when the five already arisen have not ceased? No.
Contra Andhakā.

2. Is the Path the outward form of him who walks therein? No.
Contra Mahiṅsāsakā Sammitiyā and Mahāsaṅghikā.

3. Is there attainment of the Path to him who has the five Viññāṇas? No (quoting D. 2. 64).
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā (see XII. 1).

4. Are the five Viññāṇas both good and bad? No.

5. Are they accompanied by reflection? No.

6. Has he who has the Path two different moralities? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā (relying on 'Virtues the base,' etc. Mil. I. 53).

7. Is morality independent of thought? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

8. Is not morality consequent on thought? Yes.

9. Does that morality which is the result of acquirement tend to increase? No (relying on S. I. 5. 7 and A. 4. 47).
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

10. Is Intimations (Viññatti) a moral action? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

11. Is not to practise Intimation a wrong action? No (relying on A. 4. 47).
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā (see Mil. 2. 33-37).

XI. 1. (a) Are the seven evil inclinations (*Anusayā*) immoral (neither good nor bad)? No.
(b) or do they arise without a cause? No.
(c) or are they independent of thought? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā and Sammitiyā (see ix. 4).

2. Is he whose ignorance has been dispelled by the knowledge of the Path not to be called wise? Yes.

Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

3. Is knowledge independent of thought? No.
   Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
4. Does the knowledge that 'all is sorrow' follow on an exclamation to that effect? No.
   Contra Andhakā (see II. 3 and IX. 8)
5. Can every one who has the power of Iddhi live for a Kalpa? No (relying on M. P. S. III. 54 and A. 4. 182).
   Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
6. Ia a continuation of thought Samādhi? No.
   Contra Sabbatthivāda and Uttarāpathakā.
7. Is the persistence of qualities (in S. 12. 20) produced?[5] No.
   Contra Andhakā.
8. Is the transitoriness of all things something that is like the things themselves, produced? No.
   Contra Andhakā.

XII. 1. Is restraint of the bodily organs an act of Karma? No.
   Contra Mahāsaṅghikā (misunderstanding D. 2. 64).
2. Has every Karma a result? No.
   Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
3. Is speech a result (of Karma)? No.
   Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
4. Are the six organs of sense a result (of Karma)? No.
   Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
5. Is a converted man restrained (from evil) by the inherent nature of his condition? No.
   Contra Uttarāpathakā.
6. The same of the Kolaṅkolo and the Ekabījī. (These are the stages immediately after conversion, See A. 3. 86, 2).

5. There is a difference of reading here. The Commentary has *parinipphannā and parinippannā.* My MS. of the text has *parīnabbānā* (sic) and *parinibbaṭṭā.*

7. Would a person who holds wrong views also commit murder? No.
   Contra Uttarāpathakā.
8. Can a man holding wrong views be sure of escape from rebirth in states of woe? No.
   Contra Uttarāpathakā.
9. Has not a converted man escaped it?

XIII. 1. Does a Kappaṭṭho remain for the whole Kalpa in the same condition? No.
   Contrā Rājagirikā.
2. Can a man in purgatory do good? Yes.
   Contra Uttarāpathakā.
3. Is it impossible for a man who has once committed a mortal sin to enter the Path? No.
   Contra Uttarāpathakā.
4. Can a Niyato enter the Path? No.
   Contra Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā.
5. Can any one when still entangled by the obstacles be rid of them? No (quoting D. 2. 97).
   Con. Uttarāpathakā (by a play on the word).
6. Can a man bound by the Fetters be rid of them? No (relying on A. 4. 47, and D. 2. 97).
7. Can a man practising Jhāna be rightly said to enjoy it? and is his desire to attain it the same as making it the object of his thought? No.
   Contra Andhakā.
8. Is there such a thing as desire for the distasteful? No.
   Contra Uttarāpathakā (misunderstanding passages where the Arahat is said to find a pleasure even in pain).
9. Is craving after qualities not to be condemned as immoral? No, it should be (relying on M. V. I. 6. 20).
   Contra Pubbaseliyā.
10. Is craving after qualities not the cause of sorrow? No (quoting M. V. I. 6. 20).

Contra Pubbaseliyā.

XIV. 1. Does nature transmigrate into vice? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā

2. Has a new being all its six senses at the moment of conception? No (relying on S. X. I).
Contra Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā (see XXII. 6).

3. Does the sensation of sound arise simultaneously with the Sensation of sight? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.

4. Is the outward form of an Arahat caused by the four elements? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.

5. Is inclination to lust a different thing from being under the power of lust? No.
Contra Andhakā.

6. Is the being possessed (by lust, etc.) something independent of the mind? No.
Contra Andhakā.

7. Does the desire for future life in the worlds of form follow on, (and is it contained in) the habit of dwelling in thought upon form? No.
Contra Andhakā (see XVI. 10).

8. Is the wrong view that the world is eternal rightly called *avyākata* (undefined)? No (relying on M. 63).
Contra Andhakā and Uttarāpathakā.

9. Is he who has attained to Jhāna free from wrong views? No.

XV. 1. Is the quality of being due to a cause a fiixed one? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

2. Is it right to say that though Ignorance is the cause of the Saṅkhāras, the Saṅkhāras are not the cause also of Ignorance? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

3. Is time diffused? No (relying on A. 3. 67). (See Mil. I. 77. 78) (The question apparently

means, is it the same time that is past, present and future ?)

4. Are the moments, minutes, etc. (subdivisions of time) diffused ? No.

5. Are the four Great Evils (*āsavā*) free from evil ? No.

Contra Hetuvāda (on the ground that there being only four, there are none left over for them to be implicated with).

6. Are the decay and death of transcendental qualities themselves transcendental ? No.

Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

7. Is the attainment of coma an extraordinary affair ? No.

Contra Hetuvāda.

8. Is the same an ordinary matter ? No.

Contra Hetuvāda.

9. Will a person who has attained to it die in the ordinary way ? No.

Contra Rājagirikāi.

10. Does the attainment of it involve rebirth in the Realm of Unconsciousness ? No.

Contra Hetuvāda.

11. Is Karma something different from the accumulation thereof ? No.

Contra Andhakā and Sammitiyā.

XVI. 1. Can a man subdue another's mind ? No.

Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

2. Can a man exert another's mind ? No.

Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

3. Can a man insure another's bliss ? No.

Contra Hetuvadā.

4. Does attention act through comprehension ? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā.

5. Is form a cause ? No.

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

6. Does form go with its cause ? No.

Contra Same.

7. Is form good? is it bad? Neither.
   Contra Mahiṅsāsakā and Sammitiyā.
8. Is form a result (of Karma)? No.
   Contra Andhakā and Sammitiyā.
9. Does form belong to the Realm of Form? No.
   Contra Andhakā.
10. Is the desire for life in the Realm of form included in the element of form? No.
   Contra Andhakā (see XIV. 7).

XVII. 1. Does an Arahat lay up merit? No.
   Contra Andhakā.
2. Can an Arahat die before he has worked out the Karma of his previous actions? Yes.
   Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthakā.
3. Is Karma itself the result of previous Karma? No.
   Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthakā.
4. Is all pain connected with the organs of sense? No.
   Contra Hetuvāda.
5. Is the Excellent Way to be excepted from the saying, 'All Saṅkhāras involve sorrow'? No.
   Contra Hetuvāda.
6. Can it be rightly said that the Saṅgha receives no gift? No (relying on A. 34 and A. 52).
   Contra Mahasuññata-vāda and Vetulyakā.
7. Or that the Saṅgha purifies a gift? Yes.
   Contra the same.
8. Or that the Saṅgha has food given? Yes (relying on Mahāvagga, VI. 35. 6).
   Contra the same.
9. Or that a gift to the Saṅgha is the great avail? Yes (relying on S. XI. 2. 6=Vin. V. 34. 23-27).
   Contra the same.
10 Or that a gift to the Buddha is of great avail? Yes.
11. Is a gift purified by the giver, not the receiver? No (relying on A. 4. 78).

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

XVIII. 1. Was not the Buddha really born in the world of men ? Yes.

Contra Vetulyakā (He remained in the Tuṣita heaven and sent only a phantom of himself to the world !)

2. Did not the Buddha himself preach the Dhamma? Yes. Contra Vetulyakā (Ānanda preached it !)

3. Had the Buddha no mercy ? Yes (Comp. Mil. I. 162-170).

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

4. Were the Buddha's excretions of exceeding sweet savour ? No.

Contra some Andhakā and the Uttarāpathā.

5. Did the Buddha realize the fruits of all the stages of the Path at once ? No.

Contra the same.

6. Does each (of the four) Jhānas arise out of the previous one ? No.

Contra Mahiṅsāsakā and some Andhakā.

7. Is there an intermediate Jhāna or a breach in Jhāna (between the first and second) ? No.

Contra Sammitiyā and some Andhakā.

8. Can he who has attained to the first Jhāna hear sounds ? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā.

9. Does the eye see forms ? No (it is the mind that sees them through the eye).

Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

XIX. 1. Is there no such thing as the putting away of evil dispositions but only of past evil ? No.

Contra some Uttarāpathakā.

2. Is Suññatā (Emptiness) predicable of the Skandhas ? If emptiness of soul be meant, yes. If emptiness of the three fires be meant (in which sense Emptiness is an epithet of Nirvāṇa), no.

Contra the Andhakā.

3. Is the fruit of Samaṇaship unmade ? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā.

4. Is Attainment unmade? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā.

5. Is the state of qualities unmade? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.

6. Is Nirvāṇa virtuous? No.
Contra Andhakā.

7. Is an unconverted man walking the Path? No.
Contra some Uttrāpathakā.

8. Is there a faith (etc., the question is asked of each of the Moral Organs) which is of the world? Yes.
Contra Hetuvāda and Mahiṅsāsakā.

XX. 1. Is an involuntary offence a Deadly Sin? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā.

2. Has an unconverted man no knowledge? He may have.
Contra Hetuvāda.

3. Are there no warders is Purgatory? There are.
Contra Andhakā.

4. Are there animals in heaven? No (animals go to heaven, but become gods. Whether they like to use animal forms or not makes no difference).
Contra Andhakā.

5. Is the Excellent Way five-fold? No, eight-fold.
Contra Mahiṅsāsakā.

6. Is the twelve-fold knowledge (of the Four Truths—see my "Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 150-152) extraordinary? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā.

XXI. 1. Was the doctrine altered, or made afresh, at the Councils? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā.

2. Cannot the unconverted man separte himself at the same time from the qualities belonging to the three Dhātus? Yes.
Contra the same.

3. Can Arahatship be attained without breaking the

ten Fetters? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghika (see 22. 1)

4. Have the Buddhas or their disciples intentional Iddhi? No.
Contra Andhakā.

5. Do some Buddhas surpass others? No.
Contra Andhakā.

6. Are Buddhas born in all quarters of the Universe? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.

7. Are all qualities abiding? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā.

8. Is Karma always certain? No.
Contra the same.

XXII. 1. When an Arahat dies, is there any Fetter he has not broken? No.
Contra Andhakā.

2. Has an Arahat at the moment of his death such good thoughts as will produce a result in Karma? No.
Contra Andhakā.

3. Is the Arahat at the moment of his death in the fourth stage of the Vimokhas? No.
Contra some Andhakā.

4. Can a child in the womb be converted? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā (compare XIV. 2).

5. a. Can a child in the womb become an Arahat?
b. Can a man be converted in a dream?
c. Can a man become an Arahat in a dream? No.
Contra the same.

6. Are all the thoughts of a dreamer indifferent (neither good nor bad)? No.
Contra the same.

7. Does habit never become a cause? It does (Mil, 1.90)
Contra the same.

8. Are all qualities only momentary in thought? No (relying on M. 1. 190).

Contra Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā (comp. XI. 6)

XXIII. 1. Is sexual intercourse allowable on the ground that it is right to be of one mind? No.

Contra Andhakā and Vetulyakā.

2. Can beings not human have sexual intercourse under the outward form of Arahats? No.

Contra some Uttarāpathakā (compare II. 1).

3. Can a Bodisat by reason of desire for sovranty be reborn in realms of woe, or believe in heresay, or pratise asceticism, or follow a wrong teacher? No.

Contra Andhakā.

4. Is there such a thing as an absence of lust that is lust, or an absence of ill will that is ill will, or an absence of folly that is folly? No.

Contra Andhakā.

5. Is form not diffused? It is.

Contra some Uttarāpathakā and Hetuvāda (see XI. 7, 8 and XV. 3. 4).

(JRAS, 1892)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE PĀLI CANONS

B. C. Law

Rhys Davids in his Buddhist India (p. 188) has given a chronological table of Buddhist literature from the time of Buddha to the time of Aśoka which is as follows :—

1. The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found in identical words, in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.
2. Episodes found, in identical words', in two or more of the existing books.
3. The Sīlas, Pārāyaṇa, the Octades, the Pātimokkha.
4. The Dīgha, Majjhima, Aṅguttara, and Saṃyutta Nikāyas.
5. The Sutta-Nipāta, the Thera-and Therī-Gāthās, the Udānas, and the Khuddaka Pāṭha.
6. The Sutta Vibhaṅga and Khandhkas
7. The Jātakas and the Dhammapadas
8. The Niddesa, the Itivuttakas and the Paṭisambhidā.
9. The Peta and Vimāna-Vatthus, the Apadāna, the Cariyā-Piṭaka, and the Buddha-Vaṃsa.
10. The Abhidhamma books; the last of which is the Kathā-Vatthu and the earliest probably the Puggala-Paññatti.

This chronological table of early Buddhist literature is too catechetical, too cut and dried, and too general to be accepted inspite of its suggestiveness as a sure guide to determination of the chronology of the Pali canonical texts. The Octades and the Patimokkha are mentioned by Rhys Davids as literary compilations representing the third stage in the order of chronology. The Pali title corresponding to his Octades is Aṭṭhakavagga, the Book of Eights. The Book of Eights, as we have it in the Mahāniddesa or in the fourth book of the Suttanipāta, is composed of sixteen poetical discourses, only four of which, namely, (1) Guhaṭṭ-

haka, (2) Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka. (3) Suddhaṭṭhaka and (4) Paramaṭṭhaka share the common title of Aṭṭhaka and consist each of eight stanzas. That is to say, the four only out of the sixteen poems fulfil the definition of an Aṭṭhaka or Octade, while none of the remaining poems consists, as it ought to, of eight stanzas. The present Aṭṭhakavagga composed, of sixteen poems may be safely placed anterior to both the Mahāniddesa and Suttanipāta. But before cataloguing it as a compilation prior to the four Nikāyas and the Vinaya texts it is necessary to ascertain whether the Aṭṭhakavagga presupposed by the four Nikāyas was a book of four poems bearing each the title of Aṭṭhaka and consisting each of eight stanzas or it was even in its original form an anthology of sixteen poems. Similarly in placing the Pātimokkha in the same category with the Sīlas and Pārāyaṇas it would be important to enquire whether the Pātimokkha as a bare code of monastic rules was then in existence, whether it contained in its original form 227 rules, or less than this number. There are clear passages in the Aṅguttara Nikāya to indicate that the earlier code was composed of one and half hundred rules or little more (sādhikaṃ diyaḍḍhasikkhāpadasataṃ, A. N. Vol. II, p. 232). As Buddhaghoṣa explains the Pāli expression, "Sādhikaṃ diyaḍḍhasikkhāpadasataṃ it means just 150 rules. According to a most reasonable interpretation the number implied in the expression must be taken more than 150 and less than 200. If the earlier code presupposed by the Aṅguttara passages was composed of rules near about 150 and even not 200, it may be pertinently asked if the Patimokkha, as we now have it, was the very code that had existed prior to the Aṅguttara Nikāya. Our doubt as to the antiquity of the Pātimokkha as a bare code of rules is intensified by the tradition recorded by Buddhaghoṣa in the Introduction to his Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, (pt. I., p. 17) that the two codes of Pātimokkha were to be counted among the books that were not rehearsed in the First Buddhist Council.

The putting of the first four Nikāyas under head No. 4

with the implication that these were anterior to the Suttanipāta and the remaining books of the Pāli cannon are no less open to dispute. With regard to the Dīghanikāya it has been directly pointed out by Buddhaghoṣa that the concluding verses of the Mahāparinibbāṇa Suttanta relating to the redistribution of Buddha's bodily remains originally composed by the rehearsers of the Third Buddhist Council and added later on by the Buddhist teachers of Ceylon. A material objection to putting the Dīgha and the *Aṅguttara Nikāyas* in the same category is that in the Dīgha Nikāya the story of Mahāgovinda (Dīgha, II., pp. 220 foll.) has assumed the earlier forms of Jātakas characterised by the concluding identification of Buddha, the narrator of the story, with its hero, while in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is a simple chronicle of seven *purohitas* without the identification. The four *Nikāyas* are interspersed with a number of legendary materials of the life of the Buddha which appear at once to be inventions of a later age when the Buddha came to be regarded and worshipped as a superhuman personality.[1] Our case is that without discriminating the different strata of literary accretions it will be dangerous to relegate all the four Nikāyas to the early stage of the Pāli cannon.

The Suttanipāta figures prominently in the fifth order of the chronology suggested by Rhys Davids. Without disputing that there are numerous instances of archaism in the individual *suttas* or stanzas composing this anthology, we have sufficient reasons to doubt that the anthology as a whole was at all anterior to the Niddesa which heads the list of the Pāli Cannonical texts representing the eighth order. By the Niddesa we are to understand to separate exegetical works counted among the books of the Khuddaka-Nikāya, (1) the Mahāniddesa being a philosophical commentary on the poems of the Aṭṭhakavagga (forming the fourth book of the Sutta-Nipāta) and (2) the Cullaniddesa being a similar commentary on the poems of the Pārāya-

1. Read the Life of Gotama, the Buddha by E. H. Brewster.

ṇavagga (forming the fifth or the last book of the Sutta-Nipāta). The two questions calling for an answer in this connection are (vide B. M. Barua's Aṭṭhakavagga and Pārāyaṇavagga as two independent Buddhist anthologies). Proceedings and Transactions of the Fourth Oriental Conference, Allahabad, 1928, pp. 211-219 (1) was the Mahāniddesa composed, being intended as a commentary on the Aṭṭhakavagga, the fourth book of the Sutta-Nipāta or on the Aṭṭhakavagga, then known to the Buddhist community as a distinct anthology? and (2) was the Cullaniddesa composed, being intended as a commentary on the Pārāyaṇavagga then known to the Buddhist community as a distinct collection of poems? With regard to the second question it may be pointed out that the poems of the Pārāyaṇa group, as these are found in the Sutta-Nipāta, are prolouged by 56 Vatthugāthās, while the Culla-niddesa is found without these introductory stanzas, The inference as to the exclusion is based upon the fact that in the body of the Cullaniddesa, there is nowhere any gloss on any of the introductory stanzas. We notice, moreover, that the glosses of the Cullaniddesa are not confined to the sixteen poems of the Pārāyaṇavagga, the scheme of the Cannonical Commentary including an additional *sutta*, namely, the Khaggavisāṇa, which now forms the second *sutta* of the first book of the Sutta-Nipāta. From this place assigned to this particular *sutta*, in the Cullaniddesa, it is evident that when the Cullaniddesa was composed, it passed as a stray *sutta*, not belonging to any particular group, which as the Uragavagga. The stray nature of the Khaggavisāṇa Sutta may be taken as conclusive also from its mixed Sanskrit version in the Mahāvastu (Senart's edition, Vol. I., pp. 357-359), in which, too, it is not relegated to any group. If any legitimate hypothesis is to be made keeping the above facts in view it should be that the scheme of anthology in the Cullaniddesa rather shows the anthology of the Sutta-Nipāta yet in the making than presupposing it as a *fait accompli*.

Even with regard to the first question concerning the

chronological order of the Mahāniddesa and Sutta-Nipāta, a similar hypothesis may be entertained without much fear of contradiction. The Mahāniddesa, according to its internal evidence, is an exegetical treatise which was modelled on an earlier exegesis attempted by Mahākaccāna on one of the Suttas of the Aṭṭhakavagga, namely, the Māgandiya Sutta (Mahāniddesa, pp. 187 ff). The modern exegesis of Mahakaccāna forming the corner stone of the Mahāniddesa can be traced as a separate *sutta* of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, Vol. III, p. 9, where the Sutta commented upon by Mahākaccāna is expressly counted as a *sutta* of the Aṭṭhakavagga (Aṭṭhakavaggike Māgandiya pañhe). Once it is admitted that the Aṭṭhaka group of poems had existed as a distinct anthology even before the first redaction of the Saṃyutta Nikāya and Mahākaccāna's model exegesis on one of its *suttas* and, moreover, that the Mahaniddesa as an exegetical work was entirely based upon that earlier model, it is far safer to think that the Mahāniddesa presupposes the Aṭṭhakavagga itself as a distinct collection of poems rather than the Aṭṭhakavagga of the Sutta-Nipāta. Though the scheme of anthology in the Mahāniddesa includes only the poems of the Aṭṭhaka group, there is a collateral evidence to prove that in an earlier stage of Pāli Canonical literature two stray poems were associated with those of the Aṭṭhaka group just in the same way that the stray poem, Khaggavisāṇa-sutta, has been associated in the Cullaniddesa with the poems of the Pārāyaṇa group. The *Divyāvadāna*[2] for instance, mentions that Pūrṇa, an associate of Sthavira Mahākātyāyana, recited the Munigāthā and Śailagāthā along with the poems of Arthavarga (Pāli Aṭṭhakavagga) with the implication that the Munigāthā (corresponding to Pāli Munisutta) and Śailagāthā (corresponding to Pāli Selasutta), included respectively in the Uragasutta, the first book and in the Mahāvagga, the third book of the Sutta-Nipāta, were associated with the poems of the Aṭṭhaka group. To put forward another argument

2. (Cowell and Neil Ed.) p. 35

Nālaka Sutta in the third book of the Sutta-Nipāta, is prologued by twenty Vatthugāthā or introductory stanzas which are absent from its mixed Sanskrit version in the Mahāvastu (Vol. III pp. 386. ff.). Judged by the theme and metre of the Vatthugāthā, they stand quite apart from the Sutta proper. The Sutta proper is a moral discourse of the Buddha which is quite on a par with several sutta in the Sutta-Nipāta and other texts, while in the Vatthugāthā, we come to hit all of a sudden on a highly poetical composition serving as a historical model to the Buddhacarita of Aśvaghoṣa. The Moneyasūto (Moneyya Sutta) is one of the seven tracts recommended by king Aśoka in his Bhābru Edict for the constant study of the Buddhists. This Sutta has been rightly identified by Prof. D. Kosambi (*Indian Antiquary*, 1912, Vol. XLI, pp. 37-40) with the Nālaka Sutta in the Sutta-Nipāta which, as pointed out above, has a counterpart in the Mahāvastu (Mahāvastu Ed. Senart, Vol. II. pp. 30-43 & Vol. III., pp. 382 ff.) where it does not bear specific title. Judged by its theme Moneyya Sutta is more an appropriate title than Nālaka. The importance of its naming as Nālaka arises only when the Vatthugāthā or the introductory stanzas are prefixed to the Sutta without any logical connection between the two. Considered in the light of Aśoka's title Moneya-sūte and the counterpart the Mahāvastu as well as of the clear anticipation of Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita in the Vatthugāthā, it appears that the christening of the Moneyya sutta as Nālaka and the editon of the introductory stanzas took place some time after Aśoka's reign and not before. Some stanzas of the Paḍhāna Sutta have been quoted in the Kathāvatthu which, according to the Buddhist tradition, was a compilation of Aśokan time. The stanzas are quoted without any mention of the Sutta or of the text on which these have been drawn. The Pali version of the Sutta is to be found only in the Sutta-Nipāta, Book III. The inference that can legitimately be drawn from the quotation is that the Padhāna Sutta had existed in some form prior to the compilation of the Kathāvatthu, leaving the question

of the Sutta Nipāta altogether open.

The Kuddakapāṭha figures as the last book in the fifth order, it being supposed to be earlier than the Sutta Vibhaṅga, the Khandhakas, the Jātakas, the Dhammapadas, the Peta and Vimānavatthus as well as the Kathāvatthu. Buddhaghoṣa in the introduction to his Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, informs us that the Dīghabhāṇāka list of the Pāli Canonical text precluded these four books, namely, the Buddhavaṃsa, the Cariyāpiṭaka, the Apadāna and the Khuddakapāṭha while the Majjhimabhāṇaka list included the first three of them. The preclusion may be explained either as due to sectarian difference of opinion or due to the fact that when Dighabhāṇāka list was drawn up these four texts were non-existent. If a comparison be made between the Khuddakapāṭha and the Khandhakas, it will be noticed that the first short lesson (saraṇattayam) of the Khuddakapāṭha was nothing but a ritualistic elaboration of an earlier refuge formula that ean be traced in a passage of the Khandhakas. The second lesson may be regarded as made up of an extract from another passage occurring in the Khandhakas. The same observation holds true also of the fourth lesson, the Kumārapañham. The sources being not mentioned, it is indecisive whether the Khuddakapāṭha has drawn upon the Khandhakas or on some isolated passages. But if judging by the nature of differences in the common passages we are to pronounce our opinion on the relative chronology of the two texts, the priority must be accorded rather to the Khandhakas than to the Khuddakapāṭha. The Tirokuḍḍasutta of the Khuddakapāṭha is the first and the most important sutta of the Petavatthu. The existence of this sutta previous to the reign of king Aśoka is clearly proved by certain quotations in the Kathāvatthu from it. Here again we are to grope in the dark whether the quotations were from the Tirokuḍḍa as an isolated Sutta or from a sutta in the Petavatthu or in the Khuddakapāṭha. If any inference may be drawn from the high prominence that it enjoys in the Petavatthu our opinion will be rather in favour of priority of the Petavatthu.

Now coming to the Kathāvatthu, we have already mentioned that it contains certain significant quotations from two suttas, the Tirokuḍḍa and the Nidhikaṇḍa, both of which are embodied the Kāuddakapāṭha, but there is nothing to show that when the Kāthāvattu was compiled with these quotations, the Khuddakapāṭha itself was then in actual existence, it being quite probable that the quotations were made from the two isolated suttas, we mean when these suttas had not come to be included in the Khuddakapāṭha.

The Abhidhamma treatises figure as latest compilations in the chronological table of Rhys Davids. Of the seven Abhidhamma books, the Kathāvatthu is traditionally known as a compilation of Aśokan age. The credibility of the tradition can be proved by a very peculiar dialectical style of composition developed in the all-important book of Buddhist Controversies and the traces of which can also be found to linger in some of the inscriptions of Aśoka, namely the Kalsi Shahabazgarhi and Manserah versions of the ninth Rock Edict (Vide B. M. Barua's *Old Brāhmī Inscriptions*, p. 284 . Another and more convincing place of evidence may be brought forward to prove the credibility of the tradition. Prior to the despatch of missionaries by Aśoka, Buddhism as a religious movement was confined, more or less, within the territorial limits of what is known in Buddhist literature as the middle Country (Majjhimadesa) and the Buddhist tradition in Pāli is very definite on this point. The Sāñci stūpas which go back to the date of Aśoka enshrine the relics of the missionaries who were sent out to the Himalayan tracts as also of the "good man" Mogaliputa, aptly identified by Dr. Geiger with Moggaliputta Tissa, the traditional author of the Kathāvatthu. Curiously enough, the Kathāvatthu contains the account of a controversy, (1.3) in which it has been emphatically pointed out that up till the time of this particular controversy, the Buddhist mode of holy life remained confined to the places within the middle country and had not gained ground in any of the outlying tracts (*paccantimesu janapadesu*), the representatives of Buddhism whether

the monks or the laity having had no access to those regions (B. M. Barua, *Old Brāhmī Inscriptions*, p. 284). The account clearly brings out one important historical fact, namely, that so far as the outlying tracts are concerned, there were undeniably at that time other modes of Indian holy life. It is interesting to find that the 13th Rock Edict of Aśoka is in close agreement with the Kathāvatthu regarding this point. For in this important edict issued in about the 13th or 14th regnal year of King Aśoka, His Gifted Majesty definitely says that there was at the time no other tract within his empire save and except the Yona region where the different sects of Indian recluses, the Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas were not to be found and where the inhabitants had not adhered to the tenets of one or other of those sects (Vide *Inscription of Aśoka* by Bhandarkar and Majumdar, pp. 49-50-"*Nathi chāshe janapade yātā nathi ime nikāyā ānamtā yenesha bamhmane chā shamane chā nathi chā kuvo pi janapadashi(ya)ta nathi manushānam ekatalashi pi pāshaḍashi no nāma pashāde*"). Squaring up the two-fold evidence ; it is easy to come to the conclusion that the compilation of the Kathāvatthu could not be remote from the reign of Aśoka.

In the Kathāvatthu, there are quotations the sources of which can now be traced in some of the passages in the Vinaya Piṭaka, Dīgha Nikāya, the Majjhima Nikāya, the Saṃyutta Nikāya, the Aṅguttara Nikāya and some of the books of the Khuddaka Nikāya. A few of the quotations can be traced in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi and the Vibhaṅga among the Abhidhamma books. As the passages are quoted in the Kathāvatthu without any mention of the sources, rather as well-known and authoritative words af the Buddha it cannot be definitely maintained that the quotations were cited from the canonical texts in which the individual passages are traceable. There were suttas in some definite collections but until other definite evidences are forthcoming, it will be risky to identify them with the Nikāyas and the Vinaya texts as they are known to us. Even with regard

to this point our position remains materially the same if we take our stand on the evidence of the Inscriptions of Aśoka, particularly on that of the Bhābru Edict. The Bhābru Edict clearly points back to a well-known collection of Buddha's words, the words which came to be believed as at once final authoritative (*ekeṃchi bhamte Bhagavatā Budhena bhāsite save se subhāsite).* But here again we are helpless as to by what name this collection was then designated and what were its divisions ? If such be the state of things, it will be difficult to regard all the Abhidhamma books in the lump as the latest productions among the books of the Pāli Piṭakas.

As for the chronology of the Pāli canonical texts, the safer course will be to fix first of all the upper ond lower limits and then to ascertain how the time may be apportioned between them in conceiving their chronological order. As regards the upper limit certain it is that we cannot think of any text on Buddhism before the enlightenment of the Buddha. Whatever be the actual date of the individual texts, it is certainly posterior to the great event of Buddha's enlightenment, nay, posterior even to the subsequent incident of the first public statement or promulgation of the fundamental truths of the new religion. The upper limit may be sbifted on even to the demise of the Buddha, the first formal collection of the teachings of the Buddha having taken place, according to the unanimity of the Buddhist tradition, after that memorable event. Looked at from this point of view, the period covered by the career of 45 years of Buddha's active missionary work may be regarded just as the formative period which saw the fashioning of the early materials of the Buddhist Canon. With regard to the lower limit we need not bring it so far down as the time of the Pāli scholiasts, Buddhadatta, Buddhaghoṣa and Dhammapāla, that is to say, to the fifth century A. D. Going by the tradition, the Buddhist canon became finally closed when it was committed to writing for the first time during the reign of King Vaṭṭagāmaṇī of Ceylon (Circa 29-17 B.C.). The truth of this tradition can be substan-

tiated by the clear internal evidence of the text of the Milinda Pañha which was a compilation of about the first century A.D. As is well-known, in several passages, the author of the Milinda Pañha has referred to the Pāli books or to some chapters of them by name and the number of books mentioned by name is sufficiently large to exhaust almost the traditional list. Further, it is evident from references in this text that when it was compiled the division of the canon into three Piṭakas and five Nikāyays was well established. The Dhammasaṅgaṇī, the Vibhaṅga, the Dhātukathā, and the rest were precisely the seven books which composed the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and the Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta, Ekuttara (Aṅguttara) and Khuddaka were the five Nikāyas which composed the Sutta Piṭaka. The Simhalese commentaries, the Mahāaṭṭhakathā, the Mahāpaccarīya, the Mahākurundiya, the Andhaka and the rest, presupposed by the commentaries of Buddhadatta, Buddhaghoṣa and Dhammapāla point to the same fact, namely that the canon became finally closed sometime before the beginning of the Christian era. Thus we can safely fix the last quarter of the first century B.C. as the lower limit.

The interval of time between these two limits covers not less than four centuries during which there had been convened as many as six orthodox councils, three in India and three in Ceylon, the first during the reign of Klng Ajātasattu, the second in the reign of King Kālāsoka (Kākavarṇī of the Purāṇas), the third in the reign of Aśoka, the fourth in the reign of King Devānam Piyatissa of Ceylon, the fifth in the reign of king Duṭṭhagāmaṇi and the sixth or the last in the reign of King Vaṭṭagāmanī. The Pāli accounts of these councils make it clear that the purpose of eaeh of them was a recital and settling of the canonical texts. If these councils can be regarded as certain definite landmarks in the process of the development of Pāli canonical literature, we can say that during the first four centuries after the Buddha's demise, Pāli literature underwent as many as six successive redactions. Going by

the dates assigned to these councils, we may divide the interval into such shorter periods of Pāli literary history as shown below:

First period	—	(483-383 B. C.)
Second ,,	—	(383-265 B. C.)
Third ,,	—	(265-230 B. C.)
Fourth ,,	—	(230-80 B. C.)
Fifth ,,	—	(80-20 B. C.)

Keeping these periods in view, we can easily dispose of some of the Pāli books. We may take, for instance, the Parivārapāṭha which is the last treatise to be included in the Vinayapiṭaka. This treatise, as clearly stated in the Colophon (*nigamana*) was written in Ceylon by Dīpa, evidently a learned Buddhist scholar of Ceylon as a help to his pupils to the study of the contents of the Vinaya (Parivārapāṭha, p. 226, "*Pubbācariyamaggañ ca pucchitvā'va tahiṃ Dīpanāmo mahāpañño sutadharo vicakkhano imaṃ vitthāra samkhepaṃ sajjhāmaggena majjhime cintayitvā likhāpesi vitthāra saṃkhepaṃ sajjhāmagnena majjhime cintayitvā likhāpesi sissakānam sukhāvahaṃ Parivāran ti yaṃ vuttaṃ sabbam vatthum salakkhaṇaṃ attham atthena saddhamme dhammaṃ dhammena paññatte*"). As such the Parivārapāṭha was composed as a digest of the subject-matter of Vinaya or Buddhist discipline. We say that this treatise was composed in Ceylon because there are references within the text itself that it had been written after the Vinayapiṭaka was promulgated by Thera Mahinda and a number of his disciples and by their disciples in Ceylon. The succession of his disciples from the time of Thera Mahinda as set forth in the Parivārapāṭha (pp. 2-3) may suffice to show that the date of the composition could not be much earlier than the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇī. Even we may go so far as to suggest that the Parivārārapāṭha was the Vinaya treatise which was canonised at the council held during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmanī. For it is clearly stated in the colophon that the author caused the treatise to be written (*likhāpesi*), a mode of preserving the scriptures which would be inconceivable before the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇī.

The reference to the island of Tambapaṇṇi or Ceylon is not only in the verses which one might set aside as interpolation but in the prose portions which form the integral parts of the text.

Now if we fix our attention on the traditional verses embodied in the Parivārapāṭha (pp. 2-3 edited by Oldenberg) we have to infer therefore that the five Nikāyas, the seven treatises of the Abhidhammapiṭaka and all the older texts of the Vinayapiṭaka were made known to the people of Ceylon by the wise Mahinda who arrived in Ceylon from Jambudīpa (India) after the third Buddhist council had been over. (Parivārapāṭha—pp. 2-3, *"Upāli Dāsako c'eva Sonako Siggavo tathā, Moggaliputtena Pañcamā ete Jambusirivhaye tato Mahindo Iṭṭiyo Uttiyo Sambalo tathā Bhaddanāmo ca paṇḍito, ete nāgā mahāpaññā Jambudīpa idhāgatā, Vinayaṃ to vācayimsu piṭakam Tambapaṇṇiyā nikāye pañca vācesum satta c'eva pakāraṇe")*.

The Mahāvagga and the Cullavagga are two among the earlier and important texts of the Vinayapiṭaka. Twenty-two Khandhakas or stock fragments are distributed into the two texts, ten into the Mahāvagga and the remaining twelve into the Cullavagga. These fragments constituting the separate divisions are arranged in a chronological order, and they are intended to present a connected account of the ecclesiastical history of the Buddhists from the time of the enlightenment of the Buddha down to that of the second Buddhist council which was convened, according to the Cullavagga account, a century after the demise of the Buddha (Vassasataparinibbute Bhagavatī). The growth of the two texts may be sought to be accounted for by these two hypothesis: (1) that the Khandhakas were being added as they came into existence from time to time, or (2) that they were arranged all at the same time according to a set plan. Whatever be the actual merit of these hypotheses, none of them prevents us from maintaining that the series of the Khandhakas was closed with the inclusion of the account of the second Buddhist council and that, nothing material was added after that, nothing, we mean to say,

except the Uddānas or mnemonics in doggerel verses appended to each of the Khandhakas. Had the compilation of the Khandhakas remained open after the second Buddhist council, it would have included an account of the later councils, particularly of one held during the reign of Aśoka. This line of argument is sufficiently strong to establish that the compilation of the twenty-two Khandhakas as we find them embodied in the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga was anterior to the reign of Aśoka, as well as that its history is primarily associated with the tradition of the second Buddhist council. Assuming then that the closing of the collection of the Khandakas in the shape of the Mahāvagga and the Cullavagga could not be removed from the first century of the Buddha era, we may briefly examine what inferences can be drawn from the Cullavagga accounts of the first and second Buddhist councils regarding the developmens of the Canonical texts. First with regard to the earlier Vinaya texts, the Cullavagga account of tne Buddhist council (Chap. 12) has referred to the following authorities by name.

namely (1) Sāvatthiya Suttavibhaṅga
(2) Rājagahe ,,
(3) Sāvatthiyā ,,
(4) Sāvatthiyā sutta
(5) Kosambiyā ,,
(6) Sāvatthiyā ,,
(7) Rājagahe ,,
(8) Rajagahe uposathasamyutte
(9) Campeyyake Vinaya Vatthusmin.

The Suttavibhaṅga passages referred to in the Cullavagga account have been all found out by Prof. Oldenberg in the Suttavibhaṅga and what is more, the identified passages have satisfied the context supplied (Sāvatthiyā, Rājagahe Kosambiyā). Keeping this fact in view can it be doubted that the Suttavibhaṅga of the Vinyapiṭaka was current as an authoritative text on Vinaya when the Cullavagga account referring to its passages was written ? Now with regard to the remaining two references, namely, Rājagahe Uposathasamyutto and Campeyyake Vinayavatthusmin traced res-

pectively in the Mahāvagga (II., 8. 3) and Mahāvagga (IX. 3.5), it is curious that the first reference is to a Saṃyutta passage and the second to a Vinayavatthu. Although the Saṃyutta passage has found its place in the Mahāvagga, so long as the fact remains that the reference is to a passage in the Sutta collection, our inference must be that the Mahāvagga in its extant form was not yet in existence. The second reference is important as pointing back to the existence of certain Vinayavatthus serving as materials for a compilation like Mahāvagga.

Turning at last to the Cullavagga account of the first Buddhist council, it will be a mistake to suppose that the account as we have it in the Cullavagga is as old as the time of the council itself. The account must have been posterior to the time when the scriptural authorities of the Buddhist community comprised (1) Ubhato Vinayā—the disciplinary code of the bhikkhuṇis, and (2) Pañca-Nikāya—the five Nikāyas, Dīgha, Majjhima and the rest. Some of the Burmese manuscripts read Ubhato Vibhaṅga in lieu of Ubhato Vinaya.[3] That may be a mistake. But the contents mentioned in the Cullavagga account are undoubtedly the contents of the two Vivaṅgas, the Bhikkhu and the Bhikkhunī. The list of the Sikkhāpadas codified as bare rules in the two Pātimokkhas is important as showing that the author of the Cullavagga account kept in his mind nothing but the Suttavibhaṅga with its two divisions: the Bhikkhu-Vibhaṅga and the Bhikkhunī-Vibhaṅga. Further, when this sccount was written, the five Nikāyas were well-known. But the contents mentioned are found to be only those of the first two suttas of the Dīgha Nikāya. Vol. I., we mean the Brahmajāla and the Sāmaññaphala-Suttantas. In the absence of the remaining details and of the names of the separate texts it is impossible to say that the Dīgha-Nikāya as presupposed was completed in all the

3. It may be observed that in giving an account of the first Buddhist council, Buddhaghoṣa makes mention of Ubhato-Vibhaṅga signifying thereby the whole text of the Sutta Vibhaṅga completed in 64 bhānavāras (Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, Pt, 1., P. 13).

three volumes as we now get or the five Nikāyas as presupposed contained all the fourteen suttanta texts as we now have them. One thing is, however, certain that there is yet no reference to the Abhidhamma treatises. For the reference to the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka we have to look into the Uddānagāthās in which there is mention of the three piṭakas (Piṭakaṃ tiṇī). But nothing should be built upon it with regard to the development of canonical text in so early a period as this on the strength of these uddāna gāthās which are apparently later additions.

The line of investigation hitherto followed has compelled us to conclude that the Suttavibhaṅga with its two great divisions, e.g., the Bhikkhu and the Bhikkhunī Vibhaṅgas were extant as authoritative texts on the questions of Vinaya previous to the compilation of the Mahāvagga and the Cullavagga. The historical references that may be traced in the Suttavibhaṅga appertain all to earlier times and cannot, therefore, justify us in assigning the text to period far removed from the demise of the Buddha. But we have still to enquire whether or not the Suttavibhaṅga can be regarded as the first or the earliest landmark of the Vinaya tracts. It may be sound to premise that the first landmark of the Vinayapiṭaka is not the landmark of the Vinaya tracts. The point at issue really is whether or not the text of the Sutta-Vibhaṅga forming the first land mark of the Vinayapiṭaka persupposes certain earlier literary developments and if so, where can this be traced? This is to seriously ask what was the earlier and more probably denotation of the term ubhato-vinaya, the two-fold Vinaya. If we decline to interpret it in the sense of two-fold Vibhaṅga, we must be raising this important issue just to remove an anomaly arising from the two-fold signification of the Pañcanikāya divisions of the Pāli canon. Buddhaghoṣa, the great Pāli scholiast, says that in their narrower signification the five Nikāyas denoted the five divisions of the texts of the Suttapiṭaka, and that in their wider signification the five nikāyas included also the texts of the remaining two piṭakas, namely, the Vinaya and the Abhidhamma, the

Vinaya and Abhidhamma treatises being supposed to be included in the Khuddakanikāya [Sumaṅgalavilāsini, pt. I., p. 23, cf., Atthasālinī, p. 26; *Katomo Khaddakanikayo ? Sakalam Vinayapiṭakam Abhidhammapiṭakam Khuddaka-pāṭhādayo ca pubbe-nidassita-pañcadasa bhedā (pubbe dassitacuddasa pabheda iti pāṭhāntaram), thapetva cattāronikāye avasesaṃ Buddhavacanaṃ]*. Buddhaghoṣa also inform us that the Anumāna Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya was known to the ancients as bhikkhuvinaya and the Siṅgālavāda sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya was venerated as gihi Vinaya.[4] If such terms as bhikkhuvinaya and gihivinaya had been current among the Buddhists of olden times, it is pertinent to enquire whether the expression "the two-fold vinaya" was originally used to denote the bhikkhuvinaya and bhikkhuṇīvinaya or the bhikkhuvinaya and gihivinaya. If we examine the contents of the Aṅguttara or the Ekuttara Nikāya, we need not be surprised to find that Aṅguttaranikāya abounds in the Vinaya passages. In each nipāta of this Nikāya we come across passages relating to the two-fold Vinaya namely the Bhikkhu and Gihi. Looked at from this point of view, the Aṅguttara Nikāya may justly be regarded as a sutta store-house of distinct Vinaya tracts. In this very nikāya we hit upon a vinaya tract (A. N., I., pp 98-100) which sets forth a rough sketch (mātikā) not of any particular vinaya treatise but of the whole of the Vinaya-piṭaka. The list of Vinaya topics furnished in this particular tract cannot be construed as a table of contents of any particular text of the Vinayapiṭaka. Similar Vinaya tracts are scattered also in the suttas of other nikāyas. The consideration of all these facts cannot but lead one to surmise that the treatises of the Vinayapiṭaka point to a sutta background in the vinaya materials traceable in the Nikāyas particularly in the Aṅguttara. The Sutta background of the Vinaya texts is clearly hinted at in the concluding words of the Pātimokkha. "So much of the words

4. B. M. Barua—A note on the Bhābru Edict, J.R.A.S., October 1915, pp. 805-10

of the Blessed One handed down in the Suttas, embraced in the suttas, comes into recitation every half-month." (Vinaya texts, S. B. E., Vol. I., p. 69) As for the date of the composition of the two Pātimokkha codes, one for the bhikkhus (monks) and other for the bhikkhuṇīs (nuns), it is important to bear in mind that according to an ancient Buddhist tradition cited by Buddhaghoṣa, the Pātimokkha codes as they are handed down to us are two among the Vinaya texts which were not rehearsed in the first Buddhist council (Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, pt. I., p. 17). It may be readily granted that the codification of the Pātimokkha rules in the extant shape was not accomplished immediately after the demise of the Buddha. It is one thing to say this and it is quite another that the rules themselves in a classified form had not been in existence from the earlier times. The Cullavagga account of the first Buddhist council throws some clear light on the process of codification. It is said that the utterance of the dying Buddha authorising his followers to do away with the minor rules of conduct (Khuddānu-Khuddakāni sikkhāpadāni), if they so desired, formed a bone of contention among the bhikkhus who took part in the proceedings of the first Buddhist Council (See Milinda Pañha, pp. 142-144). They were unable to decide which were precisely the minor rules they were authorised to dispense with. Some suggested all but the four Pārājika rules, some, all but the four Pārājika and thirteen Saṃghādisesa rules, some, all but the four Pārājika, 13 Saṃghādisesa and two Aniyata rules and thirty Nissaggiya rules ; some, all but the four Pārājika, 13 Saṃghādisesa, two Aniyata, thirty Nissaggiya and ninenty-two Pācittiya rules and some suggested all but 4 Pārājika, 13 Saṃghadisesa, 2 Aniyata, 30 Nissaggiya, 92 Pācittiya and 4 Patidesaniya rules. The suggestion stopped with the 4 Paṭidesaniya rules and did not proceed beyond them, leaving us in the dark as to what the bhikkhus meant by all but "all these" (counted by names). The Pātimokkha code in its final form includes two hundred and twenty seven rules, that is to say, the seven adhikaraṇasamathas

and seventy-five sekhiya rules in addition to those mentioned in the Cullavagga account. Omitting the 75 sekhiya rules the total of the Pātimokkha precepts of conduct would come up to 152. If the theras of the first Buddhist Council had in their view a Pātimokkha code in which the 75 Sekhiya rules had no place, the total of precepts in the code recognised by them was 152. Now we have to enquire if there is any definite literary evidence to prove that in an earlier stage of codification, the total of the Pātimokkha precepts was fixed at 152. Happily the evidence is not far to seek. The Aṅguttara Nikāya, as we have seen above, contains two passages to indicate that the earlier Pātimokkha code contained one and half hundred rules or little more (*Sādhikam diyaḍḍhasikkhāpadasatam*).[5] The earlier Pātimokkha code with its total of 152 rules may be shown to have been earlier than the Suttavibhaṅga on the ground that the Sutta-Vibhaṅga scheme makes room for the 75 Sekhiya rules, thereby recognising the Pātimokkha total to be 227 which was possible only in the second or final stage of codification of the Pātimokkha rules.

In dealing with the chronology of the seven treatises of the Abhidhammapiṭaka, we can only maintain that the order in which these treatises are enumerated can be interpreted as the order of the chronology. Any attempt at establishing such an interpretation would be vitiated by the fact that the order of enumeration is not in all cases the same. The order in which these are mentioned in the Milinda Pañha (p. 12) and which has since become classical is as follows:—

(1) Dhammasaṅgaṇī (Dhammasaṃgaha as Buddhaghoṣa calls it—vide Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, p. 17), (2) Vibhaṅga, (3) Dhātukathā, (4) Puggalapaññatti, (5) Kathāvatthu, (6) Yamaka and (7) Paṭṭhāna.

A somewhat different order is evident from a gāthā occurring in Buddhaghoṣa's Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, pt. I., p. 15.

5. Cf. Milinda Pañha which refers to the same total of the Pātimokkha rules in the expression "Diyaḍḍhesa Sikkhāpadasatesu."

"Dhammasaṃgaṇi-Vibhaṅgañca Kathāvatthuñca Puggalaṃ
Dhātu-Yamaka-Paṭṭhānaṃ
Abhidhammoti vuccati"

It will be noticed that in the gāthā order the Kathāvatthu stands third instead of fifth and the Dhātukathā stands fifth instead of third. We have already noted that according to general interpretation of the five nikāya divisions of the Pāli canon, the Abhidhamma treatises come under the Khuddaka-Nikāya. This is apparently an anomaly which cannot be removed save by a literal interpretation making it signify a suttanta back-ground becomes a desideratum and we may lay down a general canon of chronology in these terms. The closer connection with the Sutta materials the earlier is the date of composition. Among the seven Abhidhamma treatises, the Puggalapaññatti and the Vibhaṅga stand out prominently as the two texts which bear a clear evidence of emergence from a Sutta back-ground. The Puggala classifications in the Dīgha, Saṃyutta and Aṅguttara Nikāyas are seen to constitute at once the sutta back-ground and thc stereotyped Vibhaṅgas or Niddesas, mostly contained in the Majjhima Nikāya may be taken to represent the Sutta back-ground of the Vibhaṅga. The exact position of the Puggala-paññatti in relation to the Suttanta collections has been properly examined by Dr. Morris in his edition of the Puggala Paññatti published for the P. T. S. London, Introduction, pp. X-XI.

We have just one remark to add, namely, that compared with the Suttanta materials utilised in it, the Puggalapaññatti is the least original treatise of Abhidhammapiṭaka and its inclusion in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka would have been utterly unjustifiable but for the paññatti classifications in the mātikā No. 1. Whatever be the actual date of its compilation in respect of subject-matter and treatment, it deserves considered as the earliest of the Abhidhamma books.

In the opinion of Mrs. Rhys Davids, the Vibhaṅga is "anticipated" by the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, although "it is by no means covered by the latter work either in method

or in matter" (Vibhaṅga P. T. S., Preface XIV). "In other words, the present book (the Vibhaṅga) seems by Buddhists to have ranked second in the seven of its Piṭaka not accidentally, but as a sequel to the Dhammsaṅgaṇī requiring, in those who came to the study of it, a familiarity with the categories and formulas of the latter work —that is with the first book of the Abhidhamma", (Ibid, XIII). Thus whether the Vibhaṅga is anticipated by the Dhammasaṅgaṇī or the later is anticipated by the former is the point at issue.

Examining most of the chapters of the Vibhaṅga we find that each of them has an Abhidhamma superstructure (Abhidhamma-bhājaniya) built upon and kept distinct from a Suttanta exegesis (Suttantabhājaniya) the counterpart of which is to be found in the first four nikāyas and mostly in the Majjhima, as it will appear from the following table :—

Saccavibhaṅga (Suttantabhājaniya)—Saccavibhaṅg sutta (Majjhima, Vol. III., No. 141); Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga (Suttantabhājaniya) = Sati paṭṭhānasutta (M.N.I., No. 10) Dhātuvibhaṅga (Suttantabhājaniya)—Dhātuvibhaṅga sutta of the Majjhima, Vol. III., No. 140.

It is evident from the juxtaposition of the Suttanta and the Abhidhamma exegesis in its different chapters that the Vibhaṅga marks that stage of the development of the Abhidhamma piṭaka when the Abhidhamma or Transcendental method of exegesis had not yet gained an independent foothold, when, in other words, it remained combined with Suttanta or earlier method. The predilection is as yet for attempting the exegesis of the formulations in the Suttas. An independent treatment of pure topics of Psychological ethics, such as we find in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi is far beyond the scheme of the Vibhaṅga. In the progressive working out of exegetical schemes, the Niddesa or detailed specification of meanings of terms comes second to the uddesa or mātikā. Now if we compare the treatment of Rūpakkhandha in the Vibhaṅga (pp. 12-14) with that in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī (pp. 124 ff.), we cannot but observe that all that the Vibhaṅga has to present is merely the

uddesa or mātikā of the Rūpakkhandha section of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī. The Niddesa of the rūpamātikā is to be found in no other Abhidhamma books than the Dhammasaṅgaṇī. Mrs. Rhys Davids admits (in a way arguing in our favour) that the contents of the Vibhaṅga are by no means covered by the Dhammasaṅgaṇī. The Vibhaṅga has, for instance, a section entitled Paccayākāravibhaṅga, an exegesis on the causal relations. The paccayas fall outside the scope of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and they form the subject-matters of the great Abhidhamma treatise, the Paṭṭhāna or the Mahāpaṭṭhāna; but compared with the paṭṭhāna, the Vibhaṅga treatment of the subject is crude and vague, which is to say earlier. Considered in this light, the Vibhaṅga seems to stand out as a common presupposition of both the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and the Paṭṭhāna. It is much easier to proceed from the contents of the Vibhaṅga to the two highly systematic treatises of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and the Paṭṭhāna than to proceed from the latter to the former. The Dhātukathā being nothing but a supplement to the text of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī may be briefly disposed of as an Abhidhamma treatise dependent on and necessarily later than the Dhammasaṅgaṇī.

It is not only with regard to the Dhammasaṅgaṇī (with its supplement, the Dhātukathā) and the Paṭṭhāna that the Vibhaṅga represents the immediate background; it appears equally to have been the background of the Yamaka. It is easy to account for the dialectical method of the study of the Abhidhamma matters by keeping the Pāñhapucchakas appended to the different chapters of the Vibhaṅga. All these considerations led to conclude that strictly speaking the Vibhaṅga making "an extended application of (the) organun or vehicle for the cultivation of the moral intellect" is the first and the earliest of the Abhidhamma books.

1. Puggala Paññatti
2. (a) Dhammasaṅgaṇī Dhātukathā
   (b) Yamaka
   (c) Paṭṭhāna

3. Kathāvatthu

Although one can conceive in this manner the chronological succession of the five Abhidhamma books (leaving out the Puggalapaññatti which is rather a suttanta text the Kathāvatthu which forms a class by itself), it is difficult to determine the actual dates of their composition. One thing is certain that the seven books of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka were well-known and very carefully read especially in the Himalayan monastery when the Milinda pañha was composed in about the first century A.D. There is no reason for dout that the Pāli cannon when committed to writing during the reign of King Vaṭṭagāmanī in Ceylon, it included all these books in it. We have shown that when the Uddānagāthas of the Cullavagga (Chap. II) of the Vinayapiṭaka were added, the three piṭakas of the Pāli canon had already come into existence. The question, however, is how far the date of the books of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka can be pushed back. Here the only anchor-sheet is the Kathāvatthu, the third or the fifth Abhidhamma book which, according to tradition, was a compilation of of the Aśokan age. We have already adduced certain proofs in support of this tradition and have sought to show that when certain controversies which find a place in the Kathāvatthu took place, Buddhism as a religion had not overstepped the territorial limits of the middle century. But according to Buddhaghoṣa's commentary the Kathāvatthu contains discussion of doctrines held by some of the Buddhist schools, e. g., the Hemavata, the Andhaka, the Pubbaseliya and the Aparaseliya, which could not be possible if the Kathāvatthu had been closed in the time of Aśoka. If it was a growing compilation we have necessarily to suppose that although it commenced in Aśokan time, it was not brought to a close till the rise of the later Buddhist schools mentioned above.

Turning at last to the Suttapiṭaka comprising the five nikāyas, we can definitely say that it had reached its final shape before the composition of the Milinda Pañha in which authoritatives passages are quoted from the texts of

this piṭaka, in certain instances by a mention of the name of the sourees. We can go further and maintain that the Suttapiṭaka was closed along with the entire Pāli canon and when the canon was finally rehearsed in Ceylon and committed to writing during the reign of King Vaṭṭagāmaṇī. The tradition says that previous to the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇī the texts were handed down by an oral tradition (mukhapāṭhavasena) from teacher to teacher (ācariyaparamparāya) the process of transmission being compared to the carrying of earth in baskets from head to head. Buddhaghoṣa says (Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, pt. I. pp. 12 foll.) that immediately after the demise of the Buddha and after the session of the first Buddhist Council, the task of transmitting and preserving each of the five nikāyas was entrusted to an individual thera and his followers, which ultimately gave rise to some schools of bhāṇakas or chanters. The existence of the dintinct schools of reciters of the five nikāyas is clearly proved (as shown by Dr. B. M. Barua, *Bārhut Inscriptions*, pp. 9-10), by the Milinda Pañha where we have mention of the Jātakabhānakas (the repeaters of the Jātakas) in addition to the Dīghabhānaka, the Majjhimabhānaka, Saṃyuttabhānaka, Aṅguttarabhānaka and Khuddaka-bhānaka. (Milinda Pañha, pp. 341 foll.). The terms *Pañcanekāyika* (one well versed in the five nikāyas) and bhānaka as well, occur as distinctive epithets of some of the Buddhist donors in the Sāñci and Bārhut inscriptions which may be dated in the lump in the middle of the second century B.C. The inference from the evidence of these inscriptions has already been drawn by Prof. Rhys Davids to the effect that before the use of Pañcanekāyika (one well-versed in the five nikāyas) suttantika (a man who knows the Suttanta by heart), Suttantakinī (a feminine form of Suttantika) and Peṭakī (one who knows the piṭaka by heart) as distinctive epithets, the piṭaka and five nikāya divisions of the Pāli canon must have been well-known and well-established. We say of the Pāli canon because substitution of nikāya for the term 'Agama' is peculiar to the Pāli tradition. The term "Pañcanikāya" occurs as we saw

also in the Vinaya Cullavagga Chap. II, which we have assigned to a period which immediately preceded the Aśokan age. But even presuming that the five nikāya divisions of the growing Buddhist canon were current in the third century B.C., it does not necessarily follow from it that all the books or Suttas or individual passages comprising the five nikāyas were composed at that time. All that we can make bold to say that the first four nikāyas were, to all intents and purposes, the complete, while the Khaddakanikāya series remained still open.

We have pointed out that this account in the Vinaya Cullavagga clearly alludes to the Dīgha as the first of the five nikāyas as well as that the first two suttas were the Brahmajāla and Samaññaphala while as to the number and succession of the remaining suttas, we are kept completely in the dark. Straining the information supplied in the Vinaya Cullavagga we can proceed so far no doubt, that the first volume of the Dīgha Nikāya was mainly in the view of its compilers. Comparing the Suttas comprised in the remaining two volumes and marking the differences in theme and tone, it seems that these two volumes were later additions. The second volume contains two suttas, namely, the Mahāpadhāna and Mahā-Govinda which have been mentioned in the Cullaniddesa (p. 80) as two among the notable illustrations of the Suttanta Jātakas, the Jātakas as found in the earliest forms in Pāli literature. We have already drawn attention to the earlier chronicles of the seven purohitas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya where it is far from being a manipulation in a Jātaka form. The casting of this chronicle in a Jātaka mould as we find it in the Mahā-Govinda Suttanta could not have taken place in the life-time of the Buddha. The second volume contains also the Pāyāsi Suttanta which, as shown by the previous scholars, brings the story of Pāyāsi to the death of Pāyāsi and his after life in a gloomy heaven. This suttanta contains several anecdotes forming the historical basis of some of the Jātaka stories. In the face of all these facts, we cannot but agree with Prof. Rhys Davids who places

the date of this suttanta at least half a century after the demise of the Buddha. The third volume of the Dīgha includes in it the Āṭānāṭiya suttanta which is otherwise described as a rakkhā or a saving chant manipulated apparently on a certain passage in the then known Mahābhārata. The development of these elements such as the Jātaka stories and the Parittas could not have taken place when Buddhism remained in its pristine purity. These are later accretions or interpolations, the works of fable and fiction, we mean of imaginative poetry that crept according to a warning given in certain passages of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, under the influence from outside. But there is no reason for surprise that such developments had already taken place as early as the fourth century B.C. for the passages that strike the note of alarm are precisely one of those seven important tracts recommended by Aśoka in his Bhabru Edict under the caption 'Anāgatabhayāni.' The growth of these foreign elements must have caused some sort of confusion otherwise it would not have been necessary to discuss in a sutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya the reasonable way of keeping genuine the utterances of the Buddha distinct from others that crept in under the outside influence and were characterised by poetical fancies and embellishments (*Kavikatā*) (Saṃyutta Nikāya, pt. II, P. 267). We may then be justified in assigning the whole of the Dīgha Nikāya to a pre-Aśokan age, there being no trace of any historical event or development which might have happened after King Aśoka. The only exception that one has to make is in the case of the concluding verses of Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta which were interpolated acccording to Buddhaghoṣa in Ceylon by the teachers of that island. Like the first volume of the Dīgha Nikāya, the whole of the Majjhima Nikāya strikes us as the most authoritative and original among the collections of the Buddha's teachings. There is no allusion to any political event to justify us in relegating the date of its compilation to a time far removed from the demise of the Buddha. If it be argued that the story of Makhādeva, as we find it embodied in the Makhā-

deva sutta of this Nikāya, has already assumed the form of a Jātaka. of a Suttanta-Jātaka, mentioned in the Culla-niddesa, it cannot follow from it that the Nikāya is for that very reason a much later compilation. For the Makhā-deva story is one of those few earliest Jātakas presupposed by the Pāli Canonical collection of 500 Jātakas. The literary developments as may be traced in the suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya are not of such a kind as to require more than a century after the demise of the Buddha.

Now concerning the Saṃyutta which is a collection of kindred sayings and third of the five nikāyas, we may point out that it has been quoted by name in the Milinda Pañha, as also in the Peṭakopadesa under the simple title of Saṃyuttaka and that as such this Nikāya had existed as an authoritative book of the Pāli Canon previous to the composition of both the Milinda Pañha and the Peṭa-kopadesa. We can go so far as to maintain that the Saṃyutta Nikāya had reached its final shape previous to the occurrence of Pañcanekāyika as a personal epithet in some of the Bārhut and Sāñci inscriptions, nay, even before the closing of the Vinaya Cullavagga where we meet with the expression "Pañcanikāya". In dealing with the account of the Second Buddhist Council in the Vinaya Cullavagga (Chap. XII), we have noted that a canonical authority has been alluded to as "*Rajagaheuposatha Saṃy-utte*", at Rajagaha in the Uposatha Saṁyutta. The tran-slators of the Vinaya Texts (pt. III, p. 410) observe that the term 'Saṃyutta' "must here be used for khandhaka", the passage referred to being the Vinaya Mahāvagga (II. 8. 3 the Uposatha Khandhaka). But looking into the Mahāvagga passage, we find that it does not fully tally with the allu-sion, as the passage has nothing to do with Rājagaha. In the absence of Rājagaha giving a true clue to the tracing of the intended passage, it is difficult to premise that the passage which the compilers of the Cullavagga account kept in view was the Khandhaka passage in the Vinaya Mahā-vagga. Although we have so far failed to trace this passage also in the Saṃyutta Nikāya, the presumption ought to be

that the intended passage was included in a Saṃyutta collection which was then known to the compilers of the Cullavagga. The Suttas in the Saṃyutta Nikāya do not refer to any political incident justifying one to place the date of its compilation far beyond the demise of the Buddha. As contrasted with the Ekuttara or Aṅguttara Nikāya the Saṃyutta appears to be the result of an attempt to put together relevant passages throwing light on the topics of deeper doctrinal importance while the former appears to be numerical groupings of relevant passages throwing light on the topics relating to the conduct of the monks and householders. Considered in this light, these two Nikāyas must be regarded as fruits of a critical study of suttas in some previous collections.

Now coming to deal with the Ekuttara or Aṅguttara Nikāya, we have sought to show that its main bearing is on the two-fold Vinaya, the Gahapati Vinaya and the Bhikkhu Vinaya. This Nikāya contains a section (Muṇḍarājavagga in the Pañcaka Nipāta) commemorating the name of King Muṇḍa who reigned, as shown by Rhys Davids, in Rājagaha about half a century after the demise of the Buddha. The Nikāya containing a clear reference to Muṇḍarāja cannot be regarded as compilation made within the fifty years from the Buddha's demise. There is, however, no other historical reference to carry the date of the compilation beyond the first century from the Mahāparinibbāna of the Buddha. The date proposed for the Aṅguttara Nikāya will not, we think, appear unreasonable if it be admitted that the suttas of this nikāya form the real historical back-ground of the contents of the Vinaya texts.

We have at last to discuss the chronology of the fifteen books of the Khuddaka Nikāya, which are generally mentioned in the following order :—

(1) Khuddaka Pāṭha, (2) Dhammapada, (3) Udāna, (4) Itivuttaka, (5) Sutta Nipāta, (6) Vimānavatthu, (7) Petavatthu, (8) Thera-therīgāthā, (9) Jātaka, (11) Niddesa, (Culla and Mahā) (12) Paṭisambhidāmagga, (13) Apadāna, (14) Buddhavaṃsa, and (15)

Cariyāpiṭaka.

This mode of enumeration of the fifteen books of the Khuddaka Nikāya (paṇṇarasabheda Khuddakanikaya) can be traced back to the days of Buddhaghoṣa (Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī, pt. I. p. 17). It is obvious that in this list the Cullaniddesa and the Mahāniddesa are counted as one book ; while counting them as two books, the total number becomes sixteen. There is no justification for regarding the order of enumeration as being the order of chronology. In connection with the Khuddaka Nikāya, Buddhaghoṣa mentions the following facts of great historical importance. He says that the Dīghabhāṇakas classified the books of the Khuddaka Nikāya under the Abhidhamma Piṭaka enumerating them in the following order :—

(1) Jātaka, (2) Mahāniddesa, (3) Cullaniddesa, (4) Paṭisambhidāmagga, (5) Suttanipata, (6) Dhammapada, (7) Udāna, (8) Itivuttaka, (9) Vimānavattu, (10) Petavatthu, and (11) Therīgāthā, and leaving out of consideration the four books, namely, the Cariyāpiṭaka, the Apadāna, the Buddhavaṃsa and the Khuddakapāṭha. Buddhaghoṣa informs us that the Majjhimabhāṇaka list contained the names of 15 books counting the Cariyāpiṭaka, the Apadāna and the Buddhavaṃsa as the three books in addition to those recognised by the Dīghabhāṇakas (Sumaṇgalavilāsinī, Pt. I., p. 15). It is important to note that the Majjhimabhāṇaka list has taken no cognisance of the Khuddapāṭha mentioned as the first book in Buddhaghoṣa's own list. It is not difficult to surmise that when the Dīghabhāṇaka list was drawn up, the Khuddaka Nikāya comprised just 12 books and when the Majjhima Nikāya list was made it came to comprise altogether 15 books, the Mahāniddesa and the Cullaniddesa having been counted as two books instead of as one. It is also easy to understand that from that time onward the traditional total of the books of the Khuddaka Nikāya became known as fifteen, and so strong was this tradition that to harmonise with it, the sixteen books had to be somehow counted as fifteen, the Mahāniddesa and the Cullaniddesa being treated as a single

book. From this we may proceed to show that the Khuddakapāṭha appearing as the first book of the Khuddaka Nikāya in Buddhaghoṣa's list, is really the last book taken into the Khuddaka Nikāya sometime after the Majjhimabhāṇaka list recognising 15 books in all had been closed. We need not be surprised if the Khuddakapāṭha was a compilation made in Ceylon and was given a place among the books of thc Khuddaka Nikāya either immediately before the commitment of the Pāli Canon to writing during the reign of King Vaṭṭagamaṇī or even after that, although before the time of Buddhaghoṣa. The commentaries of Buddhaghoṣa are our oldest authorities that mention in the Milinda Pañha nor in any other work, canonical or ex-canonical, which was extant before the time of Buddhaghoṣa. The text is made up of nine lessons or short readings all culled from certain earlier canonical sources, the arrangement of these lessons being such as to make it serve as a very useful handbook for the beginners and for the clergy ministering to the needs of the laity. The consideration of two points may suffice to bear out our contention. The first point is that the first lesson called the saraṇattaya presents a developed mode of refuge formula of the Buddhists which is not to be found precisely in this form anywhere in other portions of the Pāli canon. As for the second point we may note that the third lesson called the Dvāttiṃsākārā (the thiry-two parts of the body) enumerates matthake matthaluṅgaṃ which is not to be found in the list furnished in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya, the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya and numerous other discourses.

We have seen that the Buddhavaṃsa, the Cariyāpiṭaka and the Apadāna are the three books which found recognition in the list of the Majjhimabhāṇakas and were taken no notice of in the Dīghabhāṇaka list. Apart from other arguments, one has to presume that these three books were compiled and received into the canon after the list was once known to have been complete with 12 books.

These three books, as far as the subject matters go, are interconnected, the Buddhavaṃsa enumerating the doctrine of praṇidhāna as an essential condition of the Bodhisatta life, the Cariyāpiṭaka enumerating the doctrine of cariyā or practices of a Bodhisatta and the Apadāna the doctrine of adhikāra or competence for the attainment of the higher life. These three books presuppose a legend of 24 previous Buddhas which is far in excess of the legend of six Buddhas contained in other portions of the Canon. The Buddhavaṃsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka present a systematic form of the Boddhisatta idea that was shaping itself through the earlier Jātakas and the Apadāna furnishing the previous birth stories of the theras and the therīs cannot but be regarded as a later supplement to the Thera-Therī-gāthā.

Besides the Thera-Therī-gāthā, the Vimānavatthu or the book of stories of heaven is just another canonical work which is presupposed by the Apadāna. It is important to note that the Vimānavatthu contains one story, namely, the story of Serissaka, the incident of which, according to the story itself, took place hundred years, calculated by human computation from the death of the chieftain Pāyāsi. "Manussakam Vassasatam atītaṃ Yadagge kāyamhi idhūpa-ppanno" (Vimānavatthu, P. T. S., p. 81).

The Pāyāsi Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya clearly shows that the death of Pāyāsi could not have taken place until a few years after the Buddha's demise. Thus going by the consideration of this point we are compelled to assign a date of its composition to an age ahead of a century and a half from the demise of the Buddha. So the canonisation of this book could not have taken place earlier than the time of the third Buddhist Council, we mean the time of King Aśoka. Our suggestion for the date of the Vimānavatthu will gain in significance as we consider the contents of the Petavatthu, the book of stories of hell. We have noticed above that in all the three lists of the books of the Khuddaka Nikāya the name of the Petavatthu stands after that of the Vimānavatthu. From the occurrence of certain common stories, a suggestion has already been

made that it was somehow an offshoot of tbe Vimānavatthu. Now in one of stories (Petavatthu, IV. 3, p. 57[6]) we have allusions to the Moriya (Maurya) king, who is identified in the commentary with King Aśoka.[7] If this construction of the word Moriya is correct, it leaves no room for doubt that the Petavatthu, as we now have it, was a post-Moriyan or post-Aśokan compilation.

The Cullaniddesa is a canonical commentary of the Khaggavisāṇa sutta and the Pārāyaṇa group of sixteen poems, all of which find place in the anthology called the Sutta Nipāta. We have sought to show that the Cullaniddesa indicates a stage of development of the Pali canon when the Khaggavisāṇa sutta hang on the Pārāyaṇavagga as an isolated poem, without yet being included in a distinct group such as the Uragavagga of the Sutta Nipāta. Though from this line of argument it follows that the Cullaniddesa is earlier than the Sutta-Nipāta, it cannot at the same time be denied that it is posterior not only to such Suttanta-Jātakas as the Mahāpadānīya, Mahāgovinda, Mahāsudassanīya and the Maghadeva suttanta contained in the Dīgha and Majjhima Nikāyas but also to a collection of 500 Jātakas (Pañcajatakasatāni) (Cullaniddesa, p. 80). As such thc Cullaniddesa cannot be dated much earlier than the reign of Aśoka.

The Mahāniddesa too is a canonical commentary on the aṭṭhaka group of sixteen poems forming the fourth book of the Sutta-Nipāta. As shown before the exegeses attempted in this book were all modelled on an earlier exegesis of Mahākaccāna in the Saṃyutta Nikāya. If this canonical commentary came into existence when the Aṭṭhakavagga was yet current as an isolated group the date of its composition cannot but be anterior to that of the Suttanipāta. A clear idea of the date of this work can be formed from its list of places visited by the Indian sea-going merchants. The Mahāniddesa list clearly points to a time when the

6. "Rājā Piṅgalako nāma Suraṭṭhānaṃ adhipaṭi ahu Moriyānaṃ upaṭṭhānaṃgantvā Suraṭṭhaṃ punar āgamā."

7. "Moriyānañ'ti Moriyarājūnatṃ Dhammāsokaṃ saṃdhāya vadati"

Indian merchants carried on a sea-borne trade with such distant places as Java in the East and Paramayona in the West and it alludes as well to sea route from Tamali to Java via Tambapaṇṇi or Ceylon which was followed in the 5th century A. D. by the Chinese pilgrim, Fa-Hien. We can expect to come across such a list only in the Milinda Pañha which may be dated in the 1st or 2nd century A. D. Such a wide expansion of India's maritime trade as indicated in the Mahāniddesa list would seem impossible if the book was a composition much earlier than the second century B. C. Now turning to the Suttanipāta we have been inclined to place it later than the two books of the Niddesa on the ground that when it was compiled, the Aṭṭhakavagga and the Pārāyaṇavagga came to represent two distinct books of a comprehensive anthology and the Khaggavisāṇa sutta ceased to be a stray poem hanging for its existence on the Pārāyaṇa group. But our main reason for dating it posterior to the Cullaniddesa is that the Pārāyaṇavagga in the Suttanipāta is prefaced by a prologue which is absent from the Cullaniddesa scheme. Similarly the Nālakasutta perhaps known originally as Moneyya sutta as evidenced by the titles suggested in Aśoka's Bhābru Edict as a prologue clearly anticipating the poetical style of Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita. In spite of the fact that the suttas embodied in it were gleaned from earlier collections, the Sutta-nipāta scheme of anthology does not seem to have been carried into effect before the 2nd century B. C.

With regard to the Jātakas as a book of the Khudddaka Nikāya, we have just seen above that the Cullaniddesa points to a canonical collection of 500 Jātakas. That five hundred was the original total of the Jātakas is proved on the one hand by the 500 Jātaka representation witnessed by Fa-Hien round the Abhayagiri monastery of Ceylon and on the other hand by the mechanical multiplication of the stories in order to raise the total from 500 to 550 from the days of Buddhaghoṣa. The Milinda Pañha alludes to the existence of the repeaters of the Jātakas apart from the repeaters of the five Nikāyas. We are unable to

decide whether the Milinda reference is to the canonical books of the Jātakas or to a commentary collection which was then in existence. The numerous illustrations of the Jātakas on the ancient Buddhist railings such as those at Barhut and Bodhagaya, unmistakably presuppose the existence of the legendary story of the Buddha's life, past and present. But the canonical collection of 500 Jātakas referred to in the Cullaniddesa appear to be earlier than the scriptural basis of the Buddhist sculptures and whatever the actual date of composition might be it was certainly later than that of the Suttanta Jātakas scattered throughout the first four Nikāyas. We may say indeed that the canonical collection took a definite shape near about the early Maurya period.

The Thera-Therī-Gāthās are two companion anthologies of the stanzas that are supposed to have been uttered by the theras and theris surrounding the Buddha during the lifetime of the Master, or at least shortly after his death. (Theragāthā, Oldenberg's preface, XI).

"The separate uddānas or indices which occur regularly at the end of each nipāta and at the end also of the whole work, and give the names and numbers of the theras (and the theris) and the number of verses in each chapter and in the whole work respectively seem to be based on a recension or condition of the text different from that which now lies before us" (Ibid. p. XIV). In the opinion of Dhammapāla, the commentator, the Theragāthā anthology had reached the final shape not earlier than the time of Aśoka. He points out that the Thera Tekicchakāri whose gāthās are embodied in the Theragāthā lived under King Bimbisara, the father of Dhammāśoka. He further adds that the verses uttered by this thera were received into the canon by the fathers who assembled in the third Buddhist Council. Dhammapāla attributes some of the gāthās to Vītaśoka, the younger brother of Dhammāśoka and certain other verses to Tissakumāra, the youngest brother of King Aśoka. If we can at all depend for chronology on the information supplied by Dhammapāla, the anthologies of Thera-Therī-

gāthā must be taken as compilations that had received their final shape at the third Buddhist Council and not before.

The Pāli Dhammapada is just one and undoubtedly the earliest of the six copies of the anthologies of the Dhammapada class. The earliest mention of the Pāli Dhammapada by name is to be found in the Milinda Pañha which is a composition of the first or second century A.D. From the mere fact that there were certain quotations in the Kathāvatthu and Mahāniddesa of stanzas now traceable in the Dhammapada, no definite conclusion can be drawn as to the actual date of its composition. The Dhammapada hardly includes any stanzas that might be supposed to have been drawn upon the canonical collection of Jātakas. But as shown by the editors of the Prakrit Dhammapada there are a few gāthās which were evidently manipulated on the basis of the gāthās in the Jātakas. Similarly it cannot be maintained that the Dhammapada contains any stanzas that were directly derived from the Suttanipāta, for the suttas which might be singled out as the source of some of the gāthās of the Dhammapada are to be found also in such earlier collections as the Dīgha or the Majjhima or the Saṃyutta or the Aṅguttara. The Thera and Therī-gāthās are the two anthologies of the Khuddaka Nikāya which appear to have been presupposed by the Dhammapada. As regards external evidence, there is only one tradition, namely, that a powerful discourse based on the Appamādavagga of the Dhammapada served to attract the attention of King Aśoka to Buddhism, clearly pointing to the existence of the Dhammapada as a distinct anthology as early as the third century B. C.

Itivuttaka the Udāna and the Paṭisambhidāmagga are the remaining three books of the Khuddaka Nikāya of which the date of composition must deperd upon mere conjecture till accidentally we obtain any reliable date. The Itivuttaka is a book of questions of genuine sayings of the Buddha, making no reference to any canonical work or to any historical event ascertaining its date, though it seems

that it was the result of an afterthought, of a critical study of the authentic teachings of the Buddha in a certain light and for a specific purpose. The Udāna is a curious medley of legends and historical records, presented in a particular setting with a view to emphasising some pronounced opinions of the Buddha on certain controversial matters. The Paṭisambhidāmagga presents a systematic exposition of certain important topics of Buddhism, and as such it deserves to be classed rather with the books of the Abhidhammapiṭaka than with those of Suttanipāta. It is quite possible that before the development of the extant Abhidhamma piṭaka, it passed as one of the Abhidhamma treatises. Concerning these three books the utmost that we can say is that they are mentioned even in the list of the Dīghabhāṇakas, being counted there as three among the twelve books of the Khuddaka Nikāya, and that if the tradition about this list is at all credible, these three books must have existed when the list was drawn up, say, in the second century B. C.

The results arrived at concerning the chronology of the Pali canonical literature are presented in the subjoined table.

(1) The simple statements of Buddhist doctrines now found, in identical words, in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.

(2) Episodes found, in identical works, in two or more of the existing books.

(3) The Sīlas, the Pārāyaṇa group of sixteen poems, without the prologue, aṭṭhaka group of four or sixteen poems, the sikkhāpadas.

(4) The Dīgha, Vol. I, the Majjhima, the Saṃyutta, the Aṅguttara, and earlier Pātimokkha code of 152 rules.

(5) The Dīgha, Vols. II & III, the Thera-Therī-Gāthā, the collection of 500 Jātakas, the Suttavibhaṅga, the Paṭisambhidāmagga, the Puggala-paññatti and the Vibhaṅga.

(6) The Mahāvagga and the Cullavagga, the Pātimokkha code completing 227 rules, the Vimānavatthu and Petavatthu, the Dhammapada and the Kāthavatthu.

(7) The Cullaniddesa, the Mahāniddesa, the Udāna, the Itivuttaka, the Suttanipāta, the Dhātukathā, the Yamaka and the Paṭṭhāna.

(8) The Buddhavaṃsa, the Cariyāpiṭaka and the Apadāna.

(9) The Parivārapāṭha.

(10) The Khuddakapāṭha.

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MAHĀYĀNA

L. de la Vallee Poussin

I. DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION. 1. In order to define Mahāyāna, we must first notice certain characteristics of the Hīnayāna.

Buddha has said that, as salt is the only flavour of the sea, the only flavour (*rasa*) of his doctrine, the true doctrine or religion (*saddharma*), is the flavour of deliverance (*mokṣa, mukti*), or of *nirvāna.* Buddhism, therefore can be looked on as a path (*marga, pratipad*) leading to *nirvāṇa,* as a supra-mundane (*lokottara*) path leading to the end of the constant succession of re-births (*saṃsāra punarbhava*) which constitutes the 'world' (*loka*) or existence (*bhavaloka*), or as a vehicle (*yāna*) conveying those who mount it to the same goal, 'the town of *nirvāṇa*, the island of *nirvāna*.'

The first metaphor has been adopted by primitive Buddhism ; the second one by the new Buddhism. The adherents of this later Buddhism found fault with the earlier Buddhism ; and, accordingly, while styling their own creed *mahāyāna* ('great vehicle'), true, great, and profound (*gambhīra*) doctrine of salvation, they characterized the creed of their predecessors as *hīnayāna* ('little vehicle'), an inferior, imperfect, inefficient doctrine of salvation. Another name for the older Buddhism, a more polite one, is *śrāvakayāna* ; in the old scriptures the disciples of the Buddha who have entered the path are called *śrāvaka* ('disciples', 'auditors,' or 'preachers' of the Law), or *āryaśrāvaka* ('noble disciples,' 'true disciples'). The term *śrāvakayāna* conveys the idea that the old doctrine is nevertheless an efficient means of salvation. Moreover, it marks a contrast between the two Buddhist creeds ; for the adherents of the new Buddhism style themselves *bodhisattva*

(future Buddhas) and employ the term *boddhisattvayāna* ('vehicle that conveys the *bodhisattvas*') as a synonym of Mahāyāna.

(1) The Hīnayāna asserts that salvation can be quickly gained ; it is a vehicle drawn by deer (*mṛgaratha*). It professes to lead, when duly practised, to *nirvāṇa* in this existence (*dṛṣṭa-dharma*). One has to become an *arhat*, i. e. a *jīvanmukta* (q. v.), a man freed even in this life. In fact, the *arhat* has already obtained *nirvāṇa*, the *nirvāṇa* called *sopādhiśeṣa*, the liberation from desire and lust, the machinery of life continuing automatically until it runs down. When dying, he says : ' I have nothing more to do. I shall not be re-born here again,' and he enters into *nirupādhiśeṣa nirvāṇa*, 'absolute *nirvāṇa*.'

It is mysticism, but a perfectly coherent mysticism. It involves no elements that are foreign to the end which it has in view, viz. the destruction of desire or thirst, the suppression of all activity (*karman*) liable to induce a new existence. It consists essentially in contemplation (*darśana* ='sight') and meditation (*bhāvanā*) on the four truths ; everything is painful, etc. These four truths may be summarized in a philosophical dogma : what we call the 'soul', or the 'ego,' is only a complex of incongruous, transitory elements (*skandhas*) which endures by means of desire (or thirst) alone ; and an ethical dogma ; desire can be rooted out and the consequences of action can be suppressed by meditations which emancipate and deliver from exlstence.

(2) This method of salvation (the method of supramundane meditations) cannot be practised except by a person who observes, and has observed for some time, 'morality'—i.e. the laws that make an action or a thought good and, what is very important, a person who practises continence (or the religious life *brahmacarya*) as a Buddhist monk.

(3) Although the Buddha is neither a god nor a supernatural being, he is nevertheless very different from the other saints. The saints, like the Buddha, have attained *nirvāṇa* in this life, because they have attained *bodhi* ('illumination') ; but it was the Buddha who discovered the

truths of salvation which potentially contain *bodhi*, and who showed the 'path'; and he was able to do so because in the course of his innumerable existences with a view to saving human beings, he had accumulated good works and acquired infinite knowledge.

(4) The cult of the Buddha is not distinguished by what is properly called "devotion' (*bhakti*)—this sentiment implies[1] a living god—though the *Abhidharmakośa* employs the term. Veneration of relics, *stūpas*, etc., is useful and recommended; it is good, it is helpful, as penance (*tapas*) is, but it is not essential.

(5) Ancient Buddhism is not merely a vehicle of *nirvāṇa*; it also teaches how to be re-born in heaven, in the world of Brahma.

Three Vehicles are usually distinguished: (1) the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas, (2) the Vehicle of the Pratyekabuddhas, (3) the Vehicle of the *bodhisattvas*. The first two together constitute the Little Vehicle, the third the Great Vehicle (see E. Burnout, *Le Lotus de la bonne loi*, Paris, 1852, pp. 52, 315, 369; H. Kern, SBE xxi. (1884) 80, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 61; *Dharmasaṃgraha*, ed. F. Max Muller and H. Wenzel, Oxford, 1885, p. 2, and sources cited on p. 35; E. J. Eitel, *Handbook of Chinese Buddhism*,[1] London, 1888, s.v. '*Triyānā*'; cf. *Buddhavaṃsa* (PTS, London, 1882), Commentary, p. xi., where the Śrāvakapratyeka-buddhas are opposed to the Samyaksambuddhas). There is no difference between the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas and that of the Pratyekabuddhas; both arrive at the same *bodhi*, or illumination, and the same *nirvāṇa*; but, while the Śrāvakas appear at a time when the Law of the Buddha is known, and profit by the teaching of others, the Pratyekabuddhas attain to *bodhi* themselves at a time when the Law of the Buddha has disappeared, while the Śrāvakas preach (*śrāvayanti*; *śrāvaka*, translated 'hearer' means rather 'preacher' [see SBE xxi, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, iv. 531] the Pratyekabuddhas do not convert except by miracles. There

1. For the combination of the cult of the Buddhas and compassion, or charity, with meditation on vaculty, see BODHISATIVA in *ERE*.

are still other differences, but they are of no importance to the Vehicle of salvation (see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ch. iii, Fr. tr., London 1915, p. 103 and notes; Candrakīrti *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Fr tr., Museon, new ser., viii [1907] 2 ff., quoting literary authorities). It is natural, then, for the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas and the Vehicle of the Pratyekabuddhas to be fused in the Little Vehicle (Hīnayāna lq. v. 1).

2. Great Vehicle.—The new Buddhism adopts the name of *mahāyāna* ('great vehicle'). The word *yāna* ('vehicle') is used to express the same idea as that conveyed by the 'supramundane path' (*lokottaramārga*), the 'path leading to *nirvāṇa*'. But as we shall see, there are various kinds of Mahāyāna, and this fact explains the diversity of definitions and the evident difficulty in which early writers—e.g., the Chinese pilgrims—found themselves when they tried to explain the difference between the Little and Great Vehicle.

The Great Vehicle consists of (1) the practice of the virtues (*pāramitās*) of a *bodhisattva* or future Buddha (i.e. *pāramitāyāna [naya]* or *bodhisattvayāna*); by it one becomes a Buddha (*buddhayāna*); (2) the wisdom or knowledge of vacuity (*prajñāyāna* or *jñānamārga*); (3) devotion; it is the path of devotion (*bhaktimārga*).

(1) Career of the *bodhisattva*.—The books which profess to belong to the Great Vehicle (*Mahāyāna-sūtras*) tend to assert that *nirvāṇa* cannot be attained by the ancient method. To obtain deliverance from desire, ignorance, and existence it is necessary to practise all the virtues and acquire all the knowledge of the Buddhas, to enter on the career of a future Buddha (*bodhisattvacaryā*) and pursue it for centuries. Instead of 'Great Vehicle', it may therefore be called 'Vehicle of the future Buddhas' (*bodhisattvayāna*), or 'Method of the perfect virtues, charity, patience, etc.' (*pāramitānaya*).

Now the Buddha Śākyamuni, during his former existences, has always lived in the world. It is possible, therefore, to enter the 'Vehicle of the future Buddhas' although married. Nothing, however, prevents monks from making the 'vow to become Buddhas'; by this vow they mount the 'Vehicle

of the future Buddhas,' but by their monastic observances they belong to the 'old Buddhism', and form part of one of the disciplinary schools of the Śrāvakas. Young laymen often take the vows of monks, and, after acquiring merit in this way for a time, renounce them in order to take the vows of a future Buddha.

(2) Vacuity.—The books that treat of philosophy explain that the ancient dogma, 'The soul is nothing but a complex of transitory elements (*skandha*),' is perfectly accurate, but unsatisfying; they would add that these elements themselves do not exist in themselves; but are 'void' (*śūnya*). The doctrine of vacuity (*śūnyatāvāda*) is the second characteristic of the Great Vehicle. But a layman or a monk can perform the 'vow to become a Buddha' without thinking out the doctrine of vacuity. The 'theologians' themselves declare that, as the beginning of the saintly career is entirely devoted to charity, it is not good to give too much thought to philosophy, an adept of the Little Vehicle who does not believe in the necessity of becoming a Buddha may adhere to the doctrine of vacuity and become imbued with it, in order to attain *nirvāṇa* as an *arhat*, i.e. in this present life. Some texts even explain that, if the doctrine of vacuity is really indispensable to the attainment of *nirvāṇa*, it is sufficient, without the career of the future Buddha.

(3) Devotion.—A third characteristic of the Great Vehicle is the worship of the Buddhas and 'future Buddhas' of high rank. The Buddhas are great gods, almost eternal, who sit upon thrones in heavens surrounded by saints, and send 'magic bodies' down to earth to save men. The worship of the Buddhas may exist independently of any desire to become oneself a Buddha and independently of philosophic speculation.[2] There is therefore a Great Vehicle that is merely devotional; (a) the Buddha (Amitābha, e.g.)

2. See artt. AMITĀYUS; BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Buddhist) in *ERE*; cf. Matsumoto Bunzaburo, *Gokuraku jodo ron* ('Study of the Pure-Land Sukhāvati'), Tokyo, 1909, and *Miroku jodu run* ('Study of the Pure-Land of Maitreya'). do. 1911 (Fr. tr., M. N. Peri, in Bull. de l'Ecole franc. d'Extreme-Orient, xi. [1911] 439 ff.).

is a god in the full meaning of the word, eternal or almost so (Amitābha, 'infinite splendour,' is sometimes called Amitāyus, 'infinite life'); (b) the only concern of the faithful is to be re-born in the paradise of this god, 'the blissful world' (Sukhāvatī), the western paradise, by the grace of the god and with the help of the holy saints Avalokita, etc.[3]

This Mahāyāna purely devotional and with monotheistic tendencies, is not a Vehicle of future Buddhas. In the books discussing it (*Sukhāvatīvyūha*, etc.) there is practically no Hindu *bhakti*, or devotion. *Bhakti* must be accompanied by highly orthodox acts of worship, which are recommended in the Hīnayāna: worship of *stūpas*, *maṇḍalas* in honour of the Buddha, abstinence from food before worshipping Buddha, etc. But the Mahāyānist *bhakti* is laden with litanies and formulae; it declares that rites efface sin, and attributes salutary virtue to the reading of the *sūtras* and the repetition of the name of the Buddhas—which is not quite orthodox.

It is to be noticed that the worship of Buddhas, Tārās, etc. is compatible with the strict orthodoxy of the Hīnayāna, as has been remarked in regard to Java, which is very idolatrous and yet attached to the Hīnayāna.[4]

3. Vedāntic and Tāntric Vehicle.—The Mahāyāna, as analyzed above, is, from the philosophical point of view, a phenomenalist system, and from the religious and mythological point of view, polytheism with monarchical and devotional tendencies. From early times phenomenalism and

3. A. Barth, 'Le pelerin chinois I-tsing,' in *Journal des Savants*, 1898; cf. the remark of Winternitz, *Geschichte*, ii. 157, on the Buddha in Buddhaghoṣa: '*eine Art Halbgott wie in den Mahāyānasūtra*.'

4. See Poussin, *Bouddhisme, Opinions sur la dogmatique*, p. 391; also his papers on the three bodies of a Buddha and allied subjects in JRAS, 1910, p. 129, and Museon, new ser., xiv. [1913] 257; cf. D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, London, 1907.

polytheism led to conceptions of immanence and monism.[5] In the days of Asaṅga (A.D. 4th cent.) men believed in an Ādibuddha (q.v.) who would play the part of Brahma in his various aspects as Brahmā, or Kṛṣṇa divine, or Kṛṣṇa incarnate. These speculations upon immanence and emanation, which often mingle with the doctrines of the Mahāyāna proper, are the basis of the 'vehicle of formulae' (*mantrayāna*), the 'diamond method' (*vajranaya*), also called the 'Tāntric Vehicle' (*tantrayāna*). This Vehicle is Vedānta in Buddhist disguise as regards its mythological representations and its rites. Its goal is the condition of a Buddha, its doctrine that (1) every being is, in his inmost nature, a Buddha, and (2) every being can, by meditation, spells, (*sādhana*), and theurgic practices of all kinds (often erotic), 'realize' this Buddha nature at little expense.

4. Is the Mahāyāna the only Vehicle ?—This is an interesting question and worthy of our attention. Do the Mahāyāna teachers regard the Mahāyāna as the only Vehicle of salvation ? I-tsing's remarks may be accepted as giving the general opinion :

'These two systems (Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna) are perfectly in accordance with the noble doctrine [of the Buddha] ...Both equally conform to truth and lead us to Nirvāṇa'. But the scholastic literature and the *Mahāyāna-sūtras* of course give different and often narrower views. Maitreya-Asaṅga says that ' the meditation (*dhyāna*) of the Hīnayāna, though impure, leads to salvation ; [6] but for Śāntideva the Hīnayāna is of only relative truth, and its followers are upon a path that has no issue[7] ; Candrakīrti sees no virtue in the Hīnayāna except its teaching of 'vacuity' : there are old *sūtras* which proclaim vacuity (*sūnyatāpratisaṃyukta*) ; in an extreme case arhatship and *nirvāṇa* may be attained by meditation on these *sūtras*[8]—in

5. *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896. p. 15.
6. *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, xvi. 50.
7. *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, iv. 7, ix. 49.
8. *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 19 ; *Bodhicaryāvatāra, locc. citt.*

an extreme case, we say, because the follower of the Hīnayāna has no part in the spiritual side that are reserved for the future Buddha ; he does not have the great 'means' (*upāya*) of salvation, compassion, great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) i.e. the desire and the vow to save all creatures ; the possession of wisdom (*prajñā*) is unavailing, since he lacks the great 'means' of remission of sins and elimination of passion. In fact, there is only one Vehicle, as the Lotus of the True Law (q. v.) and several *sūtras* teach very clearly. The only way to salvation is to become a Buddha. But this demands a long career ; so the Buddha has shown men a nearer goal, the *nirvāṇa* of the *arhat*, that they may not lose heart—like a caravan-leader who creates a magic town in the midst of the forest, far from the end of the journey, that the travellers may think they are near their destination, and take heart to advance. [9] 'The men who mount the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas cannot obtain deliverance by the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas' ; embracing a false *nirvāṇa*, they are like a lover who embraces his mistress's corpse ; they have, however, advanced nearer to the true *nirvāṇa*. At death, they falsely think that they have attained deliverance and exemption from re-birth ; they are re-born, for they are not yet delivered, but they are re-born beyond the world (*tridhātu*), in the 'pure realm' (*anāsravadhātu*), in lotuses which open their petals to the rays of Amitābha and other Buddhas. There they learn the true Vehicle, make the *bodhi* vow, and enter, through numerous lives, upon the career of a future Buddha. [10]

The chinese texts studied by J. J. M. de Groot (*Code du Mahāyāna en Chine*, Amsterdam, 1893, p. 94) reduce the Hīnayāna to the observation of monastic rules, taking

9. See Poussin, *Bouddhisme, Opinions sur la dogmatique*, pp. 313-320 ; *Lotus of the True Law*, tr. Kern (SBE xxi.), p. 181 ; *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Bibl. Budd. Petrograd, 1912), p. 402, and sources cited.

10. *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka*, p 166 of Poussin's MS, on *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, xxxiv. 3, who cites the *Laṅkāvatāra*, the *Ratnamegha*, Nāgārjuna, etc.

no notice, either purposely or through ignorance, of all the Noble Path and meditation on the truths. They say that Little Vehicle, thus understood, leads to re-birth in the very inferior paradises of the world of Kāma it is therefore a Vehicle that leads to the gods (*devayāna*, according to de Groot's translation), and not a Vehicle of Salvation.

5. Speculative Doctrines of the Mahāyāna.—In the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, these are examined in the articles MADHYAMAKA and VIJÑĀNAVĀDINS, which discuss the two chief philosophic schools of the Great Vehicle. The doctrines connected with the 'career of the future Buddha' (*bodhisattvacaryā*) are treated in the *ERE* in art. BODHISATTVA. Many details might be added on the technique of meditations; but the works on this subject (*Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka*, *Boddhisattvabhūmi*) have not been published, and present very serious difficulties.

6. Discipline (Vinaya) of the Mahāyāna.—The Indian schools of devotion *(bhakti)* are often not strict as regards morality and discipline. There existed, accordingly, lax Mahāyāna, inclining to Tāntrism, which preached salvation and the remission of sins by the recitation of formulae, etc., independently of rules of conduct.

But there is also a rigid Mahāyānist 'monachism,' sometimes adhering to the ancient Vinayas, sometimes introducing new ones.

(1) The *Ākāśagarbhasūtra* says:

'If a Bodhisattva (i. e. an adopt of the Great Vehicle) begins to think: "The Bodhisattva does not require to study the law which forms part of the Hīnayāna; he need not make it a rule for himself. What is the use of accepting this rule? What is the use of this rule?"—if he thinks in this way, he is guilty of error, and renders himself very culpable.'

Śāntideva speaks in the same strain:

'The adopt of the Great Vehicle will never give his hearers the vain hope of acquiring purity by simply reading the books of the Great Vehicle, and reciting formulae,

while abandoning the rules of conduct.'[11]
One fully realizes I-tsing's statement:

'Which of the eighteen schools (of the Hīnayāna) should be grouped with the Mahāyāna or with the Hīnayāna is not determined...Both (Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna) adopt one and the same discipline (Vinaya).[12] Monks and convents practising the strict monastic observance of the ancient Vinayas adopted the dogmas and worship of the Mahāyāna; Yuan Chwang therefore mentions monks who were 'Mahāyānists of the Sthavira-school and all perfect in Vinaya observance'.[13] It has been supposed that the Vinaya of the ancient Mahāsāṅghika sect was the most popular in Mahāyānist convents, because it was in a Mahāyānist convent that Fa Hian found the Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya,[14] because the Mahāsāṅghikas seem to have been the forerunners of the Mahāyāna.[15]

(2) The Mahāyana apparently introduccd into the some new rules concerning the use of milk and meat. The discipline Sarvāstivādins (Hīnayāna) allowed the use of meat under ctrtain conditions; the Mahāyānists condemned it. I-tsing tells a touching story of a young Mahāyānist. Cittavarman, who was refused ordination in a Hīnayāna convent until he renounced, in tears, his principles of diet.[16]

11. *Śikṣāsamuccaya* p. 61; *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, tr. L. de la Vallee Poussin, Introd. a la pratique des futurs Bouddhas, Paris, 1907, ch. v.
12. *Op. cit.* p. 14.
13. T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, 629-645, London, 1904-05, i. 227, ii. 136, 188, 199, 234, 248.
14. A. Remusat, *Foe-koue-ki*, Paris, 1836, p. 318; J. Legge, *Travels of Fa-hien*, Oxford, 1886, p. 98.
15. See the *Mahāvastu*; the 'basket of magic formulae' (*Vidyādharapiṭaka*) said to be a part of the Mahāsāṅghika canon; Kern, *Manual*, p. 4; S. Julien, *Voyages des pelerins bouddhistes*, Paris, 1853-58, i. 158, iii. 37.
16. *I-tsing*, *Memoires*, etc., tr. E. Chavannes, Paris, 1894, p. 48; Julien, *Voyages*, i. 50; Watters, *Yuan Chwang*, i. 55. 57, 79, ii. 173, 192; *I-tsing*, tr. Takakusu, p. 43.

Sooner or later, however, the Mahāyāna created a new Vinaya for itself—a Vinaya that was independent of the ancient Vinayas, that has a different purpose in view and that could be, and was often expected to be, used together with the ancient Vinayas. The ancient Vinayas were for the use of monks ; the Mahāyāna Vinaya is the 'Vinaya of the future Buddhas', or, more exactly, 'of incipient future Buddhas' (*ādhikarmika-bodhisattva*). (a) It was while making the vow to become a Buddha that Śākyamuni, prostrating himself at the feet of a Buddha, became a 'future Buddha' ; this vow is valid, not only for present existence, but also for numerous future existences ; like the vows of a *bhikṣu*, it creates 'discipline' (*saṃvara*), the obligation and, to a certain extent, the 'grace' (the moral power) to perform certain duties. We have no longer a Buddha in our midst to receive such a vow from us ; we must be content to take the 'discipline of' a son of Buddha' (*sugatātmajasaṃvara*) before a qualified person (*sāṃvarika*), or, in the absense of such, before all the Buddhas of the quarters.[17] (b) The future Buddha must practise the perfect virtues (*pāramitās*) ; theologians have therefore to explain how he is to fulfil the virtues of giving, energy, and meditation. (c) He commits errors ; he must know how to confess them, before whom (i.e. Buddhas of confession), and how to obtain pardon. (d) The ancient devotional practices, worship of *stūpas*, etc., are not sufficient for devotees of Avalokita. Amitābha,

17. See *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, i. 10, fol. 62, and the fragments of the *Bodhisattvapratimokṣa* (B. Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford. 1883, nos. 1096-1098), quoted in *Śikṣāsmuccaya*, p. 11. On the vow of the future Buddha see Śrījñāna, *Bodhipathapradīpa* (JBTSI [1893], 39), and art. BODHISATTVA, in *ERE* vol. ii. pp. 746, 748f. The *Bhadracāripraṇidhāna* has been published by Watanebe, Strassburg, 1912. The Vinayas of the Mahāyāna were first placed under the patronage of Upāli (Upālipariprccha); later they were more completely cut off from the tradition of the Hīnayāna.

and Tārā ; fixed rules of worship must therefore be made.[18]

We have no exact information regarding the oldest forms of the Vinaya for *bodhisattvas.* But documents which give an accurate idea of the rules of life of the Mahāyānist monk will be found in the *Brahmajālasūra* (tr. de Groot, *Code du Mahāyāna en Chine*), and in the 'Daily Manual of the Shaman' (S. Beal, *A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures*, London, 1871, p. 239). The ritual of the office in honour of Avalokita (Beal, *Catena*, p. 398) indicates the nature of the cult.

(3) The Mahāyānist monks belonged to one of the Hīnayāna schools, and fulfilled the obligations of future Buddhas[19] in addition to those of their own school. Later, there were monks who adhered solely to the monastic code of the Mahāyāna (the type given in de Groot, *Code du Mahāyāna en Chine*) which became a complete code in itself, a conglomeration of different Vinayas. Finally, it is always possible for a monk to renounce his vows and return to the world ; the Great Vehicle favoured this tendency inasmuch as it had a special 'code of the future Buddha' for the use of married people.[20] It is understood, however, that ordination to future Buddhahood can be granted only to persons who are at least Upāsakas, 'devotees,' who have taken the three refuges and are ritually bound by the five vows (not to kill, etc.).[21]

(4) The relative importance of duties for monks who are at the same time 'future Buddhas' is not always clear. I-tsing declares that he is not writing 'concerning those who claim to follow the practice of a Bodhisattva rather than the Vinaya rules.'[22] Śāntideva cites an extreme case—the story of the monk who had practised continence for

18. See e. g., *Ādikarmapradīpa*, in Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, Paris, 1898.
19. De Groot, *Code du Mahāyāna en Chine*, p. 8,
20. Kern, *Hist. du bouddhisme dans l'Inde*, ii. 34, following B. H. Hodgson, *Essays on the Languages, Literature, and Religion of Nepal and Tibet*, London, 1874, p. 145.
21. Śrījñāna, *Bodhipathapradīpa*, tr. Sarat Chandra Das, In JBTS i. 47.
22. Cf. Takakusu's tr., p. 197.

a long time (84,000 years) consenting to satisfy the desires of a woman so that he might fulfil the requirement of benevolence and kindness that is the essential law of future Buddhas.[23] For them the sins of hatred are very serious, while the sins of desire are venial. The very spirit of the Mahāyāna, therefore, may perhaps be responsible for the singular development of Kashmir monasticism, viz. married monks.[24]

II. HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF MAHĀYĀNA DOCTRINES.—As we have seen, the Mahāyāna differed from the ancient Vehicle in three points; (1) the substitution of the 'career of a future Buddha': for the 'conquest of the quality of *arhat*'; in other words, the substitution of the *bodhisattva*, who might be a layman, for the *bhikṣu*, 'monk'; (2) the creation of a new ontological theory, 'the doctrine of the void' (*śūnyatā*) or of 'the non-existence in themselves of the constituent elements of things and of the human ego' (*dharmanairātmya*), superimposed upon the doctrine of 'the non-existence in itself of the human ego' (*pudgalanairātmya*); and (3) the transformation of the Buddhas into great mythological gods, almost eternal; the deification of 'future Buddhas' as helping providences; and, by a parallel development, the practice of devotion (*bhakti*) towards these 'great beings' (Mahāsattva) instead of the respect and meditation practised by the ancients towards the Buddha: what was formerly venerated in the Buddha, what men 'took refuge in' (*śaraṇagamana*) when taking refuge in the Buddha, was the complex of the moral and intellectual qualities in virtue of which a certain person is

23. *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 167.
24. See M. A. Stein, *Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī*, a Chronicle of the Kings of Kashmir, London, 1900, p. 74: 'In one half of the monastery she plaeed those Bhikṣus whose conduct conformed to the precepts; and in the other half those who, being in possession of wives, children, cattle and property, deserved blame for their life as householders' (on the date see Introd. p. 81). Cf. Hodgson, *Essays*, p. 52, and various predictions of the *Mahāyānasūtras* as to the decadence of Buddhist law.

Buddha. To admire and meditate on these qualities is an excellent means of gaining morality, tran quillity, *nirvāṇa.* The Mahāyānist addresses himself to living, gracious paternal gods.

There are, therefore, three formative elements in the Mahāyāna ; and its history means the history of the development and inter-relation of these three elements. This comprises three distinct histories ; for, though the three elements are sometimes united, they are often separate ; and, though their development has been parallel, or almost so, they have no connexion from the logical point of view. We māy safely attempt to give the scheme the evolutionary curve of these three etements, but it is very difficult to give chronological dates or precise details in the evolution.

I. Career of the *bodhisattva.*—Ancient Buddhism holds that Buddhas are very rate, but the Mahāyāna invites all who desire salvation to enter on the career of a future Buddha. This is a fundamental change from the dogmatic point of view, and involves a corresponding change in morale ; in short, the monk believed that the quickest way to reach *nirvāṇa* was by meditation ; he worked entirely 'for himself' (*svārtham*) ; the activity of the future Buddha, on the contrary, is, above all, altruistic (*parārtham*).

Our literary evidence on the stages of this transformation is unsatisfactory. On the other hand, it is easy to guess the motives behind it. The following factors are of great importance.

(1) The ideal of ancient Buddhism, the *arhat* useless to others and an utter egoist, to the extent of insensibility, appeared mean when compared to the Buddha, the being of compassion and pity. Hence the 'saint for himself,' the 'delivered while still alive', so long the dream of India, was no longer held in honour. The creation of the type of the Buddha, the hero of charity, saving the world at the cost of so many lives consecrated to the world, reveals tendencies in ancient Buddhism towards the doctrine of the 'career of the *bodhisattva*' open to all.[25]

25. The *Cariyāpiṭaka,* not one of the most ancient books, is the

(2) The question arose, further, whether the *arhat* actually obtains *nirvāṇa*. Formerly the *arhat* was required to show, not only 'morality'. 'harmlessness', but also 'feelings of benevolence' for the mass of human creatures, as it is only just to mention, but his 'equipment of merit' appeared somewhat slight, and we may suppose that men were even then tempted to ask whether his 'equipment of knowledge' was sufficient. Metaphysics and phychology had made progress. Many existences are necessary, they may have said, to obtain 'knowledge' sufficient for deliverance ; just as, in order to achieve deliverancef rom desire, love of self, and love of existence, the first necessity is devotion to others.

(3) It is possible, also, that faith in *nirvaṇa* was shaken, or that, not knowing exactly what *nirvāṇa* was, men were somewhat afraid of it, and devoted their attention rather to the acquisition of celestial powers and the bliss of the Buddhas (now transformed into very happy and long-lived personage) (see below 3).

The *Daśabhūmika*, a very technical work on the 'career of the future Buddhas,' was translated into Chinese between A. D. 265 and 316 ; the *Mahāvastu* (q. v.), of much earlier origin, gives a lengthy account of the stages or degrees (*bhūmi*) of this career. According to Candrakīrti (*Madhyamakāvatāra*), the Hīnayāna knows nothing of the 'Vehicle of the future Buddhas,' which is the characteristic trait of the Mahāyāna.

2. Vacuity.—We have more extensive information on the philosophic doctrine. Here we are dealing with a development rather than with a transformation ; (1) the principles of analysis and speculative annihilation applied by

first in Pali literature to mention the doctrine of the *pāramitās*, 'perfect virtues' necessary for making a Buddha., 'a doctrine that plays no part in the older books' (Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, London, 1903, p. 177). The doctrine of the *bodhisattva*, the theory of his charity, merits, etc., is relatively highly developed in the *Abhidharmakośa* and its sources (Sanskrit Buddhism of the Hīnayāna).

ancient Buddhism to the ego and the great unities (the body, the chariot) were now applied to the *dharmas* ('elements of things'), the minute elementary realities constituting the ego and the great unities; this is the Mādhyamika system (see *ERE*, MADHYAMAKA); and (2) the ancient idealist tendencies were developed which saw in thought the cause of all: 'All that we are in the result of what we have thought; it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts' (*Dhammapada*, i. (SBE x. (1898) (3). Hence the conclusion that matter does not exist; thought alone exists.[26]

The two philosophical schools of the Mahāyāna (Mādhyamikas and Vijñānavādins) are both in line with the most ancient tradition. Nāgārjuna, the great master of the former, is placed in the 2nd cent. A. D.; but there is a great deal of Mādhyamika philosophy in the Pali canon,[27] and the *sūtras* of the Prajñāpāramitā, where this philosophy is predominant, are ancient.[28] Candrakīrti establishes the fact that the true doctrine of the void was known to the Hīnayāna, or, to be more exact, that the Buddha had already taught this doctrine in his first revealation, in the *sūtras* of the Hīnayāna. But, it will be asked, if this Vehicle, the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas, teaches the non-existence in themselves of the elements of the ego (*dharmanairātmya*), where is the need of the Mahāyāna? The Mahāyāna, replies Candrakīrti, teaches not only the *dharmanairātmya*, but also the stages of the career of the future Buddha, the perfect virtues (*pāramitā*), the resolutions or vows to save all creatures, the application of merit to the acquisi-

26, But its existence is not *pāramārthika*, 'absolute'; it is only *samvyavahārika*, 'contingent'.

27. H. Oldenberg (*Buddha*, Stuttgart, 1914. p. 323) disagrees with the present writer on this point.

28. The Prajñāpāramita was translated into Chinese between A. D. 147 and 164. We are told that the Pūrvaśailas and the Aparaśailas possessed a Prajñā in Prakrit (Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, p. 291), which is quite possible. They were Lokottaravādins. But what is the date of this Prajñā?

tion of the quality of Buddha, the great composition (Madhyamakāvatāra, tr. in Museon, new ser., viii, 272), whence the Mahāyāna was necessary.

3. Devotion.—As regards the deification of Buddhas and worship of Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*, we have a sure date in the Chinese translation (between A. D. 148 and 170) of the *Sukhāvativyūha*, the book in which the monotheistic religion of Amitābha (see above, 1. 2. (3) is formulated.[29] The Gandhāra monuments, the exact date of which is not known, but which can hardly be later than the Ist cent. A. D., take us back even further than the earliest date of the Chinese translation. They show, or at least may be held to show, the worship of the *bodhisattavas* associated with that of the Buddhas.[30]

On the other hand, we know from the documents of the Hīnayāna that the worship of the Buddha is of great antiquity. In the art. ĀDIBUDDHA (in *ERE*) the present writer has mentioned some of these documents, and (although he no longer sees in certain passages the quasi-deification of the Buddha which he saw in 1908) they show that the Buddhists, or at least certain Buddhists, came to the conclusion that Śākyamuni did not descend in person to the earth, but was content to send his image. This is, in substance, the teaching of the Great Vehicle on Buddha—the Buddha almost eternal and saving beings by means of magical creations. Scholars who admit the authenticity of the *Kathāvatthu* as a whole are compelled to locate this belief before the time of Aśoka. Without believing in the authenticity of this very composite book, the present writer would willingly admit that the deification of the Buddha and his 'almost' eternity belong to a period long before the formal documents.

It is almost certain, too, that this transformation of the Buddha may be explained by the natural evolution of the

29. See the tr. of Max Muller and Takakusu in SBE xlix. (1894).
30. See A. Foucher, *L'Art greco-bouddhique*, ii., who treats of the difficult identification of the icons of Gandhāra and their date.

Buddhist dogma on Hindu soil. The resemblance between the Buddha reigning peacefully in a paradise and sending images of himself down to this world, on the one hand, and Kṛṣṇa, gladdening beings in his own world (Goloka) and appearing in a human form, on the other, is striking, and contains a valuable lesson.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that, although (Śākyamuni plays an important role in the *Lotus of the True Law* and in the Mahāyānist literature of which he is the revealer, he does not seem to have such a leading part in the religions of the Great Vehicle. In the first rank are Maitreya,[31] the future Buddha, more living than Śākyamuni, and especially personages of obscure origin, Avalokiteśvara (see *ERE* AVALOKITEŚVARA), Amitābha[32] Vairocana, Vajrapāṇi, and many others, whose Buddhist character is not very marked.

Several scholars, moreover (and no mean ones), regard the origin of the devotion to the Buddhas as a real 'puzzle' (Max Muller), and believe that it is to be found in the influence of the 'barbarians,' notably the Mazdaeans—an influence which was exercised especially in Northern India, the Panjab, and Kashmir, where religious statuary reached such high development. The pre-historic mythology of the Great Vehicle is veiled in obscurity, and future researches may perhaps confirm this hypothesis ; but the comparisons to which attention has been called up to the present have little value and do not prove that Amitābha is an Ahura Mazda or an Apolio disguised. In any case it is useless to explain the worship of the Buddhas by the influence of Greek sculptors who, it is believed, were the first to make images of Buddhas. The whole 'theology' of the religion of Amitābha is Indian ; the belief in the providence of Amitābha and of Avalokita, the belief in their saving grace, has very little in common with ancient Buddhism, but is excellent Kṛṣṇaism. The paradise of the west (Sukhāvatī),

31. Bull. de l'Ecole franc. d'Extreme-Orient, xi. 442.
32. See Poussin, *Bouddhisme, Opinions sur la dogmatique*. p. 266.

and the name of Amitābha, 'infinite light,' which probably are in reality 'solar', have not up to the present been sufficiently studied and explained. The idea of multiple universes, however, each ruled by a Buddha, is very authentic Buddhism (See, e.g. the *Mahāvastu*).

III. HISTORY OF THE SCRIPTURES OF THE MAHĀYĀNA.[33]—I. Controversy on the authenticity of the books and legends concerning them. We know that the books of the Hīnayāna appeared surrounded with a very definite ecclesiastical history. Whatever may be the value to modern scholars of the tradition referring to the Councils (e.g., R.O. Franke, Dīghanikāya, Gottingen, 1913, p. xiii), the Buddhists of the Mahāyāna and of the Hīnayāna admitted authenticity, in the strict sense, of the ancient canon. But the adherents of the Hīnayāna did not recognize the books of the Mahāyāna for the simple reason that these books were unknown in ecclesiastical history.

'This is the word of the Buddha which is found in the *Sūtra*, which appears in the Vinaya which is in harmony with religion, with Truth (*dharmatā*)'.[34]

This old text of the *Dīgha* is, according to them, the condemnation of the Mahāyāna, which not only is not authentic, but is even full of heretical novelties.

The most weighty argument of the Mahāyānists is the speculative argument. The Mahāyāna, they say, is in harmony with the *dharmatā* ; it is the only vehicle of *nirvāna*. The Hīnayāna is indeed authentic, but the Buddha taught it only as provisional truth, taking into consideration the weakness of mind of his hearers. Besides, if the doctrine of the Mahāyāna is not found in your *sūtras*, it is found

33. For a description and analysis of the literature of the Great Vehicle see Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, pp. 157-207, and Winternitz, *Gesch. der. ind. Litteratur*, ii. 187-250 ; see also Winternitz on the *Lālitavistāra* and the *Mahāvastu*—works which belong to both Vehicles. Among translations see '*The Lotus of the True Law*, 'SBE xxi., '*The Sukhāvatī*, etc.,' SBE xlix.

34. *Dīgha*, ii. 124 ; Mañjughoṣahāsavajra, *Siddhānta*, i. 128b. *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, ed. S. Levi, Pais, 1907, i. 20.

in ours; if you do not admit our *sūtras*, we admit them. But, the Hīnayānists reply, our *sūtras* are authentic since you admit them; yours are not authentic, and that is why we reject them. To this the Mahāyānists answer that there are far more reasons for admitting the *sūtras* of the Mahāyāna, since they are the true path to salvation.[35]

The Mahāyānists further maintain that the Mahāyāna is not new, and that the Hīnayānist tradition shows that the Mahāyāna is authentic. (1) The *Saṃyuttanikāya* (ii. 17 and iii. 142) proves that even in the Hīnayāna the Buddha taught the non-existence in themselves of the elements of the ego (see above, II. 2; *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 22). (2) The doctrine of the multiple teaching of the Master, of his 'accommodation to the ideas of the world' (*lokānuvartana*), is taught in the Canon of the Pūrvaśailas, a sect of the Hīnayāna (*Madhyamakāvatāra*, Fr. tr., Museon, new ser., xi. [1910] 134); which is also (3) said to have possessed the *sūtras* of the Prajñāpāramitā edited in Prakrit. This sect, however, is strict in the matter of doctrine, since it orders the expulsion of those who do not understand the 'reserved questions' (see *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 251). (4) The *Mahāvastu* (a book of the *Hīnayāna* teaches the stages in the career of a *bodhisattva* and the perfect virtues [36]

If the whole of the Mahāyāna was not known to the ancients, it was because the doctrines were too sublime be understood by the compilers of the Hīnayāna. But it was the Buddha who taught them, and they were heard by the *bodhisattvas* Samantabhadra, Mañjughoṣa, Gūhyeśvara, Vajrapāṇi, and Maitreya. In fact, immediately after having

35. See *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix. 42f., Fr tr, Introduction a la pratique des futurs Bouddhas, p. 120; *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, i.; Poussin, *Bouddhisme, Opinions sur la dogmatique*, p. 137f.

36. Arguments 3 and 4 are given in the Tibetan work, the *Siddhānta* of Mañjughoṣahāsavajra, p. 128b, in the Urga ed., tr. by Wassilieff in *Buddhismus*, p. 264 (291). The connexion of the Mahāyāna with the Mahāsāṅghika school, of which the pūrvaśailas are a branch, is beyond doubt; but the antiquity of the doctrine of this school is rather doubtful.

obtained illumination, the Buddha preached to the gods (in the heaven of the Thirty-three) and to the *bodhisattvas* (J. Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, London, 1880, p. 18 ; A. Foucher, *Iconographic bouddhique*, p. 86).

The *bodhisattvas*, throughout the course of the ages, have revealed the Mahāyāna to men ; Mañjuśrī took the form of a *bhikṣu* and, it is said, made known the Prajñāpāramitā in 80,000 articles (*Tāranātha*, tr. A. Schiefner, Petrograd, 1869, p. 58). It was Maitreya, the future Buddha, who explained the Prajñāpāramitā to Asaṅga, and who is the author of the treatises of the Vijñānavadin school (Museon, vi. [1905] 145, xv. [1914] 42). According to a Japanese tradition, interesting as an example although without historical value, Mañjuśrī and Maitreya had published the Mahāyāna in the year 116 of Nirvāṇa : 'If these books had not existed before, whence would they have been obtained ?'— a very childish argument.[37] This Mahāyāna is said to have been completed in 200 of Nirvāṇa, notably by the publication of the *Avataṃsaka* (=*Gaṇḍavyūha*). All these revelations took place before Nāgārjuna (R. Fujishima, *Le Bouddhisme japonais*, Paris, 1888, p. 54).

Nevertheless, it is to Nāgārjuna that our most trustworthy documents give the honour of the revelation of the Mahāyāna. The *Laṅkāvatāra* and a *Mahāmeghasūtra*[38] put into the mouth of the Buddha words like the following :

'Four centuries after my *nirvāṇa* this Ānanda will be the *bhikṣu* called Nāga ; he will teach the Great Vehicle'. It is said that Nāgārjuna obtained the Prajñāpāramitās or the Avataṃsaka from the Nāgas (Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, p. 118. f.). We cannot give an account of all the legends referring to the revelation of the books of the Mahāyāna (see *Tāranātha*, p. 61 f.) ; what has already been said will

37. Maitreya-Asaṅga believes (*Sūtrālaṃkāra*, i. 7) that the two Vehicles are contemporaneous.

38. See *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 76 ; Fujishima, pp. 32, 55 ; for the prophecies of Laṅkā, which are wanting in the first Chinese version, see, Max Muller, *India, What can it teach us*, London, 1883, p. 298f.

give a sufficient idea of the beliefs that arose in the Buddhist word concerning the origin of these books. Apart from a few ardent partisans of the Hīnayāna, all Buddhists readily believed all that appeared as the 'word of Buddha'.

2. Criticism of the legends and conjectures.—The library of the Mahāyāna consits of two parts, which the Tibetans have carefully distinguished : first, the *sūtras*, divine works, uttered by Bhagavat himself, which are arranged in the Kanjur (=*bka hgyur*, 'word of the Master') ; and, secondly, the commentaries on the *sūtras* and the treatises (*śāstras*) properly so called, human works, the greater number of which were written by the scholars to whom tradition ascribes them ; all this literature forms part of the Tanjur (*bstan hgyur*, 'instruction, scholasticism'). This distinction has not always a historical value. Many *sūtras* are frankly scholastic works, and it is probable that some of them are later than the signed treatises whose doctrine they contain and authorize.[39]

We know that Asaṅga wrote five treatises which he gave as the revelation of Maitreya. Although revealed, these treatises are included as part of the Tanjur, because in form they are not *sūtras*, but mere treatises (*kārikās*, mnemonic verses, with a prose commentary). Presented with a formula, 'Thus have I heard. Bhagavat was on the Mount of Vultures, surrounded by thousands of Bodhisattvas...', they might have made good *sūtras*. There is therefore some truth in the legends which we were discussing above : the scholars of the Mahāyāna forged the *sūtras* in order to publish their philosophic doctrines, to glorify their chosen saints, to authorize their beliefs in the saviour Amitābha, and so on. In the same way, whether at the same time, earlier, or later, the thaumaturges and the magicians first made collections of magical formulae and then compiled the Tantras, attributed to demi-gods or semi-demons, whom they were believed to evoke. The work

39. We must confine ourselves to a few remarks here. This subject will depend for a long time yet upon mnographos.

of editing and compiling the *Sādhanas* (magic rituals) and the Tantras took a very long time—*Tāranātha* abounds in really historic stories on this subject—and the Mahāyāna probably developed by similar processes.

The scholastic character of the *Laṅkāvatāra* is very definite. This *sūtra* implies the existence of a strong Vijñānavādin doctrine ; it is full of controversy. The *Daśabhumika,* which, augmented by resumes in verse, became transformed into the *Dasabhūmīśvara,* sets forth a theory of the ten stages of the future Buddha which is quite in the manner of a 'treatise'. One of these *sūtras* invoked by Candrakīrti to confirm a Mādhyamika formula, seems to have been written according to the same formula (see *Mādhyamakavṛtti,* p. 249). Careful study will probably prove the close connexion between the *sūtras* and the treatises.

What exactly was the role of Nāgārjuna in the elaboration of this literature ? It is thus defined by Kern :

> 'Nāgārjuna may have been one of the most talented and influential leaders of the movement rather than its originator....An influential person, the first eminent leader of a school imbued with Hinduism and the methods of Indian scholastic philosophy'. He then became 'comprehensive name of the activity of Mahāyānism in the first phase of its onward course' (*Manual,* pp. 6, 123).

Nāgārjuna's importance lies in having discovered the doctrine of the 'void', which showed the inferiority of the ancient Vehicle. His name is inseparable from the Prajñāpāramitā. It may well be that Nāgārjuna, being the author of the treatises which are the scholastic working-out of the principles of the Prajñāpāramitā, is of some account in the redaction of the Prajñāpāramitās, the revelation of which tradition attributes to him.

There are many ancient materials in the *sūtras* of the Mahāyana.

> 'Not a few elements of the Mahāyānist scriptures are taken bodily from the Tripiṭaka, with such omissions

and additions as deemed necessary' (Kern, *loc. cit.*). Whole passages, e.g., of the *Lalitavistara*, recur almost word for word in the Pāli scriptures. The work that H. Oldenberg has done for the *Divyāvadāna* and E. Windisch for the *Mahāvastu*[40] in comparing these two works of the Sanskrit Hīnayāna with the Pāli canon might be done with advantage for several *sūtras* of the Mahāyāna. The comparison would also be very fruitful between the Mahāyāna and the Sanskrit Hīnayāna. The *Abhidharma* of the Sarvāstivadins (Hīnayāna) is accepted by the Mādhyamikas (Mahāyāna); the Sautrāntikas (Hīnayāna) have opened the door to the Vijñānavādins (Mahāyāna); the *Deśabhūmikā* (Mahāyāna), we may believe, depends on the *Mahāvastu* (Hīnayāna); the scholars of the Mahāyāna know and quote the Hīnayāna.[41] When they invent, preaching vacuity or the career of a *bodhisattva*, they make use of the models, reason in the manner of the Ābhidharmikas and the Brahmins, and model the career of the *bodhisattva* on the path of the *arhat*, and the new meditations on the canonical meditations.

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40. Oldenberg, Trans. of the 5th Intern. Congress of Orientalists, Berlin, 1881-82, ii. 107-122, '*Studien zur Gesch. der buddh. Kanon.*' GGN, 1912, p. 155; Windisch, *Die Komposition des Mahāvastu, ein Beitrag zur Quellenkunde des Buddhismus*, Leipzig, 1909, and also *Māra und Buddha*, do. 1885, and *Buddha's Geburt*, do. 1908.

41. Cf., e. g., the theory of the 'meritorious material gifts' (*aupādhikapṇyakriyāvastu*) in *Aṅguttara*, ii. 54, in *Abhidharmakośa*, iv. 113f. (Skr. Hīnayāna), in *Āryaratnarāśisūtra*, cited in *Śikṣāṣamuccaya*, p. 138 *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 309.

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(ERE, Vol. viii)

NĀGĀRJUNA AND ĀRYADEVA

P. S. Sastri

There has been a good deal of controversy regarding the time and birth-place of Nāgārjuna and his disciple Āryadeva. There are critics who have discovered even five Nāgārjunas, and all of them take for granted that the Madhyamaka Nāgārjuna belongs to Vidarbha. The only basis of this contention is the highly erroneous geographical and historical accounts coming from the Tibetan sources. The *Mañjuśrī-mūla-kalpa*, Tāranātha and Bu-ston give us facts clothed in fiction ; and these writings have to be sifted carefully.

1. The *Laṅkāvatāra* gives in the Sagāthaka section the verse :

dakṣiṇāpatha-vedalyāṃ bhikṣuḥ śrīmān mahāyaśāḥ/
nāgāhvayaḥ sa nāmnātu sad asatpakṣadārakaḥ//[1]

Here it is clearly stated that Nāgārjuna's place of birth is Vedali. Critics who were unable to identify this Vedali have read it as Vedahi and as Vidarbha. The compiler of the *Laṅkāvatāra* could very well have given Vidarbha in this verse had he known for definite that Nāgārjuna was born in Vidarbha. He only states that the great teacher was born in Dakṣiṇāpatha, in the southern part of the country, in the place called Vedali. Here it may be noted that some family names of Andhras are derived from place names. Thus we have family names like Vedala and Vedula. There is a village in the present Godavari District of Andhra called Vedula. In the modern Chingelput district there is a village called Vedula. From local traditions near Nāgārjunakoṇḍa in Guntur district it appears that there was at one time a village called Vedali near

1. P. 236, verse 165. See Bu-ston, II, 129 where a fantastic story is given and doubted.

about that hill.[2] Nāgārjuna's place of birth then must evidently go to one of these districts. And it is quite likely that there was the Vedali of Nāgārjuna in the Guntur district. The later writers who did not care to know of such a place drastically amended the text and misread it as Vidarbha.

2. There are other pieces of evidence that go to strengthen this contention. There is a hill in modern Bezawada which is called Indrakīla-parvata. And in the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti we come across a *Māra-damana-sūtra* where it is stated :

atha mañjuśrīḥ kumārabhūtas tasyāṃ velāyāṃ tathārūpaṃ samanvāharaṃ samanvāharatisma.
yanmārāpāpīyān indrakīlabandhanabaddho.../[3]

Mañjuśrī comes to the Indrakīla hill which is the same as the hill in Bezawada. At present there is a queer idol, a projection in a rock, called Durgā. This idol can very well be the Mañjuśrī. It is not actually an idol, but a natural formation in the rock. And according to the local and literary traditions there was an Arjuna who did penance in this hill. People even point out the cave where the penance was performed. This Arjuna was no other than Nāgārjuna.

The *Gaṇḍavyūha* speaks of Dhānyakāra, which is Dhānya-kaṭaka near Amarāvatī, as a seat of Mañjuśrī who lived in an extensive forest Mala-dhvaja-vyūha-cai ya and who converted a large number of Nāgas.[4] This was the area where Nāgas lived and where Mañjuśrī had his seat. According to Tāranātha, the worship of Amitābha began with Saraha who "saw Amitābha in the land of Dhingkoṭa and died with his face turned towards Sukhāvatī".[5] This

2. There is also a place called Vejendla now very near Guntur.
3. P. 107-8 of the Buddhist Text Society Edition.
4. dhanyākarasya mahānagarasya...caityam tathāgatādhiṣṭhitam. Names having Nāga as a part are very common even now in Andhra. There are Nāgas in the hills of Bhadracalam even now.
5. See Sir Charles Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism*, III, 219. See Schiefner, pp. 93, 103, 30..

Dhingkoṭa is the same as Dhānyakaṭaka. These sources go to confirm what we find in the inscriptions. An inscription at Jaggayyapeta tells us of an image of Buddha done by Crandraprabha, a disciple of Jayaprabha, who in turn was a pupil of Nāgārjuna. In the completion of the Mahācaitya at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa we hear that Nāgārjuna was greatly assisted by one Ānanda who knew *Dīghanikāya* and *Majjhimanikāya* by heart and who belonged to the Āryasaṅgha.

We have noted earlier that the Nāgas in the area of Dhānyakaṭaka were converted to Buddhism by Mañjuśrī. We hear elsewhere that Mucalinda, a Nāga king, was one of the first few persons to meet the Buddha after enlightenment.[6] These Nāgas were associated with the sea,[7] and they lived in a forest and in a hilly country.[8] In the life of Padmasambhava, as given by his own disciple, we gather that Nāgārjuna obtained the Pāramitās and the greater part of the Mahāyāna *sūtras* from Mucalinda Nāga and his family.[9] These texts were supposed to be hidden in Urgyan or Odyan where dwelt Indrabodhi,[10] the father of Padmasambhava. That this Urgyan is the same as the Dhānyakaṭaka area is evident when we find in the same authority that Padmasambhava was born in the Dhanakoṣa (= Dhānyakaṭaka) lake, in the north-western corner of the country of Urgyan.[11]

Kumārajīva (384 A.D.) practically agrees with this tradition that Nāgārjuna obtained the Pāramitās and other Sūtras from Nāgas. Who is this Mucalinda? He was a

6. See S. B E. 21, pp. 80, 119.
7. Jātakas, III. 82.
8. Jātakas, V. 2, cf. Gilgit Manuscripts, I. 80.
9. Evans-Wentz: *The Tibetan Book of Great Liberation*, p. 156. In the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* (p. 225) it is clearly stated that the Pāramitā literature will originate only in the Dakṣiṇāpatha, and Tāranātha states that the Pāramitās were first written in the Prakrit of this area. This Dakṣiṇāpatha is the area comprising Macilipattana and Dhānyakāraka.
10. See Evans-Wentz, p. 129.
11. *Ibid*, p. 105.

ruler over an area that bordered on the sea; and it was also full of hills and forests. Nāgārjuna had to go into the sea, as the story goes, to reach the abode of the Nāgas. Now on the other side of the Krishna river, near the sea, is a town called Macilipattanam. It is evident that the name of this place is derived from Macalinda or Mucalinda Nāga. Now in the *Mahāvaṃsa* we read that Voharaka Tissa Raja "having listened to the discourses of Thera Deva, resident at Kambugama, he repaired five edifices. Delighted also with Mahatissa, then resident at Anura Vihāra, he kept up daily alms for him at Mucilapattana".[12] There Deva belonged to Mucilapattana and he went to preach in Ceylon. And Mucilapattana, the modern Masulipatam, got its name from Mucilinda; and it was from here that Nāgārjuna obtained the Mahāyāna texts.

3. The mention of Āryadeva raises the problem of his home town. The Tibeto-Chinese traditions put him in Siṃhala. Some scholars take this Siṃhala to be modern Orissa. But the continued existence of the family name "Ayyadevara" in the Andhra country compels us to look to the home town of Āryadeva in Andhra area. The minister of Indrabodhi of Dhānyakaṭaka found out a maiden called Bhāsadharā, daughter of king Candrakumāra, in Singala.[13] Gustava-Charles Toussaint takes this Singala to refer to a country not far from Udyan, or Urgyan, the Dhānyakaṭaka area.[14] Dr. Waddel equated it with the Sīṃhapura of Yuan Chwang.[15] Sardar Bahadur Laden La remarks that it may have been what is now the Guntur District.[16] Evidently Laden La was recording a tradition. The father of Āryadeva was said to be Śrīphala, king of Singala or Sagala.[17] These facts compel us to look for Singala near about Macilipattana which is

12. *Mahāvaṃṣa*, chap. 36, p. 144.
13. See Evans-Wentz, p. 113.
14. *Le Dict de Padma*, p. 491.
15. *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 381.
16. Evans-Wentz p. 113.
17. *Ibid*, pp. 156-157

due north to Nāgārjunakoṇḍa. Then Candrakīrti's statement that Āryadeva came south to meet Nāgārjuna becomes clear. Singala is also mentioned as Sagala; and a place called Srikakulam, near Masulipatam, has a native tradition which speaks of the Sātavāhanas as coming from here. Srikakulam was the birth place of Āryadeva.

4. Before we proceed to consider the evidence of Yuan Chwang, we should remember that this Chinese traveller not only wrote about places he did not visit, but also recorded wrong geographical directions. That he wrote about places he never visited was certain when we consider his location of Potalaka in Malakuta. According to the *Suttanipāta*, Assaka and Mulaka are Andhaka territories. The capital of Assaka was said to be Potana,[18] also called Potala or Podana. The last variant gives us some similarity with modern Bodhan, near Hyderabad in the Deccan. Leaving this aside, let us see the pilgrim's sense of direction. From Kosala he went 1800 li north-west and 'saw' Nāgārjuna's monastery. Then 300 li south-west he 'found' Po-lo-mo-lo-ki-li. Then from Kosala he moved 900 li due south to the An-to-lo country whose capital was Vengi. Then south for 1000 li he saw Dhānyakaṭaka. This is a strange geography. It is not even consistent. It is as much faulty as the birth place of Nāgārjuna given by the Tibeto-Chinese authorities. Because Yuan Chwang spoke of a Bharamaragiri in Kosala, lying 1800 li (=300 miles) north-west of Kaliṅga, our interested scholars discovered Nāgārjuna's abode in Ramtek. The confusion is all the more because of a so-called Dakṣiṇa Kosala, geographical location of which is highly uncertain.

The Allahabad pillar inscription of Samudragupta refers to Mahendra, king of Kosala, in Dakṣiṇāpatha. According to the Nasik inscription Gautamīputra conquered Dakṣiṇa Kosala. The *Vāyupurāṇa* refers to the *janapadas* called Andhra and Kosala which are ruled by the same Guha.[19] Among the

18. *Dīgha Nikāya*, 2, 235; Jātaka, 3, 3-5; *Vimānavatthu*, 259 ff.
19. *Vāyu*, 99, 385-6.

Andhra Brahmins we have even today those belonging to Kasala-nadu. This Kasala-nadu is the Dakṣiṇa-kosala which cannot be put entirely outside the Telugu speaking areas. When people migrate from one area to another, they usually carry the names of places and rivers too to the lands where they settle down. Thus Kāñcī is called Dakṣiṇa-Kāśī ; but it does not mean the southern portion of Kāśī. Godāvarī is called Dakṣiṇa-Gaṅgā. Likewise if there was a Dakṣiṇa Kosala, it cannot be a southern portion of a single Kosala. On the other hand it can only be a Kosala in the south, far away from the original Kosala. As such it is but wishful thinking that can see Dakṣiṇa Kosala confined to the Chattisgarh area in the Central Provinces.

South of the capital of Dakṣiṇa Kosala was an old monastery in which Nāgārjuna lived, according to Yuan Chwang. To the south-west of this country was placed a mountain called Pc-lo-mo-lo-ki-li which has been identified with Bhramaragiri, and which can also be read as "Vara-mūla-giri" (the hill that confers boons). The hills near Nāgārjunakoṇḍa are also called Nalla-malai or black mountains. The row of hills is of the new colour of black bees ; and the Nāgārjunakoṇḍa may have been called Bhramaragiri. But there is a place called Śrīsaila, near modern Kurnool, due south-west of Nāgārjunakoṇḍa exactly by 300 li or 50 miles. Here too we have a row of hills, and there is still a temple dedicated to Bhramarāmbā. This was actually the Bhramaragiri referred to by the Chinese pilgrim. And the monastery in the Dakṣiṇa Kosala would then be identical with Nāgarjunakoṇḍa. And even the kings who ruled in this area later on in the third and fourth centuries traced their descent from the Ikṣvākus and are called Ikṣvākus. In later times Nāgārjunakoṇḍa too came to be called Śrīparvata or simply Parvata which Fahien misread as Paravata. Śrīparvata and Śrīśaila are apparently synonyms and the Bhramaragiri of Śrīśaila was quietly ignored.

5. According to Yuan Chwang the king Sha-to-po-ha (Yin-cheng) excavated a monastery in Dakṣiṇa Kosala and

another at Bhramaragiri. I-Tsing gives the personal name of the king as Shi-yen-te-ka. while the previous translator gives it as Shan-te-ka. These correspond to Jetaka, Jīvataka, or Sāntaka. In Tibetan we have Śāntivāhana Antivāhana, Śaṅkara and Udayana (or Utrayana) also. It was at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa the officers in charge of excavation in 1938 came across the tooth relics which are traditionally believed to be those of Nāgārjuna. Āryadeva's relics too were found in the same site. And as the Pag-Sam-Jon-Zang has it, Nāgārjuna was actually born in a place to the south of Vidarbha, not in Vidarbha[20]

Who was the Sātavāhana king that patronised Nāgārjuna ? Here scholars have made all kinds of guesses. According to the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* the contemporary kings of Kashmir during the time of Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna were Huska, Juska and Kaniṣka.[21] Though this is a valuable evidence it does not help us much since the dates of these kings are not settled beyond dispute, and since the dates of the Sātavāhana kings are also controversial. Here we have two more lines of evidence to fix the actual time of Nāgārjuna, the Madhyamka philosopher.

6. First we have an external evidence in the form of a Prakrita Kāvya entitled *Līlāvatī Pariṇaya.*[22] Līlāvati, daughter of Śīlamegha, king of Ceylon, was brought to the area known as Sapta-godāvaram, the Godāvarī delta, by the commander of the king called Vijayānanda,[23] and Hāla who is described as Sālāhaṇa[24] and as Sālāhaṇanarinda,[25] is married to her. In this work, which clearly puts Hāla in the modern Godāvarī district in Andhra, we have the following two very interesting verses :

bahu mannaṃto taṃ ci amaraṇaṃ saṃtosadinnaniya hiaao/

20. See IHQ. vol. 30, pp. 93-95.
21. I. 173.
22. Published in Telugu characters in the Bharati of Madras, vol. 3, pt. 1.3 ff.
23. See verses 190, 242, and 1117.
24. See verses 837 and 867.
25. See verse 939.

nāyajjuṇo varo heṇa ṇiggao ṇiya purāhim to//
ṇāyajjuṇa bhikṣu purassareṇa 'saritirī saṃṭhiao rāyā/
vijayāṇaṃ deṇasamaṃ vivarā huttaṃ parikkaṃto //[26]

Here we are definitely told that Bhikṣu Nāgārjuna was the teacher and adviser of Hāla. The king listened to Nāgārjuna's advice and turned back to his city somewhere near Drakśarama, where too there existed once a Buddhist monastery.

Hāla ruled only for five years and he must have deid quite young. He was followed by Kuntala Sātakarṇi whose name has some similarly with Jetaka or Shiyenteka. It was this Kuntala that was referred to by Vātsyāyana in his Kāmasūtras. There is no reason to doubt that the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* was the same as the author of the *Kāmasūtras*. Here begins our second line of evidence.

7. Nāgārjuna wrote his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* in reply to certain criticisms that were levelled against his *Madhyamakakārikā*. This is clear from the author's own *Vṛtti* on the 28th verse of *Vigrahavyāvartanī* where he refers his critic to what he said in the *Madhyamakakārikā* XXIV. 10. Vātsyāyana observes : pratyaksādīnāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ nāsti traikālyā siddheḥ pūvāparasahabhāvānu papatteḥ.[27] And this argument on '*traikālyāsiddhi*' appears in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* thus in the statement of the objection : pūrvaṃ cet pratiṣedhaḥ paścatprātisedhyam ityanupapannam/ paścad anupapanno yugapac ca yataḥ svabhavo'san.[28] And the reply is embodied in verses 43, 45, 70 and 71. The70th verse with its *Vṛtti* has a striking similarity with the wording of Vātsyāyana :

yastraikālye hetuḥ pratyaksaḥ pūrvam eva samatvāt/
traikālyapratihetuśca sūnyatāvādinaṃ prāpthḥ//

Nāgarjuna is evidently having before his mind the following passage from Vātsyāyana on II. i. 12 : pūrvaṃ hi pratiṣedhasid-

26. Verses 1018, 1019. The transformation of Nāga as Naya reminds us of the modern Nayudu community in Andhra. These may be the descendants of the old Nāgas.
27. On *N. S.* II. i. 8.
28. Verse 20.

dhāvasati..................siddhaṃ pratyakṣādīnāṃ pramaṇatvam iti. Nāgārjuna states that this refutation is faulty because it implies the assumption on the part of the opponent of the *traikālya-parīkṣā.* And this is clearly referred to by Uddyotakara. All this reveals that Nāgārjuna is directly replying to the points raised by the Nyāyabhāṣya.

When we consider the *prāmāṇya-vāda* we find that Nāgārjuna is actually quoted in the *pūrvapakṣa* by Vātsyāyana. The former states (31, 32): Yadi ca pramāṇatas teṣām...... naiva madhyasya nāntyasya// If the validity of one *pramāṇa* is to be established by another, then it leads to a regressus. And Vātsyāyana has in his *pūrvapakṣa* there words on II. i. 17: yadi pratyakṣādīni.........na cānavasthā śakyā anujñātum anupa- patter iti. The wording is highly reminiscent of Nāgārjuna. But in the next *Sūtra* Vātsyāyana argues about the consequences of a *pramāṇasiddhi* even without the *pramāṇa*: yadi pratya kṣādyupalabdhau............nirvartsyatya aviśeṣāt. And Nāgārjuna's position is clear in the 45th verse: yadi ca prameya-siddhir......................yadarthaṃ prasiddhaṃ tat// These passages are so baffling that one cannot definitely say who is borrowing from whom. In the 14th verse Nāgārjuna admits that there may be an objection to the effect that if there are no *pramāṇas,* there can be no negation of the *pramāṇas*: nanvevaṃ satyasti.......................ceti ṣaṭkaṃ tat// And Vātsyāyana states on II. i. 13 thus: traikālyāsiddhir ityasya hetoḥ..............sarvapramāṇavyāhato hetur ahetuḥ.... The objection stated by Nāgārjuna goes back to Vātsyāyana. The *Nyāyabhāṣya* on. II. i. 19 has similarly a close relation to the entire argument of the *Vigrah-vyāvartanī.* These facts show that Vātsyāyana wrote his *Nyāyabhāṣya* after the *Madhyamakakārikās*; that Nāgārjuna knew the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and answered it in *Vigrahavyāvartanī*; that Vātsyāyana later knew the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and tried to answer the criticism by amending and expanding his own text; and that Nāgārjuna had to come forth with a *Vṛtti* on his later text to defend his position from the attack of his Nyāya rival. These two great thinkers were exact contemporaries. Their philosophical career extended

during the reigns of Hāla, Kuntaka and their successors.

8. Finally there is the *Ratnāvalī* written by Nāgārjuna as a piece of advice to a young king. The commentator Ajitamitra says that this king was the same to whom the *Śiṣyalekha* was addressed. Besides giving the young ruler a series of moral principles, Nāgārjuna throws an interesting light on the state of things prevailing at that time. He elaborately criticises the false doctrines, condemns the atheist (I. 67), advises the king not to be misled by the self-seeking ministers and elders and declares: durlabhāḥ pathyavaktāraḥ śrotārastvati durlabhāḥ..............//pathyam apyapriyaṃ tasmāj jñātvā śīghraṃ Samācara//[29] Apparently persons like Nāgārjuna who are the *pathya-vaktās* are rare,[30] and the king is surrounded by those who do not wish the good of the king. The good that Nāgārjuna can offer is treated as unpalatable (*apriya*, II. 42). He wants the king to abstain from drink (II. 46). He admits that non-Buddhists have come to power and that they are abusing Mahāyāna: atyaudāryātigāmbhīryā............mahāyānam atas tasmin kasmāddarbhāṣitaṃ vacaḥ//[31] These lines show that the king to whom this letter was addressed broke away from the faith of his father, grand-father and others, and that he became Brahmanical. Nāgārjuna in a desparate bid to have royal support for the Buddhist church was addressing the letters to the king.

According to the Purāṇas there were three kings after Kuntala, and the fourth was Gautamīputra who styled himself as "*eka brāhmaṇa*", thereby meaning that he was the first in the remembered history of his family to come back to the Brahmanical religion. And Nāgārjuna's letters were addressed to this young king when Nāgārjuna was very much advanced in years. Assuming that the first Andhra king Śrīmukha came to power in 271 B.C., Hāla must have come to power in 10 A.D., while Gautamīputra came to power in 70 A.D. By 70 A.D. Nāgārjuna could

29. *Ratnāvalī*, II, 41, 42.
30. *Ibid.*, IV, 3.
31. *Ibid.*, IV. 79, 80. See also IV 89.

very well be ninety years old.

The foregoing enquiry establishes that Nāgārjuna was born in the modern Telegu speaking Guntur district, that his disciple Āryadeva came from Srikakulam, a place near modern Masulipatam, that the Bhramaragiri was in Śrīśaila, that the great monastery in south Kosala is the same as the Nāgārjunakoṇḍa Mahācaitya in modern Guntar district, that Nāgārjuna was the teacher and guide of successive Sātavāhana rulers from Hāla onwards, that his power declined with the rise of Gautamīputra, and that Nāgārjuna was an Andhra.

(IHQ, xxxi, 1955)

PARAMĀRTHA'S LIFE OF VASUBANDHU AND DATE OF VASUBANDHU

J. Takakusu

PARAMĀRTHA (A. D. 499-569), or Kula-nātha as he was sometimes called, was a Brahmin of the Bharadvāja family of Ujjayini, West India. In 539 A.D. the Emperor of China, Wu-ti (502-549), sent a mission to Magadha, North India, in search of a learned Buddhist and the original Mahā-yāna texts. The Indian Court despatched Paramārtha, who was then staying at Magadha, with 240 bundles of palm-leaf texts, besides 64 works which he afterwards translated.[1]

His arrival in Man-hai[2] falls in the year 546 A.D. while his visit to the then capital Chien-yeh[3] did not take place until 548, when the emperor Wu-ti gave him a hearty welcome with due honour.

The literary activity and religious enthusiasm of this Indian guest during the declining days of the Liang dynasty (548-557) and the early parts of the subsequent Chan dynasty (557-569) seem to have attracted the curious eyes of Chinese Buddhists, who thronged to listen to the new preacher in spite of all the disturbances which they were experiencing just then. His teaching embraced a variety of subjects, but throughout, as a Mahā-yānist, he laid earnest and persistent emphasis on the Buddhistic idealism (*Vijñānamātra*) of Vasu-bandhu and Asaṅga. He seems to have been fairly successful in popularising the doctrine, for on one occasion the Court is said to have considered the propagation of his idealism to be dangerous to the nation. He himself was not satisfied with his work as a preacher of peace. He once said to one of his

1. Of these only 32 translations exist at present: see Nanjio's *Catalogue*, p. 423 (104, 105).
2. A district in Canton: lst. 23°7'; long. 112°15'.
3. Now Nan-king.

pupils: "My original plan for which I am come here will never be realised. We can entertain at present no hope of seeing the prosperity of the Law". But his work as a translator was simply brilliant and in every way satisfactory. We have to thank him for the preservation of several important texts, such as the fundamental works of the Vijñāna-vādins, Vasu-bandhu, and Asaṅga, the books on Logic of Diṅ-nāga, the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa with its commentary,[4] besides some works of Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghoṣa, Vasu-mitra, and Guṇa-mati. What we value most is his "Biography of Vasu-bandhu", which furnishes us with several otherwise unknown data, and sheds an unexpected light on a dark period in the history of Buddhism, of the Sāṃkhya school and of Indian literature in general. A study of this important biography is the chief object of the present paper.

An English translation of Paramārtha's "Life of Vasu-bandhu" was given by me in the Tong-pao (July, 1904), and the whole can be summed up as follows :-

A summary of the "Life of Vasu-bandhu", by Paramārtha (A. D. 499-569; 546-569 in China).

Born, at Puruṣa-pura (Peshawar), of the Brahmin family of Kauśika, Vasu-bandhu is the second of the three brothers.

A. Vasu-bandhu Asaṅga (Asaṅga, the eldest).
B. Vasu-bandhu Viriñci-vatsa (the youngest).
C. Vasu-bandhu (the second).

A. —Asaṅga, first an adherent of the Sarvāsti-vāda school and of the Hīna-yāna, afterwards a promoter of the Mahāyāna and an author of the *Upadeśas* on the Mahāyāna *sūtras*.

The works attributed to Asaṅga are :—

(1) *The Saptadaśa-bhumi sūtra.*[5]

4. See Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, July, 1904.
5. This is attributed to Maitreya, but really a work of Asaṅga. Compare Nanjio's 1170.

(2) *The Mahā-yāna-sūtra upadeśas.*[6]
(3) *The Mahā-yāna-samparigraha-śāstra.*[7]

He converts Vasu-bandhu to the Mahā-yāna faith, and dies before Vasu-bandhu's compilation of Mahā-yāna works.

B. —Viriñci-vatsa, an adherent of the Sarvāsti-vāda school, an Arhat.

C. —Vasu-bandhu, the second and the greatest of the three brothers, had no other distinguishing name. At first an adherent of the Sarvāsti-vāda school, he is described as a free thinker, and never confines himself to the teaching of his own school. His work, *Abhidharma-kośa,*[8] represents his opinion, which presupposes the philosophy of the *Mahā-Vibhāsās*[9] as compiled by Kātyāyani-putra and put into literary form by Aśva-ghoṣa. These, in their turn, explain the principles set forth in the work, *Jñanaprasthāna*, otherwise called the *Aṣṭa-grantha,*[10] also composed by Kātyāyanī-putra, in the sixth century after the Buddha's death. As the tendency of his time requires, Vasu-bandhu writes the *Paramārtha-saptati* against the Sāṃkhya-śāstra (*Sāṃkhya-saptati,* i. e. *Kārikā*) of Vindhya-vāsa, a pupil of Vṛṣa-gaṇa (cf. Vārṣa-gaṇya), who lived in the tenth century after the Buddha's death.

King Vikramāditya of Ayodhyā, first the patron of the Sāṃkhya school but afterwards that of Buddhism, its influence being recovered by Vasu-bandhu.

Bālāditya, the Crown Prince, and the Queen-mother, both pupils of Vasu-bandhu, invite the latter to Ayodhyā, after the death of Vikramāditya. Vasu-bandhu disputes with Vasu-rata, a grammarian, and Saṃgha-bhadra, an orthodox Vaibhāṣika.

6. No work called "*Upadeśa*" is preserved, but several books called *Śāstra, Kārikā* or *Ṭīkā*, are found in the Chinese collections. See Nanjio's *Catalogue*, p. 371, 5.
7. Nanjio's Nos. 1183, 1184, 1247; compare No. 1171(2).
8. Nanjio's Nos. 1267, 1269, 1270.
9. Nanjio's Nos. 1263, 1264, 1279.
10. Nanjio's Nos. 1273 and 1275.

So far Vasu-bandhu is represented as a Hīna-yānist. The above gives us the following results :—

THE SARVĀSTI-VĀDA SCHOOL	THE SĀṂKHYA SCHOOL
Kātyāyanī-putra	Vṛṣa-gaṇa.
The Jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra	The (original Sāṃkhya-śāstra
or	()
The Aṣṭa granthas.	Vindhya-vāsa.
()	The (revised) Sāṃkhya-śastra
Kātyāyanī-putra, Aśva-ghosa.	or
The Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā.	The Sāṃkhya-saptati.
()	()
Vasu-bandhu.	Vasu-bandhu.
The Abhidharma-kośa.	(in opposition)
	The Paramārtha-saptati.

VIKRAMĀDITYA OF AYODHYĀ

Patron and contemporary.

Buddha-mitra.	Vṛṣa-gaṇa
Vasu-bandhu.	Vindhya-vāsa.

BĀLĀDITYA (son of Vikramāditya)

Patron and contemporary

Saṃgha-bhadra. Two works against the Kośa.	Vasu-bandhu. A work against the Vyākaraṇa.	Vasu-rata (grammarian). A work against the Kośa.

Asaṅga invites Vasu-bandhu to Puruṣa-pura, i.e. Peshawar, and converts him to the Mahā-yāna. After the death of Asaṅga the latter begins to write works relating to the Mahā-yāna and commentaries on several Mahā-yāna *sūtras.*

A.—A Mahā-yāna *sūtras* commented on by Vasu-bandhu ;

1. *The Avatamsaka.*
2. *The Nirvāṇa.*[11]
3. *The Saddharma-puṇḍarīka.*[12]
4. *The Prajñā-pāramitā.*[13]
5. *The Vimala-kīrti.*
6. *The Śrī-mala-siṃhanāda.*

B.—The Mahā-yāna *śāstras* compiled by Vasu-bandhu :

1. *The Vijñāna-mātra-siddhi.*[14]
2. *The Mahā-yāna-samparigraha-vyākhyā.*[15]
3. *The Nature of the Ratna-Traya.*[16]
4. *The Gate of the Nectar.*[17]

Here he is represented as a Mahā-yānist, his conversion to the school being told at length. Buddhist students of all parts of India and of neighbouring countries use Vasu-bandhu's works as their text-books. All the heretics in fear of him. He dies at Ayodhyā, aged 80.

A study of the life of Vasu-bandhu is very important for the history of the Mahā-yāna school of Buddhism, as he is an able representative of the Mahā-yāna as well as the Hīna-yāna, himself being a convert to Asaṅga's idealism.

The study must be carried out in two directions, i.e. : (1) An examination of his philosophical views, in which his position as a free thinker and a "patron of all schools" has to be fully brought out. (2) A survey of all the historical data bearing upon his life, which should be collected from all the sources available. My original plan was to go into details on these two sides of our subject. Interesting and important as they are, this would involve the laborious work of investigating into the whole Vaibhā-ṣika literature, a single translation of it amounting to 200 Chinese volumes, 438,449 ideographical characters. Besides

11. Nanjio's Nos. 1206, 1207, 1209.
12. Nanjio's Nos. 1232, 1233.
13. Nanjio's Nos. 1231, 1168.
14. Nanjio's Nos. 1215, 1238, 1239, 1240.
15. Nanjio's Nos. 1171 (2, 3, 4).
16. Probably Nanjio's No. 1219.
17. Nanjio's No. (1205 (?).

this, my study of the *Abhidharma-koša* and *Vijñāna-matra*, texts of his own, with all their commentaries, is as yet far from being complete, and is by no means an easy task. I have therefore thought it best to postpone that work, and confine myself at present to a study of the "Life of Vasu-bandhu" written by Paramārtha.

Paramārtha (499-569) of Ujjayini was, as stated above, an early importer into China of Vasu-bandhu's philosophy, and a successful interpreter of several important works of Vasu-bandhu and Asaṅga then extant in India.

He departed from Magadha together with the Chinese envoys sent out in 539 A.D. Consequently all the original texts he brought with him, and all the traditions he handed over to his pupils in China, must have been in existence before that particular date. His lifetime—or, to speak more precisely, the time of his departure from India—is not far removed from Vasu-bandhu's date, to which I shall come back directly. His "Life of Vasu-bandhu" is not a translation of another's work, as is generally considered, but seems to be a memorandum patched together from his own recollections of incidents and of traditions, or it may be a note taken down by his pupils from his oral transmissions. That it is not a translation can safely be asserted from the fact that it originally included in the text an account of his own travel in China, which was, however, struck out by a later hand,[18] perhaps with the purpose of giving the work an appearance of a more sacred character. If we subtract from the text all the explanations of names, the most curious of which is that of the name 'Puruṣa-pura,' the biography is a most sensible record of the incidents connected with Vasu-bandhu, who is not as yet styled 'Boddhi-sattva' or 'Arhat', as is the case with Aśvaghoṣa and Kātyāyanī-putra.

The reliability of the incidents recorded by Paramārtha becomes more manifest when we find, as we do, corroborations from other sources. Most of the books mentioned

18. See my note at the end of the tra slation, Tong-pao, July, 1904.

by him were translated either by himself or others, and are still extant in Chinese. Moreover, the traditions relating to their authors do not conflict with those known from different sources. For instance, he mentions Asaṅga's *Saptadaśa-bhumi*, the principal work of the Yogacaryā school, and that book is preserved in China.[19]

The *Jñāna-prasthāna*, otherwise called the *Aṣṭa-grantha* of Kātyāyanī-putra, and the great *Vibhāṣā* commentary on it compiled with the help of Aśva-ghoṣa at the Council of Kaniṣka, are found in several translations.[20] And it is so with the important *Abhidharma-kośa* and *Vijñāna-mātra*, works which were translated by himself. The *Sāṃkhyaśāstra* (i.e. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*) in Chinese was also by his own hand. Most of the works he mentions in the "*Life*" are fortunately found in China and Japan, and are used by Buddhist scholars in their schools.

Now, if we are right in assuming that Paramārtha reproduces the traditions then current in India, and gives a fairly correct account of the incidents to which he bears witness, we shall be justified in forming an opinion, based on the materials available, about Vasu-bandhu's date, which will, if settled once for all, give a clue to solving many a question confronted in the history of Indian thought.

Since not a single work of Vasu-bandhu is as yet published in the original, the date of his literary activity can only be settled by evidence adduced from Chinese authorities.

All the dates hitherto assigned to him must be either reconstructed or modified, and I do not quote them here except to make an occasional reference in passing.

Now let us try to proceed to the main question and examine at the outset the travels of those Chinese pilgrims and other biographers.

Kumārajīva (383-412 in China). The biographer of

19. See above, p. 35, note 1.
20. See above, p. 35, note 6.

Aśva-ghoṣa, Ārya-deva, and Nāgārjuna does not give the "Life of Vasu-bandhu," though some catalogues mention by mistake that such a work was then in existence.

Fa-hien (399-414 in India). The name Vasu-bandhu does not occur in his record.

Ki-chia-ye[21] (472 A. D.). A history of the Indian patriarchs (Nanjio, No. 1340) mentions for the first time 'Ba-su-ban-da',[22] though I have some doubt as to the identity of this 'Ba-su-ban-da' with our Vasu-bandhu.

Song-yun and Hui-seng (518-522 in India). Their record does not show that they knew the name Vasu-bandhu.[23]

Paramārtha (499-569 ; 546-569 in China). According to his *Life* Vasu-bandhu died at Ayodhyā, aged 80. The death must have occurred before Paramārtha's departure from Magadha (c. 539), or, at any rate, before his arrival in China (546). He does not style Vasu-bandhu a Bodhi-sattva, while he does so call Aśva-ghoṣa.

Hiuen-tsang (629-645 in India). His "Record" praises Vasu-bandhu throughout, and always styles him as a Bodhi-sattva.

I-tsing (671-695 India). His "Record" assigns the 'middle age' (c. 450-550) to Vasu-bandhu, his brother, Asaṅga, and his opponent, Saṃgha-bhadra ; while Aśva-ghoṣa, Ārya-deva, and Nāgārjuna are said to have lived in 'early years' (before A.D. 400), and Diṅ-nāga, Guṇa-mati, etc., in 'late years' (550-670).[24]

From the above list we see that Paramārtha is practi-

21. The restoration to Kiṅkara seems to be far-fetched. I suggest 'Kekaya' for it ; the Chinese translation, 'what-matter,' may be taken to be not quite accurate.

22. [Footnote in Chinese character.]

23. Chavannes, "*Voyage de Song-yun*" (Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaised 'Extreme-Orient, July-September, 1903).

24. See my I-tsing's "*Record,*" pp. lvii-lviii.

cally the earliest authority concerning Vasu-bandhu. Since he states that the latter's death occured in Ayodhyā at the age of 80, we are perfectly justified in believing that it took place before his departure from India soon after 539 A.D., in which year the Chinese mission in search of an Indian scholar was sent out. But since the exact date of his departure from India is not specified anywhere, we will take the date of his arrival in China, i.e. 546 A.D., as the latest possible *terminus ad quem* for Vasu-bandhu's date.

Thus we have to assign Vasu-bandhu a date earlier than 546 A.D. But how much earlier?

The question, I think, can be settled without much difficulty and with considerable certainty.

Saṃgha-bhadra, who is made a contemporary of Vasu-bandhu by Hiuen-Tsang and I-tsing, is said, in our "*Life*", to have attacked the *Abhidharma-kośa*, and challenged Vasu-bandhu to a personal controversy. This the latter refused, saying :—"I am already old ; do what you are inclined to do."[25] This event was while Vasu-bandhu was still a Hīna-yānist, and believed that the Mahā-yāna was not the Buddha's own teaching.

Afterwards Vasu-bandhu went from Ayodhyā (Oude) to Puruṣa-pura (Peshawar) at the request of his elder brother, Asaṅga, and was, on his arrival, converted to Mahā-yānism. He studied under Asaṅga the texts of the Mahā-yāna school.

After the death of Asaṅga he began to write all the Mahā-yāna treatise which Paramārtha mentions by name and has translated for us. Both the Mahā-yāna and Hīna-yāna schools alike used those works as their text-books, and the very sound of his name caused the scholars of his time no little trepidation, whether they were Buddhists or Brahmins. He died, aged 80, at Ayodhyā, where he must have returned after his visit to Puruṣa-pura.

25. Lao' is generally 'about 70 years'. We shall not be much wrong if we take him to be about that age.

The period of ten years between his conversion and his death would be quite reasonable, and is the shortest possible limit for it was during this period, i.e. when he was about 70-80 years of age, that he wrote his Mahā-yānistic treatises—all after the death of Asaṅga.[26]

Let us now examine the date of the translations of Vasu-bandhu's Mahā-yānistic works ; they range as follows :—

	Title	No. in Nanjio's Cata-logue	Translator	Date of Transla-tion
1.	*Sad-dharma-puṇḍrika-upadeśa	1233	Ratna-mati	608
2.	*Sad-dharma-puṇḍarīka-upadeśa	1232	Bodhi-ruci	508-535
3.	*Vajra-cchedikā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra	1168	,,	509
4.	Daśa-bhūmika-sāstra	1194	,,	508-511
5.	Aparimitāyus-sūtra-śāstra	1204	,,	529
6.	Vaiśeṣa-cintā-Brahmapari-pṛcchā-śāstra	1193	,,	531
7.	Gaya-śīrṣa-śāstra	1191	,,	535
8.	*Vijñāna-mātra-siddhi	1238	,,	508-535
9.	Ratna-cūḍa-catur-dharma-upadeśa	1241	Vimokṣa-prajñā	539 or 541
10.	Tri-pūrṇa-sūtropadeśa	1196	,,	541
11.	Dharma-cakra-pravartana-sūtropadeśa	1205	,,	541
12.	*Mahā-parinirvāṇa-śāstra	1206	Dharma-bodhi	534-550
13.	*Śāstra on the lost Gāthās of the Nirvāṇa-sūtra	1207	Paramārtha	550
14.	Tarka-śāstra	1252	,,	550
15.	*Buddha's Last Instruction (Nirvāṇa-sūtra)	1209	,,	557-569

26. Asaṅga is said to have died at the age of 75. His next younger brother, Vasu-bandhu, will be about 70 or more. Cf. Duff, "*Indian Chronology*", p. 35.

16. Buddha--gotra-śāstra	1220	Paramārtha	557-569
17. *Vijñāna-mātra-siddhi	1239	,,	557-569
18. Madhyānta-vibhaṅga-śāstra	1248	,,	557-569
19. *Mahāyāna-samparigraha-śāstra-ṭīkā	1171	,,	563
(This is commentary on Asaṅga's work.)			

On drawing up the above list I have carefully omitted all the elements likely to be open to question.[27] Those marked with an asterisk are texts which are mentioned by Paramārtha under general names, the remaining ten too being the works peculiar to the Mahā-yāna school, written after the death of Asaṅga.

If the works written at his advanced age or almost at the closing period of his life were thus translated into Chinese in A. D. 508, 509, 508-538, 529. etc., the author of these works can in no way be supposed to have lived much after 500 A. D.

It is just possible, though not likely, that the works were brought to China as soon as they were written. Even if this was the case, the earliest importers of Vasu-bandhu's texts, i. e. Ratna-mati (from Central India) and Bodhi-ruci (from North India), must have spent a considerable time, probably some years, in their travels from India to Lo-yang in Honan, where they arrived in 508.

As he was 80 years of age at his death, our proposed date for Vasu-bandhu will be about 420-500 A. D., and this can be safely taken as most probable, since it is not based on any suspicious data.

Our hypothesis does not upset altogether the date hitherto accepted for Vasu-bandhu, though it places him considerably earlier. Max Muller generally placed him in the sixth century ; this view has, however, no weight after his renaissance theory has given way.

27. There are two works sometimes assigned to Vasu-bandhu, the *Śata-śāstra-ṭīkā* (No. 1188) and *Bodhi-cittotpādana-śāstra*, translated A. D. 404 and 405 respectively. The dates have been

My own date for I-tsing's 'middle ages' (about 450-550)[28] may hold good on the whole, but it wants a little modification in the case of Vasu-bandhu, Asaṅga, and perhaps even Saṃghabhadra, the three contemporaries in I-tsing's "Record" and Hiuen-tsang's "Memoires"[29] as well as in Paramārtha's "Life." M. Sylvain Levi, in his "Notes Chinoises sur l'Inde," iii,[30] assigns Asaṅga and Vasu-bandhu to the first half of the sixth century (500-550). This too I think, must be altered a little.

Now let us proceed to see if there are any points in the "Life of Vasu-bandhu" which make our theory untenable.

I. Vasu-bandhu, Mano-ratha, and Buddha-mitra. —Mano-ratha is said to have been Vasu-bandhu's teacher by Hiuen Tsang and his disciples ; while according to Paramārtha, Buddha-mitra was Vasu-bandhu's teacher. Buddha-mitra is said to have been too old for a debate. Mano-ratha and Buddha-mitra were thus elder contemporaries of Vasu-bandhu, but nothing more definite as to their date can be adduced from any source.

2. Vasu-bandhu, King Vikramāditya, his Queen, and Bālāditya, his Crown Prince.—King Vikramāditya of Ayodhyā, North India, was first a patron of the Sāṃkhya school, but afterwards a patron of Buddhism on account of Vasu-bandhu's success in religious activity. He sent his Crown Prince (Bālāditya) to Vasu-bandhu to learn Buddhism, and

referred to in Professor Macdonell's *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 3:5. It is, however, doubtful whether these books are really his, as Nanjio already pointed out in his *Catalogue*, p, 371, and they have not been utilized by me at all. No. 1219, the 'San-wu-sin-Lun,' is very likely identical with Paramārtha's 'San-pao-sin-Lun,' as I have pointed out in my translation, but I have not included it in the list. Further No. 1205, the *Dharma-Cakra-pravartana-śāstra*, is probably the same as the 'Door of Nectar' (*Amṛta-dvāra*) mentioned by Paramārtha, but this too I have omitted as doubtful.

28. I-tsing's "*Record*," pp. lvii-lviii.

29. Hiuen-tsang's "*Memoires*," iiii, 183 ; iv, 223.

30. Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, Jan.—Mars, 1903, p. 49.

the Queen too became one of his disciples. When he came to the throne King Bālāditya, in conjunction with his Queen-mother, invited Vasu-bandhu to Ayodhyā and favoured him with special patronage.[31] Now Vikramāditya must be a king of the Gupta dynasty, the capital of which was removed from Pāṭaliputra to Ayodhyā, and this king must be Skanda-Gupta, who ruled about 452-480 A. D. and bore the epithets of Kramāditya and Vikramāditya.[32] With his successor, King Bālāditya, whose reign must have begun 481 A. D., or, according to some accounts, 490 A. D., the old Gupta dynasty came to an end. There is nothing at all in the points to contradict our hypothesis.

3. Vasu-bandhu and Vasu-rata.—Vasu-rata was, according to Paramārtha, a Brahmin, husband of a sister, i. e. a brother-in-law, of King Bālāditya. He was well versed in the Vyākaraṇa treatise. When Vasu-bandhu composed the *Abhidharma-kośa*, this Brahmin attacked his composition on the authority of the Vyākaraṇa, thinking that the Buddhist disputer would certainly defend his own work when the grammatical faults were thus pointed out. Vasu-bandhu answered :—'If I do not understand the Vyākaraṇa how can I ever understand the admirable truth of Buddhism ?" Thereupon he composed a treatise utterly refuting the thirty-two chapters of the Vyākaraṇa. Thus the Vyākaraṇa was lost, while the *Abhidharma-kośa* survived. The King and the Queen-mother gave him some lacs of gold. Vasu-rata further tried to defeat him through the intervention of another scholar. The Vyākaraṇa here mentioned will be in all probability the "Cāndra-vyākaraṇa," when we see that what Bhartṛ-hari (died 650) obtained through Basu-rata (though not necessarily directly) was Candra-gomin's grammar.[33] Liebich here seems to be right in taking Vasu-

31. The Queen-mother seems to have exercised her influence; see Duff, "*Chronology of India*", p. 38(515).

32. Cf. Duff, I. c., p. 33: Cakravarti's letter to Professor Rhys Davids, also quoted in Lisbich's "*Datum Candra-gomin's*," p. 5.

33. But the work, "*Vyākaraṇa*," mentioned by Paramārtha is said to have been in eight divisions and thirty-two chapters; this

rata to be a direct pupil of Candra-gomin, whose date is fixed by him at 470 A. D. as the latest limit.[34] In spite of M. Sylvain Levi's grave objections to Liebich's theory, it seems to be utterly impossible from our text to place Vasu-rata later than Yue-kuan (moon-official) who lived till I-tsing's time (A. D. 673-687).[35] The probable date of Vasu-rata, as a younger contemporary of Candra-gomin and an opponent of Vasu-bandhu, does not conflict with our hypothesis, and will be about 480, his controversy having taken place under Bālāditya, who came to the throne in 481.[36]

4. Vasu-bandhu and Saṃgha-bhadra. —Saṃgha-bhadra was invited by Vasu-rata from T'ien-chu[37] in order to dispute with and defeat Vasu-bandhu. When he came to Ayodhyā he composed a treatise called the "*Samaya* of Light"[38] to explain the principles of the *Vibhāsā*, and another work called the "Conformity to the Truth"[39] to refute the *Abhidharma-kośa*. After the compilation of these two treatises he challenged Vasu-bandhu to a personal discussion. The latter was quite aware that even a complete refutation by the former would have no effect on his *Kośa*, and was not inclined to have a personal

clearly points to Pāṇini's Grammar. Candra's work is in twenty-four chapters. Vasu-rata seems thus to have been versed in Pāṇini as well as in Candra.

34. Liebich. *l. c.*, p. 11.

35. See my I-tsing's "*Record*", p. lviii, d. 7. Yue-kuan may be Candra-gomin, as M. Sylvain Levi thinks, but, if so, he cannot be the grammarian who was the predecessor of Vasu-rata.

36. Vikramāditya reigned 452-480 (cf. Mabel Duff, "*Chronology of India*," p. 33). Bālāditya was the successor to the throne, according to our "Life," and ruled from 481 onward.

37. "T'ien-chu" is generally the name for India. Perhaps it means "Madhyadeśa," if not the Sindhu (Indus) itself from which the Chinese "T'ien-chu" was originated.

38. This may be "*Raśmi-samaya*," but nothing is known about it.

39. This will be something like "*Satyānusāra*." in fact, it seems to point to his "*Nyāyānusāra*," which is directed against the *Kośa*. For particulars see Nanjio's No. 1265 and his remarks there.

debate. He declared that he was too old to renew the discussion, which would be useless, because both parties had already written books against each other. This Saṃgha-bhadra was, as above stated, a contemporary and opponent of Vasu-bandhu and Asaṅga, according to Hiuen-tsang.[40] He composed a work called the "*Nyāyānusāra*," in which he refuted the *Kośa*. This book was fortunately preserved in the Tripiṭaka collection through Hiuen-tsang's pen, and is full of instructive discussions. It further helps the elucidation of the *Abhidharma-kośa*, for it quotes some 600 verses of Vasu-bandhu. From this particular work, again, I do not see anything contradicting our proposed date.

5. Vasu-bandhu, Asaṅga, and Viriñci-vatsa. —Paramārtha tells us that these three were brothers, born in a Brahmin family of Kauśika, and all three called Vasu-bandhu. Viriñci-vatsa Vasu-bandhu became an Arhat, and nothing about him is recorded anywhere except that he was a Bhikṣu of the Sarvāstivāda school. Asaṅga Vasu-bandhu was known always as Asaṅga, while our Vasu-bandhu had no other distinguishing name. We have thus no confusion at all. Asaṅga must have died, aged 75 some years before Vasu-bandhu, whose Mahā-yānistic works were all posterior to the death of the former.

6. Vasu-bandhu, Vindhya-vāsa, and Vṛṣa-gaṇa. —Vṛṣa-gaṇa (probably Varṣa-gaṇya),[41] well versed in the Sāṃkhya-śāstra,was the teacher of Vindhya-vāsa, who revised the *śāstra*. Vindhya-vāsa was successful in a dispute with Buddha-mitra, teacher of Vasu-bandhu, the latter of whom was then away from Ayodhyā. King Vikramāditya gave Sāṃkhya philosopher three lacs of gold as a reward. After this triump he returned to the Vindhya mountains and died there, his revised *Sāṃkhya-śāstra* being generally

40. Hiuen-tsang's "*Memoires*," iii, 183; iv, 223; I-tsing's "*Record*," p. lviii; see also Nanjio's remarks in his *Catalogue*, Nos. 1265 and 1266.

41. Two citations which bear the name of Vārṣa-gaṇya have been found by Garbe, s pb., pp. 36-37, The *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* calls him Bhagavān Vārṣa-gaṇya.

current. Vasu-bandhu, on his return to Ayodhyā, heard of the shame of his teacher, and searched for the rival philosopher in the Vindhya mountains. Finding, however, that the heretic was dead, he wrote a book called "*Paramārtha-saptati*,"[42] in opposition to the new *Sāṃkhya-śāstra* of Vindhya-vāsa. The *siddhāntas* of the Sāṃkhya were all destroyed. This caused general satisfaction, and King Vikramaditya gave him three lacs of gold. These are the incidents given by Paramārtha. Among the translations made by this learned scholar there exists, as I have frequently pointed out elsewhere, a work called the Sengchia-lun, that is to say, Saṃkhya Book. It is, in China, more generally as the "Gold-seventy" (*Suvarṇa saptati* or *Hiraṇya-saptati*[43]). Īśvara-Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* is, as is well known, called otherwise "*Sāṃkhya-saptati*.[44] The verse 72, "*Saptatyāṃ kila ye'rthās te'rthās*," indicates that it originally consisted of seventy verses. The Sānskrit *Sāṃkhya-saptati*, also called *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, the Chinese "Gold-seventy", of both of which we have the actual texts, and Vindhya-vāsa's revised *Sāṃkhya-śāstra* referred to by Paramārtha are in all probability one and the same work. The probability is strength-

42. This work unfortunately does not exist in the Chinese collection of Indian works.

43. Most of the Catalogues of the Chinese Tripiṭaka give both names :—

The Catalogue of A. D.	594,	the "Gold-seventy."
,, ,,	597,	the "Gold-seventy" and "Sāṃkhya śāstra."
,, ,,	664,	the "Gold-Seventy".
,, ,,	730,	the "Gold-seventy" or "Sāṃkhya-śāstra".
,, ,,	799	,, ,,
,, ,,	1287	,, ,,

Thus we see that the text was known throughout as the "*Sāṃkhya-śāstra*" (Seng-chia-lun),

44. See Hall, "Contribution to the Bibliography of the philosophical systems of India," p. 5; Oppert, MSS. in the private Library of S. India, No. 5212. As to this latter, I doubt still whether it is Gauḍapāda's work.

ened by the name given by Vasu-bandhu to his work, "*Paramārtha-saptati*", perhaps in opposition to *Sāṃkhya-saptati*. The name of the author is, however, different, one being Īśvara-kṛṣṇa, the other Vindha-vāsa. If our theory is correct these must be two names for the same man. Now Īśvara-kṛṣṇa, of the Kauśika family,[45] must be the same philosopher as Vindhya-vāsa, Chief of the 'Rain-host,'[46] since the work attributed to one proves to be identical with that of the other. Īśvara-kṛṣṇa is, no doubt, his personal name, while Vindhya-vāsa is an epithet given him because he lived and died in the Vindhya forest.[47] This is, of course, the same as Vindhya-vāsin, who is according to Professor Garbe, quoted twice in Bhoja-rāja's Yoga commentary.[48] Here, again, the value of Paramārtha's labour cannot be overestimated, for he was the translator of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* and the transmitter of the tradition of the intellectual struggle of Vindhya-vāsa *versus* Vasu-bandhu. Thus Paramārtha's date (499-569); (546-569 in China) can be taken as the safe *terminus ad quem* for Īśvara-kṛṣṇa. Professor Garbe expressed his opinion that his date would be one to two hundred years anterior to this *terminus ad quem*. Our date for Vindhya-vāsa, otherwise Īśvara-kṛṣṇa, as an elder contemporary of Vasu-

45. The Chinese *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* gives 'Kauśika' as his family name.
46. The 'Rain-host' is an incorrect interpretation of Vārṣa-gaṇya, derived from Vṛṣa-gaṇa (lit., Bull-herd, but the Gaṇa of Vṛṣa).
47. I submitted my translation of Vasu-bandhu's "*Life*" to Professor Garbe, who kindly wrote to me in reply as follows:—
"Ueberraschend ist Ihre mir schr einleuchtende vermuthung, dass Vindhyavāsa mit Īśvarakṛṣṇa, dem Verfeaser der *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, identisch sei. Wenn diese Identification richtig ist (was ich nicht bzweifle), so ware das Alter der Samkhya-karika erheblich hoher anzusetzen, als bisher geschehen ist, und mit genugender Sicherheit festzustellen. Ich habe schon 'Sāṃkhya-philosophie,' 59 gesagt, dass ich die *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* fur alter halte, als sonst immer angenommen wird."
48. Garbe, s. ph., pp 35-37. The citations do not contain anything contrary to the Sāṃkhya doctrine. The Skt. *-vāsa* and *-vāsin*, like *-vāda* and *-vādin*, are used indiscriminated in Chinese.

bandhu would be circa 450, about one century earlier than Paramārtha's time in China. I will mention here two or three points which may serve to make clearer the identity of Vindhya-vāsa and Īśvara-kṛṣṇa. Kuei-chi, pupil of Hiuen-tsang, in his commentaries on the *Vijñāna-mātra-siddhi* and the *Nyāyānusāra*, says :- "The Sāṃkhya school was formerly split up into eighteen groups, the head of which was 'Bā-li-sha'; meaning the 'Rain' (Varṣā). His associates were all called the 'Rain-host' (Vārṣa-gaṇya). The 'Gold-seventy' (*Hiraṇya-saptati*) is the work of them." The Chinese *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* contains a comment on verse 71, where the *paramparā* of the Sāṃkhya teachers is given as follows :- (1) Kapila ; (2) Āsuri ; (3) Pañca-śikha (c. first century, according to Garbe) ; (4) He-ch'ich (probably Gārgya) ; (5) Yu-lou-ch'ia (Ulūka, but it is just possible that it refers to Vodhūka of Gauḍapāda ; cf. Garbe, S. ph., p. 35) ; (6) P'o-p'o-li (7) Īśvara-kṛṣṇa. This P'o-p'o-li seems to contain some mistakes. '*ba*' and '*sa*' are often mistaken in the Chinese Buddhist books. I can point out scores of instances of the kind. Copyists often correct, adding either one of these characters by the side of the other, and in time both may be found to have crept into the text. Sometimes the correct one is struck out, and the wrong one is preserved, and, further, the character irregularly put at the side, either a little above or below, is often inserted in a wrong place. Whenever '*ba*' or '*sa*' occurs one must be, therefore, very careful in detecting whether (1) it contains a mistake in form, or (2) it has a superfluous ideograph, or (3) it is in a wrong order. Unfortunately the Sanskrit vocabulary abounds in *ba*, *bha*, *va*, *sa*, *śa*, *ṣa*. In Our P'o-p'o-li (Jap Bat-ba-li) the second *p'o* ('*ba*') is the character in question. The name, I think, contains two mistakes in form and in order from the causes above stated. P'o-p'o-li thus corrected will be first 'P'o-sa-li' (Jap. Bat-sha-li) and then 'P'o-li-sa' (Jap. Bat-li-sha), i e. Varṣā or Varṣa in Sanskrit. If I am correct in this hypothesis we shall have the following parallels :-

Kuei-chi's Commentaries on the *Vijñāna-mātra-siddhi* and the *Nyāyā-nusāra.*	Paramārtha's "Life of Vasu-bandhu."		Paramārtha's translation of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā-bhāṣya.*
Varṣa (Rain)	Vṛṣa-gaṇa		Varṣa (P8o-p'o-li)
|	|		|
Vārṣa-gaṇya (Rain-host)	Vindhya-vāsa	Vasu-bandhu	Īśvara-kṛṣṇa (Kauśika)
Hiraṇya-saptati (Gold-seventy)	Sāṃkhya-śāstra	Paramārtha-saptati (in opposition)	Sāṃkhya-saptati (Sāṃkhya-kārikā)

These parallels, though they contain some uncertain elements, help us much in establishing the identity of Vindhya-vāsa-Īśvara-kṛṣṇa and the date of this important philosopher (c. 450). The Commentary portion of the Chinese *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* is, be it added in passing, an elaborate work, much more complete than that of Gauḍa-pāda. The Chinese authorities assign the Commentary, curiously enough, to Vasu-bandhu, which I take to be a confusion arising in the transmission of traditions. These questions have been discussed by me in my introduction to the translation of the Chinese *Sāṃkhya-kārikā-bhāṣya.* According to my opinion the Commentary on the original seventy *Kārikās* was drawn up by Īśvara-kṛṣṇa himself, just as was done by some of the *Kārikā* writers. Vṛṣa-gaṇa seems to have been an orthodox philosopher of the school, and his date will be somewhat earlier than Vindhya-vāsa (c.450). There is here one point which must not be passed without comment. When Vindhya-vāsa was victorious in his controversy he was rewarded by King Vikramāditya of Ayodhyā with three lacs of gold as a prize, but soon afterwards he died. It was after his death that Vasu-bandhu wrote his *Paramārtha-saptati* and got a prize from the same king (whose date is about 452-480). Vasu-bandhu was patronised by both Vikramāditya and Bālāditya, while Vindhya-vāsa was favoured

only by the former. Accordingly, the death of vindhya-vāsa—Īśvara-kṛṣṇa must have ocurred before 480 A.D. in any case.

7. The Sāṃkhya teachers, Vṛṣa-gaṇa and Vindhya-Vāsa, in the "nine hundred" years after the death of Buddha.—According to Paramārtha, Vṛṣa-gaṇa and Vindhya-vāsa lived in the tenth century[49] after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa. If we accept 480 B.C. or thereabouts as the date of the Nirvāṇa, the "nine hundreds," i.e. tenth century, will be about 420-520 A.D. That a comparatively correct tradition concerning the date of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa had been current among Indian Buddhists about Paramārtha's time can be seen from another source quite independent of ours. The famous "Dotted Record" of Indian sages which was brought to China by Saṃgha-bhadra indicated 975 dots (years) from the Nirvāṇa to 489 A.D.[50] This exactly agrees with our date now in consideration. The evidence of Saṃgha-bhadra is worth noticing, especially because he was the translator of the "*Samanta-pasadika,*" which was written by Buddha-ghoṣa soon after 432 A.D. in Ceylon, brought by himself to Burma in 450, and was translated by Saṃgha-bhadra into Chinese in 488.[51] He seems thus to have been a direct pupil of Buddha-ghoṣa, or at any rate,

49. The text has 'in the nine hundred years' i.e. at a time in 900-999 years, therefore it means the truth century after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa. A Chinese date of the Nirvāṇa is generally described, and with it any calculation of date from the Nirvāṇa. But one must not confound Paramārtha's calculation with any other Chinese ones, because he is not a Chinese, and he is giving us a tradition current in India in his time.

50. The "Dotted Record" was attached to the Vinaya-piṭaka, and every year at the end of the Vassa ceremony the presiding priest used to add a dot to it. This process is said to have been kept up till 489 A.D., when Saṅgha-bhadra added the last dot after his Vassa residence of Canton, China. For the details see my "Pali Elements in Chinese Buddhism," J. R. A. S., July, 1896; Kasawara and Max Muller is the Academy March 1, 1884; Indian Antiquary (1884), p. 156.

51. See my "*Pali Chrestomathy,*" p lxxiv, notes to p. 112.

a younger contemporary of his.[52] In the light of Saṃgha-bhadra's "975 years after the Nirvāṇa" (489 A.D.), Paramārtha's "Nine Hundreds" (i.e. a time between 900 and 999 years) for Vṛṣa-gaṇa and Vindhya-vāsa (c. 450; died before 480) becomes more intelligible and important. We shall see further whether our argument holds good in the case of another statement of Paramārtha.

8. Kātyāyanī-putra and Aśva-ghoṣa in the "five hundred" years after the Nirvāṇa.—In the "five hundreds" (a time between 500-599 years, i e. sixth century) after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, Kātyāyanī-putra of the Sarvāsti-vāda school went to Kaśmīra, where he convened 500 Arhats and 500 Bodhi-sattvas in order to compile the Abhidharma of his own school. The result of this compilation was the "*Aṣṭagrantha*" (eight books), otherwise called the "*Jñāna-prasthāna*".[53] The work, which consisted of 50,000 *ślokas*, was in perfect conformity with the Sūtra and Vinaya literature. Next their business was to compile a great commentary called the *Mahā-vibhāṣā*[54] upon the above text. They invited Aśva-ghoṣa from Sāketa (in Śrāvastī), who was much reputed for his literary ability in order to give the Commentary a literary finish. The *Mahāvibhāṣā*, though it was guarded by the Kasmirian worthies, got abroad owing to the strenuous efforts of Vasu-bhadra. The above tradition refers, without doubt, to Kaniṣka's council. Here, again, we have to thank

52. Saṃgha-bhadra may be the same person as one whom we have in our "*Life*,"the opponent of Vasu-bandhu. Both flourished at the same time. But one is a Vaibhāṣika (Nos. 1265 and 1266 belong to him) and the other is a Theravādin (No. 1125 translated by him); therefore the identification seems to be improbable. The teacher of Saṃgha-bhadra the Theravādin came with him to Canton. It is just possible that he may be Buddha-ghoṣa himself (see l.c., p. lxxv). I hope this may be stated with more certainty after an edition of the Chinese and Pali "*Samanta-pasadika*" which I am preparing is brought out.

53. No. 1223, translated into Chinese A.D 383.

54, Nos. 1273 and 1264, translated A.D. 383 and 437-439 respectively; cf. also Nos. 1279, 1263.

Paramārtha for the preservation of the tradition of Kaniṣka's council, which was hitherto believed to emanate solely from Hiuen-tsang. According to the recent investigation of Vincent Smith, who has established several important dates for Indian history, the date of Kaniṣka (Kanerki) of the Kuṣāṇa dynasty is 125 A.D. Professor Sylvain Levi, on the other hand, utilizing all the Chinese evidence available, assigns the Kuṣāṇa king an earlier date of 50 A.D. Now Paramārtha's "five hundreds" is equivalent to 20-120 A.D. thus covering the possible dates of Kaniṣka proposed by the two scholars. Aśva-ghoṣa is a contemporary of Kaniṣka, according to Hiuen-tsang and several other authorities.[55] The glowing accout of Aśva-ghoṣa's literary skill in Paramārtha is approprite to the author of that famous Kāvya "*Buddha-Carita*" and the beautiful "*Sūtrālaṃkāra*" preserved in Chinese.[56] The works of Kātyānī-putra and Vasu-bhadra being translated into Chinese in A.D. 382, 383, 391, etc., an earlier date than that proposed by Bhandarkar seems to be preferable for Kaniṣka,[57] though an argument against any proposed date for Kaniṣka is here quite out of court. As there seem to have been so many noted scholars besides those mentioned above dur ng Kaniṣka's reign, such as Nāgārjuna, Āɪya-Deva, Pārśva, Vasu-mitra, the Physician Caraka, and the Minister Māṭhara, the further publication of Mahā-yāna Buddhist texts will, we may hope, shed more light on a dark passage in the

55. Hiuen-tsang's "*Memoires*," xii, 214. "The Chinese *Saṃyukta-ratna piṭaka-sūtra*" (No. 1329, A.D. 472), vol. vi, makes Aśva-ghoṣa and Caraka the contemporaries of Kaniṣka. "The Record of the Indian Patriarchs" (No. 1340 A.D. 472), vol. v, Aśva-ghoṣa and Caraka live under the King. See also Wassilieff, "*Buddhismus*," p. 52, note.
56. Nanjio, Nos. 1351 and 1182.
57. Kātyāyanī-putra's work, see above p. 52, notes 2, 3. Vasu-bhadra's two works (Nos. 1381 and 1271) were translated into Chinese in A.D. 382 and 391 respectively. Our text of Vasu-bandhu's life has Vasa-subhadra for Vasu-bhadra, but for the reasons above stated (see above, p. 50, under P'o-p'o-li), I take it to be Vasu-bhadra, the '*sa*' being superfluous.

history of Buddhism. At present we must rest satisfied with the result at which we have arrived, however small it may be, in establishing the date af Vasu-bandhu in the light of Paramārtha's valuable work. We can thus take Vasu-bandhu's date, A.D. 420-500, as well-nigh settled, and with it those of Vindhya-vāsa (Īśvara-kṛṣṇa), c. 450 (died before 480), and Vasu-rata, c. 480, being brother-in-law of Bālāditya, who ruled from A.D. 481 or thereabouts.

(JRAS, 1905)

PHILOSOPHY OF VASUBANDHU IN VIMŚATIKA AND TRIMŚIKĀ

S. N. Dasgupta

The scheme of Vedānta philosophy is surprisingly similar to the idealism of Vasubandhu (280-360 A.D.) as taught in his *Viṃśatikā* with a short commentary of his own and *Triṃśikā* with a commentary of Sthiramati on it.[1] According to this Vijñānavāda (idealism) of Vasubandhu all appearances are but transformations of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects which to us seem to be existing outside of us and generating our ideas. Just as in dreams one experiences different objects in different places and countries without there being any objective existence of them or as in dreams many people may come together and perform various actions, so what seems to be a real world of facts and external objects may will be explained as mere creations of the principle of intelligence without any objective basis at all. All that we know as subjective or objective are mere ideation *(vijñapti)* and there is no substantive reality or entities corresponding to them, but that does not mean that pure non-conceptual *(anabhilapyenātmanā)* thought which the saints realise is also false.[2] It is possible that the awareness of anything may become the object of a further awareness, and that of another, but in all such cases where the awareness is significant *(arthavati)* there are no entities or reality as represented by them ; but this should not be

1. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* containing two treatises of *Viṃśatikā* and *Trimśikā.* Paris 1225.
2. Yo bālair dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvo grāhyagrāhakādiḥ parikalpitas tena kalpitenātmanā teṣāṃ nairātmyaṃ na tvanabhilapyenātmanā yo buddhānām viṣaya iti. Commentary on *Viṃśikā*, p. 6.

interpreted as a denial of the principle of intelligence or pure knowledge as such. Vasubandhu then undertakes to show that the perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world cannot be trusted. He says that taking visual perception as an example we may ask ourselves if the objects of the visual perception are one as a whole or many as atoms. They cannot be mere wholes, for wholes would imply parts ; they cannot be of the nature of atoms for such atoms are not separately perceived ; they cannot be of the nature of the combination of atoms, for the existence of atoms cannot be proved.[3] For if six atoms combine from six sides, that implies that the atoms have parts, for if six atoms combines with one another at one identical point, it would mean that the eombined group would not have its size bigger than that of an atom and would therefore be invisible. Again, if the objects of awareness and perception were only wholes, then succession and sequence would be unexplainable and our perception of separate and distinct things would remain unaccountable. So, though they have no real objective existence, yet perception leads us to believe that they have. People are dreaming the world of objects in the sleep of the instinctive roots of the habit of false imaginative construction (*vitathavikalpābhyāsavāsananidrayā*) and in their dreams they construct the objective world and it is only when they would become awake with the transcendent indeterminate knowledge (*lokottaranirvikalpajñānalābhāt prabuddho bhavati*) that they would find the world-construction to be as false as the dream-construction of diverse appearances. In such a view there is no objective material world and our cognitions are not influenced by outside objects ; how then are our minds influenced by good instructions and associations, and since none of us have any real physical bodies, how can one kiil another ? Vasubandhu explains this by the theory that the thought-currents of one person can some-

3. Nāpi te saṃhatā viṣayībhavanti, yasmāt paramāṇurekaṃ dravyaṃ na sidhyati. *Ibid.*, p, 7.

times determine the thought-currents of another. Thus the idea of killing of a certain type may produce such a disturbance of the vital powers of another as to produce a cessation of the continuity of one's thought-processes which is called death.[4] So also the good ideas of one may influence the ideas of another for good.

In the *Triṃśikā* of Vasubandhu and its commentary by Sthiramati, this idealism is more clearly explained. It is said that both the soul (or the knower) and all that it knows as subjective ideas or as external objects existing outside of us are but transformations of pure intelligence *(vijñāna-pariṇāma)*. The transformation *(pariṇāma)* of pure intelligence means the production of an effect different from that of the causal moment simultaneously at the time of the cessation of the causal moment.[5] There is neither externality nor subjectivity in pure intelligence, but still these are imposed on it *(vijñānasvarūpe parikalpita eva ātmā dharmaśca)*. All erroneous impositions imply that there must be some entity which is mistaken as something else. There cannot be erroneous impositions on mere vacuity; so these erroneous impositions of various kinds of external characteristics, self etc. have to be admitted to have been made on the transformations of pure intelligence.[6] Both Vasubandhu and Sthiramati repudiate the suggestion of those extreme idealists who deny also the reality[7] of pure intelligence on grounds of interdependence or relativity *(saṃvṛti)*. Vasubandhu holds that pure consciousness *(vijñaptimātratā)* is

4. Paravijñaptiviśeṣādhipatyāt pareṣāṃ jīvitendriyavirodhinī kācit vikriyā utpadyate yayā sabhāgasantativicchedākhyaṃ maraṇaṃ bhavati. *Viṃśatikā*, p. 10.
5. Kāraṇakṣaṇanirodhasamakālaḥ kāraṇakṣaṇavilakṣaṇakāryasya ātmalābhaḥ pariṇāmaḥ. Sthiramati's Commentary on *Triṃśikā* p. 16.
6. Upacārasya ca nirādhārasyāsambhavād avaśyaṃ vijñānapariṇāmo vastuto'sty upagantavyo yatra ātmadharmopacāraḥ pravarttate. Na hi nirāspadā mṛgatṛṣṇikādayaḥ. *Ibid.* Compare Śaṅkara's Commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā*.
7. Thus *Laṅkāvatāra*, one of the most important works on Buddhistic idealism, denies the real transformation of the pure intelligence or *ālayavijñāna*. See *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 46.

the ultimate reality. This ultimate consciousness is a permanent entity which by its inherent power (*śakti*) undergoes threefold transformation as the inherent indeterminate inner changes *(vipāka)* which again produce the two other kinds of transformation as the inner psychoses of mental operations *(manana)* and as the perception of the so-called external sensibles *(viṣayavijñapti)*. The apprehension of all appearances or characterised entities *(dharma)* as the cognised objects and that of selves and cognisers, the duality of perceivers and the perceived is due to the threefold transformation of *vipāka, manana* and *vīṣayavijñapti.* The ultimate consciousness *(vijñaptimātra)* which suffers all these modifications is called *ālayavijñāna* in its modified transformations, because it is the repository of all experiences. The ultimate principle of consciousness is regarded as absolutely permanent in itself and is consequently also of the nature of pure happiness *(sukha)*, for what is not eternal is painful and this being eternal is happy.[8] When a saint's mind become fixed (*pratiṣṭhita*) in this pure consciousness *(vijñaptimātra)*, the tendency of dual thought of the subjective and the objective *(grāhyagrāhakānuśaya)* ceases and there dawns the pure indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and transcendent (*lokottara*) consciousness. It is a state in which the ultimate pure consciousness runs back from its transformations and rests in itself. It is divested of all afflictions (*kleśa*) or touch of vicious tendencies and is therefore called *anāsrava.* It is unthinkable and undemonstrable because it is on one hand pure self-consciousness (*pratyātmavedya*) and omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) and it is divested of all limitations (*āvaraṇa*) and on the other hand it is unique in itself[9]. This pure

8. Dhruvo nityatvāt akṣayatayā ; sukho nityatvād eva yad anityaṃ tad duḥkham ayaṃ ca nitya iti asmāt sukhaḥ. Sthiramati's commentary on *Triṃśikā*, p. 44.
9. *Ālayavijñāna* in this ultimate state of pure consciousness (*vijñaptimātratā*) is called the cause (*dhātu*) of all virtues, and being the ultimate state in which all the *dharmas*, or characterised appearances, had lost all their limitations it is called the *dharmakāya* of the Buddha (mahāmnueḥ bhūmipāramitādibhāvanayā kleśajñeyāvaraṇa prahāṇāt...sarvadharmavibhūtilābhātaś ca dharmakāya ity ucyate).

consciousness is called the container of the seed of all (*sarvabīja*) and when its first indeterminate and indefinable transformations rouse the psychosis-transformations and also the transformations as sense-perceptions, these mutually act and react against one another and thus the different series rise again and again and mutually determine one another. These transformations are like waves and ripples on the ocean where each is as much as the product of others as well as the the generator of others.[10]

In this view thought (*vijñāna*) is regarded as a real substance and its transformations are also regarded as real and it is these transformations that are manifested as the selves and the characterised appearances.[11] The first type of transformations called *vipāka* is in a way the ground of the other two transformations which contain the indeterminate materials out of which the manifestations of the other two transformations appear. But as has already been pointed out, these three different types of transformations again mutually determine one another. The *vipāka* transformations contain within them the seeds of the constructive instincts (*vikalpavāsanā*) of the selves as cognisers, the constructive instincts of colours, sounds ete., the substantive basis (*āśraya*) of the attribution of this twofold constructive instinct as well as the sense-faculties and the localisation of space determinations (*sthānavijñapti* or *bhājanalokasanniveśa-vijñapti*). They are also associated in another mode with sense-modifications involving the triune of the sense (*indriya*), sense-object (*viṣaya*) and cognition (and each of these triune is again associated with a characteristic affective tone corresponding with the affective tones of the other two members of the triune in a one to one relation), attention (*manaskāra*), discrimination (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*) and feeling (*vedanā*).[12] The *vipāka* transformations have

10. Tac ca varttate srotasaṅghavat. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
11. Avaśyaṃ vijñānapariṇāmo vastuto'sty upagantavyo yatrātmadharmopacāraḥ pravarttate. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
12. Feeling (*vedanā*) is distinguished here as painful, plesurable, and

no determinate or limited forms (*apraicchinnālambanākāra*) and there are here no actualised emotional states of attachment, antipathy or the like which are associated with the actual pleasurable or painful feelings. The *vipāka* transformations thus give us the basic concept of mind and its principal functions with all the potentialities of determinate subject-object consciousness and its processes. There are here the constructive tendencies of selves as perceivers, the objective constructive tendencies of colours, sounds etc., the sense-faculties etc. attention, feeling, discrimination, volition and sense-functioning. But none of these have any determinate and actualised forms. The second grade of transformations called *manana* represents the actual evolution of moral and immoral emotions and it is here that the mind is set in motion by the ignorant references to the mental elements as the self, and from this ignorance about the self is engendered self-love (*ātma-sneha*) and egoism (*ātma-māna*). These references are again associated with the fivefold universal categories of sense-functioning, feeling, attention, volition and discrimination. Then comes the third grade of transformations which are associated with the fivefold universal categories together with the special manifestations of concrete sense-perceptions and the various kinds

as the basic entity which is neither painful nor pleasurable, which is feeling *per se* (vedanā) anubhavasvabhāva, sa punar viṣayasya āhlādakaparitāpakatadubhayākāraviviktasvarūpasākṣātkaraṇabhedāt). This feeling *per se* must be distinguished again from the non-pleasurable-painful feeling existing along with the two other varieties, the painful and the pleasurable. Here the *vipāka* transformations are regarded as evolving the basic entity of feeling and it is therefore undifferentiated in it as pleasure or pain and is hence called "feeling as indifference (*upekṣa*)" and undifferentiated (*avyākṛta*). The differentiation of feeling as pleasurable or as painful takes place only as a further determination of the basic entity of feeling evolved in the *vipāka* transformations of good and bad deeds (*śubhāśubhakarmavipāka*). Good and bad (*śubhāśubha*) are to be distinguished from moral and immoral as potential and actual determinations of virtuous and vicious actions.

of intellectual states and moral and immoral mental states such as desire (*chanda*) for different kinds of sense-experiences, decisions (*adhimokṣa*) in conclusions firmly established by perceptions, reasoning etc., memory, attentive reflection (*samādhi*), wisdom (*prajña*), faith and firm will for the good (*śraddhā*), shamefulness (*hrī*) for the bad etc. The term *ālayavijñana* is given to all these three types of transformations, but there is underneath it as the permanent passive ground the eternal and unchangeable pure thought (*vijñaptimātratā*).

It may be pointed out here that in this system of philosophy the eternal and unchangeable thought substance undergoes by virtue of its inner dynamics, three different orders of superficial changes which are compared with constantly changing streams and waves. The first of these represents the basic changes which later determine all subjective and objective possibilities; the second starts the process of the psychosis by the original ignorance and false attribution of self-hood to non-self elements, self-love and egoism and in the third grade we have all the concrete mental and extra-mental facts. The fundamental categories make the possibility of mind, mental processes and the extra-mental relations evolve in the first stage of the transformation and these abide through the other two stages of the transformation and become more and more complex and concrete in course of their association with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the knowledge situation, Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness of blue is only a modification of the "awareness" but he thinks that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the subject or the knower (*grāhakagraha*) and a relation with the object which is known (*grāhyagraha*). Blue as an object is essential for making an awareness of blue possible, for the awareness is not blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought and it does not at all follow that this

implies that there are real external objects existing outside of it and generating the awareness as external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply ontological objectivity. It is argued that if the agency of objective entities in the production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there could not be any case where sense-knowledge can be admitted to be produced without the operation of the objective entities, but since in dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge is universally regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such objective entities, no causal operation can be admitted to the objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge.

(IHQ, iv, 1928)

EVOLUTION OF VIJÑĀNAVĀDA

V. Bhattacharya

There is an old tradition in this country which speaks of a relationship between the Vedānta or Upaniṣads and Buddhism; and the available facts show that the tradition is not without foundation. Indeed, so far as some of the vital points are concerned, the difference between the two systems is very slight. Śāntirakṣita says in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* (v. 330) that the defect in the system of the followers of the Upaniṣads is slight (*alpāparādha*). As a matter of fact, Buddhism owes much of its being to the Upaniṣads. Although it is true that like the Sāṅkhya system, it has rejected much of the Vedic religion relating to different rites and ceremonies, nevertheless it is equally true that, like the same Sāṅkhya system, it has drawn much from that religion, following its 'path of knowledge' (*jñānamārga*).

Buddhism admits with the Vedānta that the origin of the *saṃsāra* is due to ignorance (*avidyā*), which therefore is to be overcome. In both the systems desire (*kāma*) is the root cause of all sufferings, and, as such, it is rightly called by the followers of the Vedānta 'Great Evil' (*mahāpāpman*) and by Buddhism 'death' (*Māra*, a synonym for *mṛtyu* both being derived from the same root *mṛ* 'to die'). Naturally therefore by destroying or conquering that evil one attains to immortality. In both the systems the notion of 'I' and 'mine' (*aham* and *mama*) which brings about one's bondage is to be shaken off, though the methods suggested for achieving this end are totally different. There are many more such points of mutual agreement of which the one we are concerned with here is Vijñānavāda which, as we shall see, found its first expression in the Upaniṣads and gradually developed into its accepted form in Buddhism.

It goes without saying that the Upaniṣads avowedly deal with *Brahmavāda*, and *Brahmavāda* and *Ātmavāda* are

one and the same, there being no difference whatsoever, for the words *Brahman* and *Ātman*, according to the seers or teachers of the Upaniṣads, differ only in letters and not in sense or spirit. It is repeatedly shown therein that *Brahman* is nothing but *vijñāna*[1]. or *jñāna.*[2] Thus *Brahmavāda* or *Ātmavāda* is, in fact, *Vijñānavāda.*

Now Brahman being, in fact, identical with *vijñāna* one naturally takes the former in the sense of the latter in such Upanisadic passages as the following (*Taitti.* III. 1):

'That from which these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their end, try to know that. That is Brahman.'[3]

And it is actually supported by the following in the same work (III. 5):

'He perceived that Brahman was *vijñāna*, for from *Vijñāna* these beings are born; by *vijñāna*, when born, they live and into *vijñāna* they enter at the end.'[4]

When somehow or other the above interpretation is accepted the following and the similar texts of the Upaniṣads are easily taken with reference only to *vijñāna*:

'Verily all this is *ātman*.'[5]

'*Brahman* alone is all this.'[6]

'All this is *Brahman*.'[7]

1. *Bṛ Up.*, III., 9. 28; see also *Taitti. Up.*, II. 5. 1. III. 5. 1; *Bṛ. Up.*, IV. 3. 7.
2. *Taitti Up.*, II. 1. 1. see Śaṅkara.
   Cf. *Jñapti* in the above extract with the Buddhist term *vijñapti*. It is to be noted that as the Upaniṣadic texts under discussion here show, originally there was made no distinction between *jñāna* and *vijñāna*, as generally in such cases in Buddhist texts. The main function of the former is *arthamātraparicċheda*, while that of the latter is *arthaviśeṣaparicċheda*. Sometimes in Buddhism, too, no distinction of *jñāna* and *vijñāna* is observed.
   See Note 16.
3. *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jātāni* etc.
4. *vijñānaṃ brahmeti vyajānāt* etc.
5. *Ch. Up.*, VII; 25, 2; *Bṛ. Up.*, IV. 5-7.
6. *Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 2. 11.
7. *Ch. Up.*, III. 16. 1; *Maitrī Up.*, IV. 6.

'There is no diversity here. He who perceives here diversity goes from death to death.'[8]

Thus to say all this is *Brahman* or *Ātman* amounts to saying that all this is *vijñāna*; or in other words, all this is a *pariṇāma* or *vivarta*[9] of *Brahman* or *vijñāna.*

Compare this with such passages as the following from Buddhist works:

'O the sons of the Jina, the three planes are only *citta*.'[10]

'This is only *vijñapati*.'[11]

According to the Buddhists, *citta, manas, vijñāna,* and *vijñapti* are synonyms.[12]

Now as evident from the above, the external world has in fact no reality, and yet it appears to be. This appearance demands an explanation which is supplied by the *avidyā* of the Vedāntins and by the *vāsanā* of the Buddhists. It is *avidyā* or *vāsanā* that changes *vijñāna* into the external phenomena, even as happens in illusion, mirage, dream, etc.

The idealistic interpretation of the Vedānta as given above is fully supported by Gauḍapāda and a careful and close examination of his *Āgamaśāstra*, generally known by the name of *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*, will bear out the statement. I shall quote here only a few lines from that work. Gauḍapāda says (IV. 72): 'This duality having the

8. *Bṛ. Up.* IV. 4. 19.
9. The word *pariṇāma* means 'transformation' of 'modification'; and *vivarta*, in fact, conveys the same meaning, i.e. 'changing from one state to another. Its use in Vedantic sense, 'illusory manifestation' is not pre-Śaṅkara.
10. See *Subhāṣitasaṅgraha* ed. Bendall, p. 19; *Daśabhumikasūtra*; Advayavajra's *Tattvaratnāvalī*, Gaekwad Oriental Series, No. XL, p. 18; Levi: *Materiaur pour Petude du Systeme Vijñānamātra*, Paris, 1932, p. 43.
11. *Viṃśatikā* of Vasubandhu ed. Levi in *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Paris, 1925, 1. See also *Pañjikā* on *Tattvasaṅgraha*, GOS., 550; *Laṅkāvatāra* ed. B. Nanjio, X. 77, p. 274.
12. *Viṃśatikā*, p. 3; *Abhidharmakośa*, ed. Poussin, 11. 34; (referring to *cetas*,) *Madhyamakavṛtti*, ed Poussin. p. 203.

subject and the object[13] is only the vibration of *citta*. *Citta* has no object, therefore it is said to be always *asaṅga* (i.e. having no attachment or relation to an object)'.[14]

Here *spandita (=spanda* or *spandana)* of *citta* implies the activity of mind, owing to which objects are represented.

The following *kārikās* from the same work may also be compared with their parellel verses from the *Laṅkāvatāra*: 'As the movements of a fire-brand appear to be straight, or crooked, etc., so the vibrations of *vijñāna* appear as the perceiver and the perceptible.' (IV. 47). 'As a fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance (of its being straight, etc.) and (thus) is not born, so when the *vijñāna* does not vibrate it has no appearance (of the perceiver and the perceptible), and (thus) is not born (IV. 48). 'When a fire-brand moves the appearances are not produced from anything other than that; and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than that, nor do they enter then into that. (IV. 49). 'When the *vijñāna* vibrates the appearances are not produced from anything other than that, and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than that, nor do they enter then into that. (IV. 51). 'As in dream owing to illusion, the mind moves having the appearance of the duality (the subject and the object), so does it in the waking state owing to illusion, having the appearance of the duality.' (III. 29).[15] 'There is no doubt that in dream the mind though without a second is with the appearance of the duality, so is undoubtedly the mind in the waking state with the appearance of the duality, though it is without a second.' (III. 30).[16]

Let us read here a few lines from the *Laṅkāvatāra* (ed B. Nanjio), the well-known work on the *Vijñānavāda* :

13. lit. 'the perceiver and the perceptible'.
14. Cf. *Laṅkāvatāra*. p. 157. For *cittaspandita* or *cittaspanda* cf. in the *Yogavāśiṣtha* (III 67. 6-8) which is full of Vijñānavāda.
15. This *kārikā* occurs again in the last chapter (IV. 61) with only one variation i.e. *calati* for *spandate* in both the halves.
16. This *kārikā* is identical with IV. 62.

'All this is *citta*. It comes forth in two ways, in the form of the perceiver as well as of the perceptible. There is neither *Ātman*, nor anything belonging to it.' (III. 121, p. 209). 'There is only *citta*, and not the visible. The *citta* comes forth in two ways, in the form of the perceiver as well as of the perceptible. It is neither eternal nor has it annihilation'. (III. 65, p. 181).

'The *citta* of men inclines (towards its objects) in the form of the perceiver as well as of the perceptible. There is no characteristic of the visible, as imagined by fools.' (X. 58, p. 272).

'As appears the castle in the sky, or mirage, so does always the visible; but in transcendental wisdom it does not exist.' (X. 69, p. 272).

That the visible universe is the creation of *vijñāna*, or *manas* or *citta* is found also in the *Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇopaniṣad* (Mysore, 1900, p. 12) where occur the following lines :

'The mind which is the author of the creation, continued existence, and dissolution of the three worlds, disappears, and that is the highest state of Viṣṇu'.

In the Vijñānavāda the theory of *Vijñaptimātratā* which is the same as *vijñānamātratā* is a very well-known one. Literally *vijñānamātra* means 'simply *vijñāna*,' and its state is *vijñānamātratā*. When the *vijñāna* does not perceive any object whatsoever, it rests only in itself. This state of resting of the *vijñāna* only in itself is called *vijñānamātratā*.[17]

According to the Vijñānavādins this *vijñānamātratā* is *mukti* 'deliverance.'[18] On this we shall have an occasion to speak a few words more.

In Vedānta this *vijñānamātratā* is expressed by Gauḍapāda in his *Āgamaśāstra* (III. 38) as *ātmasaṃstha-jñāna* '*jñāna* that rests in itself'.[19]

17. Vasubandhu's *Triṃśatikā* ed. Levi, 28 ; *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Poussin, p. 585. See *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 169.
18. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* ed. Levi, XI. 47.
19. See *Bhagavadgītā*, VI. 25 : *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, II. 1. 19. This is in fact *nirvikalpa-jñāna*. See Poussin's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, (Tome II), p. 607, Gauḍapāda describes it (III. 33) as *akalpa-jñāna*.

The following stanza in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (11.3.10) clearly points to this *vijñaptimātratā :*

'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state'.

We have seen that Brahman is *vijñāna.* And I think it points to *vijñaptimātratā. Vijñāna* when it rests only in itself *(ātmasaṃstha)* is *Brahman.* This reminds us of the following in the Upaniṣads (*Ch. Up.* VII. 24. 1-2) :

'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite (*bhūman*)...The infinite is immortal'.

'Sir, in what does the Infinite rest ?'

'In its own greatness—or not even in greatness'.[20]

The exposition of Gauḍapāda is very clear here. He says (III. 46).

'When the *citta* does not fall into a state of oblivion, nor is distracted again, nor is unsteady, nor has it any sense-image, then it becomes *Brahman*'.[21]

This *vijñānamātratā* is, therefore, in fact, *Brahmabhara* of the Brahmavādins. *Brahmabhara* means the 'state of *Brahman*' or 'becoming *Brahman*'.[22]

This is the *mukti* 'deliverance' of the Brahmavādians, and here on this point they entirely agree, as has already been shown[23] with the Vijñānavādins.

Now when the *citta* or *vijñāna* rests only in itself, or in other words, when there is *vijñānamātratā*, that state is described as 'non-perception *(anupalambha)*' there being no

20. Tr. by Max Muller, SBE., vol. 1, p. 129. Here following Śaṅkara he writes "The Commentator takes *yadi vā* in the sense of, "If your ask in the highest sense, then I say no ; for the Infinite cannot rest in anything, not even in greatness."

21. See my paper, *The Gauḍapādakārikā on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* in the Proceedings and Transactions of the Second (All India) Oriental Conference, 1922, p. 457-8 ; and *Brahmabindu Up., Matrī Up.*, VI. 34. *Yogavāśiṣṭha*, III. 67. 8.

22. *Muṇḍaka Up.*, III. 2. 9. He who understands the highest Brahman becomes Brahman.

23. See Note 18.

citta (acitta), 'supermundane *(lokottara) jñāna*,' incomprehensible *(acintya)*', 'good *(kuśala)*,' 'enternal *(dhruva)*,' and 'bliss (*sukha=ānanda*)'.[24]

Now consider if there is any difference between this *vijñāna* as Brahman of the Vedāntins.

Here on the authority of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati, *vijñāna*, as we have seen above, is eternal *(dhruva, nitya)*. And there are other texts, too, that can be cited in support of the view.[25] But it is a well-known fact that the Buddhists hold the theory of 'momentariness' *(kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda)*, and hence, according to them, *vijñāna* is also momentary, and not eternal as the Vedāntins maintain. Śāntirakṣita while agreeing with them on many an important point differs from them saying that their system is

24. The original from which these words are taken is in the *Triṃśikā*. Here in the first *kārikā anupalambha* 'non-perception' is expressed as *parama upalambhasya vigamaḥ* 'extreme cessation of perception.' in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, XI. 47. See note 18. For *acitta* See Vasubandhu's *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*, 36.
With reference to the words *anupalambho'sau* in the *Triṃśikā*, quoted above Prof. Poussin observes (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 606) "D'apres le commentaire de Sthiramati les motes *anupalambho 'sau* se rapportent au Bodhisattva: Undoubtedly Bodhisattva may rest in *vijñaptimātratā* but, so far as the commentary of Sthiramati is concerned, those two words, I think, do not refer to a Bodhisattva, though his gradual success is shown. Sthiramati's introductory line clearly shows that it is the *citta* in that state, which is referred to by the following stanzas including the words in question.
25. *Jñānasiddhi*, XV. 50 in *Two Vajrayāna Works*, G.O.S., p 85. This refers to *cittadhārā, op. cit.*, p 75.
Op. cit., p. 85, See Suzuki: *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, 1907, p. 348:
"*Nirvāṇa* is sometimes spoken of as possessing four attributes; (1) eternal (*nitya*), (2) blissful (*sukha*), (3) self-acting (*ātman*), and pure (*śuci*). It is eternal because it is immaterial; it is blissful because it is above all sufferings; it is self-acting because it knows no compulsion; it is pure because it is not defiled by passion and error," See also *Viśuddhi magga*, Vol, I, p. 294; *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, iv, 362. 369 ff. In the *Abhichanappadipika* ed. Subhūti, 7 *dhuba* is one of the synonyms for *nirvāṇa*.

defective, for *vijñāna* can in no way be eternal, as held therein.[26]

This eternity of *vijñāna* of the Vijñānavādins refers, I think, to its continuity *(santāna-nityatā)*,[27] and is not to be taken in the strict sense of the term, as maintained by the Vedāntists. This explanation is supported by the *Jñānasiddhi* quoted in the foot-note, no. 25.

In conclusion, it may be observed that following the line of thoughts suggested above a very large number of passages in the Upaniṣads may easily be explained from the Vijñānavāda point of view. For instance, let us take the following two stanzas from the *Īśā Up.*, 6-7.

'When to a man who understands all the beings in the *Ātman* (i.e. *vijñāna*) and the *Ātman* (i.e. *vijñāna*) in all beings, he does not remain in doubt.'

'When to a man who understands, the *Ātman* (i.e. *vijñāna*) has become all beings, what sorrow, what troubles can there be to him who beheld that identity (i.e. the identity of the *vijñāna* and the beings).'

It is, however, to be noted that the Upaniṣads do not say one thing, but various things. There are various thoughts and while some of them are more or less systematic, others are not so. Originally, the Upaniṣads were meant not merely to guide one's speculations, but to lead one along an active spiritual life. But that was found impossible owing mainly to the wide divergence in their thoughts. Consequently a strong necessity was felt for making up that difference; and the result was the composition of the *Brahmaśāstras*. But unfortunately the question

26. *Tattvasaṅgraha*, GOS, 328-330.
27. Cf. *anutpanna-pradhvaṃsi jñānam* in the *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 157, and *pariṇāmanityatā* of the Sāṅkhyas. But against this see Jayanata-bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1895 (Part II) p. 164. But truly speaking, as followers of the Middle Path the Vijñānavādins can not hold that the *vijñāna* is eternal, for according to them it should be regarded as one having neither eternity nor annihila tion. The *Laṅkāvatāra* (III. 65, p. 181) clearly says : *cittamātraṃ na............śāśvatocchedavarjitam.*

remained still unsettled, there being a number of schools of interpreters. The diversity of these interpretations is due specially to the different passages in the Upaniṣads, some of which do actually differ, and some are explained differently. Thus the interpretation of the Vedānta from the idealistic point of view is quite just, for there are actually some texts to that effect.

(IHQ, x, 1934)

"DHARMAS" OF THE BUDDHISTS AND "GUNAS" OF THE SĀMKHYAS

Th. Stcherbatsky

Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya has recently devoted a series of lectures to the subject of the Basic Conception of Buddhism.[1] The opinions expressed by him have elicited the following remarks :

Buddhism strikes the historian of religions by two quite extraordinary features. First of all, it places man above god. Man can reach the highest position, for above the position of a god, by his own effort without the intervention of a divine power. The gods abide in heaven, they constitute a divine world *(deva-loka)*, but the Superman, the Buddha, stands far above all worlds, he is *lokottara*. At the same time, this man, who by his own exertion can attain so high a position, is deprived of a Soul. For it is most emphatically and repeatedly stated, that the Soul does not exist, neither the Soul, nor the Self *(ātman)*, nor the Ego *(ahaṃkāra)*, nor the personality, the individual *(pudgala)*, nor the living being (*jīva*), nor even man (*manuṣya*). All these are mere names, names of unreality, imagined phantoms. Man does not exist ! Buddhism is *anātma-vāda, pudgala-nairātmya.* Atheism, the denial of God, should not so much strike the Indian scholars as it strikes the European, for the most orthodox system of Indian philosophy, the Mīmāṃsā, is also atheistic (*anīśvara-vāda*). But the denial of the reality of man and at the same time the worship of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who are men, not gods, is a puzzle to the Indian historian just as it is to the European.

Mr. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya proposes a very simple

1. Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara, *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, 1934 (Calcutta University), 105 pages.

solution of the puzzle. According to him Buddha, like all his predecessors, the sages of the Upaniṣads, was willing "to extinguish desire." He does not tell us what desires Buddha strived to extinguish, he says desire in general, all desires, whatsoever they should be (p. 64). Now, what is the object most desired, asks our author and answers, it is evidently one's own life, the Self (p. 65). "Offer the kingdom of heaven and tell a man that he may accept it, but only on condition, that he shall give up his life. Certainly he would not accept the offer" (*ibid*).

It is also evident, thinks our author, that by extinguishing the Self all desires will be *co ipso* completely extinguished. For neither will there be any persons who could desire, nor will there be any objects which could be desired. This the author states in an unambiguous manner, he says, "thus there being neither the subject nor the object there is no room for desire to come forth" (p. 74). A more radical extinction of desire can hardly be imagined !

Such a drastic solution of the puzzle has the merit of simplicity, but I do not think it will find many believers. The author will probably be quite astonished to know that even if his *experimentum crucis* be realized and no subject at all be in existence, this does not at all mean that there will be no objects and no desires. For although there is in Buddhism no subject, there is plenty of objects desired. The objects, like everywhere, are devided in Buddhism in those that are desired (*upādeya*) and those that are not desired (*heya*). There is a whole class of objects termed "*anāsrava-dharma*" which are never *heya*. *Nirvāṇa* is not *heya*, the Path (*mārga*) and its various divisions is not *heya*, but *upādeya*. Notwithstanding th circumstance, that there are seemingly no persons who could desire them, the desired objects exist nevertheless. The desires which Buddha wished to extinguish are *kleśas* i.e., "oppressors," bad desires. Buddhism is a doctrine "of defilement and purification" (*saṃkleśa-vyavadāniko dharmaḥ*), a doctrine of defilement by bad desires, and purification by good desires. In the early history of Buddhism there

are some instances, in which the aim of Buddhism has been misunderstood just as Mr. Bhattacharya misunderstands it. There have been some religious men who committed suicide. They thought thus to "pull down the very foundation of desire" (p. 70). But they were condemned by the church, and sucide was declared to be a crime equal to assassination. The author says (p. 74),—"desire, the cessation of which is sought for *naturally* requires for its very being both a subject and an object. Therefore while by *pudgalanairātmya* its subject is denied, it is *dharma-nairātmya* that removes its object."

To this we must object first of all that *pudgalanairātmya* is Hīnayāna and *dharma-nairātmya* is Mahāyāna. Buddhism existed seven centuries without *dharma-nairātmya* at all and continues to exist till now without it in Ceylon and other countries.

The argument of the author gives an eloquent demonstration of the fact that it is impossible to treat such problems as the basic conception of Buddhism in ignoring all results of modern research[2], and in forgetting the existence of history.

Moreover the argument which to our author seems so strong and so self-evident,—the argument namely that if there is neither subject nor object there can be no desires—is strong only in common life and in realistic systems, it has no strength in an idealistic system.

Thirdly, the argument that "desire naturally requires for its very being both subject and object" is contradictorily

2. The latest productions of European research in the field of *mārga* are, a master-work of Prof. L. de La Vallee Poussin, *La Morale Bouddhique* (Paris, 1927) concerned mainly with Hīnayāna, and Dr. E. Obermiller's *Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā* (Acta Orientalia, XI) concerned exclusively with Mahāyāna. Although the author treats Buddhism mainly as *mārga*, these two very rich sources of information have apparently completely escaped his attention. Dr. E. Obermiller is at present issuing a further work on the same subject, viz. *Analysis of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (Calcutta Oriental Series).

opposed to what Buddhism has always preached. It is a "natural" argument only in everyday life, but not in philosophy. still less in Buddhism. The basic conception of Buddhism is perhaps exactly the contrary of what Mr. Bhattacharya thinks it to be. For it is most clearly stated and repeated almost in every Buddhist work "*asti karma, asti phalaṃ kārakas tu nopalabhyate.*" "Action exists, and their results (i.e., attaining the desirable and avoiding the undesirable) exist also, but the man who perpetrates these actions does not exist." That does not mean that he does not exist for the man in the street, but he does not exist in Buddhist philosophy, as well as in all those great European systems of philosophy, which doubted or denied personal identity.

What then exists if man does not exist ?

The same text answers "*kārakas tu nopalabhyate......... anyatra dharma-saṅketāt.*" The *dharma*-theory exists. And what is the *dharma*-theory ? It is causality "*tatrāyaṃ dharma-saṅketo yad uta asmin sati idaṃ bhavatīti.*" The two central conceptions of Buddhism are *dharma* and *pratītya-samutpāda* is the causality inherent in these Elements. The one implies the otner, an Element is a causally connected Element. There are in Buddhism at least three different conceptions of *dharma* as well as of *pratītya-samutpāda.* (Cf. my *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 134).

It is exceedingly important to realize the full compass and all the implications of the principle that the *dharmas* alone exist, but not the *dharmin* and consequently not the man. The overwhelming importance of this principle has escaped the attention of our author. Therefore his work, notwithstanding all its other merits, must be considered as a failure to solve the puzzle of Buddhism. It is clear that we must look for a solution of that puzzle in another direction. We must fully realize the fact that Buddhism always has been not only a religion, but also a system of philosophy. It is *jñānamārga.*

We thus come to the problem of the basic conception of Buddhism as a problem of philosophy. We will look

for it not in the emotional or religious field, but in the field of ontology. This philosophic basis of Buddhism however has several time changed. It is Pluralism in Hīnayāna, Monism in Mahāyāna, Relativism in the Mādhyamika and Idealism tn the Yogācāra school.

We thus must turn our attention not only to philosophy, but also to history.

When the author posits the problem of a "basic" conception of Buddhism, he apparently seeks after a conception which is never changed and is to be found as the basis of every historical or even modern form of Buddhism.

He therefore indiscriminately wanders through all sources accessible to him which go under the general stamp of some kind of Buddhism, and seeks to extract the general conception lying at their bottom. Historical treatment is quite foreign to him, unless we hold for such treatment the views expressed on pp. 1-10, where we find very interesting considerations on the store of ideas of the Vedic age out of which Buddhism arose. This want of historical treatment inside Buddhism, this treatment of all Buddhist literature *en bloc*, is a great defect of the otherwise very interesting work.

The want of an historical point of view makes the author recoil in astonishment before three quite contradicting statements. Being glibe assertions regarding all existing things, those statements bear the unmistakable stamp of being intended as basic (p. 33). The one says "everything exists" (*sarvam asti*), the other maintains "nothing exists" (*sarvaṃ śūnyaṃ*), the third asserts "mind only exists" (*vijnāna-mātram asti*). The author tries to find some solution in patching together these quite contradictory assertions. But he fails. By themselves these views are exclusive of one another, and cannot be reconciled unless treated historically. There is absolutely no hope to develop them out of the princlple of desire-extinction. But historically we find that there are three kinds of Buddhism, the one maintaining that "everything exists", the other that "nothing exists" and the third that "all things are mind only."

These are celebrated "three swingings of the law" as stated by the Tibetan historian, the first, the middle and the last we would tell, the three periods in the development of Buddhist philosophy, the first which arose in ancient Magadha in the sixth century B.C., and still exists in Ceylon and in Burma, the second which arose in the last centuries B.C. in the Andhra country and was given a definite formulation by Nāgārjuna in the second century A.D., and the third which seems to have arisen in the North-west of the same time as the second and was given a definite formulation by Asaṅga of Peshwar in the fourth century A.D.

But how is it that these three quite different basic conceptions are all included in the general pale of Buddhism? Is there or is there not a conception still more basic which could serve as a starting point for all of them?

Yes, there is such a conception. The author rightly points to the connection of *anātman* as the basic of all the forms of Buddhism. This is a conception which by itself needs not to be exclusively Buddhistic[3] but it is the basic in the sense of a starting point from which the historical development began and which has produced many modifications. Buddhism at the beginning is *anātmavāda*, the theory of no-Soul or no-Self as the author translates the term. This is the conception from which all the later variety of theories developed and which till now is at the basis of that form of Buddhism which prevails in Ceylon and Burma, but which, according to the method of our author. must be the constant basis of all the forms of Buddhism.

Now what really means "no-Soul" (*anātma*)? And how does it come that "no-Soul" is the common basis of the three conflicting statements, "all exists" "nothing exists," "mind only exists"? It seems very difficult, even quite impossible, "to develop them out of "no-Soul" and still more difficult to identify them with it. Moreover it is not

3. Cf. below.

at all true that all Buddhists believe in no-Soul. For it would be very strange if "no-Soul" had become the creed of almost all Asia. If it is not the creed of its mother-country India, it is the creed of Tibet, Mongolia, China, Corea and Japan. They have borrowed it from India and if Vedānta be regarded as the fundamental creed of India at present, we have the testimony of Śrīharṣa that Vedānta does not differ in principle from Mādhyamika.[4] That means that it is also allied to Buddhism. The puzzle is great! The simple solution proposed by Mr. Bhattacharya will not help us.

We must distinguish between Buddhism as a religion and Buddhism as a philosophy.

Tradition, which we have no reason to disbelieve, maintains that Buddha himself had recourse to a double language. To the simple man he preached morality, to the educated men he taught philosophy. Buddhism has conquered the people of India and of almost All Asia by its noble and lofty moral ideals, and not by its no-Soul philosophy.

The religious masses in all Buddhist countries hardly have any idea of professing a no-Soul religion. They probably would be very much astonished if they were told that their religion is a no-soul religion, just as some amature lady-scholars in Europe are astonished and unwilling to admit that Buddha preached no-Soul.

I therefore think that our author is on the wrong way, if he wishes to solve the puzzle of no-Soul without either making a difference between religion and philosophy or between the different periods of Buddhist philosophy. The principle of no-Soul has an altogather different meaning. Grammatically and logically it can mean either no-Soul or non-Soul.[5] In the first case the term represents a simple negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*), in the second it is a qualified negation (*paryudāsa = apoha*) i.e. a negation

4. Cf. *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, pp. 19 and 29 (Chowkh.)—Mādhyamikādi-vāgvyavahārāṇām svarūpāpalāpo na śakyate.
5. Cf. Aristotle's distinction between "*non est homo justus*" and "*est homo non-justus.*"

which contains not alone its negative part, but also its positive counterpart. This positive counterpart is a positive assertion of those things which are the non-Soul.

Our author evidently conceives no-Soul as a simple negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) whose aim it is to "pull down the very foundation of desire" and to create a condition where there is neither subject nor object.

However on the other view, the *paryudāsa* view, the term *anātman* means the real existence of all things except the Soul. We now understand the meaning of the first of the three dictums in which the basic conception of Buddhism has been expressed, "all exists." It means that all elements even the past and the future, the subtle and the visible, all exist, except the Soul.[6]

How are these all really existing things called? They are called *dharmas*. What does the term *dharma* mean? It means "quality". The qualities exist, but not the substances (*dharmin*), not the possessors of these qualities, not the *kāraka*. The Soul is supposed to be a thinking substance. This substance, acccording to Buddhism, does not exist, but its supposed qualities, the mental phenomena, all really exist. Which are they? They are first of all consciousness, pure consciousness (*vijñāna*). Nobody can deny its reality. Next to consciousness nobody can deny will (*cetanā*[7] = *saṃskāra*). Presentations (*saṃjñā*) or separate ideas are *dharmas*, nobody can deny their existence. There are finally feelings (*vedanā*),

6. Cf. my *Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 25.

7. The author is very gravely mistaken when he on p. 48 assumes that *citta* in Buddhism can be a synonym of *cetanā*. Synonyms are in Buddhism the three terms *cittaṃ mano-vijñāna* corresponding to *buddhir, upalabdhir, jñānam* of N. S. I. 1. 15. Both triads are contrasted as synonyms (*anarthāntaram*), the one in Buddhism, the other in Nyāya. In Buddhism they are *vijñāna-skandha*. But *cetanā* is the foremost among *saṃskāras*. It belongs to *saṃskāra-skandha* Every *dharma* (element) can be envisaged as a *saṃskāra* (force) when it is considered as a cause, but *cetanā* is *saṃskāra* in the narrow sense, it is synonymous with *karma*, the driving force of the Universe. The author is also mistaken when he translates on p. 68 *saṃskāra* as "coefficient of consciousness," for such

the feelings of pleasure and pain, no one will deny their reality. We thus have a classification of all mental phenomena in four groups (*skandhas*) but there is no-Soul, no thinking substance among them. The author quotes (pp. 63-70) the very eloquent and precise statement of this theory in the Benares sermon by Buddha himself. Buddha goes through all the Elements of body and mind and finds in them only these Elements, but no possessor of the Elements, no Ego, no Soul. This sermon and this quotation should have suggested to the author the right meaning of the term no-Soul, but he seems to have kept past its real import and discoverad here the mere repudiation of desire.[8]

are only the *saṃskāras* of the *samprayukta* class, but by no means those of the *viprayukta* class. *Saṃskāra* is *sambhūya-kārin* i.e. co-operating force or force simply. since all forces in Buddhism are cooperative. The force is *cetānā* "will". Cf. my *Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 20, 32, 100.

8. By the bye, this classification of all mental phenomena in four groups—feeling, ideas, will and pure sensation—is an extraordinary important feature of all Buddhism. It does the highest credit to the philosophers who established it, it is in the full sense of the term "psychology without a Soul." It corresponds to a quite modern achievement of European Science. It compares most favourably with some modern and old European attempts to arrive at a correct classification of mental phenomena. Such a correct classification is a very important part of psychology and if we take the development of German psychology up to classification of Brentano, the English ones up to that of B. Russel, and French philosophy up to M M. Bergson, we will be astonished to see that India possessed some centuries B. C. that classification which European philosophy arrives at only at a very recent date.

The main difference is this that the Indian classification distinguishes between pure sensation (*vijñāna-skandha*=*nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*) and a presentation or concept (*sāṃjñā-skandha* = *savikalpa-pratyakṣa*). European science (W. James, B. Russel etc.) doubts whether pure sensation (*nirvikalpa*) can be considered as really existing, as a separate element. The *Abhidharma* also maintains that it is *samprayukta*, i.e. never appearing alone. But it plays an enormous part in all the history of Indian philosophy appearing there under different names, cf. my *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 174.

These are the mental phenomena (*dharma*) as only realities according to the no-Soul theory. What about the physical world? Taking *ātman* to mean substance[9] is there any substance in the physical world? Under the physical world we must understand our body and the external physical objects. Does Matter exist as a substance? No! Matter exists only as sensible qualities (*dharmas*) sense-data, not as a substance possessing these qualities. The substance (*pradhāna*) does not exist, but the fundamental tactile qualities—repulsion, attraction, heat and motion (the four *mahābhūtas*) are the only fundamental physical facts which are cognizable. They are all classified as varieties of tactile "qualities" (*spraṣṭavya-dharma*). Besides these fundamental Elements of Matter (*mahābhūta*) there are other tactile Elements, and there are the sense-data, e.g., the visible, auditory, offactory and gustatory Elements; colour, sound, odour and taste, but no substance, no Matter. Matter is *pradhāna*, this sterile, mute, indefinite, enduring, omnipresent "something" which is supposed to be Matter (*vastu*); it does not exist. On the other hand the *dharmas* (mental and physical) exist, they are realities, they are the Elements of the existing world. Existing in the world are only its Elements, mental and physical, sensations and sense-data, but no enduring substances, neither Souls, nor Matter. The terms *dharma* (Element), *sat* (existent), *anitya* (unenduring), *kṣaṇa* (point-instant) *saṃskṛta* (causally produced) *pratītya-samutpanna* (dependently appearing) are synonyms. It is particularly remarkable that their meaning extends equally to mental as well as physical entities. They all refer to the ultimate, simplest, minutest, subtlest Elements of existence (*dharma*.)

Now what is according to our author the meaning of the term "*dharma*"? It is very important to have a clear answer on this point since, as we have seen, *anātma* (as *paryudāsa*) simply means the *dharma*-theory (*dharma-saṅketa*).

Since the author does not attach due importance to

9. Cp. *Mādh. Vṛtti*, 437—*ātma-śabdo'yam svabhāva-śabda-paryayaḥ.*

this term, he does not swell upon its definition, but it is clear from his occasional statements on pp. 75-76 that he accepts the interpretations of *dharma* as "things," as even "thing round us", It is time that this utterly wrong interpretation should be once for all dismissed and forgotten. *Dharma* is exactly the contrary of a thing, a thing is *dharmin*, a *dharma* is the contrary, it is a non-thing, it a quality, not a substance, it is the negation of a substance.[10] Substance is *dharmin*, but not *dharma*.

A thing and a thing "round us" first of all means such things as jars and cloths etc. (*ghaṭa-paṭādi*), perhaps also such as cows and horses (*aśva-gavādi*). But is consciousness (*vijñāna*) a thing? Is it a thing round us? The will (*cetanā*), an idea (*saṃjñā*), a feeling (*vedantā*)—are they things? But they are all *dharmas*. Admitting the jars and cloths, horses and cows can be called thing, is a horse a *dharma*, is a jar a *dharma*? Let it once for all be known that the jar is not a *dharma*, but an assemblage of *dharmas*.

An assemblage of what *dharma*? First of all, it consists of a patch of colour (*varṇa*), the lines of its figure (*saṃsthāna*), of matter, i.e. the four phenomena of repulsion, cohesion, a certain temperature and nobility. They are all *dharmas* i.e. elements of the imagined complex called a jar. These *dharmas* together constitute the jar, but the jar is not a *dharma*, because it is an assemblage of *dharmas*. The principle that all things are assemblages of *dharmas*, that they themselves are non-*dharmas*, spurious *dharmas*, that only the ultimate Elements of the empirical things

10. It is true that a quality being detached from every substance becomes a thing (*vidyamānaṃ dravyam*), *sui generis*, or more precisely, "something" and this would perhaps be an adequate translation of the term, it is *vastu-mātra*, an indefinite but pure reality, the ultimate, subtlest Element of reality, implying the negation of *samavāya*, of the relation of substance to quality altogether. But that is a very special standpoint—*yo hi pedārtho vidyamānaḥ sa sasvabhāvaḥ*, cf. *Madh. Vṛtt.*, p. 760, cf. also my *Central Conception etc.*, p. 26. no. 1.

possess fully reality, but **not all** these things themselves, is at the root of all Buddhism. It is a fundamental mistake to admit that the jar is a *dharma*. The jar as *dharmin* is an illusion. A man to whom this basic theory of Buddhism is not clear cannot undertake it to solve the fundamental puzzle of Buddhist philosophy. For not working on the basis of what a *dharma* means, one never will arrive at a right comprehension of two other very important Buddhist terms, viz., the terms *pratītya-samutpāda*, "dependent origination" and *saṃskāra* (*sambhūya-kāritva*), "co-operative production". *Dharmas* are infra-atomic minutes, very subtle, separate momentary unities of energy,[11] which are held together not by inherence in a substance, but by causal laws, laws of dependent origination. "Dependent origination" means origination of *dharmas*. Since every *dharma* (except the three eternal ones) is produced by a combination of several *dharmas* in the preceding moment, it is called *saṃskṛta* i.e. "co-operatively produced." Every *dharma* is *saṃskṛta* as a product and *saṃskāra* as a cause. Without knowing what a *dharma* is, it is quite impossible to have a correct and adequate idea of what *pratītya-samutpāda* and *saṃskāra* are in early Buddhism.

In the later periods the meaning of these three fundamental terms has shifted, but shifted simultaneously in a parallel change. When the meaning of *dharma* in the Mādhyamika school has changed, the meaning of *pratītya-samutpāda* and of *saṃskāra* has also changed. The same happened in the Yogācāra school.

Thus the basic conception of Buddhist philosophy is *anātma*, but *anātma* in the sense of *reality* of all *dharmas*

11. Since the four *mahā-bhūtas* are not substances but forces (repulsion, attraction, heat and motion) it is clear that the Buddhist atoms cannot be like the atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas absolutely hard and indivisible particles of matter. The *saṃghātaparamāṇu* although consisting of 8 parts is not larger or heavier than the simple one, just as a needle will not become heavier if it becomes hot, i.e. if 'atoms' of the element heat are added to it or get intensified in it.

among which no *ātman* is to be found. Buddhism is a system of philosophic Pluralism, *anātma-vāda* means at the beginning the same as *sarvāstivāda*, the reality of all Elements (*dharmas* among which no-Soul and no substance, no things are to be found, it is a pluralistic and realistic psychology without a soul; *anātma-vāda, sarvāsti-vāda, dharma-vāda* or *dharma-sanketa* means the same. It is also synoymous with *pratītya-samutpāda-vāda* or *saṃskāra-vāda*, because every *dharma* can be a *saṃskāra* and is *partītya-samutpanna.*

We thus can consider the following expressions as synonymous and referring to the basic conception of Buddhism : *anātma-vāda = dharma-vāda = dharmatā = dharma-saṅketa = pratītya-samutpāda-vāda = saṃskāra-vāda = saṅghāta-vāda = bauddha-matam.*

Whosoever wishes to translate *dharma* in whatsoever a language must choose a phrase which would imply (i) plurality (*saṅghāta*) and (ii) denial of substance. The term "thing" misses the point because it implies rather the assertion by no means the denial of the *dharmin.* Moreover, and this is the main point, it must be applicable to the physical as well as to the mental domain. The term "element" seems to me preferable, although of course it is also not quite free from defects.[12]

BASIC IDEAS OF SĀṂKHYA AND BUDDHISM COMPARED

We will perhaps better understand the basic ideas of Buddhism if we compare them with the basic ideas of

12. Prof, H. Jacobi has rallied to the translation of the term *dharma* as an "element of existence," "Seins element," cf. his *Triṃśikā-vijñapti* "ubersetzt von Hermann Jocobi (Stuttgart, 1 32). Prof. Sylvain Levi's rendering of *dharma* as "essence" (cf. *Materiaux Vijñaptimātra*, Paris 1932) is not very much different, it hits the right point, namely that it is *dharma* as opposed to *dharmin.* Remains it for Frenchmen to decide whether such expressions as "les essences de la cruche" or "les essences de la personalite" would

the Sāṃkhya system. The difference between them is great, but there is unquestionably a family likeness. Just as every empirical thing or every living being, according to Sāṃkhya, is an assemblage of minutest infra-atomic Elements, more forces than substances, which are called "qualities" (*guṇa*), just so in Buddhism the empirical things and living beings are assemblages of momentary infra-atomic, very subtle unities or forces, which are also called "qualities" (*dharmas*).

It is a fundamental feature of the Indian mind in general and a firm tradition of all Indian science to be always on the search after invisible, subtlest, infra-atomic, dynamical elements or forces, whose operation produces the visible phenomena of our experience.

What are the so-called "oppressors" or *kleśas*. Are they really oldest Indian science? Are they really "wind, bile and phlegm" as *vāta-pitta-kapha* are often translated? These are only conventional names for very subtle infra-atomic three forces whese equipoise produces health.

What are the four "Great Elements" of Matter? Are they really what their names imply: earth, water, fire, and air? They are the forces of repulsion, attraction, heat and mobility, each of them some subtlest energy manifested in tactile phenomena.

What are the elements of grammar? There are invisible suffixes, the so-called *kvips*, which are active forces forming words.

What are the *dharmā-dharmau* or *karma* which is even called *adṛṣṭa*? It is an invisible force of our former deeds.

What are the so-called "oppressor" or *kleśas*. Are they really "love, hatred and infatuation", as they usually are translated or are they something quite different? One must consider that the extinction of *kleśas* not only makes a man dispassionate, but converts him into a Buddha, hence it converts phenomenal life into the absolute. The *saṃkleśas* are

be found equally convenient phrasing. We want a term that would be equally applicable to the mental as well as to the physical domain and would express plurality.

the 12 *nidānas*[13] or phenomenal life as contrasted with the absolute and produced by transcendental illusion (*avidyā= mukhyā bhrāntiḥ*). The *kleśas* are therefore transcendental forces creating and controlling phenomenal life (*saṃsāra*).

What are the *guṇas* of the Sāṃkhya system ? Are they really 'goodness,' 'passion' and 'darkness' as *sattva,rajas* and *tamas* are sometimes translated ? They are infra-atomic quanta of three different energies whose interplay produces the phenomenal world, both physical and mental.

Now what are the *dharmas* of the Buddhist ? As already stated *dharma* means the same as *guṇa* i.e. quality.[14] What is hidden under this designation ? There is no mystery, the whole catalogue containing 75 items is presented to you. They first of all are 5 sense-organs, 5 corresponding categories of sense-data and that is all for the physical world. No mysterious Matter ! For the mental world there is consciousness as pure consciousness and corresponding to it mental phenomena, ideas, feelings, will and different kinds of emotions or mental forces (*samprayuktasaṃskāra*), their list contains 46 items.

There are other forces which are general, neither physical nor mental (*rūpa-citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra*), e.g. the forces of production and destruction applicable to both spheres. They are therefore neithe specially mental nor specially physical, but general. Their list contains 14 items. Space (*ākāśa*) is a *dharma*. Time, however, is not a *dharma*. What does it mean that it is not a *dharma* ? It means that it does not exist. Duration does not exist. Time is past, present and future. The past does not exist, because it is past. The future does not exist, because it is future. Remains the present moment which alone exists, but it also does not exist separately from the thing existing at that moment. A *dharma* is a separate (*pṛthag*), thing, a Thing-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*). Thus space, as empty space, is a *dharma*, but time is not. The full catalogue of *dharmas* contains 75 items in the Sarvāstivada school.

13. Cf. *Madhyāntav*, p. 29 ff. (ed. Tucci).
14. This meaning has been established by Dr. B Seal in his *Positive Sciences of the Hindus*.

They are alone the *dharmas* ; there is apparently no mystery, The mystery comes from the fact that the *dharmas* are physical and mental at the same time just as the *guṇas* of the Sāṃkhyas, they are the ultimately real. Their synonym is the real (*sat*). The real lying at the bottom of every phenomenon, whether physical or mental, is a *dharma* and this is a mystery! Sthiramati says that in Hīnayāna a *dharma* is the ultimate reality (*pariniṣpanna*).[15] Vasubandhu recording the controversies which raged in the schools on the problem of the essence of *dharmas*, says that they are something very deep or subtle. They are also infra-atomic, dynamic unities of forces or Elements, whose interdependence according to casual laws (*pratītya-somutpāda*) constitutes the illusive objects of our phenomenal life.[16] Sāṃkhya admits besides the moving *guṇas* a motionless (*niṣkriya*) Soul. This Soul is degraded in Buddhism, it is converted into simple consciousness (*vijñāna*) which is also a *dharma*, an Element having the same sense as all other Elements. In Buddhism as well as in Sāṃkhya the human personality consists of an infinite number of point-instants of *guṇas* or *dharmas* which are held together in Sāṃkhya by a pervading Matter (*pradhāna*) and an eternal Soul in Buddhism exclusively by casual laws (*pratītya-samutpāda*).

The individual, according to Sāṃkhya, consists of Soul enveloped for the time of *saṃsāra* in Matter, which consists of eternally moving minutest elements (*guṇas*) of three different kinds. The process of the Deliverance of the Soul from the embracement of Matter consists in the gradual purification and pacification of the *guṇas* through knowledge. When absolute knowledge is attained, the Soul alone remains in its genuine purity and freedom.

The Buddhist conception of an individual can be imagined as a large circle filled with point-instants of different kinds. Inside the large circle of point-instants united by causality, there is no Soul, but a small island filled with

15. *Madhyāntav.*, p. 27, (ed. Tucci).
16. Cf. below, p, 27(a) n. 3.

anāsrava-dharma, or Elements which are eternally tranquilised, motionless and pure. They never will be sullied by passion and turmoil.

As long as the process of purification from desire goes on, the turmoil of moving Elements gradually subsides and gets pacified. Finally all will become *anāsrava. Nirvāṇa* will be attained.

In both systems, as we have seen, phenomenal life is represented as a bondage and as a beginningless commotion of minutest infra-atomic particles charged with some energy. In both systems the theory of salvation offers many points of similarity. In both systems there is at the bottom of every personal life an element of purity which is concealed and enveloped by the commotion of the impurity of phenomenal life. In both systems this life is regarded as a burden (*duḥkha*) and liberation from it is the aim of the doctrine. In both systems this is expressed in the formula of the "four principles of the saint" (*catvāri āryasatyāni*). Remaining faithful to its pluralistic principles, Buddhism has replaced the pure Soul of the Sāṃkhya by a plurality of pure elements (*anāsrava-dharma*) and by a complete extinction (*nirodha*) of all life in *Nirvāṇa*. The annexed chart can to a certain degree represent the comparative outlook of both systems very far from being "things," still less the things "round us." as jars, cows and horses etc., and the *dharmas* are something "very deep", something "inexplicable,"[17] something transcendental, the ultimate reality that can be ascertained by philosophic analysis. They can be characterized just as thr *guṇas* of the Sāṃkhyas are characterized in an old document,[18] "their ultimate reality transcends the domain of the sensible ; the objects which are contained in the domain of the sensible are Illusion,[19] they are quite in one".

17. *aran-bar-mi-nus-so=bsad-par-mi-nus*-so, cp. *Ab. Kośa,* I. 27, M de La Vallee Poussin's note in his translation and my *Central Conception etc.*, p. 91.
18. *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* quotes this couplet from *Ṣaṣṭitantra.*
19. Prof. R. Garbe writing in 1892 thought it a great merit on the

In Mahāyāna "the ultimate reality which transcends the domain of the sensible" is quite different. Mahāyāna is monistic, the ultimate reality is there called *pariniṣpanna*, the ultimate or perfect reality. "How is a unity (i.e. Monism) converted into a plurality?" asks Sthiramati[20] and answers "plurality is mere illusion."[21] Only for those philosophers "who assume that the *dharmas* are ultimate realities, only for them, would it be a contradiction to maintain unity and plurality at the same time. But for those who do not assume the ultimate reality of *dharmas*, scripture must not be interpreted in that sense." It is clear from this passage that Sthiramati opposes Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna as Pluralism and Monism. It is also clear that in Hīnayāna the *dharmas* were considered as a plurality of ultimate realities, as a plurality of *pariniṣpanna* Elements while in Mahāyāna all this plurality is merged into one single monistic ultimate reality which alone is designated by the term *pariniṣpanna* and its synonyms *tathatā, bhūtakoṭi, animittaḥ, paramārthaḥ, dharmadhātuḥ, śūnyatā etc.*

A long time since, when comparatively little was known of Buddhism, Professor Hermann Jacobi made an attempt to deduce some basic Buddhist ideas out of the Sāṃkhya

part of Prof. H. Oldenberg to have established that early Buddhism is realistic He says "the world of the objects is as real for Buddha as it is real for Kapila" (cp. Introd. to h's trans. of *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, p. 10). This would imply, if taken literally, the reality of objects or things, of jars and cows etc. However these objects are illusions (*śūnya*). Oldenberg had the right impression of the realism of Hīnayāna as compared with the illusionism of Mahāyāna, but the *dharma*-theory was quite unknown to him. he confounded the reality of *dharmas*, i e. of mere Sense-data with the reality of things (*dharmins*) He did not realize the import of the principle *sarvam asti*, he did not know that it refers to the reality of the 12 *āyatanas* alone, (cp. my *Central Conception etc*; p. 90) and the 12 *āyatanas* are a classification of Elements alone, not of things. He did not know the difference between *dharma-nairātmya* and *pudgala-nairātmya*.

20. *Katham ekaṃ vicitraṃ ya* cp. *Madhyāntav.*, p. 26.

21. Ibid.—*Yohi* (i.e. the Mahāyānist) *dharmāvaśavam (pariṭiṣpannamicchati)*.

system.[22] He compared the *tattvas* of the Sāṃkhyas with the 12 *nidānas* of Buddhism and noticing some points of similarity he thought it possible to deduce the latter out of the former. This attempt, in the form in which it was initially proposed, has been dropped, but it became the starting point of a long discussion in which a number of the leading scholars of Europe participated. It is now more or less generally admitted that the Sāṃkhya system preceded Buddhism in time and constitutes its philosophic basis. It is impossible to speak about the basic ideas of Buddhism without comparing it with Sāṃkhya ideas. According to Prof. R. Pischel[23] "theoretical Buddhism reposes entirely on Sāṃkhya-Yoga," "it has borrowed from Sāṃkhya-Yoga almost everything." "Buddha has converted into a religion what his teachers had taught before as a philosophy." Prof. H. Oldenberg who at first was unwilling to admit so powerful an influence, accepted later on this opinion in a more moderate form. The thought that "we have ample right to call Sāṃkhya that doctrine which appears as the remote, if not the nearest, background of the fundamental ideas of Buddhism."[24] Prof. R. Garbe[25] fully rallies to this opinion and lays stress upon the fact that Sāṃkhya preceded Buddhism not in the shape of detached ideas, but as a complete, closed system. He enumerates[26] seven points of detail where the similarity seems to him quite convincing. Under point No. 5 we meet here the *anātman* which thus proves to be, in its origin, a Sāmkhya and not a Buddhist idea. Oldenberg

22. *Der Ursprung des Buddhismus aus dem Sāṃkhya-Yoga* gott, Nachrichten, 1896, pp. 1 ff., continued in a further article "*Ueber das Verhaltniss der Buddhistischen Philosophie zum Sāṃkhya-Yoga und die Bedentung der Nidāna*, ZDMG., 52, 1 ff.
23. Lebeen, u. *Lehre des Buddha*, seconded by Luders, pp. 22, 62, 65, 67, 69, 75.
24. *Die Lehre der upanishaden u. die Aufange des Buddhismus* (1915), p. 318.
25. *Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie*, 2 (nd) ed. p. 10.
26. *Der Mondshein der Sāṃkhya Wahrheit* (Munclen, 1892) pp. 1-10.

also makes the following remarks :—"When Buddhism repeatedly and constantly laid great stress on the changing and fleeting character of the world process,—the constant change also of feelings, ideas etc. in which no self (*ātman, atta)* is contained,—this changing life lying entirely in the domain of Non-self,—this was a Sāṃkhya doctrine." M. E. Senart[27] assumed a still greater influence of Sāṃkhya on Buddhism. He however limited it to the practical teaching of the path to Salvation and made Buddhism more dependent on Yoga than on Sāṃkhya. He maintains that the Yoga shared indeed the speculative doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, but Buddhism could stand very near to Yoga without sharing its philosophy (*tout en divergeont sur les philosophimes purs*). Senart thought that early Buddhism was not philosophic *(incapable d' im effort de logique suivie et conciente)*, but he could not think otherwise since at that time the *dharma*-theory was quite unknown to him and consequently the meaning of *pratītya-samutpāda* and its contrast with the *pariṇāmavāda* of Sāṃkhya could not be understood. Indeed he assumed the identity of these theories. We thus have the authority of Professors Jacobi, Cldenberg, Pischel and Garbe in favour of the opinion that the doctrine of *anātman* was initially a Sāṃkhya idea.[28] Later on in the run of centuries it had lost its unorthodox character. Of course the *anātma*-doctrine is for them not much more than the fleeting and constantly changing character of feelings, ideas and notions. The *dharma*-theory

27. *Bouddhisme et Yoga*, in Revue de l' histoire des religions. v. 42, 1900, pp. 345 ff.

28. It means in Sāṃkhya just as it means in Buddhism exactly the same, namely 'everything except the soul,'' it is a *paryudāsa*-negation, an affirmation of the reality of the non-soul; whatsoever exists, i.e. changes and lives, belongs to the domain of the non-Soul, "des alles jenes Pliessen ganz und gar im Bereich des Nicht-Selbest verlauft" (Oldenberg, *Buddha*, pp. 331-332). Of course the Sāṃkhya system assumed a separate lifeless Soul, this Soul being *niṣkriya* was rejected by the Buddhists just as they rejected *ākāśa*, *pradhāna*, time, space and other imagined entities.

in its full extent, was also completely unknown to them and the meaning of *dharma* as a technical term appeared as a riddle.[29] Nor was the *guṇa* theory of Sāṃkhya sufficiently understood, nay even the translation of the terms *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* remained fluctuating and series of hypotheses on their meaning and their origin, mythological and foreign, were proposed.[30] It seemed also a contradiction that the Hindus themselves should Sāṃkhya for an eternalist doctrine (*śāśvata-vāda*). Indeed the Hindus assume that Sāṃkhya is diametrically opposed to Buddhism. They admit the existence of two "radical doctrines" (*ekānta-darśana*) in principle opposed to one another, the one maintaining that "everything is eternal" *(sarvaṃ nityam)*,[31] the other on the contrary, assering that "everything is non-eternal *(sarvam anityam)*"[32], the first is Sāṃkhya, the second is Buddhism. This contradiction disappears when one realizes that the difference refers to the theories of causations adopted by each system. In Sāṃkhya everything is eternal since it represents the manifestation of one eternal Matter ; although these manifestations are eternally-changing *(nitya-pariṇāmin)*, they are eternally the same in their material cause (*kāraṇa-avasthāyām)*.[33] In Buddhism there is no eternal Matter. the manifestations are detached *(pṛthag)* momentary *dharmas*, appearing in functional interdependence upon one another

29. The first systematic attempt to understand this term was made by Mrs. Magdalene and Wilhem Geiger, in Pali Dharma (Munich, 1921).
30. The *guṇa*-theory as the main or central Sāṃkhya doctrine has been fully disclosed by Dr. B. N. Seal in his *Positive Sciences of the Hindus* and by Prof. S. N. Dasgupta in his *Study of Patañjali* (Calcutta, 1920) and other works.
31. *Nyāya-sūtra*, IV. 1. 29.
32. *Ibid.*, IV. 1. 25.
33. In Sāṃkhya virtually there is no intrinsic difference among things, *sarvaṃ sarvātmakam*, the change of the colloction of atoms only changes potentiality into actuality. Just as in Leibnitzen's system every monad is the mirror of the universe, just so in Sāṃkhya every point instant is "identical" with the eternal and ubiquitous whole. Cp. Das gupta, *The Study of Patañjali*, p. 79.

(*pratītya-samutpāda*).[34] Thus it is that notwithstanding the unmistakable affinity between the *guṇa*-theory and the *dharma*-theory the two systems to which they belong and in which they play the leading part are diametrically opposed to one another, the one being called Evolution (*pariṇāma-vāda*), the other Functional Interdependence (*pratītya-samut-pāda-vāda*). Here as always the history of philosophy evolves by contrasts. It is a general rule in the history of philosophy that every new departure starts in opposition to reigning ideas, but at the same time it creates the new on the basis of the old. Causation as Functional Dependence (*pratītya-samutpāda-vāda*) is unquestionably the new departure of Buddhism. It implies the negation of *pariṇāma-vāda*, which is the Sāṃkhya theory of Causation, asserting "identity" (*tādātmya*) between cause and effect. The first is *a-sat-kāryavāda*, the second is *sat-kārya-vāda*. But the *dharma*-theory of the Buddhists seems only to be a far going modification of the *guṇa*-theory of the Sāṃkhya, a modification made necessary by the change in the theory of Causation. The *guṇas* are Elements or qualities which are "identical" with Matter; the *dharmas* are separate Elements.[35] Whatsoever the indirect antecedents of the *guṇa*-theory may have been in the Upaniṣads or in mythology, its definite aim in the Sāṃkhya system is to bridge over the gulf between Mind and Matter. According to this theory a physical phenomenon and a mental one are equally composed out of minutest infra-atomic quanta of three different stuffs or forces, the Intelligence (or nervous)

34. These two opposite and contrasting theories, implying the one as the negation of the other have nevertheless often been identified as long as the *dharma*-theory was not understood, In the Yogācāra system *pratītya-samutpāda* is retained only by name, it has become *pariṇāma-vāda* as is quite clear from the initial passage of the *Triṃśikā*. The Chinese tradition is conscious of the difference and calls it *ālaya-pratītya-samutpāda*, Cp. Demieville, in *Materiaux Vijñaptimātra*, p. 34, but virtually it is *pariṇāma-vāda*.

35. *Sarvam pṛthag, sarvam nānā, na kaścit eko bhāvo vidyate*, cp. *N. Sūtra*, IV, 1. 34.

stuff, Energy-stuff and Inertia-stuff. The first is predominant in a mental phenomenon. the last in physical one. In an idea or a feeling, e.g., the nervous stuff is more active, matter or inertia is in abeyance. In a plant or in a stone the last is predominant, the first is in abeyance. Energy is constantly being liberated and absorbed. There is therefore no stability at all, everything is moving and instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*). But although being momentary flashes of instantaneous infra-atomic quanta charged with some energy, the *guṇas* and the phenomena composed by them are said to be ubiquitous and eternal (*vibhu, nitya*). As already stated they are eternal in their causal or potential condition (*kāraṇāvasthāyām*) as absorbed in an eternal, primordial Matter. At that early period of Indian philosophy when the *guṇa*-theory was being philosophically founded, it is more than probable that the atomic structure of Matter must have been discussed.[36] It is probable that at that early epoch there was a division of opinion. The Jains and some pre-Vaiśeṣika system joined the Materialists and began to assume indivisible atoms, whereas the Sāṃkhyas and some pre-Buddhist philosophers decided for infinite divisibility. Although later on the Buddhists assume the existence of atoms, they deny their indivisibility. Their atoms are therefore no atoms at all, they are *dharmas* i.e., "qualities" absolute qualities, qualities without any stuff. That the Buddhist atoms cannot be any stuff is a direct consequence from the character of their four fundamental Elements of Matter (*mahā-bhūta*). Although called earth, water, fire and air, it is clearly stated that these are only conventional designations and that the four forces of repulsion, attraction, heat and motion are meant by these terms. Vasubandhu states that only the last of these names

36. Prof. H. Jacobi (art. *Atomism in* ERE.) attaches much importance to the silence of Pali Suttas and to the denial of atomism by the Vedāntins, Mahāyānists and Sāṃkhyas. But this denial referrs to the Vaiśeṣika. eternal atoms and does not refer to those systems who had a dynamic or semi-dynamic theory of Matter. The *tanmātras* are evidently also some kind of atoms or infra-atoms.

is adequate, because the Sanskrit term *samīraṇa* means both air and motion. Just as Berkley thought that space is presented to us in our sensuous experience of "resistance" to organic movement, just so the Buddhists at an early date defined matter as mainly the phenomenon (resistance of *sapratighatva*). At the early date Buddhism contained already the germs of that Idealism into which it later on developed. At that date Hīnayāna or Sarvāstivāda maintained in general that all realisable ideas must be either concrete data of sense (*bāhya-āyatana*) or concrete data of invalid consciousness (*ābhyantara-āyatana*). Substance, whether Spirit or Matter, was denied every separate reality. Both categories, the inward as well as the outward data, were called *dharmas* i.e. non-substances, absolute qualities. This designation evidently also aimed at bridging over the gulf between Matter and Mind, not however by assuming an equal composition, but by assuming their parallelism, their equal status.[37] This psycho-physical parallelism was indeed quite natural, because according to the Buddhist theory of Causality *(pratītya-samutpāda)* there is a general parallelism between all elements of existence (*asmin sati idaṃ bhavati*). Moreover, in marked opposition to the Sāṃkhya tenet that everything is eternal, because Matter is eternal, the Buddhists maintained that nothing is eternal (*sarvam anityam*), because substance does not exist. Existent are only "qualities", i.e., realisable data of sensuous experience and of inward consciousness (*dharmas*). Therefore the terms Element (*dharma*) and the term "existent" (*sat*) have become synonyms. Thus although *dharma* is a general term embracing both categories of data, assumes a separation between Mind and Body, but only because it assumes a separation between all Elements in general (*sarvaṃ pṛthag*), there is no identity between them at all, and no inherence (*samavāya*) in whatsoever a substance. The idea which the Buddhists made of an Element as an external *dharma* is

37. This psycho-physical parallelism is called by Vasubandhu, *Ab. Kośa*, I, 45.

most clearly seen from the manner in which they explain the phenomenon of acceleration in a falling body.[38] Every body is composed of "atoms" or infra-atomic quanta of four kinds of energy: resistance, attraction, heat and motion. They all are present in every body, in the same proportion, but their intensity (*utkarṣa*) can be different. When a body falls, its quanta of motor energy are intensified. At every moment the falling body is otherwise composed. It is clear from this that the *dharmas* are not "things," but "elements" of things.

DHARMA, THE BASIC CONCEPTION OF BUDDHISM

That the conception of *dharma* is the basic conception of Buddhism is most clearly and pregnantly expressed by the Buddhists themselves in their old *credo—ye dharma hetuppabhara*...This formula which professedly contains the shortest statement of the essence and spirit of Buddhism, declares that Buddha discovered the Elements (*dharma*) of existence, their causal connection *(hetu=pratītya samutpāda)* and a method to suppress their efficiency for ever *(nirodha)*. We have seen that *dharma, pratītya=samutpāda* and *anātma* are only different expressions of one and the same idea of philosophic pluralism which is also called *skandha-vāda*. This Buddhist *credo* embraces all the three varieties of Buddhism with some difference of implication. Generally the phrase means—Buddha established the Elements *(ye dharma)* which are causally produced *(hetuppabhara=pratītya-samutpanna)* and which are extinguished (*nirodha*) in *Nirvaṇa*. In Hīnayāna it implies that all Elements are inter-related and real. That is the genuine *pratītya-samutpāda*, Pluralism. In the Mādhyamika system it implies that all Elements, being interdependent, cannot be intrinsically real by themselves (*svabhāvena*), they are relatively real

38. Cp *Ab. Kośa*, II. 46 and my *Buddhist Logic*. I. 101.

(*svabhāvena śūnya*). This is the *śūnyatā-pratītya-samutpāda* or *advaya-vāda*, Monism. In the Yogācāra system a further implication is added, viz., "all Elements are relative, except one, viz. Pure consciousness (*vijñapti-mātratā*) which is Absolute. This is the *ālaya-pratītya-sumutpāda*, Idealism.

As to the intrinsic philosophic value of early Buddhism, in that form in which it was shaped in the school of the Sarvāstivādins, Professor Stanislav Schayer delivers himself in the following words :—

"This system is by itself a very important subject of scientific investigation and can be placed on the same level as the great speculative systems of Greece, of the Christian middle ages and of modern Europe."[39]

This testimony from an authoritative pen which has the right to speak in the name of European philosophy can be supplemented by the opinion of a man who without being a professional philosopher had nevertheless a life-long intimacy with Buddhist ideas to the study of which he devoted his life. He thus summarizes the basic idea of Buddhism which, we have seen, is the *anātma*-theory, as the pluralistic *dharma*-theory but not *anātma* as extinguishing of desire.

"Buddhism,' says he, "stands alone among the religions of India in ignoring the Soul. The vigour and originality of this new departure are evident from the complete isolation in which Buddhism stands in this respect, from all other religious systems then existing in the world. And the very great difficulty which those European writers who are still steeped in animistic preconceptions find in appreciating or even understanding the doctrine, may help us to realize how difficult it must have been for the origination of it to take so decisive and so far-reaching a step in philosophy and religion at so early a period in the history of human thought...The doctrine of impermanence of each and every condition, physical or mental ; the absence of any abiding principle, any entity, and sub-stance, any "Soul"

39. Stanislav Schayer, *Ausgewahlte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā* (Krakow, 1931), p. XII.

is treated from the numerous points of view from which it can be approached, in as many different Suttas."[40]

(IHQ, x, 1934)

40. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues* v. II, p. 242.

DIGNĀGA AND DHARMAKĪRTI

Th. Stcherbatsky

The lives of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, as recorded by the Tibetan historians Tāranātha, Bu-ston and others, are so full of quite incerdible mythological details that it becomes a difficult task to extract some germs of truth out of them. There are however facts which with great probability must be assumed as correct. These refers, first of all, to the lineage of teachers, their caste and place of birth. Vasubandhu was the teacher of Dignāga, but he was probably an old and celebrated man when Dignāga came to attend to his lessons. Dharmakīrti was not the direct pupil of Dignāga. There is an intermediate teacher between them in the person of Īśvarasena who was a pupil of Dignāga and the teacher of Dharmakīrti. Īśvarasena has left no trace in the literary history of his school, although he is quoted by Dharmakīrti who accuses him of having misunderstood Dignāga. We have thus the following lineage of teachers—Vasubandhu-Dignāga-Īśvarasena-Dharmakīrti.[1] Since Dharmakīrti flourished in the middle of the VII century A.D., Vasubandhu could not have lived earlier than the close of the IV century.[2]

Both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were natives of Southern India and born from brahmin parents. Dignāga was born in the neighbourhood of Kāñcī. He was at an early age converted to Buddhism by a teacher of the Vātsīputrīya

1. Cp. Tāranātha's History.
2. M. Noel Peri, in his excellent paper on the date of Vasubandhu, arrives at an earlier date, but this apparently reposes on a confusion of the great Vasubandhu with another author of the same name, Vṛddhācārya-Vasubandhu, quoted in the AK. and also called *bodhisattva* Vasu, the author of *Śataśāstra*, who was a century earlier. The opinion of V. Smith, *Early History*, p. 328 (3d ed.) is founded on the same confusion.

sect and took the vows from him. This sect admitted the existence of a real personality as something different from the elements of which it is composed. Dignāga dissented on this point with his teacher and left the monastery.[3] He then travelled to the north in order to continue his studies in Magadha under Vasubandhu whose fame at that time must have been very great. Among the great names of later Buddhism the name of Vasubandhu occupies an exceptional position, he is the greatest among the great. He is the only master who is given the title of the Second Buddha. His teaching was encyclopaedic, embracing all the sciences cultivated in India at his time. He had a great many pupils, but four of them attained celebrity. They became "independent scholars"[4], i.e., they freed themselves from the influence of their teacher and advanced further on, each in the special branch of his studies. These were the master Sthiramati—in the knowledge of the systems of the early 18 schools (*abhidharma*), the saint Vimuktasena—in monistic philosophy (*prajña-pāramitā*), the master Guṇa-prabha—in the system of discipline (*vinaya*) and master Dignāga in logic (*pramāṇa*). The works of all these savents are preserved in Tibetan translations. Dignāga seems to have dissented with his teacher on logical questions just as he dissented with his first teacher on the problem of a real personality.[5]

To the time of his apprenticeship probably belong two

3. The learned translator of *Māṇi-mekhalai* thinks that the Buddhists of the country of Kāñcī may have studied logic before Dignāga. Since the sect of the Vātsīputrīyas has some affinities with the Vaiśeṣikas, cp. Kamalaśīla, p. 132. 6, this is not improbable. The theory of two *pramāṇas* and the definition of *pratyakṣa* as *nirvikalpaka* certainly have existed long before Dignāga in some Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna schools. Dignāga gave to these formulas a new signification, but he himself quotes in support of them a passage from the *abhidharma* of the Sarvāstivādins,
4. *raṅ-las-mkhas-pa*=*svatantra-paṇḍita*.
5. His remark on Vasubandhu's definition of sense-perception, referred to above, is perhaps a polite way of expressing the fact that he disagreed with his teacher.

early works, two manuals for the use of students. One of them is a condensed summary of the capital work of his teacher under the title of *Abhidharmakośa-marma-pradīpa.*[6] The other contains a brief summary *(piṇḍārtha)* in mnemonic verse of all the topics contained in the *Aṣṭa-sāhasrika-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra.*[7] The first is a manual for the class of early Buddhist philospphy (*abhidharma*) the second a manual for the class of monistic philosophy *(pāra-mitā)*. The remaining works of Dignāga are all devoted to logic.[8] He at first exposed his ideas in a series of short tracts some of which are preserved in Tibetan and Chinese translations[9] and then condensed them in a great *oeuvre d'ensemble*, the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, in 6 chapters of mnemonic verse with the author's own commentary. The commentary however is very laconic and evidently intended as a guide for the teacher. Without the very evidently intended as a guide for the teacher. Without the very detailed, thorough-going and clear commentary of Jinendrabuddhi[10] it hardly could be understood. All the previous short tracts on logie were brought to unity in this great work.

The life of Dignāga after he had finished his studies was spent in the usual way, just as the life of every celebrated teacher at that time in India. He won his fame of a powerful logician in a famous debate with a brahmin surnamed Sudurjaya at the Nalanda monastery. After that

6. Tanjur, Mdo, v. LXX.
7. Tanjur, Mdo, v. XIV.
8. These are *Ālambana-parīkṣā*, *Trikāla-parikṣā*, *Hetu-cakra-samarthana* (*Hetu-cakra-hamaru* ?), *Nyāyamukha* (=*Nyāya-dvāra*) and *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* with *vṛtti*.
9. It is remarkable that his chief work, *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, has remained unknown in China and Japan. It has been replaced by *Nyāya-praveśa*, a work by *Śaṅkara-svāmin*, on whose authorship cp. M. Tubianski, *On the Authorship of Nyāya-praveśa* and Tucci, *op. cit.*; M-r Boris Vassiliev in his paper mentioned above establishes that the Chinese logicians knew about *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* only from hear-say.
10. Called *Viśālāmalavatī*, cp. Tanjur. Mdo, v. 115.

he travelled from monastery to monastery, occasionally fixing his residence in one of them. There he was teaching, composing his works, partaking in public disputations. Such disputations were an outstanding feature of public life in ancient India. The often were arranged with great pomp, in the presence of the king, of his court and a great attendance of monks and laymen. The existence and prosperity of the monastery were at stake. The authorized winner received the support of the king and of his government for his community, converts were made and new monasteries were founded. Even now in Tibet and Mongolia every celebrated teacher is the founder of one or several monasteries, every monastery is a seat of intense learning and sometimes great scholarhip.

Dignāga by the celebrity he won in disputations has been one of the most powerful propagators of Buddhism. He is credited with having achieved the 'conquest of the world".[11] Just as an universal monarch brings under his sway all India, so is the successful winner of disputations the propagator of his creed over the whole of the continent of India. Cashmere seems to have been the only part of India where he has not been, but he was visited by representatives of that country who later on founded schools there. These schools carried on the study of his works and produced several celebrated logicians.

THE LIFE OF DHARMAKĪRTI

Dharmakīrti was born in the South, in Trimalaya (Tirumalla ?) in a brahmin family and received a brahmanical education. He then became interested in Buddhism and adhered at first as a lay member to the church. Wishing to receive instruction from a direct pupil of Vasubandhu he arrived at Nalanda, the celebrated seat of learning where Dharmapāla, a pupil of Vasubandhu, was

11. *dig-vijaya.*

still living, although very old. From him he took the vows. His interest for logical problems being aroused and Dignāga no more living, he directed his steps towards Īśvarasena, a direct pupil of the great logician. He soon surpassed his master in the understanding of Dignāga's system. Īśvarasena is reported to have conceded that Dharmakīrti understood Dignāga better than he could do it himself. With the assent of his teacher Dharmakīrti then began the composition of a great work in mnemonic verse containing a thorough and enlarged commentary on the chief work of Dignāga.

The remaining of his life was spent, as usual in the composition of works, teaching, public discussions and active proprganda. He died in Kaliṅga in a monastery founded by him, surrounded by his pupils.

Notwithstanding the great scope and success of his propaganda he could only retard, but not stop the process of decay which befell Buddhism on its native soil. Buddhism in India was doomed. The most talented propagandist could not change the run of history. The time of Kumārila and Śaṅkara-ācārya, the great champions of brahmanical revival and opponents of Buddhism, was approaching. Tradition represents Dharmakīrti as having combated then in public disputations and having been victorious. But this is only an afterthought and a pious desire on the part of his followers. At the same time it is an indirect confession that these great brahmin teachers had met with no Dharmakīrti to oppose them. What might have been the deeper causes of the decline of Buddhism in India proper and its survival in the border lands, we never perhaps will sufficiently know, but historians are unanimous in telling us that Buddhism at the time of Dharmakīrti was not on the ascendency, it was not flourishing in the same degree as at the time of the brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. The popular masses began to deturn their face from that philosophic, critical and pessimistic religion, and reverted to the worship of the great brahmin gods. Buddhism was beginning its migration to the north where

it found a new home in Tibet, Mongolia and other countries.

Dharmakīrti seems to have had a foreboding of the ill fate of his religion in India. He was also grieved by the absence of pupils who could fully understand his system and to whom the continuation of his work could have been entrusted. Just as Dignāga had no famous pupil, but his continuator emerged a generation later, so was it that Dharmakrīti's real continuator emerged a generation later in the person of Dharmottara. His direct pupil Devendrabuddhi was a devoted and painstaking follower, but his mental gifts were inadequate to the task of fully grasping all the implications of Dignāga's and his own system of transcendental epistemology. Some verses of him in which he gives vent to his deepest feelings betray this pessimistic mentality.

The second introductory stanza of his great work is supposed to have been added later, as an answer to his critics. He there says, "Mankind are mostly addicted to platitudes, they don't go in for finesse. Not enough that they do not care at all for deep sayings, they are filled with hatred and with the filth of envy. Therefore neither do I care to write for their benefit. However, my heart has found satisfaction in this (my work), because through it my love for profound and long meditation over (every) well spoken word has been gratified."

And in the last but one stanza of the same work he again says, "My work will find no one in this world who would be adequate easily to grasp its deep sayings. It will be absorbed by, and perish in, my own person, just as a river[12] (which is absorbed and lost) in the ocean. Those who are endowed with no inconsiderable force of reason, even they cannot fathom its depth! Those who are endowed with exceptional intrepridity of thought, even they cannot perceive its highest truth."[13]

12. The Tib. translation points rather to the reading *sarid iva* instead of *paya iva*.

13. The *śleṣa* which Abhinavagupta finds in these words seems not to have been in the intention of the author. The commen-

Another stanza is found in anthologies and hypothetically ascribed to Dharmakīrti, because it is to the same effect. The poet compares his work with a beauty which can find no adequate bridegroom. "What was the creator thinking about when he created the bodily frame of this beauty! He has lavishly spent the beauty-stuff! He has not spared the labor! He has engendered a mental fire in the hearts of people who (theretofore) were living placidly! And she herself is also wretchedly unhappy, since she never will find a fiance to match her!

In his personal character Dharmakīrti is reported to have been very proud and self-reliant, full of contempt for ordinary mankind and sham scholar.[14] Tāranātha tells us that when he finished his great work, he showed it to the pandits, but he met with no appreciation and no good will. He bitterly complained of their slow wits and their envy. His enemies, it is reported, then tied up the leaves of his work to the tail of a dog and let him run through the streets where the leaves became scattered. But Dharmakīrti said, "just as this dog runs through all streets, so will my work be spread in all the world."

THE WORKS OF DHARMAKĪRTI

Dharmakīrti has written 7 logical works, the celebrated "Seven treatises" which have become the fundamental works (*mūla*) for the study of logic by the Buddhists in Tibet and

tators do not mention it. Cp. *Dhvanyāloka* comment, p. 217. According to Yamāri's interpretation the word *analpa-dhī-śaktibhiḥ* must be analysed in-*hai* and *alpa-dhī-śaktibhiḥ* The meaning would be: "How can its depth be fathomed by men who either have little or no understanding at all?" and this would refer to the incapacity of Devendrabuddhi.

14. Cp. Ānandavardhana's words in *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 217. A verse in which Dharmakīrti boasts to have surpassed Candragomin in the knowledge of grammar and Sūra in poetry is reported by Tāranātha and is found engraved in Barabudur, cp. Krom, p. 756.

have superseded the work of Dignāga, although they originally were devised as a detailed commentary on the latter. Among the seven works one, the *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, is the chief one, containing the body of the system; the remaining six are subsidiary, its "six feet".[15] The number seven is suggestive, because the *abhidharma* of the Sarvāstivādins also consisted of seven works, a principal one and its "six feet". Evidently Dharmakīrti thought that the study of logic and epistemology has to replace the ancient philosophy of early Buddhism. The *Pramāṇa-vārtika* consists of four chapters dealing with inference, validity of knowledge, sense-perception and symbolism respectively. It is written in mnemonic verse and contains about 2000 stanzas. The next work *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* is an abridgment of the first. It is written in stanzas and prose. More than the half of the stanzas are borrowed from the principal work. The *Nyāya-bindu* is a further abridgment of the same subject. Both last works are in three chapters devoted to sense-perception, inference and syllogism respectively. The remaining four works are devoted to special problems. *Hetubindu* is a short classification of logical reasons, *Sambandha-parīkṣā*—an examination of the problem of relations—a short tract in stanzas with the author's own comment, *Codanā-prakaraṇa*—a treatise on the art of carrying on disputations and *Santānāntara-siddhi*—a treatise on the reality of other minds, directed against Solipsism. With the exception of the *Nyāya-bindu* all other works are not yet recovered in thier sanscrit original, but they are available in Tibetan translations, embodied in the Tanjur. The Tibetan collection contains some other works ascribed to Dharmakīrti, viz. a collection of verse, comments on Sūra's *Jātakamālā* and on the *Vinaya-sūtra*, but whether they really belong to him is not sure.[16]

15. According to another interpretation three first works are the body, the remaining four the feet, cp. Buston, *History*.
16. He is also reported by Tāranātha to have written a work on tantric ritual and the tantrists of Java reckoned him as a teacher of their school. But probably this was only their

THE ORDER OF THE CHAPTERS IN *PRAMĀṆA-VĀRTIKA*

Dharmakīrti had the time to write a commentary only upon the mnemonic stanzas of the first chapter of his great work, the chapter on inference. The task of writing comments upon the stanzas of the remaining three chapters he entrusted to his pupil Devendrabuddhi. However the latter could not acquit himself of the task to the full satisfaction of his teacher. Tāranātha reports that twice his attempts were condemned and only the third had met with a half-way approval. Dharmakīrti then said that all the implications of the text were not disclosed by Devendrabuddhi, but its *prima facie* meaning was rendered correctly.[17]

The order of the chapters in the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* makes a strange impression. Whereas the order in both the abridged treatises, in *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* and *Nyāyabindu*, is a natural one—perception comes first and is followed by inference and syllogism—an order moreover agreeing with Dignāga, who also begins perception and inference,—the order in *Pramāṇa-vārtika* is an inverted one. It bngins with inference, goes over to the validity of knowledge, then come back to sense-preception which is followed by syllogism at the close. The natural order would have been to begin with the chapter upon the validity of knowledge and then go over to perception, inference and syllogism. This is much more so because the whole chapter on the validity of knowledge is supposed to contain only a comment upon the initial stanza of Dignāga's work. This stanza contains a salutation to Buddha, who along with the usual titles is here given the title of "Embodied Logic" (*pramāṇa-bhūta*).[18] The whole of Mahāyānistic Buddhology, all the proofs of the existence of an absolute, Omniscient Being are discussed under that head.

belief sprung up from the desire to have a celebrated name among their own school. The work is found in the Tanjur.

17. Cp. Tāranātha's *History*.
18. *pramāṇa-bhūtāya jagad-dhitaiṣiṇe*, etc. cp. Dutt, *Nyāya-praveśa*, Introd.

We would naturally expect the work to begin with this chapter upon the validity of knowledge and the existence of an Omniscient Being, and then to turn to a discussion of perception, inference and syllogism, because this order is required by the subject-matter itself, and is observed in all other logical treatises throughout the whole of Buddhist and brahmanical logic. To begin with inference, to place the chapter on the validity of knowledge between inference and perception, to deal with sense-perception on the third place and to separate inference from syllogism by two other chapters, is against all habits of Indian philosophy and against the nature of the problems discussed.

This very strange circumstance did not fail to attract the attention of Indian and Tibetan logicians who commented upon the work of Dharmakīrti, and a great strife arose among them around this problem of the order of the chapters in *Pramāṇa-vārtika.* The arguments for changing the order into a natural one or for keeping to the traditional order have recently been examined by Mr. Vostrikov. We take from his paper[19] the following details. The main argument for maintaining the traditional order is the fact that Devendrabuddhi, the immediate pupil of Dharmakīrti supported it, and that Dharmakīrti had himself written a comment only on the chapter of inference. It is natural to assume that he began by writing the commentary on the first chapter, and was prevented by death to continue the work of commenting on the remaining chapters. A further notable fact is that the chapter on Buddhology, the religious part, is not only dropped in all the other treatises, but Dharmakīrti most emphatically and clearly expresses his opinion to the effect that the absolute omniscient Buddha is a metaphysical entity, something beyond time, space and experience, and that therefore, our logical knowledge being limited to experience, we can neither think nor speak out anything definite about

19. His paper has been read in a meeting of the Institution for Buddhist Research at Leningrad and will soon appear in the press.

him.[20] We can neither assert nor deny his existence. Since the chapter on Buddhology in his natural run must have been the earliest work of Dharmakīrti, begun at the time when he was studying under Īśvarasena, Mr. A. Vostrikov admits a change in the later development of his ideas, a change, if not in his religious convictions, but in the methods adopted by him. Dharmakīrti then, at his riper age, abandoned the idea of commenting upon the first chapter, entrusted the chapter on perception to Debendrabuddhi and wrote the chapter on inference, as the most difficult one, himself.

(*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. i)

20. Cp. the closing passage of *Santānāntarasiddhi*, and *NB*, III. 97.

GAUḌAPĀDA

V. Bhattacharya

"This is not said by the Buddha."

The following is the last but one *kārikā* of the fourth or last chapter of Gauḍapāda's *Āgamaśāstra*:

kramate na hi buddhasya jñānaṃ dharmeṣu tāyinaḥ/
sarve dharmās tathā jñānaṃ naitad buddhena bhāṣitam//

Literally it says that according to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him (*tāvin*)[1] *jñāna* 'knowledge' does not approach the *dharmas* 'elements' of existence (i.e. it does not relate itself to the objects). But all *dharmas* and *jñāna*—this is not said by the Buddha.

It has been repeatedly shown in the *Āgamaśāstra*[2] (specially in IV. 96) that *jñāna is asaṅga* 'free from attachment, i.e. free from any relation to its objects' as the *dharmas* or objects have no reality. Here the author refers to that fact and concludes showing the supreme truth

1. See the present writer's paper, 'Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrtti' in IHQ., vol. XIII, 1937. The explanation is partly followed by Udayanācārya in his *Tātparyaṭīkā-pariśuddhi* (Bib. Ind.) in explaining *tayin* in Vācaspatimiśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā*, 2 Prajñākaramati (*loc. cit.*) offers also another explanation. This word is widely used in Buddhist [e.g. *Lalitavistara*, ed. Lefmaun, p. 421; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, III. 2; *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (BIB. BUD.) pp. 25, 57, 67, etc.] and Jaina [e.g. Hemacandra's *Yogaśāstra*, (Bib. Ind., vol. I, pp. 1, 47); *Daśavaikālika* (Devacand Lalbhai Jaina Pustakoddhara, No. 49, p. 115)] works and is misunderstood. Sometimes it is read as *trāyin* 'protector', and *tāpin*, as in the present case. As a name for Buddha it is translated into Tibetan by *Skyob-pa* (Mahāvyutpatti, s. 1. 15) which suggests its Sanskrit equivalent *trāyin* 'protector'. See JRAS., 1910, p. 140; JPTS, 1891-1893, p. 53; JA., 1912, p. 243; Proceedings and Transactions of the Second Oriental Conference, Calcutta, 1922, pp. 450-1.
2. See IV. 72. See also IV. 97, 79, 79 (nibsanga); cf. III. 32 (Agraha).

that according to the Buddha there is neither *jñāna* nor *dhārmas* as he has said neither of them : *naitad buddhena bhāṣitam*.

What does the last line mean? Scholars of the orthodox school interpret it in various ways, but without sufficient justification.[3] In this paper an attempt will be made to throw some new light on the line.

In one way it can be said that there are only two things, *jñāna* 'knowledge' and *jñeya* 'knowable' or *dharmas* 'elements of existence', 'objects'.[4] Here we are told that neither of them is said by the Buddha. But how? Has he ever said anything? The Buddhists would give the answer in the negative. According to them the Buddha has never uttered a single word, as the following quotations will show :

Nāgārjuna in his *Madhyamakakārikā*, XX, 25 : *sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ......dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ*. *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* quoted in the *Madhyamakavṛtti* on the above : *yāṃ ca rātriṃ tathāgataḥ......nāpi pravyāhariṣyati*. *Laṅkāvatāra*, ed. B. Nanjio, 1923, pp. 142-3 : *yāṃ ca rātriṃ ......avacanaṃ buddhavacanam*. Nāgārjuna in his *Niraupamyastava*, ed. G. Tucci, JRAS, 1932, pp. 309 ff. 17 : *nodāhṛtaṃ tvayā etc.* Bhagavat quoted in *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 264, and *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, p. 365 (with a slight change) : *anakṣarasya dharmasya etc. Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 137 : *na me yānaṃ mahāyānaṃ na ghoṣo na ca. akṣaraḥ*[5] *Vajracchedikā*, ed. Max Muller, p. 24. *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 144 : *yasyāṃ ca rātryāṃ etc. Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 539 : *avāca 'nakṣarāh* etc.

The passages quoted above show that the Buddha has said nothing. Let us now try to understand what it signifies. This statement is based on two grounds : (i) *pratyātmadharmatā*, i.e. the nature of the highest truth that it is realised in one's own self, and (ii) *paurāṇas-*

3. Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Ananta Krishna Shastri ; *Vedāntarakṣāmaṇi*, 1937, Introduction, p. 6.
4. See our text, IV. 1.
5. Cf. *Āgamaśāstra*, IV. 60.

thitidharmatā, i.e. the nature of the elements of existence that remains from the past. This requires some explanation.

As regards the first it is held that the transcendental reality (*paramārtha*) springs up only as an inward conviction (*pratyātmavedya*), it cannot be attained through an instruction from others (*aparapratyaya=paropadeśagamya*), for it cannot be expressed by any speech or word. So we are told that for the noble the transcendental truth is silence.[6] This is well-known in the Vedānta.[7] Chandrakīrtti writes in his *Mādhyamakavṛtti*, p. 493 : *sarva evāyam......sa nopadiśyate na cāpi jñāyate.* Thus the Buddha did not say anything in fact, yet the people according to their own dispositions think that he did so. We read therefore in a text, *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, quoted in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 539, just after the passage, No. 2, cited above : *atha ca yathādhimuktāḥ.........imaṃ dharmam asmabhyaṃ deśayatīti.* The following may also be cited here from the *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 194 : *na ca mahāmate tathāgata.........mahāmate sarvadharmāṇāṃ śāsanalopaḥ syāt.*

And the conclusion arrived at here is that one should rest on the meaning and not on only letters, for one who rests on letters not only ruins oneself, but also cannot make others understand : *arthapratiśaraṇena*[8] *mahāmate.. ... parārthāṃśca nāvabodhayati. op. cit.*, pp. 194-95.

This second ground is this : The Buddha has said nothing because what he is reported to have said was from the past. Nothing depends on the birth or absence of birth of the Tathāgatas, the true nature of elements of existence remains always the same. This is meant by the statement that the speech of the Buddha is no speech.

6. *Mahdyamakavṛtti*, p. 56.
7. *Taittarīya Upaniṣad*, II. 4. 1. See also *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II. 3 ; *Brahmasūtras* with Śaṅkara, III. 2-17 ; *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 19ff.
8. In such cases other texts read °*pratisaraṇa* for °*pratiśaraṇa*.

Taking both the grounds together the *Laṅkāvatāra* says (pp. 143-4 : *yaduktaṃ bhagavatā.........tathāgato'bhisambuddho nodāhariṣyati.*

The following may also be quoted here from the *Vajracchedikā*, p. 24, just after the passage, No. 9, cited above : *tat kasya hetoḥ..... hyārya-pudgalāḥ.*

This is the significance of the passage under discussion and it is reasonable that the author who begins the chapter (IV) with *jñāna* and *dharmas*[9] should state in conclusion the transcendental truth about them.

(IHQ, xiv, 1938)

9. *jñānenākāśakakalpena dharmān yo gaganopamān.*

THE MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANIṢAD AND THE KĀRIKĀS OF GAUḌAPĀDA

A. N. Ray

The question of the relation of the *Gauḍapāda Kārikās* to the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* has been engaging the attention of the present writer ever since Mm. Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya raised a discussion over it.[1]

The *Māṇḍūkya* is traditionally regarded as one of the ten major *upaniṣads* and the *kārikās* of Gauḍapāda are supposed to be explanatory verses thereon. The *Muktikopaniṣad* names 108 *upaniṣads* and holds that the *Māṇḍūkya* alone is enough to liberate a man.

There is a good deal of controvery over the extent of the *Māṇḍūkya*, which is set forth in Professor Bhattacharya's paper referred to above. While present-day Advaitins are unanimous that the twelve prose passages found interspersed in Gauḍapāda's work constitute the *upaniṣad*, most Vaiṣṇava commentators of it since the days of Mādhvācārya have, on the other hand, held the *kārikās* of the first book also to have been a part of the *upaniṣad*. Puruṣottama, the grandson of the *śuddhādvaitn*, Vallabhācārya, going further and holding the entire work of Gauḍapāda as a part of it. It has also been pointed out by Bhattacharya that all the four books of the *kārikās* have been severally held by others as distinct *upaniṣads*, while some latter-day *advaitins* have accepted the Vaiṣṇava view. Mr. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma has pointed out[2] that *kārikā* I. 17 is

1. 'The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and the *Kārikās* of Gauḍapāda'. IHQ., I, pp. 119-25, and 295-302.
2. 'Some light on the *Gauḍapāda Kārikās*,' 'Further light on *Gauḍapāda Kārikās*', and 'Still further light on *Gauḍapāda Kārikās*, in the *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, II, pp. 35 ff.; III, pp. 45 ff. and IV, pp. 174 ff.

referred to in *Sūta-sambita*, IV. 55, as *Śrūti*, and he has further attempted without success to prove that both Śaṅkara and Sureśvara knew the *kārikās* of BK. I to have been a part of the *upaniṣad*. All that he has succeeded in proving is that a few of these *kārikās* have been mentioned as *Śruti* in Śaṅkarācārya Apocrypha like the 'Viṣṇusahasranāma' commentary, the 'Nṛsiṃhapūrvatapanīya' commentary, and the 'Vivekacūḍāmaṇi.' Bhattacharya has pointed out that Śaṅkara, in his commentary on B.S., II. 1. 9, distinctly refers to *kārika* I. 16 in the following terms :—*atroktaṃ vedāntārthasampradāyavidbhirācāryaiḥ*. It is aiso found that in his *Brahmasiddhi*, Śaṅkara's senior contemporary, Maṇḍanamiśra, quotes *kārikā*, I. 11, but does not mention it as *śruti*.[3] Nor does Sureśvara refer to *kārikās* BK. I as such. He refers to them as *āgamamātram* or *vedāntokti*, but that is because the entire work of Gauḍapāda is described as the 'Āgamaśāstra' and the first book is particularly named the *'āgamaprakaraṇa.'*

So there can be no doubt that Śaṇkara and his contemporary *advaitins* did not look upon the *kārikās* of BK. I as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. If the prose passages and the *kārikās* had been works of the same author, there is no reason why the prose passages should use the terms *'vaiśvanara'* and *'turīya'* : while the *kārikās* vary them as *'viśva'* and *'turya'* ; nor should we expect in such a case a difference of opinion as between p.ose passage 9 and *kārikā* 19, BK. I. Madhva, however, anticipated these difficulties when he said that Varuṇa, in the shape of frog, saw the passages, while he introduced explanatory *mantras* in the shape of the verses which had been seen by Brahmā, the creator, a view which he supports by quotations from certain Purāṇas which, according to Bhattacharya, cannot be traced in the printed editions thereof. This practically amounts to an admissian that the prose and the verse portions of BK. I are not works of the same author.

3. *Brahmasidhi*, ed. by Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, p. 150.

Prof. Bhattacharya thinks that the twelve prose passages are a later work than the *kārikās* of Gauḍapāda, and that probably it is a post-Śaṅkara work, since Śaṅkara is not found referring to them, even where one would expect him to do so, in this recognized commentaries. He is also of opinion[4] that the author of the commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya* and *kārikās* is not really Śaṅkara, but somebody else assuming that great man's name,—a view which it should be possible to accept in spite of tradition and the opinion of such a distinguished scholar as Mm. Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri to the contrary.

One may also readily accept Bhattacharya's view that the *kārikās* are by no means what they are supposed to be, namely, a sort of *vārtika* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, since they have no characteristic of a *vārtika* which consists in discussing what is said, what is not said what is badly said (*uktānukta-durukta cintā vārtikam*—Rājaśekhara). The reasons set forth by Prof. Bhattacharya need not be repeated here.

But one cannot help joining issue with this erudite scholar when he insists that the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, that is, the twelve prose passages, is a post-Śaṅkara or even a post-Gauḍapāda work. First, the tradition that the *Māṇḍūkya* is one of the ten major *upaniṣads* cannot be discarded without adequate reason. Secondly, Y. Subrahmaniya Sarma has pointed out[5] that Sureśvara actually quotes from this *upaniṣad* and names it :

eṣo'ntaryāmyeṣa yoniḥ sarvasya prabhavāpyayau/
māṇḍūkeya—śruti-vaca iti spaṣṭam adhīyate//

Thirdly, Maṇḍanamiśra, who like Sureśvara, was a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, quotes the *Nṛsiṃhottaratapanīya* passage *ekam amṛtam ajam*, and the *Māṇḍūkya* words—*sarvajñaḥ, sarveśvaraḥ*.[6] Fourthly, Śaṅkara's commentary

4. Sir Ashutosh Silver Jubilee, vol. III, pt. 2, pp. 101-110.
5. *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, IV, p. 220.
6. *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 4, 127.

on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, IV. 2. 3 and 4., leaves hardly any doubt in one's mind that he is referring therein to the *Māṇḍūkya*, though not expressly naming it. I refrain from quoting the relevant commentary *in extenso*, and hope that my readers will take the trouble of reading the commentary at first hand. Swami Madhavananda, in the excellent translation of Śañkara's commentary on this *Up.*, appears to have come across references to the *Māṇḍūkya* in the *bhāṣya* for he names this *Up.*, in the list of abbreviations, prefixed to his work, but I have unfortunately failed to trace the references. Then, again, in view of Sureśvara's quotation of the *Māṇḍūkya* passage containing the expression, *prabhavāpyayau*, it seems likely that Śaṅkara, too, had this passage in mind when he used the expression in his B.S., I, 1. 9, commentary and not *Kaṭha*, II. 3. II, as Bhattacharya contends, for the expression appears to have a somewhat different import in the latter context. Lastly, Bhattacharya has himself shown that the terms 'Vaiśvanara' and 'Turīya' are older than 'Viśva and 'Turya' found in the *kārikās* and also that that the prose passages have a tinge of the language of the *Brāhmaṇas*. For all these reasons it would be legitimate to hold that the *Māṇḍūkya* is a pre-Śaṅkara and pre-Gauḍāpada work and that it would be wrong to reject the tradition that it is one of the ten major *upaniṣads*. Even Nāgārjuna might have borrowed the word '*prapañcopaśama*' from it.

We shall now proceed to discuss the real problem before us, viz., what is the relation of the *kārikās* to the Upaniṣad. In agreement with Bhattacharya, I have already said that the *kārikās* of Gauḍapāda are not a *vārtika* on the *Māṇḍūkya*. What then, is the relation between the two? To come to a finding on this point, it is necessary to examine first what it is that the *kārikās* aim at. Are they pure Vedānta as the orthodox commentators would have us believe? Most probably not. It stands to the credit of Poussin[7] and Bhattacharya[8] that they have been the first to tell us

7. 'Vedānta and Buddhism', J.R.A.S., 1910, pp. 129-40.
8. 'The *Gauḍapāda Kārikās* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*', Proceedings

what the *kārikās* really aim at. The *kārikās* of the first BK. establish non-dualism of the Māṇḍūkya type, the second and the third BKs. have to use Poussin's words, a *double entendre* or, in the language of Prof. Bhattacharya : they begin with the Vedānta and end with Buddhism, while the *kārikās* of the fourth BK. confine themselves to the exposition of Mahāyāna Buddhism, mainly of the Vijñānavāda but partly also of the Mādhyamika variety. Bhattacharya points out how, in this book, the terminology used is entirely Buddhistic, such upanisadic terms as '*ātman*' and '*brahman*' being discarded, how the word '*agrayāna*' (which means 'Mahāyāna') is used and how the author begins by saluting the Buddha and ends by telling us what the Buddha did not teach.[9] Any one having a moderate acquaintance with Yogācāra and Mādhyamika literature, who goes through the *kārikās* dispassionately, will have little doubt left in his mind that the sole object of Gauḍapāda in writing this *prakaraṇa* work was to show, first, what Vedāntic non-dualism really stood for and, next, to make out that Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Buddhism could be reconciled to it and placed on an upanisadic basis.

The question which now confronts us, and which should not be difficult to answer, is how the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* came to have a place at the head of the *kārikās*. Even in the case of an *upaniṣad*, we know that the *Nṛsimha-pūrvatapanīya* quotes almost the whole of the *Māṇḍūkya*. Now, Gauḍapāda, in order to show that his views had the support of the *Śruti* could do better than to begin his *prakaraṇa* work of four Books with the quotation of the *Māṇḍūkya* passages. After quoting six prose passages, Gauḍapāda introduces some of his verses with the words,

of the Second Oriental Conference, pp. 439 ff.

9. According to Poussin and Bhattacharya *Kārikā* 99, BK., IV, tells us what the Buddha did not teach. I am inclined to think however, that the *Kārikā* tells us what the Buddha taught ; it repeats what has been said in the introductory *Kārikā* I, viz., that '*jñeya*' is not different from '*jñāna*'. This, however, does not affect the conclusions arrived at in this paper.

Atraite ślokā bhavanti and the process continues till the entire Upaniṣad is exhausted. The introductory words do not mean, in this case at least, that the verses are older than the prose passages. Gauḍapāda evidently preferred the *Māṇḍūkya* to any other Upaniṣad because this very brief and unambiguous work was best calculated to support his own point of view, and he has distributed the prose passages just as they suited his purpose.

The commentator of the *Upaniṣad* and the *Kārīkās*, whoever he might be, was, therefore, perfectly right when he said that this '*prakaraṇa*' work of four Books began with the words "*Om ity etad akṣaram.*" But this does not certainly mean that the entire work is Gauḍapāda's in the sense that there is no such thing as a *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, as Dr. Venkatasubbiah contends.[10] The entire work is Gauḍapāda's, but he has quoted the entire *Māṇḍūkya* in support of his thesis. This seems to be the right solution of the problem before us.

(IHQ, xiv, 1938)

10. See his paper in the Indian Antiquary, 1933, pp. 181-193.

ON MĀYĀVĀDA

H. Jacobi

In my last article[1] I have discussed the attitude taken up by the orthodox philosophers in India towards the epistemology of the Buddhists. In connection with this discussion I shall now treat the question about the nature of early Vedānta, and, as I hope, bring it nearer to a conclusion.

The arguments of the Buddhists of both the Nihilistic and Idealistic schools regarding the unreality of the objects of perception may thus be summarised. Our perceptions in dreams do not, in principle, differ from those in the waking state, and consequently the latter must be just as void and as independent of something existing beside them (their object) as the dream-impressions; further examples of impressions void of really existing objects are magic, *fata morgana*, and mirage. This view of the Illusionists is confuted much in the same way in the *Nyāya* and *Brahma-sūtras*; here we are concerned with the latter only. The discussion of Bādarāyaṇa (B. S. II. 2. 28-32) as illustrated by the passage from the ancient Vṛttikāra, quoted by Śabarasvāmin in the Bhāṣya on M. S. i. 1. 5 (see above, 31. 23), leaves no doubt on the point at issue, viz. that, according to these ancient Vedānta authors, there is a generic difference between dream-impressions and waking impressions, and that therefore the latter are not independent of really existing objects.

The oldest work on Vedānta Philosophy besides Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtras*, are the Kārikās[2] on the *Māṇḍūkyo-*

1. *The Dates of the Philosophical Sutras of the Brahmins*; see JAOS. 31. 1 ff.
2. Ānandāśrama Series. No. 10. An English translation of the text and Commentary has been issued in Ind a; but the book has not been accessible to me.

paniṣad by Gauḍapāda.[3] The chronological relation between Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍapāda will be discussed hereafter; for the present we have to deal with his philosophical opinions. Gauḍapāda is, as far as we know, the first author who formulated the Māyāvāda or the doctrine that everything except Brahma is an illusion; this doctrine was either originated by him, or by a school of thinkers of whom he became the head; the latter alternative would seem the more probable one.

Now Gauḍapāda has used the very same arguments as the Buddhists to prove the unreality (*vaitathyam=asatyatvam*) of the external objects of our perceptions; he states this arguments in II 4 which is thus explained by his commentator, Śaṃkara[4]: "Things seen in the waking state are not true: this is the proposition (*pratijña*): because they are seen: this is the reason (*hetu*): just like things seen in a dream: this is the instance (*dṛṣṭānta*); as things seen in dream are not true, so the property of being seen belongs in like manner (to things seen) in the waking state: this is the application of the reason (*hetūpanaya*); therefore things seen in the waking state are also untrue: this is the conclusion (*nigamana*). Things seen in a dream differ from those seen in waking in that the former are reduced in size because they are within (the body of the dreamer). But there is no difference in so far as both are 'seen' and are 'untrue'."—And in II. 31 all unreal things are mentioned together: "As dreams or

3. I fully concur with Mr. Barnet in his review of Max Wallesser, *Zur Geschichte und Kritik des alteren Vedānta* (Heidelberg 1910) in JRAS 1910 that Gauḍapāda is the name of the author and that it has not wrongly been abstracted from the title Gauḍapādīya *Kārikāḥ*. Whether the author be the same as or different from the Gauḍapāda, the oldest commentator on the *Sāṃkhya Kārikās*, in both cases there can be no doubt that Gauḍapāda was an actual name.

4. I am inclined to think that this Śaṃkara is not the same as the author of the *Śārīraka Bhāṣya*. The latter would hardly have stated the argument in the form and the terms of an *anumāna* according to Nyāya principles.

magic or *fata morgana* are regarded (as unreal by ordinary men), so this whole world is regarded by those versed in the Vedāntas".

The argument thus expounded by Gauḍapāda forms the basis of his doctrine of Māyāvāda, and it is, as we know, the same argument which the Buddhists employed to establish the Śūnyavāda. As that argument is strenuously confuted by Bādarāyaṇa, it is evident that he cannot have held the same opinion in this matter as Gauḍapāda, or, in other words, the *Brahma-sūtras* do not teach the Māyāvada. This is one point which I wish to make.

The next question we must try to solve is whether Gauḍapāda is acquainted with the Śūnyavada or the Vijñānavāda. The answer is furnished by *kārikās* IV. 24 ff. For in *kārikā* 24 a Realist contends that ideas (*prajñapti*) and feelings would not arise if not caused by external things. The opponent, in *kārikās* 25-27, shows the unreasonableness of assuming objects existing beside and independent of ideas (*prajñapti, citta*). This refutation is, as the commentator tells us, "the argument of the Buddhists of the Vijñānavādin school, who combat the opinion of the realists (bāhyārthavadin), and the Ācārya agrees with him thus far". That the statement of the commentator is right, is evident from the nature of the argument itself, and becomes still more so from the next verse (28), which furnishes the final decision of the Vedāntin : "Therefore the idea (*citta*) does not originate, nor does the objects of the idea originate : those who pretend to recognise the originating of ideas, may as well recognise the trace (of birds) in the air". For here the fundamental doctrine of the Vijñānavādins, which admits only a continuous flow of momentary ideas, is clearly referred to and confuted. Since the *Brahma-sūtras* and the ancient Vṛtti refer to the Śūnyavāda only, as I hope to have established in my former article, the Gauḍapādīya *Kārikās* which allude to the latest phase of Buddhist philosophy must be considerably younger than the *Brahma-sūtras*. This has always been the opinion of the Pandits. It has, however, lately been controverted by Dr.

Walleser[5] on the ground that the Gauḍapādīya *Kārikās* only are quoted in ancient Buddhist books as an authority on Vedānta philosophy. Even in case this assertion should be confirmed by the progress of research, the alleged fact would not necessarily upset the above result. For the enigmatical character of the *sūtras* of Bādarāyṇa make them unfit for quotations, at least of an outsider, to illustrate a point of Vedānta philosophy. And besides the Buddhists may have ignored the old Vedānta of Bādarāyaṇa as the Jainas did so as late as the ninth century A. D.[6]; but they could not well have ignored the Gauḍapādī, since that work taught a philosophy which resembled their own in many regards.

Our inquiry has established (1) the near relation, amounting almost to identity, between the epistemology of the Śūnyavādins or Vijñānavādins on one side and of Gauḍapāda's Māyāvāda on the other; (2) the opposition of the latter to Bādarāyaṇa on this head; and (3) the posteriority of Gauḍapāda to Bādarāyaṇa. Now these facts admit, in my opinion, of a natural and probable construction, viz. that Gauḍapāda adapted the Illusionism of the Buddhists to the teachings of the Upaniṣads. This view is supported by the many coincidences between the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās and the Mādhyamika sūtras to which Professor L. de la Vallee Poussin has lately drawn attention.[7] The theory, that the Māyāvāda is a Vedāntic adaptation of the Śūnyavāda, has been first put forward by V. A. Sukhtankar[8]; I may add that I perfectly agree with him.

The probable history of the Māyāvada may be briefly described: originally the doctrine of some school of Aupaniṣadas, it became an orthodox philosophy, when it had successfully been made the basis of interpretation of the *Brhma-sūtras*, already by earlier writers and finally by the

5. l. c. p. 23.
6. Haribhadra, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* v. 3; Siddharṣi, *Upamitibhāvaprapañca Kathā* p. 661 ff.; see above vol. 31. p. 6 note 3.
7. JRAS 1910 p. 128 ff.
8. WZKM vol. 22, p. 136 ff. see also above vol. 31, p. 8, note 1.

great Śaṃkara. For the two Mīmāṃsās are the preeminently orthodox systems ; but we should never lose sight of the fact that they are originally and primarily systems of the Exegesis of the Revelation, the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā of the Revelation as far as it is concerned with sacrifice (*karmakāṇḍa*), and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā with regard to Brahma. These two schools of orthodox theologians developed philosophical doctrines of their own, but these are found in the *Bhāṣyas* and are scarcely alluded to in the *sūtras* themselves.

(JAOS, xxxiii, 1913)

VEDĀNTA AND BUDDHISM

L. de la Vallée Poussin

There is much to support the opinion of Rāmānuja, Dr. Thibaut, and many others, that Śaṃkara's doctrine of "Illusion" is a biassed rendering of the old Vedānta, Bādarāyaṇik as well as Aupaniṣadic. If that be granted, it is by no means self-evident that Buddhism has been without influence on Śaṃkara's speculation; and the last writer on the subject, Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar, a very able pupil of Professor Jacobi, does not conceal his opinion, or his surmise, that Śaṃkara is indebted to Nāgārjuna.[1] That may be true, but I would object that we really know little or nothing about the history of Vedānta, and that conclusions based on philosophical parallels are by no means definitive. Autonomous developments—autonomous if not absolutely independent—are admissible. Nāgārjuna (or his predecessors, the anonymous authors of the oldest Mahāyānasūtras), by the very fact that he proclaims "voidness" to be the real nature of things, was prepared to distinguish the relative truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) and the absolute one (*pāramārthika*); and his nihilism coupled with "idealism" might lead to the Vijñānavāda: "existence of pure non-intelligent (?) intellect." On the other hand the Aupaniṣadas, from their main thesis (*tat tvam asi*, etc.),[2]

1. *The Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja* (Inaugural Dissertation, Bonn, August 12, 1903; Wien, Druck von Adolf Holzhausen, 1908).
2. I think that no unprejudiced reader will admit Rāmānuja's interpretation of the old pantheist or monist saying of the Upaniṣads. Against Vasudev Anoant Sukhtankar (p. 13), I adhere to the opinion of Dr. Thibaut: "The fundamental doctrines of Śaṃkara's system are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upaniṣads than those of other Vedāntic systems" (S. B. E., xiv, p. cxxiv). The "essential teaching" of

could derive the distinction of the two *brahmans*, of the two *vidyās*. Both developments are natural enough ; the conception of the universal void (o) and the intuition of the infinite (L) are convergent, in the end ; but parallel and convergent as they are these developments do not lose their primitive tinge. The *qualis ab incepto* is true of every evolution, political (as M. de Kerallain has proved)[3] or doctrinal ; the *saṃvṛtisatya*, "erroneous truth," of Nāgārjuna is really "untruth" ; the *vaiyavahārika-satya*, "practical truth," of Śaṃkara is truth, provisory indeed, but truth *quand meme. Māyā* is. Śaṃkara's "magic play" is caused by a magician, and this magician is a Lord. Nāgārjuna's *saṃvṛti*, the Buddhist counterpart of the Vedāntic *māyā*, is like the son of a barren woman : it is not, it cannot be. But the two systems bear *un air de famille*, which has been taken into account more than once and from both sides.

This problem is of paramount importance in the history of Indian thought. It would not be imprudent to say that as long as we have not ascertained the chronological relations between primitive Buddhism and the Aupaniṣadic-Sāṃkhya theories, between the system of Nāgārjuna and that of Śaṃkara, between Dignāga and "orthodox Nyāya"[4], we cannot boast of even having traced the cardinal lines of the spiritual and intellectual history of India.

It is not my present object to discuss the claims of Śaṃkara or Rāmānuja to Aupaniṣadic orthodoxy, or to unravel the problem of the relations of Buddhism to Śaṃkara's monism, to specify the possible or probable

the Upaniṣads is not their spiritual undogmatic or polydogmatic enthusiasm (the chief part from the point of view of the history of religion), but their ontological surmises.

3. M. de K. is the French translator of Sumner Maine, Sir Frederick Pollock, and Sir Alfred Lyall. One will find in the *Etudes sur les moeurs religieuses at sociales de l'Extreme Orient* (Paris, Fontemoing, 1908) a splendid translation of the Asiatic Studies of Sir Alfred, with many notes, illustrations, and appendices of no small interest.

4. It is a pity that M. Th. de Stcherbatskoi is writing in Russian.

loans on both sides. I only intend to give a few references, some of which are already well known.

I

The common opinion of the Dvaitavādins or "dualists" (Sāṃkhyas, Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins) is that the Māyā-doctrine is not Vaidic, i.e. Aupaniṣadic: *māyāvādam avaidikam*, says Śiva: na......tad Vedāntamatam, argues Vijñānabhikṣu. This doctrine is "Buddhism in disguise", a doctrine of "crypto-Bauddhas" (as says Dr. Thibaut)—

māyāvādam asac chāstraṃ pracchannaṃ bauddham eva ca. The theologians who maintain the "Neo-illusionism" (*ādhunika māyāvāda*) and style themselves Vedāntin (*Vedāntibruva*) are, in fact, Buddhists; more precisely, they belong to that branch of the Buddhist school which is named Vijñānavādins, "who maintain the sole existence of thought" (*bauddhaprabhedāḥ, Vijñānavādyekadeśitayā*). They assimilate the "data" of experience, merit, and demerit, etc., to the "data" of a dream, and, using the (Buddhist) phrase *sāmvṛtika* (erroneous) as the exact connotation of the "Particular", they admit that the world, the whole of the "knowable" (*prapañca*) is produced by Ignorance. Therefore they ought to be styled Nāstikas (miscreants, or Buddhists). Thus Vijñānabhikṣu.[5]

Yamunācārya, too, the *guru* of the *guru* of Rāmānuja, clearly refers to Dharmakīrti in his *Siddhitrayam*,[6] when he compares a thesis of the "avowed Buddhists" (*prakaṭāḥ*

5. See *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, edited and translated by Professor Richard Garbe, index sub voc. *bauddha, pracchanna-bauddha, vijñānavāda*. With 1, 22 (p. 16, 6-7) compare the readings of *Padmapurāṇa* (xliii) apud Aufrecht, *cat. oxoniensis*, p. 14: "māyāvādam asac chāstrampracchannaṃ bauddham ucyate, māyaiva kathitaṃ devi kalau brāhmaṇarupiṇā...parātmajīvayor aikyaṃ mamātra pratipādyate, brahmaṇo 'sya paraṃ rūpaṃ nirguṇaṃ vakṣyate mayā, sarvasya jagato 'py atra mohanāya kalau yuge.

6. Chowkhamba S. S. (No. 36), p. 19. For this reference I am indebted to Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar, p. 19, who also refers to Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya*. ii. 2. 27.

saugatāḥ), with the formula of the "Buddhists in disguise".

The first say—

"Although the pure intelligence is free from differences, it is understood, by people whose view is troubled, as multiple: object of knowledge, subject of knowledge, knowledge"[7]

The second say—

"The pure reality is not the cause of the development [of names and forms, of the intellectual contingencies], because it ceases not to be (what it is, pure]: therefore it is Illusion who is the mother of this distinction, knower, knowable."

It is only just to say that Rāmānuja could hardly avoid the reproach of dualism, and may be styled "Sāṃkhya in disguise".

II

Whilst Brahmin nihilists (*māyāvādins*) are charged with the crime of Buddhism, Buddhist monists (*vijñānavādins*) have to apologize for their "Brahmic" speculations.[8]

As has been said in this Journal (1908, p. 889), Buddhists are aware of the close relation between Vedāntism and some of their systems. The Vijñānavāda, at least in some of its ontological principles, is very like Vedāntism in disguise, or, to be more exact, it is likely to be understood in a Vedāntic sense: as Mahāmati said to Buddha in so many words. We cannot forget that Vijñānavādins are

7. This line occurs in *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, p. 16 (Bibl. Indica, 1858), and elsewhere; it is extracted from the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti (see Museon, 1902, and *Bouddhisme d'apree les sources brahamaniques*, p. 34: add reference to Śuklavidarsanā). It runs as follows: *avibhāgo'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaiḥ, grāhyagrāhakasamvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate* (or *kalpyate*). Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar understands *buddhyā ātmā*: the Buddhist attributes the false distinction...to *buddhi*, as the Pseudo-Buddhist attributes the same distinction to *māyā*. I prefer my translation.

8. Śākyamuni has condemned Vijñānavāda-Vedānta, Majjhima, i, p. 329: viññāṇam anidassanaṃ anantaṃ. sabbatopabhaṃ.

divided into several schools, which are not without analogy with the schools of Vedānta. Some of them believe that the prime spirit or thought remains pure, untouched by the development of contingencies [*prapañca*, i.e. *manas*, *mano-vijñāna* (=*nāma*, *nāma-rūpa*)]: does not this resemble *vivartavāda*? Others will admit that the development is real: does not this resemble *viśiṣṭādvaita*?

I will not miss this opportunity of avowing that I have been perhaps unfair in my review of my friend Suzuki's book, *Outlines of Mahāyāna* (see Journal, 1908, p. 885). The claim of the Buddhists to be *śūnyatāvādins*, "doctors the voidness," not *brahmavādins*, cannot be set aside; philosophers must be credited with the opinions they profess to cherish. And I have strong objections, as a historian, to the Buddhist modernism of the Japanese scholars, of P. L. Narasu, etc. But there may be some slight portion of truth in Modernisms (they may develop old, unconscious ideas: much that is believed to be modern is old),[9] and as a matter of fact, *śūnyata* turns out to be very like *brahma*, and *nirvāṇa*, "translated" as it is by *bodhi* or *buddhabhūya*, has the same religious import as *brahmabhūya*.

III

One cannot read the Gauḍapādakārikās without being struck by the Buddhist character of the leading ideas and of the wording itself. The author seems to have used Buddhist works or sayings, and to have adjusted them to his Vedāntic design; nay more, he finds pleasure in double entendre. As Gauḍapāda is the spiritual grand-father of Śaṃkara, this fact is not insignificant.[10]

The fourth chapter bears a distinctly Buddhist tinge. It has been happily summarized by Professor A. A. Macdonell: "It is entitled Alātaśānti, or 'Extinction of the

9. I have just read a good book, written from the "intellectualist" point of view, but very "matter of fact", *Pragmatisme, Modernisme, Protestantisme* (Paris, Bloud, 1909; by A Leclere, Dr. es-Lettres, Prof. agrege a l'Universite de Berne.
10. The following notes are by no means exhaustive.

firebrand (circle)' so called from an ingenuous comparison made to explain how plurality and genesis seem to exist in the world. If a stick which is glowing at one end is waved about, fiery lines or circles are produced without anything being added to or issuing from the single burning point. The fiery line or circle exists only in the consciousness (*vijñāna*). So, too, the many phenomena of the world are merely the vibrations of the consciousness, which is one."[11] One could add that, really, knowledge (*jñāna*) or *brahman* is free from the three-fold determination; knower, knowable, and knowledge. If we are not to rest on syllables—*appamattakaṃ kho pan 'etaṃ yad idaṃ byañjanaṃ! mā āyasmanto appamattakehi vivādaṃ āpajjitha*[12]— this transcendent knowledge is like the absolute blank of the Vijñānavādins.

The simile of the firebrand circle occurs in *Maitry-upaniṣad*, iv, 24: "He beholds Brahman flashing like the circle of a whirling torch, in colour like the sun..." ;[13] but it can also be traced in Buddhist books as one of the numerous symbols of unreality,[14] namely, in the *Laṅkāvatāra*[15]—

tadyathā Mahāmate acakram alātacakraṃ bālaiś cakrabhāvena parikalpyate na paṇḍitair, evam eva Mahāmate kudṛṣṭitīrthyāśayapatitā ekatvānyatvobhayatvānubhayatvaṃ

11. Sanskrit Literature, p. 242.
12. Majjhima, ii, p. 240. "Syllables are of little importance: do not, O monks, dispute on mere trifles."
13. Cowell's translation. Alātacakram iva sphurantam ādityavarṇam... brahma...apaśyat. (Comm.: tasya brahmaṇa ātmābhedatvakhyāpanāya puṃliṅgair viśeṣaṇair viśinaṣṭi.) *Id est*, the unreal qualifications of *brahman*, "flashing like a firebrand circle," are in the masculine "to show the identity between the neuter *brahman* and the masculine soul", says Rāmatīrtha (and also to spare the undenotability and the unconcern of the Absolute). As a matter of fact, Brahman does not flash into unreal solar protube ances, but it appears. it appears to itself, to be flashing. Cf. vi, 17: *Brahma......eko 'nantak.*
14. Mahāvyutpatti, 139, 21.
15. Buddhist Text Society, p. 95.

parikalpayiṣyanti sarvabhāvotpattau :

"The firebrand circle is not a circle, and is wrongly supposed by the ignorant, not by the wise, to be circle. In the same way, heretics will suppose that being originate from themselves, from others, from both, without both."[16]

Nevertheless, the title of the fourth chapter of the Kārikās cannot be said so far to be Buddhist (the phrase *alātaśānti* has not been traced in Buddhist books) ; but the main idea that there is no birth, production, *jāti*, *utpāda*, the causation is impossible since the cause cannot be identical with, nor different from, the effect since neither being, nor nonbeing, nor being, nonbeing can originate, is thoroughly Madhyamaka. Gauḍapāda maintains *ajāti* (once *anutpatti*), and denies *uccheda*, with the same emphasis as Bhagavat in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā* or the *Laṅkāvatāra* ; and he supports his thesis by Nāgārjuna's or Buddhapālita's favourite arguments :—

II, 32. na nirodho na cotpattir na ca sādhakaḥ/
na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā paramārthatā//

16. The simile of the firebrand is also of use in the Sautrantika school, to explain the *quomodo* of the "compound perceptions." See Wassilieff, *Buddhisms*, p. 28 (312): "The forms of the object penetrate one after the other into the understanding ; the illusion of simultaneity is caused by the swiftness of this proceeding. Just so an arrow passes through the eight leaves of a flower, as it were. at the same time, and firebrand appears as a circle." From another point of view it is evident that any compound perception (i. e. every perception) is "born from imagination", or subjective : "The notion of a cloth or a straw mat is gradually produced : therefore this notion has for real object the parts of the cloth or straw mat, and as such, as cloth or mat notion, it results from imagination. As in the case of a firebrand. The notion of a firebrand circle has for real object a firebrand which obtains successively different places owing to a rapid motion. Just so. Argument : cloth is not real, because the grasping of it depends on the grasping of its parts, as is case with the firebrand circle"—(*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, MS. Soc. As., fol. 367a).

There is no destruction, no birth, no bound, no endeavouring [for release], no desiring release, no released: such is the real truth."[17]

Or again—

IV, 59. yathā māyāmayād bījāj jāyate tanmayo 'ṅkuraḥ/
nāsau nityo na cocchedī tadvad dharmeṣu yojanā//

"From a magical seed is born a magical sprout: this sprout is neither permanent nor perishing. Such are things, and for the same reason."

It is the *śūnyebhya eva śūnyā dharmāḥ prabhavanti dharmebhyaḥ*, "from void things, void things are born" each according to its causes, for "illusion is manifold, being produced by manifold causes".[18]

As concerns the wording, let us compare—

I. Gauḍapāda, ii, 38[19]—

tattvam ādhyātmikaṃ dṛṣṭvā tattvaṃ dṛṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ/
tattvībhūto tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet.//

COMM. bāhyaṃ pṛthivyādi tattvaṃ ādhyātmikaṃ ca dehādilakṣaṇaṃ rajjusarpādivat svapnamāyādivad asat; Ātma ca sabāhyāntaro hy ajo...nirguṇo niṣkalo niṣkriyas tat satyaṃ sa ātmā......evam tattvaṃ dṛṣṭvā......

Bhagavat (quoted *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 348)[20]—

śūnyam ādhyātmikaṃ paśya paśya śūnyaṃ bahirgataṃ na vidyate so'pi kaś cid yo bhāvayati śūnyatāṃ.

2. Gauḍapāda, iv, 1—

jñānenākāśakalpena dharmān yo gaganopamān/
jñeyābhinnena sambuddhas taṃ vande dvipadāṃ varam//

COMM. ayam eveśvaro yo Nārāyaṇākhyas taṃ vande... dvipadāṃ varaṃ dvipadopalakṣitānāṃ puruṣāṇāṃ varaṃ pradhānaṃ puruṣottamam ity abhiprāyaḥ...jñānajñeyajñātṛbhedarahitaṃ paramārthatattvadarśanam...

It is probable that this *śloka* is a Buddhist one: the

17. Quoted more than once by Vijñānabhikṣu: see Garbe's index Madhyamaka, xvi, 5: *na badhyante na mucyante.*

18. Sāpi nānāvidha māyā nānāpratyayasambhavā, *Bophicaryāvatāra* ix, 12.

19. Anandasrama edition.

20. Bibliotheca Buddhica.

excellent biped is Śākyamuni.

3. Gauḍapāda, iv, 7—

prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathaṃ cid bhaviṣyati.

Nāgārjuna, Madhyamaka, xv, 8 (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 271)—

prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate.

4. Gauḍapāda, iv, 17, 18—

aprasiddhaḥ kathaṃ hetuḥ phalam utpādayiṣyati?
yadi hetoḥ phalāt siddhiḥ phalasiddhiś ca hetutaḥ
katarat pūrvaniṣpannam yasya siddhir apekṣayā?

Nāgārjuna, Madhymaka, x, 8 (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 207)—

yadīndhanam apekṣyāgnir apekṣyāgniṃ yadīndhanam
katarat pūrvanṣpannaṃ yad apekṣyāgnir indhanam?

5. Gauḍapāda, iv, 19—

evaṃ hi sarvathā buddhair ajātiḥ paridīpitā.

COMM. evaṃ hetuphalayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvanupapatter ajātiḥ sarvasyānutpattiḥ paridīpitā prakāśitānyonyāpekṣadoṣaṃ bruvadbhir vādibhir buddhaih paṇḍitair ity arthaḥ.

Laṅkavatāra (p. 78)[21]—

anutpannāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ.

Satyadvayāvatārasūtra (quoted *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 375)—

evam eva devaputra...saṃsāro' py paramārthato 'tyantānutpādatā yāvan nirvāṇam api paramārthato 'tyantānutpādatā.

6. Gauḍapāda, iv, 22—

svato vā parato vāpi na kiṃ cid vastu jāyate/
sad asat sadasad vāpi na kiṃ cid vastu jāyate//

Nāgārjuna, Madhyamaka, i, I (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 12; cf. i, 6-7, p. 82)—

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ/
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana//

7. Gauḍapāda, iv, 93—

ādiśānta hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ
sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajaṃ sāmyaṃ viśāradam.

COMM. ādiśāntā nityam eva śāntā......ajaś ca prakṛtyaiva suṣṭhūparatasvabhāvaḥ......sarve dharmāḥ samāś cābhinnāś ca...... ajaṃ sāmyaṃ viśāradaṃ viśuddham ātmatattvaṃ

21. Buddhist Text Society.

yasmāt tasmāc chāntir mokṣo vā nāsti kartavya ity arthaḥ.

Mādhyamikas, too, maintain that *nirvāṇa* or *śānti* or *mokṣa* is not to be acquired, as says Bodhisattva Sarvanivāraṇaviṣkambhin in

Ratnameghasūtra (quoted *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 225)—

ādiśāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva ca nirvṛtāḥ/
dharmās te vivṛtā nātha dharmacakrapravartane//

8. Gauḍapāda, iv, 98—

alabdhāvaraṇāḥ sarve dharmāḥ prakṛtinirmalāḥ
ādau buddhās tathā muktā buddhyanta iti nāyakāḥ.

Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix, 104—

sattvāḥ prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ.

Pañjikā ad ix, 108—

sarvadharmāḥ......auutpannāniruddhasvabhavatvāc ca prakṛtiparinirvrtā ādiśāntā ity ucyante.

Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix, 151—

nirvṛtānirvṛtānāṃ ca viśeṣo nāsti vastutaḥ.

Laṅkāvatāra (p. 80)—

prakṛtiprabhāsvaraviśuddhyādiviśuddha...tathāgata garbha.

Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā (p. 47)—

ādiśuddhatvād ādipariśuddhatvāt sattvasya.

9. Gauḍapāda, iv, 99—

kramate na hi buddhasya jñānaṃ dharmeṣu tāyinaḥ/
sarve dharmās tathā jñānaṃ naitad buddhena bhāṣitam//

COMM. "The knowledge of an Awakened (Buddha), *id est* of a seer of reality, does not bear on things, *id est* on any extraneous object ; it resides on things itself, as does light in the sun. Awakened = Tāyin. The Awakened one is, indeed, homogeneous *(tāyin) id est* endowed with homogeneity, possessed of continuity, without interval or difference, space like. Tāyin can also be understood in the meaning of Adorable or sage, Such are all the things, *id est* all the souls ; just as the knowledge [of a Buddha] they are space-sike, and do not bear on anything outside themselves. What has been said at the beginning of this treatise (Gauḍapāda, iv, 1), 'by a space-like knowledge,' that space-like knowledge of a space-like homogeneous Awakened who

is nothing else than this knowledge does not bear on anything outside. Such are [also] things [whatever they are]. This [knowledge] space-like, immovable, unmodifiable, without parts, fast, sole, free, not to be seen, not to be grasped, beyond hunger and the like, essence of Brahma ātmā according to the Scripture, there is not discontinuity of seeing to the seer' (*Bṛhat.* iv, 3. 23), free from the opposition knowledge-knowable-knower, reality, non-duality, has not been taught by (Śākyamuni) Buddha. When denying the existence of the external world and supposing the sole existence of knowledge, he came very near the essential non-duality : but this non-dual reality can only be learned in the Upaniṣads."

As a matter of fact, this knowledge, without "knowable-knower-knowledge", is the knowledge of a Buddha, according to Mahāyāna. And a Buddhist may say *naitad buddhena bhāṣitam*, "This doctrine has not been taught by Buddha," for Buddha does not teach anything.

(JRAS, 1910)

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